Earlier this week, we co-published “He Was Convicted of Killing His Baby. The DA’s Office Says He’s Innocent, but That Might Not Be Enough” with The New York Times Magazine. In the story, reporter Pamela Colloff details how flawed science helped convict Russell Maze more than 20 years ago. The district attorney’s office now says the evidence was misinterpreted, but Maze is still behind bars.
Pam responded to some reader questions in the Times Magazine’s comments section, which we’re excerpting here. If you have a question for her about the investigation, reply to this email with it — we’ll answer some of them in a future newsletter.
A reader asks: It seems that if the case were tried today, there’s no way that Russell could be found guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt”. There’s reasonable doubt all over this. Why, then, is the standard different when trying to reverse a potentially flawed conviction in front of one judge and no jury?
Pamela Colloff: It's hard to wrap your mind around, isn’t it? The standard changes once a conviction is in place. In a 1993 Supreme Court decision, Herrera v. Collins, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote, “Once a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the constitutional presumption of innocence disappears.”