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EGYPT’S DARK DECADE WAS BUILT UPON SISI’S DANGEROUS BARGAIN  
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Ahmed Abdeen
June 3, 2024
Middle East Eye
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_ In exchange for loyalty, the president allows the military to drain
public finances, while propping up a genocidal Israel in service of
the West. _

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, surrounded by top generals,
is pictured in Cairo in October 2014 , (Egyptian Presidency/AFP)

 

A decade ago, Egypt
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the Armed Forces announced its approval
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Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as a candidate for president, laying out a
fundamental principle that would become a cornerstone of his
governance for the next 10 years: The interests of the military and
its leadership were paramount. The entity that placed him in power was
the only one capable of removing him.

Throughout this dark decade, the military’s role evolved from being
a guardian of the state, as it had been for decades, to becoming the
owner, manager and executor of all significant aspects of the
nation. 

In exchange for loyalty and obedience, Sisi has allowed the military
to control the state’s wealth and institutions, with army personnel
managing these resources primarily for their own benefit, free from
accountability.

The army’s loyalty to Sisi even extends to decisions that could
endanger national security, such as ceding sovereignty over the
strategic Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir
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located in the Gulf of Aqaba, to Saudi Arabia
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The long-established governance equation between the presidency and
the military persists: The president holds ultimate authority,
provided he maintains control and stability. In times of unrest, the
military intervenes and imposes its conditions, as in the January 1977
uprising and the January 2011 revolution
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This pattern was repeated after the massive protests in September
2019.

Sisi’s extensive experience in the military has played a crucial
role in maintaining internal stability within the institution, in
terms of curbing personal ambitions, preventing the formation of power
centres, and employing both carrot and stick approaches. 

Rapid and regular leadership changes have became a hallmark,
institutionalised by reducing the tenure of senior military positions
from four years to just two
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Sisi retains the authority to extend them, ensuring absolute control
and loyalty.

Wealth and privileges

Benefits, rewards and incentives for loyalty have expanded, flooding
military officers with projects and positions that bring immense
wealth and privileges, making any rebellion seem suicidal. Those who
have dared to defy Sisi, such as former military chief of staff Sami
Anan
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have faced severe repercussions.

As with all of Egypt’s previous presidents, Sisi has worked
tirelessly to secure his position, learning from the experiences of
his predecessors. The events of January 2011 remain at the forefront
of his mind, perhaps mentioned more in his own speeches than by the
revolutionaries themselves. 

The revolution that toppled Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year regime in 2011,
when a massive surge of people overwhelmed security forces, left the
ruling system utterly exposed. But the military soon reclaimed power
with ease, just as it did in the summer of 2013 to oust Mohamed Morsi
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capitalising on popular discontent.

Sisi has focused on preventing another such occurrence by ensuring
that no demonstrations, however small, can escalate into a full-blown
uprising. He has crushed all attempts at organised peaceful dissent.
His campaign of repression has exceeded any other period in modern
Egyptian history.

The past decade has shown that the only escape from this vicious cycle
is the return of power to its rightful owners: the Egyptian people,
who must reclaim their role in holding authorities accountable. But
movements need leadership and organisation, tools that Sisi has
systematically destroyed.

Finding a way for the people to re-enter the political equation was a
task undertaken by jailed opposition leader Ahmed Tantawy
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myself and a group of our comrades. I served as a political adviser on
Tantawy’s recent presidential campaign.

The strategy of what we called the “Hope Project” was to halt the
cycle of despotism by reintegrating all segments of the population
into the political process, strengthening political organisations and
fostering an environment conducive to massive public engagement.

Global silence

We gambled on the return of the people through the ballot box, which
we deemed safer and more secure than protests. What we didn’t
anticipate were the terrifying scenes of thousands of thugs across the
country preventing people from signing petitions to grant Tantawy his
right to run for office. 

Egypt’s security forces and state apparatuses entrenched themselves
against the people’s will. Even if we had expected this, what could
we have done against armed gangs assaulting citizens on the streets?

Even more astonishing was the international community’s silence. Not
only did countries fail to condemn the anti-democratic actions of
Sisi’s regime, but they also rewarded the repressive leader
with billions of dollars
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avert an economic meltdown.

A key reason for this is Sisi’s relationship with Israel
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Egypt, the international community is clearly concerned with only two
things: preventing its collapse, which could send an influx of
migrants to Europe’s shores, and ensuring Israel’s security - a
task at which Sisi has excelled.

Before the 1952 military coup, multiple forces vied for power in
Egypt: the king, the British occupation, and various political
parties. The coup concentrated all authority in the hands of the
president, with the military holding the keys to the presidency. 

Former president Anwar Sadat then placed those keys in the hands of
the United States [[link removed]], and
with the growing influence of the Israel lobby
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Washington, the importance of any regime governing Egypt became
measured by its relationship with Israel.

Liberating Palestine

Sisi grasped this equation well, going beyond mere friendship with Tel
Aviv to become a close ally. This partnership is mutually beneficial,
as both are threatened by the prospect of democracy in Egypt. 

For Sisi, democracy means losing his throne, especially after
unprecedented levels of failure
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repression and poverty in the country. For Israel, democracy in Egypt
would likely produce a government reflecting the Egyptian people’s
will - hostile towards Israel and and viewing itself as part of
the Palestinian
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ideology unchanged since the 1940s, when scores of Egyptians travelled
to Palestine to fight against invading Zionist gangs.

The significance of what’s happening in Gaza
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Palestine today cannot be overstated. For decades, the mantra has been
that liberating Palestine from occupation
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liberating Cairo from dictatorship, positing Egypt as the linchpin
capable of uniting Arabs. But the opposite seems to be occurring.

The changes brought about by the Gaza war will shape not just
Palestine’s future, but also Egypt’s - and perhaps the entire
region’s. The shift in international public opinion against the
Israeli occupation will be reflected in global policies towards
Egypt. 

Going forward, democracy and human rights could become the foundation
of international relations with Egypt, moving away from the
decades-long trend of supporting corrupt regimes solely to protect and
aid Israeli occupation, even amid the large-scale genocide and ethnic
cleansing in Palestine.

This situation underscores analyst Naomi Klein
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recent assertion that the "false idol of Zionism equates Israeli
safety with Egyptian dictatorship and client states".

_The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not
necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye._

_Ahmed Abdeen is an Egyptian journalist and political analyst. He
holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from L’Ecole
Supérieure de Journalisme de Paris (ESJ-Paris)._

_Middle East Eye delivers independent and unrivalled coverage and
analysis of the Middle East, North Africa and beyond. To learn more
about republishing this content and the associated fees, please fill
out this form [[link removed]]. More
about MEE can be found here
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* Egyptian Armed Forces
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* Egyptian protests
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* General al-Sisi
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