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September 30, 2024
This month’s newsletter features a new episode of Iran Watch Listen, a podcast by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. We sat down with Hanna Notte and Jim Lamson of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies to discuss the history of Iran and Russia’s military relationship, how it has changed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and areas where both countries might benefit from deeper cooperation in the future.
The newsletter also includes profiles of a network supplying dual-use goods to Iran’s defense industry, as well as news about the launch of a satellite on an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-built rocket, the unveiling of a new ballistic missile, and the transfer of close-range missiles to Russia. Additions to the Iran Watch library include official statements and documents from the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, U.S. and allied statements regarding Iran’s missile transfers to Russia, and other recent sanctions on Iran.
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A video circulating on social media showed Shahed (Geranium) drones in production at a Russian factory. |
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For several decades, Iran-Russia military cooperation was characterized by a patron-client dynamic in which assistance largely flowed in one direction, with Russia occasionally helping Iran. But, as our guests Hanna Notte and Jim Lamson explain, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point. Since then, the two countries have deepened ties in pre-existing areas and found new fields in which to work together, and the current relationship is likely to stick around even after the war in Ukraine ends. |
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A "pin dome" from the Iranian nuclear archive documents. (Credit: Institute for Science and International Security) |
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Thanks to its growing stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent and its increased deployment of advanced centrifuges, Iran’s breakout timeline continues to fall. The country has reached the point at which, within about one week, it might be able to amass enough weapons-grade uranium for five fission weapons. For that uranium to pose a nuclear weapon threat, however, it would have to be processed further, and the other components of a weapon would have to be ready to receive the processed uranium. |
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In March, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Germany-based procurement agent Maziar Karimi and several of his companies for supplying epoxy resin and other items to Iran’s defense industry, including its ballistic missile program. |
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Iran’s Jihad missile, which resembles the liquid-fuel Qiam. (Credit: Tasnim News Agency) |
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September 22, 2024: Iran unveiled a new ballistic missile called Jihad during a military parade marking Sacred Defense week. Developed by the IRGC Aerospace Force, Jihad is an optimized version of the Qiam liquid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers and a guided warhead. Iran also displayed a launch vehicle that can carry two missiles rather than one. |
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September 14, 2024: Iran launched the Chamran-1 satellite into a 550-kilometer orbit using its Ghaem-100 rocket, the second successful launch of the rocket in 2024. The three-stage, solid-fuel rocket was built by the IRGC and launched from a mobile launcher near the city of Shahroud. The satellite, whose purpose was to test orbital maneuvering technologies, was built by the Aerospace Research Institute. |
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September 10, 2024: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Russia had received Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles from Iran. In response to the transfer, the United States imposed further restrictions on Iran Air and announced sanctions targeting 10 individuals and nine entities, including Russian-flagged vessels allegedly involved in delivering weapons from Iran to Russia. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom also pledged sanctions on Iran Air. Iran denied supplying the missiles to Russia. |
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At its quarterly meeting, the IAEA Board of Governors discussed Iran’s most recent nuclear advances as well as the lack of progress in resolving several outstanding safeguards issues.
On September 10, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed intelligence findings that Russia had received hundreds of close-range ballistic missiles from Iran.
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The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced sanctions on entities that it said facilitated the transfer – September 10.
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France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a statement promising to sanction Iran’s national airline Iran Air and cancel bilateral air services agreements with Iran – September 10.
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At the UN Security Council, Blinken drew a sharp distinction between Western military support for Ukraine versus Iran and North Korea’s support for Russia – September 14.
The United States and allied governments announced more targeted sanctions against Iran.
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The United Kingdom designated IRGC Quds Force Unit 700 and several individuals thought to be involved in arming Iran’s regional proxies – September 2.
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On the second anniversary of the death of Mahsa Amini, Australia, Canada, and the United States imposed sanctions on individuals committing human rights abuses in Iran – September 18.
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The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned a network smuggling oil for the IRGC Quds Force and Hizballah – September 25.
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Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Copyright © 2024 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
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