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VENEZUELA’S DISPUTED ELECTION AND THE PATH FORWARD  
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Center for Economic and Policy Research
August 12, 2024
CEPR
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_ The crisis in Venezuela is unlikely to be resolved soon. Public
pressure for diplomacy, negotiations, an end to sanctions and other
illegal, coercive measures; and in favor of cooperation with other
governments who share those goals is needed. _

, (Marcelo Camargo/Agência Brasil).

 

Venezuela is facing a new political crisis that could potentially
erupt into a damaging, protracted civil conflict. Following the July
28 presidential election, two incompatible sets of results have been
published: one by the country’s electoral council, showing incumbent
President Nicolás Maduro winning by nine percentage points; the other
by the Venezuelan opposition, showing Edmundo González winning by a
37-point margin. While the opposition has released thousands of
purported tally sheets that appear to support their claim,
Venezuela’s electoral authority has yet to publish a detailed
breakdown of results. Without these detailed results, it is impossible
to independently verify the announcement of a Maduro victory by
Venezuela’s authorities. 

In their response to the unfolding situation in Caracas, international
actors, in particular the US, must avoid repeating the profoundly
harmful policies of the past. These policies, including support for
military coups and other unconstitutional efforts to remove the
government, have deeply undermined democracy and contributed
substantially to increased polarization. Far-reaching economic
sanctions have fueled a humanitarian emergency and caused tens of
thousands of deaths — or more. It is critical that external actors
proceed with caution and even-handed diplomacy and support efforts to
renew dialogue between opposition and pro-government leaders in order
to achieve a peaceful and sustainable political solution.

Going forward, the best opportunity for bringing about a peaceful
resolution of the current crisis appears to be the effort led by
Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, which have initiated a high-level
dialogue with both the Venezuelan government and opposition and are
supporting a Venezuelan-led solution to the crisis.

Introduction

The events that have taken place since Venezuela’s recent election
have resulted in a perilous situation that threatens to boil over into
a severe and prolonged crisis with potential regional implications.
Two incompatible sets of results have been presented, one by the
opposition showing its candidate winning, and the other by
Venezuela’s electoral authority and government, which have
proclaimed current president Nicolás Maduro the victor.

Detailed and reliable electoral data, including a breakdown of results
from each voting table, are key to adjudicating claims of electoral
fraud.

Without these detailed results, it is impossible to independently
verify the announcement of a Maduro victory by Venezuela’s
authorities. The electoral council has claimed that a cyberattack has
delayed the publication of disaggregated results. In the meantime, the
opposition has published purported tally sheets from a reported
[[link removed]] 83.5 percent of polling stations,
which point to a victory for Edmundo González even in the event that
the government won heavily in the remaining precincts. These present a
serious challenge to the official results and it is now incumbent upon
the authorities to release detailed voting tallies.

These conflicting post-election narratives have sparked mostly
peaceful
[[link removed]] mass
demonstrations by supporters of both candidates, but there have also
been reports of serious
[[link removed]] violence
[[link removed]], including
killings, on both
[[link removed]] sides
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There are also concerning reports of hundreds of arrests of opposition
activists in the days following the election.

Political leaders from both the government and opposition have made
troubling pronouncements that are not conducive to a peaceful
resolution of the current dispute within a constitutional framework.
For example, González and opposition leader Maria Corina Machado have
called for what amounts to a military coup
[[link removed]]. This
would repeat the errors that many opposition politicians made in 2019
when they called on the armed forces to turn against the government
and support the installation in the presidency of Juan Guaidó, a
member of the National Assembly who was never elected president.
Extra-constitutional efforts of this sort should be vigorously opposed
internationally. Likewise, the government needs to ensure that
security forces adhere to international human rights standards when
responding to protests and disturbances; they should also refrain from
carrying out arbitrary detentions.

The US government should not respond to the current crisis by applying
more of the failed, harmful policies of the past, including additional
broad economic sanctions — which have taken the lives
[[link removed]] of
tens of thousands of Venezuelans and fueled the migration of millions
more. These failed policies include military coup attempts, such as
those that US administrations supported in 2002 and 2019. Recognizing
a parallel government, or imposing more sanctions on Venezuela, will
only make the crisis much more difficult to resolve; in fact, these
policies helped create the current crisis. It is concerning that some
US government officials have made statements
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appear to recognize the victory of the opposition candidate — a
position that can only contribute to a further escalation of the
current crisis.

Instead, the Biden administration — as well as any other external
actors who want to avoid further escalation and potential loss of life
— should strongly support the efforts of Brazil, Mexico, and
Colombia to seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to the crisis. In a
positive development last week, State Department official Mark
Wells announced that
[[link removed]] the
US was supporting these dialogue efforts and was “now focused solely
on getting the parties to talk and be part of a peaceful
transition.”

This is also consistent with President Biden’s statement
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the beginning of the crisis. But, as will be noted below, this
apparent diplomatic approach is a striking turnaround from the past 25
years of Washington’s dealings with Venezuela — as well as with
other countries in the region. Given the United States’ deplorable
record, there is a strong possibility that Washington’s apparent
reluctance to escalate the conflict could be reversed, especially
after the US election in November (and even before there is a new
administration in Washington).

Both sets of voting results suggest that there are sizable political
minorities representing millions of Venezuelans. The official
results show
[[link removed]] the
opposition as the preferred option of 43 percent of the population.
The opposition tallies, that reportedly amount to 83.5% of the
total, show [[link removed]] Maduro government
winning 30 percent of the vote. If one assumes that those tallies are
accurate, the remaining 20 percent of precincts may tilt more toward
Maduro, increasing his share when they are included1
[[link removed]] Regardless
of the final outcome, the current pro-government coalition would
retain control of the National Assembly and most regional and
municipal governments, which were elected in 2020 and 2021
respectively.

A diplomatic, negotiated solution that respects Venezuela’s
constitution and provides acceptable guarantees for the minority would
appear to be essential to stopping the slide toward a deeper crisis,
one that would have ramifications far beyond the country’s borders.
Given the inevitable spillovers such a crisis would cause, including
increased migration, it is not surprising that a robust diplomatic
initiative in favor of dialogue has been taken by the governments of
Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.

Some opposition leaders have welcomed the engagement of Brazil’s
President Lula, who is spearheading this diplomatic initiative,
indicating that the trio of countries — whose governments have
relatively friendly relations with the Maduro government — could be
a trusted interlocutor.

The trio of countries’ two statements
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thus far have called on the Venezuelan authorities to release the full
disaggregated electoral results and allow institutional processes to
move forward, and have urged both sides to avoid further inflaming the
situation. They have said that they would be willing to help
facilitate dialogue leading to agreements that benefit the Venezuelan
people, while respecting Venezuela’s sovereignty. Despite
sending mixed signals
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the US Department of State has — as noted above — recently
expressed some support for this initiative, and should continue to do
so.

Other international actors should also support these efforts led by
the three Latin American governments.

The Venezuelan Vote

Venezuela’s latest presidential elections, held on July 28, have
seen both sides claim victory. The second official bulletin released
by the National Electoral Council (CNE) reported
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Maduro had been reelected with 52 percent of the vote versus 43
percent for leading opponent Edmundo González. However, unlike in
past elections, the CNE has so far failed to release a breakdown of
the results at the voting table (mesa de votación) level. The
opposition, however, has announced
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against Maduro’s 30 percent. To support this claim, it has released
about 84 percent of what it claims to be the voting tally sheets —
produced for each voting table — from across the country.

The Venezuelan voting system itself is one of the most robust and
reliable in the region, if not the world
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with myriad built-in processes for validating the result. Many of
these audit processes
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either not been followed, or have not been conducted with established
oversight mechanisms, as has been the case in previous contests.

One of the most important protections built into the Venezuelan
electoral system is provided by its system of tally sheets. Printouts
of these are normally made available to both opposition and
pro-government poll observers once the voting process is finalized,
and these can be used to confirm the accuracy of the electronic vote
count that is transmitted automatically by voting machines to the CNE.

These tally sheets have a number of built-in security features
[[link removed]], including unique
hash numbers associated with each sheet and QR codes that provide a
digital data trail, which make them difficult to forge without
detection.

Leading Venezuelan opposition parties have alleged fraud in many major
national elections for more than a decade and did not sign
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pre-electoral agreement to recognize the results of this year’s
election.

In previous national contests, the Venezuelan authorities have quickly
provided a detailed breakdown of the results. While the opposition has
claimed that the government committed fraud previously — including
in 2004, 2013 and 2018 — these claims were made without evidence and
were therefore not credible. Nevertheless, the unfounded perception
that elections on those occasions were fraudulent, provoked or
contributed to serious public disorder and major outbreaks of violence
in 2013, 2014, 2017, and 2019.

The Venezuelan electoral authorities claim
[[link removed]] that
the electronic transmission of the results was affected by a
cyberattack. They claim that this has delayed the release of the
disaggregated results. The website of the CNE has been down since the
election. While legally the Council has 30 days
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publish the final results in the official gazette, they have provided
disaggregated results much more rapidly in previous contests. Given
the prolonged dispute in this election, with two sides reporting
incompatible sets of results, this information should be released as
promptly as possible.

The government has rejected the authenticity of the tally sheets
published by the opposition. But the case it has made so far has been
unconvincing, presenting
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purported tally sheets (out of about 25,000) where there are allegedly
missing signatures and similar issues which are common in most
electoral processes. Just as the opposition had poll observers, so did
the governing party — which should also have copies of the printed
tally sheets and should normally be able to make these public, just as
they did after the elections in 2013.2
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Though the CNE has not publicly released disaggregated results, Maduro
appealed to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) to adjudicate the
electoral dispute. The court then summoned all the key actors in the
election and asked them to hand over their copies of the tally sheets
for the TSJ’s analysis. The CNE reportedly did so on August 5.
However, opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzaléz, who has contested the
legitimacy of the TSJ’s role in adjudicating the election result and
reportedly fears arrest, hasn’t appeared before the court. On August
10, TSJ chief justice Caryslia Rodríguez
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that the opposition coalition “did not submit any electoral
material.” The justice added that the court’s ruling would be
“unappealable and compliance will be mandatory.” While recognizing
the ongoing court process, the governments of Colombia, Mexico, and
Brazil have noted
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the CNE has the legal mandate to release the results.

CEPR’s Past Electoral Work

CEPR has analyzed election results in many votes throughout the region
over the past 20 years — including Mexico’s controversial 2006
election
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the Haiti post-earthquake vote of 2010
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election in 2017
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the Bolivian election in 2019
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and many others.

At the core of that work has been access to data. Disaggregated
electoral results allow independent researchers to analyze the results
of the election for possible irregularities or, as in the case of
Haiti in 2010 or Bolivia in 2019, to analyze the electoral audits of
the Organization of American States (OAS) that, in both cases,
challenged the official results of the election without basis.

In 2017, in Honduras, an analysis of disaggregated polling station
data
[[link removed]] revealed
the possibility of significant irregularities in the vote counting
process. The OAS eventually performed a similar statistical exercise
and concluded that the results were not legitimate
[[link removed]].
Nevertheless, the US recognized the winner
[[link removed]],
Juan Orlando Hernández, who is now serving a 45-year sentence in a US
federal prison after being found guilty of narcotrafficking in June of
2024.

In both the Haiti
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cases, initial allegations of fraud were widely accepted and promoted
by international actors. However, as CEPR demonstrated, the claims
did not stand up to scrutiny
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There are plenty of reasons to question allegations of fraud in
Venezuela — including a history of baseless accusations of fraud and
of efforts aimed at toppling the Venezuelan government
unconstitutionally. Notably, following the 2004 recall referendum won
by Hugo Chávez, a Venezuelan NGO led by María Corina Machado alleged
that the results were the product of fraud
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pointed to exit polling it had done as evidence. However, CEPR
research showed
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these claims were false. The Carter Center, which convened a group of
experts to review the allegations, reached the same conclusion
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In the current election, and unlike on prior occasions, the opposition
has released purported tally sheets that present a prima facie case
that the official results are inaccurate. Without the release of
detailed electoral data, there is no way to independently verify the
official results announced by the Venezuelan electoral authorities.

Sanctions and US Intervention

As CEPR warned
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the vote, it was likely that neither the government nor the opposition
would recognize a victory of the opposing side. Both had legitimate
reasons to contest the free and fair nature of the vote.

While much attention has been given to the challenges
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Venezuela’s opposition has faced ahead of the election, there has
been scant discussion of the impact of broad sanctions imposed by the
United States and some of its European allies, and how these have made
it virtually impossible to have a free and fair, or democratic
election at this time.

The United States has intervened heavily
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Venezuela over the past 25 years, beginning with the 2002 military
coup. As a US State Department investigation revealed
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the US “provided training, institution building, and other support
to individuals and organizations understood to be actively involved”
in the 2002 military coup that briefly removed Hugo Chávez,
Maduro’s predecessor, from power. The US also provided initial
backing
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the destructive 2002-2003 oil lockout, and after Chávez won a recall
election in 2004, began to impose the first sanctions measures
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Over the past decade, the most destructive and lethal form of
intervention against Venezuela has been economic sanctions — or
“unilateral coercive measures,” as the United National calls them.
These have taken tens of thousands of lives — possibly more — as
well as causing devastating harm to public health, and fueling the
departure of millions of people — nearly a quarter of the population
— from Venezuela.

Sanctions also influence elections, and this is part of their intent:
a form of collective punishment that is life-threatening and that
could convince people to either vote the way that the United States
wants them to or get rid of the government by other means. This
economic violence of regime change is increasingly recognized by
political leaders in the United States, including some who think it is
very wrong. In May 2021, one of the top Democratic leaders in the US
House of Representatives, Jim McGovern, wrote a letter
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Biden asking for an end to “all secondary and sectoral sanctions on
Venezuela. He said:

“The impact of sectoral and secondary sanctions is indiscriminate,
and purposely so…Economic pain is the means by which the sanctions
are supposed to work. But it is not Venezuelan officials who suffer
the costs. It is the Venezuelan people…. For people in Venezuela the
ongoing crisis is a life and death matter…”

“… I have never believed that sanctions should be used to punish
whole populations for the actions of their leaders… I believe
sanctions like those the previous administration imposed on Venezuela
are both misguided and immoral.”

The order of magnitude of sanctions-related deaths in Venezuela is no
longer in question, and supported by an increasing body of research.
In just the first year following the Trump sanctions of 2017, a survey
by the National Survey on Living Conditions (ENCOVI), run by three
universities in Venezuela not supportive of the government, found
an increase
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mortality of 31 percent, which implies tens of thousands of additional
deaths in that year. This is consistent with research on the
relationship between recessions and mortality in developing countries;
for example, as investigated
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Settlements, which would imply an increase in deaths of about 43,000
from the economic contraction in the first year of these broad,
including financial, US sanctions.

Extensive research
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the historical application of broad economic sanctions has found an
impact of similar proportions, with US sanctions associated with a 35
percent increase in mortality.

It is worth noting that the US sanctions are also illegal
[[link removed]] under
international law and treaties that the United States has signed,
including the charter
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the Organization of American States. They would violate the fourth
Geneva Convention, which prohibits collective punishment, except for
the technicality that this treaty applies during war, and there is not
a war going on between the United States and Venezuela.

However, UN experts and other legal scholars have argued
[[link removed]] that
something that is a war crime when people are killing each other with
weapons of war, should also be a crime when they are not. The loss of
food imports in Venezuela due to sanctions led to a sharp rise in
malnutrition; and imports of medicine also fell substantially.

All this is most relevant to the current situation in terms of its
potential effect on voters. The economy is down an estimated 37
percent of GDP
[[link removed]] per
person as a result of US sanctions. This loss of GDP was more than the
United States lost in the collapse of the Great Depression.

The role of the sanctions in causing this damage is clear. Although
the economy has recently stabilized somewhat, any government
with more than 80 percent of its population
[[link removed]] still
living below the poverty line (when the 2015 rate was 33 percent,
according to the World Bank
[[link removed]]) is going to be at
a severe disadvantage in an election.

But it’s actually much worse than that for the incumbent government,
because millions of citizens know that the sanctions will continue,
and perhaps even worsen, if voters were to re-elect the current
government.

It would therefore be incomplete to cite only the disadvantages that
the opposition faces in an election like this; the impact of sanctions
on the electorate, and more importantly the threat of further death
and destruction if they vote the “wrong” way, can be expected to
have a powerful impact on voters’ choices. In all of these ways,
sanctions that are ostensibly designed to “promote democracy” end
up having the opposite effect.

The history of just the past two decades of US foreign policy in the
hemisphere would make any rational observer wary of Washington’s
potential role in a multilateral effort to resolve a political crisis,
especially one in which it is already deeply committed to supporting
one side against the other.

Since the early 2000s, Washington has intervened against a number of
democratically elected governments in the region, sometimes succeeding
in toppling them — at a serious cost to those countries and their
people. This has included
[[link removed]] Brazil
(where the US lent diplomatic cover to Dilma Rousseff’s ouster and
was involved in the lawfare targeting Lula da Silva); Honduras (where
the US helped a military coup succeed
[[link removed]] in 2009)
[[link removed]]; Haiti
[[link removed]] (where
the US backed a 2004 coup
[[link removed]] and
the arbitrary reversal
[[link removed]] of election results
[[link removed]] in
2011); Paraguay
[[link removed]] (where
the US supported the ouster of a president in 2012); and Bolivia
[[link removed]] (where
the US and OAS supported a military coup in 2019
[[link removed]]),
among others
[[link removed]].

The Bolivian election of 2019 (referenced previously) is one of the
most outrageous examples of the United States’ intervention in this
hemisphere in recent years. Together with the leadership of the OAS,
the US government supported a military coup that overthrew the
democratically elected president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, the first
Indigenous president in a country that has the highest percentage of
Indigenous people in the hemisphere.

The pretext was a false claim that Morales had stolen the election.
This was arguably even more transparently false than Donald J.
Trump’s “stop the steal” effort in the 2020 US presidential
election. Trump’s claim is rightfully dismissed because there is no
evidence to support it. But the claim that Bolivia’s election was
stolen, led by OAS secretary general Luis Almagro, was numerically
untenable from day one, as 133 economists and statisticians explained
in an open letter
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the OAS.

All this is relevant not because the Bolivian dispute is directly
analogous to Venezuela’s July election. Rather, it illustrates —
as do the numerous twenty-first century examples cited above — how
badly things can go wrong when the most powerful actors in the
hemisphere are more interested in regime change than they are in
helping resolve any crisis or dispute, as has been the case with
regard to US policy towards Venezuela for the past 25 years.

Almagro himself is still secretary general of the OAS, and can be
expected to prioritize regime change as compared to conflict
resolution as in the past, with respect to Venezuela.

It is interesting to recall how the false fraud narrative that served
to justify the Bolivian coup was undone. A news report
[[link removed]] appeared
in the _New York Times_ on June 7, 2020 that debunked the story that
the 2019 election was stolen. The “flawed” OAS analysis, the
report stated, helped “force out a president” and “fueled a
chain of events that changed the South American nation’s history.”
After that one report, the prior narrative of a stolen election
largely disappeared from the major news reporting rather quickly.3
[[link removed]]

Of course, the other examples cited above also help explain how the US
“changed [each] nation’s history.”

A Way Forward

The purpose of the above references to the recent history of US and
OAS intervention is not to imply anything about the results of the
presidential election in Venezuela. Rather, this history is important
to keep in mind for what happens going forward and how to reach a
negotiated solution to Venezuela’s crisis. One lesson of these past
25 years (and many more) is that there is a need for regional actors
who are strongly committed to a non-violent, negotiated solution, in
order to get one. And it is incumbent on those who care about a
peaceful solution to work to ensure that the US government supports
the efforts of these actors.

In the weeks since the July 28 vote, a number of countries have
recognized Maduro’s claimed victory and/or recognized him as
president-elect, including Bolivia, Honduras, Cuba, China, Russia,
Turkey, Mali, Mozambique and other countries. On the other hand, the
governments of Peru, Argentina, Panama, and Costa Rica have formally
recognized González as the president-elect. For its part, the US has
stated its belief that González received the most votes but has thus
far stopped short
[[link removed]] of
formally recognizing him as president-elect.

However the US administration could eventually recognize a parallel
government as occurred in 2019 with Guaidó – a policy that failed
(and that would probably have required a bloody military coup to
succeed). This would also increase the probability of yet more
economic sanctions, including the revocation of licenses given to
multinational corporations to allow them to engage in economic
activity in Venezuela, particularly within the oil industry.

Snapping back to prior, failed policies detailed in the previous
section is unlikely to convince the Maduro administration to give up
power, will certainly cost many lives, and will cause much additional
suffering.

The new presidential term in Venezuela does not begin until January
2025, providing more than four months for all sides to reach a
negotiated agreement and allow for diplomatic efforts to take shape.
In that regard, it seems like the most promising efforts are led by
the group formed by Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, who are “holding
conversations with both sides”, as the Associated Press reports
[[link removed]].
The countries also have generally good relations with Russia and
China, who have recognized Maduro as president-elect and are
considered to have some degree of influence with his government.

The leaders of these three countries also have decades of experience
dealing with the problems embodied by the current conflict in
Venezuela, including election-related challenges. As noted above,
Brazilian president Lula de Silva himself was jailed following an
illegal process of lawfare, preventing him from participating in
Brazil’s 2018 presidential election, which he was widely expected to
win.4
[[link removed]] The
conviction that jailed him was subsequently overturned and the
persecution subsided.5
[[link removed]]

Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador lost the Mexican
presidential election in 2006 in a disputed election in which ballots
at more than half the voting tables in the election did not add up.6
[[link removed]] And
Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s president, was once a member of a
guerrilla group that formed following allegations of electoral fraud
[[link removed]].
As president, he has been a champion of the ongoing peace process in
his own country, which seeks to end decades of civil conflict through
dialogue and mediation.

The likely alternative is not promising: if these governments were to
be sidelined, the United States would likely play a bigger role
together with right-wing regional governments who are allied with
Washington. Given the history described above, it is highly unlikely
that this would result in a positive outcome for Venezuela.

Though there have been mixed signals indicating at least tepid support
in favor of cooperation with Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, it is not
clear how far this will go, or how long the US administration’s
support for these dialogue efforts will last. Some observers see the
administration as trying to avoid trouble before its own election in
November. This tendency has been prevalent in the past, and some have
seen the Venezuelan government’s decision to hold elections shortly
before the US elections as motivated by the idea that US intervention
would be less likely. The administration may be even more circumspect
than in previous years because it’s likely that if Democrats win a
close presidential election in the US, they will have to deal with a
fight over the election results. And then there is also the issue of
migration, which could increase if the situation deteriorates further
in Venezuela, including through the imposition of additional
sanctions.

Whatever the case, the crisis in Venezuela is unlikely to be resolved
soon and it will be necessary to generate public pressure for
diplomacy, negotiations, an end to sanctions and other illegal,
coercive measures; and in favor of cooperation with other governments
who share those goals.

_The Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) was established in
1999 to promote democratic debate on the most important economic and
social issues that affect people’s lives. In order for citizens to
effectively exercise their voices in a democracy, they should be
informed about the problems and choices that they face. CEPR is
committed to presenting issues in an accurate and understandable
manner, so that the public is better prepared to choose among the
various policy options._

* Venezuela
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* elections
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* Sanctions
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* Lula da Silva
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* Gustavo Petro
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*
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*
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*
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