ISIS carried out at least 25 confirmed attacks in May in the Homs, Hama, Raqqa,
and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 36 pro-Assad regime
soldiers and one civilian and wounded at least 22 more soldiers and civilians.
There were also six high quality* attacks carried out during the month.





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In May 2024


Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency in May 2024 by clicking here
<[link removed]>
.



ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency in May 2024

By Gregory Waters



Following is the May 2024 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. All previous 2024 monthly installments can be foundhere
<[link removed]>, as well as a
review of developments throughout2023
<[link removed]>,
2022
<[link removed]>
, and 2021
<[link removed]>.
A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also beexplored here
<[link removed]>, here
<[link removed]>
, andhere
<[link removed]>
.



ISIS carried out at least 25 confirmed attacks in May in the Homs, Hama,
Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 36 pro-Assad
regime soldiers and one civilian and wounded at least 22 more soldiers and
civilians. There were also six high quality* attacks carried out during the
month. The level of violence in May continued to decline from the insurgency’s
peak in March. May’s violence, while significantly lower than that of the past
two months, is still in line with historic high-activity months seen in 2020
and early 2023. Much of the decline came from a sharp drop in activity in Deir
Ez Zor and Raqqa, both of which saw almost no mine or improvised explosive
device (IED) attacks in May. These types of attacks generally compose a
significant portion of violent activity in the two governorates, targeting
local civilians and security forces traveling into the desert. It is possible
that locals exercised extra caution in May, given the severity of both mine and
small arms attacks in these two regions during this year’s truffle season. This
hypothesis is supported by the fact that there were only two documented attacks
on civilians in May, both occurring in eastern Hama.



ISIS did not have as much success capturing regime outposts in April as it did
in March. As with April, ISIS managed to maintain consistent serious operations
against the critical Taybeh-Kawm axis throughout May, including capturing
several regime positions. While the frequency of these attacks continues to
decline slightly from their peak in March, it still appears that the group is
dedicating significant resources to fighting large scale battles here. Russia
also continued its extremely active bombing campaign against both static ISIS
targets and in providing close air support during larger ISIS attacks against
fixed regime positions, with the bulk of airstrikes occurring in southern Raqqa
and eastern Homs.



*Indicates attacks in Damascus City claimed by ISIS. Additional IED attacks
occurred in Homs City in June 2023 and Damascus in March 2024 and May 2024 that
went unclaimed but were suspected to be conducted by ISIS.



Confirmed ISIS attacks decreased in May in nearly every governorate compared
to April. The biggest drops came in Deir Ez Zor (4 compared to 13) and Raqqa (4
compared to 12), with a smaller drop in Homs (12 compared to 13). Attacks in
Hama increased slightly (5 compared to 4). No attacks were recorded in Aleppo.



Deir Ez Zor and Raqqa



ISIS expanded its low-level insurgency within the urban belt of Deir Ez Zor in
January, when it conducted three assassinations of local security members.
Sleeper cells continued this trend in February, carrying out two assassinations
of local pro-regime fighters inside Mayadin city, and again in March, when
unidentified gunmen conducted three attacks inside Mayadin and one attack on
the edge of Shamitiyah. This pattern continued into April, with one attack
inside Mayadin and two attacks within and adjacent to towns in west Deir Ez
Zor. In May, regime security forces captured a small four-man ISIS cell inside
Mayadin. According to local journalist Zain al-Abidin three of the detained men
were serving in the NDF and their leader had entered Mayadin from northeast
Syria during the regime’s 2022 reconciliation initiative – a security risk this
author had highlighted at the time.



On May 3, a soldier was killed in a small arms attack north of Shoula. That
same day unknown armed men attacked the brother of a local militia leader
inside Mayadin, wounding him slightly. On May 20, ISIS fighters attacked an
army position in the west Deir Ez Zor desert, killing one and wounding two. On
May 26, eight days after the ISIS cell bust in Mayadin, a group of gunmen on a
motorcycle attacked an NDF truck inside the city, wounding three.



In Raqqa, ISIS’s insurgency dropped back down its more typical levels
following two months of extreme activity. On May 2 ISIS cells attacked a regime
position in the Sabkha desert, leaving one dead and one wounded. The next day,
a Republican Guard truck was hit by a mine or IED while driving west of Tabqa,
leaving one dead and three wounded. On May 11, two 4th Division soldiers were
killed and wounded in the Sabkha desert when recovering the dead body of
another soldier which had been rigged with explosives. On May 14, ISIS fighters
attacked a regime position near the Zamlah Sharqi hamlet in southeast Raqqa.




Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in Deir Ez Zor (top) and Raqqa
(bottom) in May 2024 alongside all other attacks in 2024.



Homs



ISIS activity in eastern Homs decreased in December, but remained focused
around the Doubayat Oil Field, which the group had temporarily captured in
November. January likewise saw most ISIS activity concentrated in this area,
though the group also expanded operations west into the desert just south of
Palmyra and Arak. In February, ISIS largely abandoned the southern Palmyra
front, likely because of pro-regime ground and air operations, and shifted its
focus to the Taybeh sector north of Sukhnah and the Jubb Jarah mountains north
of Palmyra. This focus continued into March, with activity remaining
concentrated in the Sukhnah-Taybeh-Kawm axis in both April and May. However,
security forces continue to largely stand their ground.



On May 3, ISIS cells launched a coordinated attack on the Kawm axis, targeting
three regime positions simultaneously and killing at least 13 pro-regime
fighters from the Russian-backed al-Assad Shield Forces. On May 7, ISIS
launched another attack on al-Kawm, targeting a Liwa al-Quds position east of
the town. On May 11, ISIS cells shifted their focus south, seizing a regime
position east of Taybeh. Three days later, ISIS fighters overran a Liwa al-Quds
position near Qasr Hayr Sharqi, south of Taybeh. According to Zain al-Abidin’s
sources, two Liwa al-Quds fighters and six Iranian-led Afghan foreign fighters
were killed and at least seven others wounded. Militants also managed to
destroy two trucks during the battle. On May 17 a soldier from the regime’s
25th Division was killed somewhere in east Homs. The 25th Division’s 26th
Brigade, commanded and directly supported by the Russians, was recently sent to
eastern Homs to help reinforce security forces.



The next day, ISIS fighters attacked a regime position inside the Mahr Gas
Field, killing one and wounding two others. As Zain al-Abidin reports, this is
the first such attack on this field, long considered to be one of the more
secure areas in the Badia. That same day another soldier was killed in an
attack west of Sukhnah. On May 20, three more members of the 25th Division’s
26th Brigade were killed in an attack in the Talilah Reserve area south of
Palmyra. Among them was a lieutenant colonel, the first high ranking officer
killed in the Badia this year. On May 23 a soldier was killed in clashes near
Arak, just days after security forces swept the area. Lastly, another soldier
was killed on May 28 when his position west of Arak came under attack.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Homs (highlighted) in May 2024 alongside all
other attacks in 2024. Not shown is one attack which occurred in an unknown
part of eastern Homs.



Hama



Significant ISIS activity returned to east Hama in January, when the group
conducted five attacks in the province, three of which were deemed high
quality. Likewise, ISIS conducted three high quality attacks in eastern Hama in
February. This was the first time eastern Hama had back-to-back months of three
or more high quality attacks since spring of 2021, amid the regime’s
semi-successful campaign to suppress ISIS activity in the province. March
continued this trend with five high quality and 12 total attacks, almost all
against security forces. However, activity reduced significantly in April, with
only four confirmed attacks all month, and likewise with only five attacks in
May.



On May 3 a local militia fighter was killed in eastern Salamiyah. On May 8 a
shepherd was killed by a mine while driving on the Tel Tout road. On May 15 a
man driving a water tanker in the countryside was wounded by a mine. Lastly,
according to Zain al-Abidin, multiple skirmishes broke out between security
forces and ISIS cells in the Duwayzin region of southeast Hama between May 23
and May 24.



Looking Ahead



ISIS activity has returned to the more typical moderately high level seen in
2020 and early 2023. While the data from May does not look anywhere as bad as
that of March and April, the trends of the past months have largely continued.
ISIS cells continue to conduct a steady pressure campaign north of Sukhnah,
seemingly unperturbed by heavy Russian airpower as they repeatedly target, and
often capture, regime positions outside Taybeh and Kawm. The group also
continues to demonstrate a clear ability to rapidly redeploy forces in order to
shift the geographic focus of its operations. For example, May saw a return of
ISIS activity to the Palmyra-Arak axis for the first time since mid-February.



While ISIS activity in eastern Homs has largely continued unabated, it was
southern Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor that saw the most dramatic shifts in activity
this month. These two regions were the primary drivers of March and April’s
unprecedented activity, and in May ISIS appeared to have largely gone quiet,
conducting single digit attacks in both areas. However, ISIS activity continues
to escalate across the river in the SDF-held parts of Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor. On
May 10, ISISconducted <[link removed]>
its first SVBIED attack against against the SDF since its January 2022 assault
on Sinai Prison in Hasakah. This time, an ISIS member targeted an SDF
checkpoint outside Shuhayl. Then on June 3 the SDFreported
<[link removed]>
that another ISIS fighter targeted an SDF base outside Izbeh, Deir Ez Zor
(though earliertweeting <[link removed]>
that the attack was thwarted). Later that day the SDF and U.S. Coalition forces
conducted an operation in the nearby town of Dahleh where they claimed to kill
a five-man ISIS cell including two “leaders” responsible for both SVBIEDs. Two
days later, ISIS released an officialclaim
<[link removed]> for an SVBIED attack
in the town of al-Atala it says was carried out also on June 3. It is unclear
if this is the same attack as the June 3 Izbeh bombing.



Regardless of whether or not these were the same attacks, ISIS has now
conductedat least two suicide car bombings in less than one month in Deir Ez
Zor. This marks a significant increase in the level of violence in the
governorate, and mirrors a similarly escalating level of ISIS extortion and
financial operations in the northeast. It is possible that the decrease in ISIS
activity in regime-held Deir Ez Zor and Raqqa comes from some fighters and
resources being sent to the northeast. If so, it remains to be seen how long
they stay in the northeast before returning to regime areas and escalating
their violence once more.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in May 2024 alongside all other
attacks in 2024. Not shown are two attack in eastern Hama and one attack in
eastern Homs. To view an interactive version of this map, please clickhere
<[link removed]>
.



*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines: attacks that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, “flying checkpoints” (temporary roadblocks ISIS fighters
establish in order to stop and extort or ambush a few cars), ambushes on
military convoys, or attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers
or lead to POWs.



###







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