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A SLIPPERY SLOPE TO WORLD WAR III?  
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John Feffer
June 5, 2024
Foreign Policy in Focus
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_ A closer look at the five assumptions behind the push for a
"ceasefire now" in Ukraine _

Russian flag + Ukrainian flag. Regnum Carya Golf & Spa Resort, Belek,
Serik District, Antalya, Turkey, Sharon Hahn Darlin

 

Ukraine can now use U.S. weapons to strike at targets inside Russia.
That permission comes with numerous asterisks. The targets are
geographically restricted to the northeast region across the border
from Kharkiv, for instance, and Ukraine has only received the
go-head to use
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missiles.

Other Ukrainian allies are less cautious. The Netherlands has
authorized Ukraine to use its recently delivered F-16 fighter jets
to strike pretty much any military target
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Russia. France is considering the dispatch of military trainers to
Ukrainian territory (previously it was conducting such trainings
outside of Ukraine).

This relaxation of restrictions has prompted yet another series of
threats
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the Kremlin that it will attack NATO directly or use tactical nuclear
weapons within Ukraine. Yet, it is precisely because Russia has made
these threats repeatedly—and not followed through on them—that has
made it easier for Ukraine’s allies
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cross the purported “red lines” and supply ever more offensive
weapons.

Russia has been brazen and incautious in many ways: invading Ukraine
in the first place, committing widespread war crimes, and throwing
wave after wave of infantry into the line of fire with its
“meat-grinder” tactics. But it has also been fundamentally
cautious by not directly engaging NATO forces, escalating the current
conflict beyond Ukraine’s borders, or introducing nuclear weapons
onto the battlefield.

The Biden administration has certainly devoted a considerable amount
of money to the defense of Ukraine and has gone to great lengths to
solidify the sanctions regime against Russia. But it, too, has been
fundamentally cautious by holding back certain weapons systems from
Ukraine, not offering to police a no-fly zone over the country, and
not even considering the introduction of U.S. or NATO troops on the
ground.

Despite this cautiousness on the part of both Russia and the United
States, can the conflict in Ukraine still spin out of control to
become a world war with the possible use of nuclear weapons? And does
the possibility of Armageddon mean that an immediate peace has become
more important than adherence to international law or a minimum of
justice for the victims?

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

Later this month, Switzerland will convene representatives of over 100
countries to discuss Ukraine’s 10-point peace plan. Russia’s not
invited, and China doesn’t plan to attend. Nor will Joe Biden be
there, much to Ukraine’s disappointment.

The 10-point plan requires Russia to abandon the territory it has
occupied in Ukraine. Right now, Russia is not interested in
negotiating along those lines. Any peace proposals coming out of the
Kremlin are predicated on Russia keeping what it has already seized
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Ever since a set of negotiations
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began (and ended) shortly after the 2022 invasion, neither warring
party has been interested in compromise. Ukraine believes that it has
international law on its side. Russia is confident that it has
superior force on its side. And the Kremlin is also convinced that a
punishing stalemate will either undercut Ukrainians’ will to resist
or their allies’ willingness to maintain military and monetary
support.

Indeed, Russia’s recent battlefield victories, however modest, have
prompted a number of commentators on this side of the Atlantic to push
harder for a ceasefire in the conflict. They do so confident that they
are speaking in the best interest of Ukrainians (and world peace).

“Taking advantage of Putin’s apparent openness to a ceasefire and
striking a deal now, however unpleasant, will be better for everyone:
for the state of Ukraine, for its people, and for the safety of the
entire world,” writes
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Marcetic.

That certainly sounds beneficent, even though the “unpleasant”
aspects will fall entirely upon the shoulders of Ukrainians.

But let’s take a closer look at the assumptions behind the push for
a ceasefire in the Ukrainian conflict, which comes from a motley crew
of peaceniks, realists, and right-wing zealots.

CEASEFIRE LATER

The assumptions behind the “ceasefire now” contingent fall into
the following categories:

* Ukraine is on the defensive and at risk of losing everything
* Public opinion in favor of the war is softening inside Ukraine and
in the West
* It’s just a dispute over territory—surely the two sides can
compromise
* Vladimir Putin can be trusted to hold to his side of any bargain
* The risk of nuclear war is great, either in the case of Russia
being “backed against the wall” or if the West crosses a red line
to save Ukraine from collapsing

Let’s address each assumption in turn.

_Ukraine Is Near Collapse_

There’s no question that Russia has an advantage over Ukraine in
terms of firepower and size of army. It has been bringing in as many
as 30,000 new recruits
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month while Ukrainian soldiers at the frontline can only dream of
demobilization as the latest wave of new conscripts dribbles in. Over
the last few months, Russia has used these advantages to take some
territory in the Donbas (around Avdivka), open up a new front
northeast of Kharkiv, and battle to regain Robotyne in the south.

But if you look at the maps
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territory that Russia has gained is marginal—and it has done so at
great expense to personnel and military hardware. The most heralded
advance, in the direction of Kharkiv, stalled even before the U.S.
decision to allow Ukraine to attack targets on the other side of the
border where Russian troops have massed. After encountering
considerable Ukrainian resistance, Russian troops have begun digging
in around
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Ukrainian town of Vovchansk, after destroying bridges that Ukrainian
forces could have used to counterattack and Russian forces could have
used to move even closer to Kharkiv.

The window of opportunity for Russian forces to take advantage of the
delay in resupplying Ukraine has effectively closed. There was never
much threat
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Russian troops could have taken Kharkiv, if that was ever their goal.
At best, Russian forces will expand control over Donetsk and Luhansk
provinces, one of President Vladimir Putin’s stated objectives.

At the same time, Russian continues to attack
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infrastructure and other civilian targets throughout Ukraine. It has
done so effectively because it has air superiority and Ukraine was
running out of supplies for its air defense. But with the delivery of
the F-16s
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The Netherlands and Belgium, along with Patriot missiles from the
United States
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another system from Germany
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Ukraine will be better able to defend itself and, eventually,
challenge Russian air superiority.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks elsewhere have compromised Russia’s
ability to wage this war. It has taken out radar installations
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Ukrainian positions. It has reduced the Russian navy in the Black Sea
by a third. It is turning Crimea from an asset to a liability
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all the military infrastructure Putin has placed there.

So, Ukraine is not on the verge of collapse, though it certainly faces
considerable strains as a result of the war and the destruction of
civil infrastructure.

_The Softening of Public Opinion_

Vladimir Putin isn’t waiting for people in the West to tire of the
war in Ukraine. He is actively conducting disinformation campaigns to
speed that development.

Czech intelligence recently uncovered the latest Russian effort to
pour money into the pockets of far-right politicians in Europe who
communicate messages favorable to the Kremlin. Started by a former
pro-Russian Ukrainian politician, Voice of Europe used
“interviews”
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a way of contacting members of the European far right, strengthen
their efforts domestically, and grow the bloc of pro-Russian voices in
the European Parliament.

Perhaps the most prominent of these is Petr Bystron, the far-right
Alternative für Deutschland’s spokesperson on foreign policy
issues. In one recording, Bystron “can be heard complaining to a
Voice of Europe official about the difficulty of transporting tens of
thousands in cash to his vacation home in Mallorca.” He’s now
being investigated on charges of corruption and money-laundering.

Despite this Russian campaign, public opinion hasn’t budged much. In
the spring 2024 Eurobarometer poll
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percent of respondents supports providing military equipment as they
did in the fall 2023 poll. Much larger majorities continue to support
sanctions against Russia (72 percent today compared to 72 percent in
the fall) and provide financial support to Ukraine (70 percent today
versus 72 percent in the fall). Obviously, these results differ from
country to country
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with Hungarians and Italians largely opposed to military assistance
while those in northern Europe strongly supporting it.

In the United States, despite the delay in getting the legislation to
a vote, an overwhelming majority in the House supported the aid
package to Ukraine: 311 to 112, with all the opposition coming from
Republicans. But even Republicans are finding their courage to stick
up for Ukraine, with the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Michael McCaul (R-TX), aggressively pushing
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Biden administration to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of U.S.
weapons. McCaul’s performance suggests that even if Donald Trump
wins in November, the mandarins of his party might still marginalize
the MAGA caucus on the issue of Ukrainian assistance and join with
Democrats to overcome any presidential vetoes.

At the level of U.S. public opinion, the only change has been among
Republican voters
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After a dip in 2023, 36 percent of Democrats believe the United States
doesn’t provide enough assistance to Ukraine—compared to 38
percent immediately after the invasion. Republicans, on the other
hand, have gone from 49 percent holding the “insufficient aid”
position to 13 percent today. Trump and congressional allies like J.D.
Vance (R-OH), with a lift from the usual Russian disinformation
campaigns, have been responsible for this turnaround in Republican
sentiment.

And then there’s the most important public opinion of all:
Ukrainians. Overwhelming majorities back the current government, its
military, and the objective of not giving up any territory to Russia.
As Mark Temnycky writes
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“Ukrainians would like nothing more than for the conflict to end.
But public opinion polls show that the war needs to end on Ukraine’s
terms.”

_Stop Squabbling over Land_

In his interview with Tucker Carlson in February, Putin went deep
into history
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argue that Ukraine has always belonged to Russia, which was the real
reason for the invasion, not the threat of NATO expansion. The
Ukrainian government, meanwhile, provides its own history lesson
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demonstrate that Ukrainian language and culture, as well as control
over a particular swath of land, goes back hundreds of years.

Don’t be misled by these dueling versions of history. The Russian
government wants to create an enormous buffer between itself and the
West by transforming Ukraine into a “friendly” neighbor with a
puppet government or, at the very least, a dysfunctional state that
doesn’t pose a security threat and can’t get its act together to
join the European Union.

Ukraine, of course, wants to defend its sovereign borders. But what
motivates Ukrainians to fight on is the prospect of living under
Russian rule. Ukrainians in occupied territory have been tortured and
killed
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Children have been whisked away
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Russia for adoption (leading to last year’s International Criminal
Court arrest warrant for both Putin and his  commissioner for
“children’s rights”). Journalists have been jailed (at least 28
of them
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Democratic institutions have been gutted
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This is what the war is about: a battle between imperial barbarism and
democratic civilization (however imperfect).

_Trust Putin!_

Countries with democratic administrations can’t be trusted to abide
by treaties. Obama fought hard for the Paris climate deal; Trump nixed
it. From the outside, it just looks like the United States is an
unreliable actor.

Russia is not democratic. It hasn’t had free and fair elections
during the Putin era. But that also means that Putin, effectively
leader for life, can be expected to follow through on a commitment
since he won’t be replaced in office or face any serious political
opposition from the Duma.

But Putin can’t be trusted, certainly not on issues related to
Ukraine. He has clearly stated that he holds Western powers in
contempt and has no use for international law if it doesn’t serve
his purposes. He thumbed his nose at the Budapest Memorandum, in which
Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security
guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the UK. He has paid no
attention to the Geneva Conventions
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treatment of prisoners of war—or any of the other human rights
conventions that he has violated in his war in Ukraine.

Putin can’t even be trusted to respect force. He invaded Ukraine
knowing full well that he was potentially bringing his country into
direct confrontation with a much stronger, nuclear-capable alliance.
He rolled the dice nonetheless. The lack of democracy in the country,
in this case, makes it even less likely that he will be forced to
change his position.

_We’ll All Be Blown Up!_

Nuclear war has been a sword of Damocles hanging over the human race
since the first atomic bombs were developed. Deterrence has more or
less held the peace, though any number of near-misses nearly
destroyed
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planet anyway.

A direct confrontation between the United States and Russia carries
with it an enormous risk of escalation and apocalypse. Fortunately,
both sides have gone to some lengths to avoid a direct confrontation
over Ukraine. NATO hasn’t sent troops into battle; Russia hasn’t
bombed supply lines in NATO countries. The United States has done what
it can to limit Ukraine’s ability to strike at targets deep in
Ukraine; Russia has not invaded the Baltic countries. Neither side has
introduced tactical nuclear weapons into the conflict.

And there is good reason to believe that both sides will continue to
do their part to keep the sword of Damocles in place. Putin is a
greedy megalomaniac, but he is not a suicidal lunatic. The U.S.
government is not (yet) ruled by a madman.

But what if Putin is “backed into a corner”?

The only corner that Putin will be backed into will be at the hands of
his own people, who at some point in the future may decide that
they’ve had enough of his kleptocratic rule. Both Ukraine and the
United States are clear about the risks of destabilizing Russia, so
their “maximalist” positions are limited to returning to
Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders.

Nuclear war remains a global threat, particularly around flashpoints
like the Taiwan Strait, between India and Pakistan, and around Israel.
Certainly, the risk of escalation to nuclear war is non-zero in
Ukraine. But so far, the two nuclear powers, Russia and the United
States, have demonstrated considerable reluctance to escalate.

GIVE US PEACE…

So, there is no political support for a ceasefire right now in Kyiv or
Moscow. Ukraine is not in such desperate straits that it will trade
land for peace, and Ukrainians support a continuation of the war
despite all the hardships they must endure. The alternative, living
under Russian rule, is simply unacceptable, and Ukrainians don’t
trust the Kremlin to abide by any agreements.

Whatever scenarios transpire in Ukraine today—Russian gains,
stalemate, Ukrainian gains—the best results will be gained if Kyiv
has the stronger position at the negotiating table. And that, as Raj
Menon writes in a powerful piece
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Policy_, requires “that Ukraine boost its bargaining power by ending
Russia’s momentum, mounting its own counteroffensive, and retaking
more territory.” That, in turn, means that the United States and
allies must supply Ukraine with what it needs to stop the advance of
imperial barbarism.

St. Augustine, in the full flush of youth, famously said, “Lord,
give me chastity…but not yet.” The same can be said about the
conflict in Ukraine. Give us peace, but not yet.

_More articles [[link removed]] by John Feffer_

_Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) is a “Think Tank Without Walls”
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* Ukraine
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* Russia
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* Vladimir Putin
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* Volodymyr Zelensky
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