[[link removed]]

INTERVIEW: IMPERIALISM, PUTIN’S RUSSIA AND THE GLOBAL LEFT  
[[link removed]]


 

Federico Fuentes
September 28, 2024
Links Magazine
[[link removed]]


*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

_ Russian socialist Ilya Matveev discusses imperialism today, the
nature and development of capitalism in Russia and China, and the need
for a global left alternative. _

,

 

[LINKS EDITOR'S NOTE: Ilya Matveev will discuss the topic of
“Imperialism(s) today” at the online conference, “Boris
Kagarlitsky and the challenges of the left today
[[link removed]]”, on October 8. The Boris
Kagarlitsky International Solidarity Campaign is organising the
conference as part of its campaign for Kagarlitsky's release from
Russian prison, after his jailing for speaking out against the
full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As a conference co-sponsor, _LINKS
International Journal of Socialist Renewal_ encourages all readers
to register for the event [[link removed]].]

Ilya Matveev is a Russian socialist and political economist. Currently
a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, he is
also a member of the Public Sociology Laboratory research group based
in Russia. In this extensive interview with Federico Fuentes
for _LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal_
[[link removed]], Matveev discusses the two logics of
imperialism, how they help us explain the different paths that China
and Russia took to become imperialist powers, and the left's need for
a shared global vision of progressive change.

OVER THE PAST CENTURY, THE TERM IMPERIALISM HAS BEEN USED TO DEFINE
DIFFERENT SITUATIONS, AND AT TIMES BEEN REPLACED BY CONCEPTS SUCH AS
GLOBALISATION AND HEGEMONY. HOW VALID IS THE CONCEPT OF IMPERIALISM
TODAY AND HOW DO YOU DEFINE IT?

The main debate regarding imperialism is whether to view it as a
theory for understanding global capitalism, or as a policy of
aggression or coercion by a powerful country towards a weaker one.
Lenin argued that imperialism was a global characteristic of late
stage capitalism: the economic logic of imperialism was built into his
definition. But that is the problem with Lenin’s definition, because
you cannot explain every specific act of imperialist aggression
through economic motives alone. If you define imperialism as a
characteristic of global capitalism, then it might make sense to
substitute it with terms such as globalisation, which is sometimes
referred to as a kind of “new imperialism”. But if we treat
imperialism as a systematic policy of aggression towards a weaker
country through military, political and/or economic means, then it
does not make sense to equate globalisation with imperialism.

Economics can drive imperialism, but the two are not the same thing.
There is no eternal law that states imperialism must always coincide
with the needs of capital. Moreover, imperialism can be driven by
other factors. [British-American geographer] David Harvey, building on
[Italian economist] Giovanni Arrighi’s work, suggests two logics of
imperialism: the economic logic of capital and the geopolitical logic
of the state. The interaction between these two logics can be complex:
sometimes their needs coincide, sometimes not. Moreover, these logics
are not universal. The logic of capital is more universal, in that
capitalist contradictions are more or less the same everywhere. But
the same can not be said for political imperialism. There is no
universal logic of political imperialism: different countries will
have different motives and strategies. This can lead to contradictions
between the two logics. That is why we should not collapse them into
one.

ARE THERE ELEMENTS, HOWEVER, OF LENIN’S WORKS ON IMPERIALISM THAT
REMAIN RELEVANT TODAY?

Lenin’s most important contribution in this area was to develop the
ideas of English liberal author John Hobson to their logical
conclusion. Hobson, who wrote a famous book called _Imperialism_,
wanted to prove that imperialism was an aberration, and that
capitalism and trade would ultimately bring peace to the world. But he
had some unorthodox economic views that led him to develop a theory
that when you have huge inequality within a country, you end up with
excess capital that cannot be reinvested profitably at home and
therefore needs to be invested abroad. For Hobson, this was the
“economic taproot” of imperialism, because when you reinvested
capital abroad, you needed to create conditions for your investments
to be profitable. This could, for example, mean coercing other
countries to accept your investments. You also needed to protect those
investments and trade routes, which required a big navy. So, this
economic logic created the need to use force in international affairs.
Hobson’s ideas made him a renegade within the liberal tradition,
because he discovered that trade did not always lead to peace;
instead, for Hobson, capitalist contradictions created the demand for
a more aggressive foreign policy.

Lenin took Hobson’s idea but said he was wrong about being able to
reform capitalism. Lenin said capitalism will always produce a demand
for external aggression because there will always be a surplus of
capital. Uneven and combined development meant there would always be
more developed and less developed capitalist countries, and developed
capitalist countries would seek to export their capital to less
developed countries and apply political pressure to ensure these
investments were profitable. Reforming capitalism was therefore
impossible. Lenin also envisioned that competing national capitals in
developed capitalist countries would lobby their governments to help
them gain a greater share of the world market. The problem was that
once the whole world was divided among the different national
capitalist blocs, the only option left for further expansion was war.
Global war was therefore inevitable: it was built into the logic of
capitalism.

These two ideas were Lenin’s most important contribution. He was the
most consistent proponent of these two ideas: that capitalism breeds
imperialism, because more developed countries will always need new
outlets for their investments; and that capitalism breeds
inter-imperialist rivalries, because powerful countries will
inevitably clash as they seek to expand their share of the global
market. Lenin’s big contribution was explaining the economic motives
behind imperialism and inter-imperialist rivalry. The problem though,
as I mentioned, was that he abstracted this economic logic from any
kind of ideological or political considerations.

AFTER THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR, WORLD
POLITICS WAS COMPLETELY DOMINATED BY US IMPERIALISM. IN RECENT YEARS,
HOWEVER, A SHIFT SEEMS TO BE TAKING PLACE. WE HAVE SEEN CHINA’S
RISE, RUSSIA INVADE UKRAINE, AND EVEN NATIONS SUCH AS TURKEY AND SAUDI
ARABIA, AMONG OTHERS, DEPLOY MILITARY POWER BEYOND THEIR BORDERS. HOW
DO YOU VIEW THESE CURRENT DYNAMICS WITHIN GLOBAL POLITICS?

After World War II, the world approached something similar to Karl
Kautsky’s idea of ultra-imperialism. Kautsky disagreed with
Lenin’s concept of inter-imperialist rivalry and suggested the
possibility that imperialist countries could create a cartel or
alliance in order to jointly exploit the rest of the world. He called
this ultra-imperialism. We saw something similar to this under US
hegemony in the post-WWII period, and especially from the ’80s
onward with the collapse of the Soviet Union. During this time, the
West collectively ruled over and exploited the rest of the world. This
was possible because the economic logic of imperialism went into
decline after World War II as Keynesian policies placed limits on the
overaccumulation of capital. Instead, the driving logic of imperialism
in this period was political; namely, the US’ vision for the world
and its fights against Communism. Starting in the ’80s, however,
overaccumulation re-emerged as a result of neoliberal policies. This
was at the peak of what we could say was something similar to
ultra-imperialism, during which a united West forced structural
adjustment programs and neoliberal policies onto every peripheral
country.

What we have now is the disintegration of this US-led
ultra-imperialism. The problem was that the US tried to have it both
ways. It wanted strong consumption at home, so it borrowed money from
China. And it also wanted to export capital abroad. The end result was
China’s transformation into an economic powerhouse, which posed a
threat to US economic dominance. It is this economic conflict that
ultimately drives the political conflict between the two today. In my
opinion, China’s leaders do not actively want to confront the US.
But their economic ambitions, driven by the objective contradictions
of capital accumulation in China, have forced them to become more
assertive. I also do not think that the US actively wants a
confrontation with China. But, here again, the economic logic of
imperialism is very powerful and difficult to counteract. That is what
drives the US-Chinese conflict. We are left with not so much a
multipolar world as a reemerging bipolar world. The confrontation
between China and the US, while still manageable for now, is only
growing. All this creates a very combustible situation, one that is no
longer similar to ultra-imperialism, but more like the period before
World War I.

BUT SOME, BASING THEMSELVES ON LENIN’S DEFINITION, WOULD QUESTION
THE IDEA THAT CHINA IS IMPERIALIST.

If we look at the world today, what do we see? We see the rise of
China as an alternative centre of capital accumulation within the
global capitalist system that exports capital through huge global
projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative. The motivation of these
projects is economic: China has a capital surplus and industrial
overcapacity, so it needs new outlets for reinvesting capital and
exporting goods. To achieve this, China has begun scrambling around
the world for new markets. This has started a clash with the US, the
world hegemon, which also requires outlets for its goods and
investments. This means the cooperative relationship which existed
while the US used China as a production platform is now slowly
becoming antagonistic. Chinese capital, backed by the Chinese state,
is now so powerful that US capital does not want to cooperate with it
anymore. Instead, it fears China’s rise and expects Chinese capital
to become a powerful competitor. That is why US capital has begun
enlisting the help of the US state to counter this threat.

We are left with a classic inter-imperialist rivalry, as described by
Lenin. You have two powerful centres of capitalism clashing over
outlets for their investment and goods. This, in turn, is leading to
the creation of political blocs around these centres of capitalist
accumulation: the US has the West behind it, China has Russia. In this
sense, the economic logic of imperialism is still relevant for
understanding today's world.

HOW THEN DOES RUSSIA FIT INTO THIS SCENARIO? CAN IT ALSO BE DEFINED AS
IMPERIALIST?

In Russia’s case, there is a different dynamic at play. Russian
capital was never powerful enough to challenge the West; it was always
a junior partner to Western capital, which preferred to cooperate with
Russian capital in order to better exploit Russian natural resources
and profit from Russia’s role as a sub-imperialist power in the
post-Soviet world. Western capital used Russia to extract surplus
value from post-Soviet countries. To give one example: [the majority
Russian state-owned gas company] Gazprom had a lot of international
investors, including the huge trillion-dollar US asset management
company BlackRock. When Gazprom expanded into and profited from
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, etc, Blackrock also profited. Western
capital was OK with Russia being a regional power as long as it
provided Western capital with a window for making profits in the
region. Economically speaking, there was no real contradiction:
Russian and Western capital cooperated and both profited from this
cooperation.

But starting in 2014, the political logic of Russian imperialism began
to decouple from the economic logic. Before then, Russian imperialism
was based on a sub-imperialist arrangement: it had an aggressive
policy towards countries in the post-Soviet region, but the West
profited from its actions and therefore had a direct stake in Russian
imperialism. But in 2014, Putin broke the script by annexing Crimea.
At that point Russia stopped being a sub-imperialist power and chose
the path of confrontation with the West. It broke the rules that the
West had set for the Russian government and Russian capital. Yet there
was no real economic logic to this move, as it only made life more
difficult for Russian capitalists. There was no economic logic to
annexing Crimea. While Crimea has some natural resource deposits, to
exploit them Russia would need to invest a lot of money. Moreover,
Crimea is today a net recipient of Russian energy and federal
government funding. Therefore, the explanation for its annexation
cannot be found in economic motives; the explanation lies in the realm
of Russian ruling class’ ideology.

So, the cases of China and Russia are different. With China, you have
a more classic imperialism, as described by Lenin. With Russia, you
have a different kind of imperialism — a political imperialism that
is decoupled, to some extent, from economic interests.

ARE YOU SUGGESTING THAT, UNLIKE THE IMPERIALIST POWERS THAT AROSE IN
LENIN’S TIME, RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM HAS NO ECONOMIC FOUNDATION AND CAN
SOLELY BE EXPLAINED BY POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS?

I am not saying that Russian imperialism is entirely different to
other imperialisms or that it has no economic basis at all. Starting
in 1999, Russia began to recover from the crisis of the ’90s: up
until about 2008, it experienced a period of strong economic growth
with an annual growth rate of about 7%. During this period, Russian
companies became powerful global corporations. While Russian capital
was not as powerful as Western capital, it became a serious player on
the global market. At the same time, there was an overaccumulation of
capital inside Russia as a result of high energy and commodities
prices.

These emerging Russian companies needed to reinvest their surplus
capital somewhere — and they opted to reinvest in post-Soviet
countries. Their aim was to reconstruct something similar to the
supply chains and economic ties that existed during the Soviet-era.
The difference, however, was this time Russian capital would be in
control. During the Soviet Union, you had an integrated Soviet
economy; now we were dealing with a Russian economy dominating the
other economies of the region. This then created pressure on the
Russian government to be more assertive in the post-Soviet region. So,
in this sense, the classic Leninist economic logic of imperialism is
relevant to the Russian case, particularly during the 2000s when Putin
first comes to power.

But it is important to re-emphasise that when Russia was staking its
claim over the post-Soviet region during this first period, it did so
in a cooperative rather than confrontation manner with the US and the
West. This was not just limited to economic cooperation between
Western and Russian capital; there was also geopolitical cooperation
between the Russian and Western states. For example, Russia cooperated
with NATO in its war on Afghanistan: Russia was NATO’s biggest
supplier of oil and resources, and provided the NATO coalition with
logistical land and airspace routes. In 2011, Russia sold transport
helicopters to the US for the government it had installed in
Afghanistan in a deal worth more than US$1 billion. Clearly, despite
any disagreements or tensions that existed, the West viewed Russia as
a junior partner, at least until 2014.

Ultimately, there was nothing inevitable about Russia becoming an
enemy of the West if we limited ourselves strictly to economic logic.
Russia could have remained a sub-imperialist power that jointly
profited from the post-Soviet space with Western capital. It could
have been like Turkey is today, which appears to act independently but
is careful to not spoil relations with the West. Or like Brazil, which
has had leaders such as Lula [da Silva] who may have very militant
rhetoric and disagree with the US on many points, but maintain
relationships with the US that are far from extremely confrontational.
Russia was comparable to these countries, in that they all benefited
economically from being a junior partner of the West, even if certain
tensions or contradictions existed.

SO, WHAT LED TO THIS CHANGE IN RUSSIA’S POSITIONING TOWARDS THE
WEST?

To understand this change, we have to look at the political logic at
play. Putin feared that the West was plotting regime change against
him. Putin was also clearly incapable of comprehending popular
movements and social revolutions. For Putin, popular movement was a
contradiction in terms, because people could never do anything by
themselves; any such movements were always being controlled and
manipulated from the outside. So, when the Arab Spring [of 2010-11]
occurred, Putin saw it as nothing more than the West seeking to
destabilise Middle Eastern countries.

Then came the [2014] Maidan Revolution in Ukraine. Putin refused to
accept that this could be a real popular movement driven by people’s
genuine frustration with the government and repression. Instead, he
saw Maidan as the US using Ukraine as a pawn in its chess game with
Russia. Maidan transformed Putin’s understanding of everything.
Because if Maidan was a move by the West against Russia, then
according to Putin’s logic, Russia had to respond by violently
crushing this move and making one of its own. Ultimately, Putin’s
fear of regime change coloured every calculation he made. It led him
to conflate a political threat to his regime with a Western security
threat to Russia. Generally speaking, NATO was not threatening Russia
in any conventional military sense. But for Putin, NATO was behind
Maidan, which he viewed as a plot against his rule.

The result was that Russia became a much more aggressive imperialist
country after 2014: annexing Crimea, arming separatists in the Donbas,
and occupying parts of eastern Ukraine, are all ultimately explained
by Putin’s ideological fear that the West was plotting regime
change. In reality, the West was perfectly fine with Putin as a
capitalist ruler that facilitated Western companies’ access to
Russian natural resources and the post-Soviet region. Putin was also
fine with this, until he feared the West was plotting against him.
This ultimately explains why Russia embarked on its confrontation with
the West.

And once Russia started down this path, it was difficult to turn back
as the confrontation took on a logic of its own. For example, after
Russia annexed Crimea, Ukrainians started to hate Putin and turned to
the West for help. Yet that is exactly what Putin wanted to prevent.
So what did he do? He became even more aggressive towards Ukraine and
ultimately initiated a full-scale invasion, all in the name of
preventing a pro-Western Ukraine. But Ukraine’s hatred of Russia was
precisely the product of Russia’s own actions. Putin could not
understand this, however; for him, this was all just a manifestation
of the West plotting against his rule. Paradoxically, while Putin’s
convictions were not grounded in reality, the chain of events he
unleashed only strengthened his convictions, eventually leading him
down the path of this disastrous war. That is why this war was not the
result of economic motives; it was driven by ideology.

WHAT INFLUENCE DO YOU THINK CHINA’S RISE MIGHT HAVE HAD IN PUTIN’S
CALCULATIONS AND IN RUSSIA’S SHIFT FROM A SUB-IMPERIALIST TO
IMPERIALIST POWER? IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT CHINA’S PRESENCE AS AN
ALTERNATIVE POWER THAT RUSSIA COULD TURN TO ONCE IN CONFRONTATION WITH
THE WEST MIGHT HAVE INFLUENCED THE DECISIONS PUTIN MADE FROM 2014…

That is an interesting question. I agree that Putin had a better sense
of these global changes that were afoot compared to Russian economic
managers and the government, who viewed this kind of extreme
confrontation with the West as unimaginable. Just look at 2022: it was
evident at the time that even the most hawkish sectors of the
government were not expecting the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Putin, on the other hand, was completely convinced that Ukrainians
were all just waiting for Russia to liberate them from Western
colonialism and the supposedly small minority of Nazi Bandera types
ruling the country. But while holding this fantastical view of
Ukraine, Putin was in some ways more prescient than others when it
came to the kind of tectonic shifts that were occurring in global
affairs and Russia’s place in the world. Putin could sense the
possibilities posed by China and semi-peripheral countries such as
Turkey, Brazil, and India becoming more autonomous from the US.

It is worth considering that in 2000, the G7 countries controlled 65%
of global GDP, but that by 2021-22 this figure was more like 40-45%.
The BRICS bloc of countries represented a slightly bigger share of
global GDP when measured in purchasing power parity terms. This
represented a huge change in economic and political power. Putin
perceived this shift and, as you said, saw the opportunity. He
understood that Russia breaking from the West would be very painful,
but that it could probably survive in an alliance with China and by
trading with semi-peripheral countries that had become powerful in
their own right, economically and politically. And he was right about
this: while his views on Western motives and Ukraine were wildly
inaccurate and biased, his vision of what was happening
internationally was quite accurate. This combination of sound and
unsound thinking is what ultimately drove the invasion and everything
that has happened since.

SOME LEFTISTS, RELYING ON LENIN’S DEFINITION OF IMPERIALISM, WOULD
ARGUE THAT THE LACK OF ECONOMIC MOTIVES AND RUSSIA’S MUCH WEAKER
ECONOMIC POWER AS COMPARED TO THE WEST MEANS RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE
CANNOT BE IMPERIALIST. SOME EVEN GO AS FAR AS TO IMPUTE SOME KIND OF
ANTI-IMPERIALIST DYNAMIC TO RUSSIA’S WAR. WHY, IN YOUR OPINION, IS
IT IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND RUSSIA’S WAR AS AN ACT OF IMPERIALIST
AGGRESSION?

This is the problem with economistic definitions of imperialism: when
a country does not fit a certain economic profile or you cannot
immediately explain a country’s actions on the basis of some kind of
economic logic, then the default position is that the country cannot
be imperialist or aggressive, and its actions must therefore be
defensive. But a country can be aggressive without its actions being
driven by specific economic motives.

If we understand imperialism as a policy of systematic aggression
towards a weaker neighbour, then we can see why imperialism defines
exactly what Russia has been doing to Ukraine since the ’90s. There
were already flashpoints of aggression back then when Russia
manipulated gas supplies to Ukraine in order to influence government
policies. Then in 2004, Russia tried pressuring Ukraine into electing
a pro-Russian presidential candidate, sending spin doctors and covert
operatives from Moscow to Kyiv to help defeat [Viktor] Yushchenko.
When this failed, Russia sought to coerce Ukraine by halting its
supply of natural gas, first in 2006 and again in 2009. Russia also
acquired economic assets in Ukraine in order to create an economic
platform to use as a political foothold in the country. After this you
had the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s participation in the war in
the east and, finally, the full-scale invasion in 2022.

The whole story of Russian-Ukrainian relations in the post-Soviet
period is one of Russian imperialism towards Ukraine. How else can you
describe this if not imperialism? Moreover, how can this be defined as
defensive? Russia’s imperialist actions began well before there was
any talk of Ukraine joining NATO: for example, when Russia was
interfering in Ukraine’s 2004 elections, Ukraine was in no way
connected to NATO. And in what way can Ukraine be said to have
attacked Russia? How is that even possible? With what army?
Ukraine’s army was practically non-existent before 2014. Ukraine
only started strengthening its army as a response to Russian
imperialism. It is self-evident that Russia is the aggressor in this
relationship. Its aggression has escalated gradually, but Russia has
always been the aggressor. By sticking to a solely economic
understanding of imperialism, we miss Russian imperialism as a
phenomenon.

IN LIGHT OF EVERYTHING WE HAVE DISCUSSED, DO YOU SEE ANY POSSIBILITIES
FOR BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLES AND STRUGGLES
IN IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES, BEARING IN MIND THAT DIFFERENT STRUGGLES
WILL CONFRONT DIFFERENT POWERS AND MAY THEREFORE SEEK SUPPORT FROM
RIVAL IMPERIALIST BLOCS? WHAT SHOULD ANTI-CAPITALIST AND
ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONALISM LOOK LIKE IN THE 21ST CENTURY?

There are, of course, practical aspects to internationalism, such as
helping political prisoners. International solidarity campaigns can
achieve a lot and have achieved a lot, for example for [jailed Russian
anti-war Marxist] Boris Kagarlitsky
[[link removed]]. Unfortunately, there
are a lot of left-wing prisoners in Russia right now. So, in practical
terms, this is something the socialist movement can do: have each
other's backs by helping political prisoners in Russia.

But in terms of thinking about this issue more generally, we need to
first understand the nature of the current inter-imperialist rivalry
compared with the Cold War. Though the Soviet Union was problematic in
many respects, there was an ideological component to its foreign
policy: it had a vision for another world that represented some kind
of alternative. The Soviet Union had an ideological project, even if
it was distorted by Stalinism and hollowed out by the cynicism of the
elites. This ideological vision influenced the Soviet Union’s
attitude towards the Third World, even if there was also a cynical
element to its approach to post-colonial movements. But Russia is not
the Soviet Union. If we look at Russia today, we see there is no
vision of an alternative.

The only thing Russia offers is confrontation with the West. Russia
says: “You need to fight against the West.” But fight for what
exactly? What is Russia’s vision of an alternative political,
economic model? Russia is an ultra-capitalist country ruled by
oligarchs, with huge inequality between people and regions, and a very
weak welfare state. The war with Ukraine may have forced these
oligarchs to reoriented their business interests towards markets in
Asia and move from their London estate to a huge apartment in Dubai.
But what difference does that make for an ordinary Russian worker?
There is nothing progressive about Russia. The same is true for China:
it has no ideological vision beyond capitalism with a large state
presence; it offers no alternative vision of progressive change.

That means progressive movements around the world need to fight for an
alternative. They need an alternative vision to guide this global
internationalist workers and socialist movement. It also means no
compromise with dictatorships or predatory capitalist classes, whether
in China, Russia, or the US. Ultimately, this boils down to a very
classic vision of imperialism, in which the main enemy is at home. The
main enemy of Russian socialists is Russian imperialism; it is not the
US or Ukraine. And the main enemy of US socialists is US imperialism.
That is the basis for true internationalism: unity against our own
imperialist governments and for a shared vision for progressive change
in the US, in Russia and in China. This may sound abstract, but it is
just sound logic. That is the basis on which we can build bridges
between our struggles.

_Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal
[[link removed]] is
a journal for a post-Cold War left. It is a journal that rejects the
Stalinist distortion of the socialist project; takes into account
ecological questions; is committed to taking steps to bring together
the forces for socialism in the world today; a journal that aspires to
unite Marxists from different political traditions because it
discusses openly and constructively. Links is proud to be the sister
publication of Green Left [[link removed]], the
world's leading red-green newspaper, and we urge readers to visit that
site regularly._

*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

 

 

 

INTERPRET THE WORLD AND CHANGE IT

 

 

Submit via web
[[link removed]]

Submit via email
Frequently asked questions
[[link removed]]
Manage subscription
[[link removed]]
Visit xxxxxx.org
[[link removed]]

Twitter [[link removed]]

Facebook [[link removed]]

 




[link removed]

To unsubscribe, click the following link:
[link removed]