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IDF ORDERED HANNIBAL DIRECTIVE ON OCTOBER 7 TO PREVENT HAMAS TAKING
SOLDIERS CAPTIVE  
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Yaniv Kubovich
July 7, 2024
Haaretz
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_ Documents and testimonies obtained by Haaretz reveal the Hannibal
operational order, directing use of force to prevent soldiers being
taken as captives, employed at three army facilities infiltrated by
Hamas, potentially endangering civilians as well _

Hamas attack on Gaza border communities in Southern Israel on October
7. (Credit: Hani Alshaer, Anadolu Agency // Haaretz),

 

Gaza Division operations and airstrikes in the first hours of October
7 were based on limited information. The first long moments after the
Hamas attack was launched were chaotic. Reports were coming in, with
their significance not always clear. When their meaning was
understood, it was realized that something horrific had taken place.

Communication networks could not keep up with the flow of information,
as was the case for soldiers sending these reports. However, the
message conveyed at 11:22 A.M. across the Gaza Division network was
understood by everyone. "Not a single vehicle can return to Gaza" was
the order.

At this point, the IDF was not aware of the extent of kidnapping along
the Gaza border, but it did know that many people were involved. Thus,
it was entirely clear what that message meant, and what the fate of
some of the kidnapped people would be.

This was not the first order given by the division with the intent of
foiling kidnapping even at the expense of the lives of the kidnapped,
a procedure known in the army as the "Hannibal procedure."
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Hamas terrorists breach the Israel-Gaza border on the morning of
October 7.  (Credit: Hani Alshaer/Anadolu Agency  //  Haaretz)
 

Documents obtained by Haaretz, as well as testimonies of soldiers,
mid-level and senior IDF officers, reveal a host of orders and
procedures laid down by the Gaza Division, Southern Command and the
IDF General Staff up to the afternoon hours of that day, showing how
widespread this procedure was, from the first hours following the
attack and at various points along the border.

* 'Unlawful, unethical, horrifying': IDF ethics expert on
controversial Hannibal Directive
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* Who is the IDF general who ordered tank fire on a kibbutz home
with 13 hostages inside?
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Haaretz does not know whether or how many civilians and soldiers were
hit due to these procedures, but the cumulative data indicates that
many of the kidnapped people were at risk, exposed to Israeli gunfire,
even if they were not the target.

At 6:43 A.M., at which time rocket barrages were launched at Israel
and thousands of Hamas operatives were attacking army strongholds and
the division's observation and communications capabilities, the
division's commander Brig. Gen. Avi Rosenfeld
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that "the Philistines have invaded."

This is the procedure when an enemy invades Israeli territory, upon
which a division commander can assume extraordinary authority,
including the employment of heavy fire inside Israeli territory, in
order to block an enemy raid.

A very senior IDF source confirmed to Haaretz that the Hannibal
procedure was employed on October 7
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adding that this was not used by the divisional commander. Who did
give the order? This, said the source, will perhaps be established by
post-war investigations.

In any case, says a defense official who is familiar with the October
7 operations at the Gaza Division, in the morning hours "no one knew
what was going on outside." He says that Rosenfeld was in the war
room, not emerging, "while outside a world war was raging."
 
Hamas terrorists driving to the Erez crossing in southern Israel on
the morning of October 7.  (Credit: Mohammed ABED / AFP  //
 Haaretz)
"Everyone was shocked by the number of terrorists who had penetrated
the base. Even in our nightmares, we didn't have plans for such an
attack. No one had a clue about the number of people kidnapped or
where army forces were. There was crazy hysteria, with decisions made
without any verified information," he continued.

One of these decisions was made at 7:18 A.M., when an observation post
at the Yiftah outpost reported that someone had been kidnapped at the
Erez border crossing, adjacent to the IDF's liaison office. "Hannibal
at Erez" came the command from divisional headquarters, "dispatch a
Zik." The Zik
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an unmanned assault drone, and the meaning of this command was clear.

This wasn't the last time that such an order was heard over the
communications network. Over the next half hour, the division realized
that Hamas terrorists had managed to kill and abduct soldiers serving
at the crossing and at the adjacent base. Then, at 7:41 A.M., it
happened again: Hannibal at Erez, an assault on the crossing and the
base, just so that no more soldiers be taken. Such commands were given
later as well.

The Erez border crossing was not the only place this happened.
Information obtained by Haaretz and confirmed by the army shows that
throughout that morning, the Hannibal procedure was employed at two
other locations penetrated by terrorists: the Re'im army base, where
the divisional headquarters were located, and the Nahal Oz outpost in
which female spotters were based. This did not prevent the kidnapping
of seven of them or the killing of 15 other spotters
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as well as 38 other soldiers.

Over the next few hours, division headquarters started putting the
pieces of the puzzle together, realizing the extent of the Hamas
attack, but missing the invasion of Kibbutz Nir Oz, which the first
army forces reached only after the terrorists had left. Regarding the
frequency of employing the Hannibal procedure, it seems that nothing
changed. Thus, for example, at 10:19 A.M. a report reached divisional
headquarters indicating that a Zik had attacked the Re'im base.

Three minutes later, another such report arrived. At that time,
Shaldag commando forces were already on the base fighting the
terrorists. To this day, it's not clear whether one of them was hurt
in the drone attack. What is known is that over the communications
network there was a message asking everyone to make sure no soldier
was outdoors on the base, since IDF forces were about to enter and
drive out or kill remaining terrorists.
 
Vehicles in the parking lot of the Nova music festival, two days
after Hamas attack.  (Credit: South First Responders / AFP  //
 Haaretz)
The decision to conduct attacks inside outposts, says a senior defense
official, will haunt senior commanders all their lives. "Anyone making
such a decision knew that our combatants in the area could be hit as
well."

But such attacks took place, it turns out, not only inside outposts or
bases. At 10:32 A.M., a new order was issued, according to which all
battalions in the area were ordered to fire mortars in the direction
of the Gaza Strip. Internal discussions in the army noted that this
order, attributed to Brig. Gen. Rosenfeld, was heavily criticized,
since at that time, the IDF did not have a complete picture of all the
forces in the area, including soldiers and civilians. Some of these
were in open areas or in woods along the border, trying to hide from
the terrorists.

At that point, the army did not know the number of people who had been
kidnapped. "We thought they numbered dozens at that stage," a military
source told Haaretz. Firing mortars at the Gaza Strip would endanger
them as well. Furthermore, another order given at 11:22 A.M.,
according to which no vehicle would be allowed to return to Gaza, took
this a step further.

"Everyone knew by then that such vehicles could be carrying kidnapped
civilians or soldiers," a source in Southern Command told Haaretz.
"There was no case in which a vehicle carrying kidnapped people was
knowingly attacked, but you couldn't really know if there were any
such people in a vehicle. I can't say there was a clear instruction,
but everyone knew what it meant to not let any vehicles return to
Gaza."

A new development occurred at 2:00 P.M. All the forces were instructed
not to exit border communities toward the west, in the direction of
the border, with an emphasis on not chasing terrorists. At that point,
the border area was under intense fire, directed at anyone in that
area, making it a danger zone.

"The instruction," says the source in Southern Command, "was meant to
turn the area around the border fence into a killing zone, closing it
off toward the west."

At 6:40 P.M., military intelligence believed that many terrorists were
intending to flee together back to the Gaza Strip, in an organized
manner. This was near Kibbutz Be'eri
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Azza
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Kissufim. Following this, the army launched artillery raids at the
border fence area, very close to some of these communities. Shortly
afterwards, shells were fired at the Erez border crossing. The IDF
says it is not aware of any civilians being hurt in these
bombardments.
 
Palestinians taking a hostage from Israel into Gaza.  (Credit: Hatem
Ali/AP  //  Haaretz)
 

UNRESTRICTED FIRE

One case in which it is known that civilians were hit, a case that
received wide coverage, took place in the house of Pessi Cohen at
Kibbutz Be'eri. 14 hostages were held in the house as the IDF
attacked it, with 13 of them killed
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In the coming weeks, the IDF is expected to publish the results of its
investigation of the incident, which will answer the question of
whether Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram
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the commander of Division 99 who was in charge of operations in Be'eri
on October 7, was employing the Hannibal procedure. Did he order the
tank to move ahead even at the cost of civilian casualties, as he
stated in an interview he gave later to the New York Times?

Over all the months that have passed, the IDF has refused to say
whether this procedure was employed against civilians who had been
taken hostage. It now seems that even if the answer is positive, the
question may have been only a partial one. The actions of Hiram may
have simply been congruent with the way the IDF operated that day.

 
The home of Pessi Cohen in Kibbutz Be'eri, last month.  (Credit:
Eliyahu Hershkovitz / Haaretz)
As far as Haaretz knows, even at 9:33 P.M. this was still the
situation on the ground. At that time, there was a further order from
Southern Command: close off all the border area with tanks. In fact,
all forces in the area received permission to open fire at anyone
approaching the border area, without any restrictions.

The IDF spokesman responded by saying that "the army has been fighting
for six months at high intensity on several fronts, focused on
attaining the war's objectives. In tandem, the IDF has begun
conducting internal investigations of what transpired on October 7 and
the preceding period. The aim of these investigations is to learn and
to draw lessons which could be used in continuing the battle. When
these investigations are concluded, the results will be presented to
the public with transparency."

* Oct. 7
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* Hamas
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* IDF
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* Hannibal Directive
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* Israel
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* Israel-Gaza War
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* Ceasefire
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* Hostages
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* Benjamin Netanyahu
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* Palestine
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* Gaza
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* Israeli military
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* Israeli politics
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