North Koreans visit Mansudae Grand Monument and the statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, on August 19, 2018 in Pyongyang, North Korea. (Photo by Carl Court/Getty Images)

Last night, media outlets began reporting on Kim Jong Un's reappearance, capping off three weeks of speculation after the secretive leader of North Korea disappeared from view. While many questions remain over his health, the uncertainty of Kim's future has raised questions about regional security in a time of potential North Korean instability.

This week, Hudson hosted leading experts to discuss Kim's retreat from public view, along with the impact of COVID-19 on North Korean politics, the reasons behind China's silence, and how the US and allies can be prepared for all scenarios involving Kim's future. Hudson's Asia-Pacific Security Chair Dr. Patrick Cronin led a conversation with FDD Senior Fellow and US Army Special Forces (ret.) Col. David Maxwell, Director of Chinese Studies at South Korea's Sejong Institute Dr. Lee Seong-hyon, and Deputy Director and Co-Founder of the influential 38 North website Jenny Town. See below for key takeaways from their discussion.

Also be sure to watch Hudson Senior Fellow Heather Nauert's interview with Elliot Abrams, US special envoy to Venezuela, and catch next week's events on rebuilding US infrastructure after COVID-19, and the impact of the "maximum pressure" campaign on Iran amid coronavirus featuring Hudson Senior Fellows David Asher and Mike Doran. 

Considering a Post-Kim North Korea 

Major takeaways from the event, Understanding the Hermit Kingdom: Assessing North Korea's Future.

1. Even if Kim fully recovers, questions about his health and future will remain, notes Jenny Town:

This is a wake-up call. Kim Jong Un's health, even if he is okay, alive and well, he does run a number of health risks given his body mass size, given his lifestyle. This is something that may happen again even if it didn't happen this time.

It's something we need to be prepared for and think through as the stakes are enormously high. You have a population of 25 million people, extensive weapons of mass destruction, arsenal, and infrastructure, some parts of which are decentralized. You have a million-man army. And you have a pervasive social control infrastructure and mechanism. People are unlikely to know what's happening in real time in the country if something does happen. And that's a huge problem when you're dealing with such a complex issue and the stakes are so high.

2. China's silence on Kim reflects the delicate relationship between the two countries, notes Dr. Lee Seong-hyon:

There is a joke that the United States is a 50-year enemy for North Korea, but China is a 5,000-year enemy for North Korea. That joke I heard from a North Korean interlocutor a few years back. [It reflects] some nuances of the China-North Korea relationship. [China] is keeping mum about Kim Jong's health, probably because China wants North Korea to share the condition of Kim's health to the North Koreans rather than China saying that first because of the delicate relationship with the history between China and North Korea.

3. If China intervenes at a future time, it'll likely be through the UN, notes Dr. Lee: 

China will likely use an international body such as the UN, an international medium to legitimize its behavior of intervening. China is very consciously aware about its international reputation, particularly when it comes to North Korea because it is the country that has the most leverage and influence and it could be easily pointed out if things go wrong.

China will be less inclined to first cooperate with the United States, rather China will reach out to an international party such as the United Nations to do peacekeeping operations or to send troops, medical troops, or to do rebuilding operations work. 

4. COVID-19 could complicate a political leadership transition, notes Colonel David Maxwell: 

When Kim Il Sung died and Kim Jong Il died, the country locked down all the borders, stopped movement, and recalled all Politburo members to the big meeting in Pyongyang to really work on the transition.

It's complicated now because of the coronavirus that the country has been locked down. They've closed their borders. It's going to be even more difficult for us to see indications that they're going through a transition, because of the stringent control measures that have been applied really to defend against the coronavirus.

An intervention by China might bring great resistance to Chinese forces. And I think any outsider is going to face resistance inside North Korea from some remnants of the military, the regime, and the population. It is after all a gorilla dynasty. 

5. Kim Jong Un's successor would likely continue North Korea's push for Peninsula dominance, notes Col. Maxwell:

North Korea's demand [will be for the US] to end our "hostile policy," which is really the code word for ending the alliance, for removing US troops from the Korean Peninsula, for ending extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella over South Korea and Japan. That is how they define being able to trust us. And of course, that's in keeping with their strategy, to be able to dominate the Peninsula. I don't think there's any sign that that strategy to dominate the Peninsula has been walked back at all.

I doubt very much if Kim Yo Jong takes over that she would walk that back as well. Whoever comes to power following Kim Jong Un, we should make an attempt to provide at least a short-term opportunity to move things forward. But I think we should not be lulled into a sense of complacency that all we have to do is build trust and then we can work towards denuclearization. 

6. The US should focus on contingencies and joint coordination, notes Col. Maxwell:

One of the proposals is in times of emergency, we really need to establish some kind of joint coordination center with China, South Korea, and the United States. This is one measure to prevent miscalculation among the three major parties, to really keep each other informed and prevent any kind of miscalculation and escalation.

We're going to have to be prepared to deal with the contingencies. WMD is more than nuclear. Five thousand tons of chemical weapons are assumed to be there, a biological program that we believe exists. All of that is going to have to be dealt with. And all of those are very, very dangerous and are going to require security forces.

And of course, the nuclear program and all these programs are complicated because their proximity is to China, not to the DMZ. And so China has the proximity, the ability to get there first, which may not be a bad thing. But there's going to be this competition which I go back to the necessity for coordination among all the parties.

Quotes have been edited for length and clarity

Go Deeper: Hudson on North Korea