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Venezuela’s opposition has battled the Marxist government in Caracas for more than 20 years, suffering many disappointments and near misses in the pursuit of regime change. Last week, it handed the so-called revolutionary regime its worst electoral defeat yet—even though President Nicolás Maduro declared victory. The Washington Post and other media say [ [link removed] ]the outcome wasn’t even close, estimating that the opposition’s Edmundo González vote count exceeded Maduro’s by at least two to one. Longtime Latin America reporter Andrés Oppenheimer claims this is the worst example of electoral fraud [ [link removed] ] in the region in years; indeed, Maduro’s minions manufactured out of whole cloth 40% of his vote! 
But despite what the tallies show, the opposition is still far from pushing Maduro’s inept and corrupt regime out the door. On the contrary, his opponents are literally fighting for their life and freedom; some are being arrested, while others are in hiding. Media reports say that since the election, 2,000 Venezuelans have been arrested and at least 20 killed [ [link removed] ] in protests. Human rights groups are alarmed [ [link removed] ] at the intensity of the government’s crackdown on anyone questioning its official election results.
In their hearts, though, Maduro’s opponents probably know that they may never have another chance like this again. Certainly, Maduro, after this shocking rebuke, will never again risk his leadership by holding elections, and the opposition, in jail or in exile, will be reduced to easily contained dissidents, as in Maduro’s dream regime, Cuba. Right now, Maduro likely is calling on help from all his allies, including Russia and Cuba, whose mercenaries in the past have helped security forces track down the opposition and suppress protests.
The U.S.’s long retreat from Latin America—in 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry declared that the Monroe Doctrine Era [ [link removed] ] was over—has meant that bad actors like China, Russia and Iran, who are willing to use economic pledges and military agreements [ [link removed] ] to gain influence, can keep regional dictators like Maduro afloat. But the drawbacks of our passivity are now exposed. Letting Maduro’s Cuban-led security forces crush the opposition will be a major blow to Washington’s prestige and a victory for our anti-democratic adversaries. Additionally, more repression could mean hundreds of thousands more fleeing refugees from Venezuela heading to the U.S. and other Latin American countries.
Still, the opposition may yet have a chance. “People power”—bottom-up movements to affect change—has evicted other dictators from power, most recently Bangladesh’s autocratic Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina [ [link removed] ] and, in 2019, Maduro’s ideological bedfellow, Bolivia’s Evo Morales. [ [link removed] ] The Venezuelan opposition’s superior organization and strategy, with its emphasis on tenacious poll watching and securing of the precinct-level vote tally sheets, will be studied as a model by similar movements worldwide.   
The U.S. has long backed Venezuela’s opposition as striving for a just cause against an increasingly repressive dictatorship and has encouraged its democratic participation. But it will need to help them to even the odds. The Biden administration must exercise its still-considerable leverage to ensure a rightful democratic transition in Venezuela. It must take the lead, and not defer to regional actors like Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, [ [link removed] ] who will give away too much to the Maduro dictatorship.
This challenge comes at a time when many policymakers seem skeptical about a more assertive role in Latin America. Mounting criticism of our overuse of sanctions [ [link removed] ] probably has made policymakers more reluctant to use them. Furthermore, the use of our military to restore order or force regime change has become unthinkable in the region. It has been a long time since 1989, when, in Operation Just Cause, [ [link removed] ] President George H.W. Bush sent 27,000 troops to overthrow Panama’s corrupt dictator, Manuel Noriega, and reestablish Panama’s democracy. Or even 1998, when President Clinton threatened to send troops to Haiti to reverse a coup attempt. Now, we won’t even assist failed-state Haiti’s security [ [link removed] ], relying on Kenyan police instead.
Despite growing doubts about our former role, as Oppenheimer emphasizes [ [link removed] ], Washington—and in particular President Biden—needs to do more for Venezuela. Waiting for other countries to take the lead won’t work. The U.S. must firmly confront Maduro and his allies, build a democratic coalition of states to support a transition and insist that González take over as Venezuela’s president in January 2025.
The Dictator in His Labyrinth
Maduro will be hard to budge because it’s not just his personal power and fortune on the line. Maduro’s failure means the “revolution” has failed, which might have repercussions in Cuba and throughout the region. This is one reason why Maduro ally President Lula of Brazil [ [link removed] ] and the presidents of Colombia and Mexico are trying to manage the election outcome, in part to prevent a collapse of the anti-American far left, but probably also to calm a crisis and hold off massive politically driven migration, which has had a major impact on all three countries.
As the successor to the current Venezuelan regime’s founder, the late President Hugo Chávez, Maduro has never had it easy. Chávez was a talented and cunning demagogue who probably commanded enough popular support to win elections legitimately; Maduro, who lacks Chávez’s gifts, has had to cheat—both this year and in his previous “reelection” in 2019. That year, the opposition, which controlled the National Assembly, voted him out of office and, as per Venezuela’s constitution, voted for assembly president Juan Guaidó as interim president.
In his memoir, Donald Trump’s National Security Adviser John Bolton [ [link removed] ] saw this as an opportunity to force out Maduro with a credible alternative to replace him. The U.S. didn’t resort to military force, as Trump had hinted might be an option, but it did punish the Maduro regime with a broad array of steep sanctions, including sanctioning more than 100 major Venezuelan figures, including President Maduro. The U.S. and other Latin American nations backed Guaidó’s claim to the presidency, but the gambit, though legal, didn’t work because too few regime figures defected to the opposition. The Venezuelan military mostly stayed on Maduro’s side, and eventually, Guaidó faded as a viable alternative.
After 2021, the U.S.—now led by Joe Biden—changed course, eventually offering to normalize relations with Venezuela [ [link removed] ]—a drastic change in position, given that the U.S. hadn’t had an ambassador to Venezuela since 2010. The Biden administration also reduced sanctions on oil sales in exchange for holding fair presidential elections. Bad cop, meet good cop. Last year, in the so-called Barbados Agreement, Maduro agreed to the deal—he really needed sanctions relief to boost his failing economy—but soon reneged by having his hand-picked electoral council declare the popular María Corina Machado [ [link removed] ] and then her replacement ineligible to run. In April, the reluctant Biden administration resumed the oil sanctions.
Behind in the polls going into July’s election, Maduro still believed his electoral vote-buying and intimidation machine would come through for him. According to The New York Times [ [link removed] ], this effort failed because the Maduro regime, which cut public spending in the hopes of reviving the economy, no longer has the resources to afford that kind of campaign. Stunned by the election tallies, his electoral officials decided not to release the results and concocted a phony story about a computer crash. Its “official” numbers weren’t close to believable on their face. Now, even Venezuela’s close allies abroad [ [link removed] ] want Maduro to share the voting returns, which by law, Venezuela’s electoral commission must do.
Reports are that the beleaguered Maduro [ [link removed] ] is growing increasingly erratic and angry, continuing to refuse the release of the results. Recently, he railed at the press corps, evicting reporters from the country and threatening to throw opposition leader González in jail. Bizarrely, he’s even claimed the opposition is funded by “international Zionism [ [link removed] ].” Maduro also warns that ousting his party from power will provoke a civil war [ [link removed] ].
Operation Restore Democracy
In 2001, the Organization of American States, with the strong support of the United States, adopted an “Inter-American Democratic Charter,” which declared that “the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.” Twenty-three years later, the story in the region seems to be more about democratic backsliding [ [link removed] ] than consolidation. As a sign of this decline, the Organization of American States failed to gather [ [link removed] ] enough support from member states to condemn Maduro. More assertive leadership by the United States in support of democracy will be needed to reverse this trend.
Clearly, Maduro has to go, and Washington must send a strong signal that it will not tolerate the use of force against civilian protestors and the jailing of political opponents. President Biden himself should publicly embrace the cause of Venezuelan democracy, which has strong bipartisan support in the U.S. Despite appearances, the U.S. has a lot of leverage to effect a positive outcome to remove Maduro from power. We must employ a strategy of credible threats and strong assurances.
First, our State Department has recognized that Edmundo González is the winner of the presidential election. [ [link removed] ] The Venezuelan people have spoken, and this is nonnegotiable. The Venezuelan electoral authorities must publish the actual vote counts and demonstrate transparency. Biden should call Lula and other leaders to press Maduro hard for this. The EU also has demanded a release [ [link removed] ] of the official vote count, but it would build momentum if we officially recognize González as Venezuela’s president-elect soon. [ [link removed] ] 
Second, the U.S. needn’t introduce more sanctions [ [link removed] ]; there are plenty in place already. It should, however, vigorously enforce these sanctions and close all loopholes. While no additional sanctions make sense at this time, the U.S. also should consider implementing more if the Maduro regime resorts to violence. The Biden administration also must make clear that economic sanctions relief won’t happen as long as Maduro, or any ally appointed by him, is sitting in the presidential chair. The U.S. must insist that diplomatic normalization talks will only occur with the rightfully elected González administration.
Third, the U.S. must communicate to key sanctioned officials in Maduro’s regime that charges or sanctions will be dropped only if the regime members publicly back the legitimate results of this election and urge Maduro to step down. We need to be willing to impose more sanctions on individuals swiftly if there is backsliding.
And lastly, we must set firm expectations for the transition to a new opposition government. In a recent op-ed, the economist Eduardo Rodríguez [ [link removed] ] suggests a power-sharing arrangement by which Maduro’s people would still hold the defense and interior ministries, arguing this would ease regime supporters’ anxieties about retaliation. But these ministries are the Maduro regime’s center of gravity and have been unaccountable to the public [ [link removed] ]. Some compromise would probably be necessary, but the U.S. should urge the opposition never to accept such a major and dangerous concession.
Venezuela’s election crisis represents a great opportunity for President Biden, as the leader of the free world and champion of democracy, to leave office with a significant win. Success is hardly guaranteed, and it will require steadfast commitment and leadership. In the meantime, we have to stop worrying about getting blamed for exercising our essential influence in the region. Our adversaries hate us no matter what we do, anyway. Our adversaries like Russia and Cuba are heavily invested in the opposition’s failure; we need to be invested in its success.

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