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THE ISRAELI WAR ON GAZA: POST-WAR SCENARIOS  
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Omar Shaban
April 30, 2024
Arab Reform Initiative
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_ The war on Gaza, with all the killing and destruction it has
caused, must provide a historic opportunity to start a new path
towards a landmark settlement that ends the century-old conflict and
achieves stability and peace in the Middle East _

Palestinians at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Rafah, southern
Gaza Strip, April 18, 2024, Abed Rahim Khatib/Flash90

 

The attack of October 7th 2023 was a pivotal event at the local and
international levels, ushering in a new era in the life of the
Palestinian people and relations with  the conflict with the Israeli
occupation. For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, Israel was subjected to a surprise attack by militants
belonging to armed organizations, not an organized army, who broke
through the border and reached about 14 small towns in southern
Israel, inflicting a number of Israeli and foreign civilian and
military casualties, and kidnapped and held hostage dozens of
civilians, military personnel and non-Israeli foreigners.

The Hamas-Jihadist attack came as a shocking surprise to everyone,
Israel, the world, the Palestinian people, and a large part of the
leadership and members of Hamas itself and Palestinian society in
general, because there were no indications of the possibility of such
an event taking place. A few hours after the attack, Israel launched
its war on the Gaza Strip in general and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in
particular. This war, which is still going on for the 205th day as of
this writing, is one in which Israel used all means of killing,
destruction, death, and starvation, amounting to genocide, with
a case [[link removed]] submitted to
the International Criminal Court by the State of South Africa.

The Israeli government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu and the War
Cabinet set goals
[[link removed]] for
the war: 1), to free the hostages held in the Gaza Strip, and 2), to
eliminate Hamas’ military capabilities, and undermine the regime it
runs in the Gaza Strip, and 3) ensure that Gaza will not pose a future
threat to Israel's security.  These objectives, if realized, will
necessarily produce radical changes in Gaza's system of governance,
and their effects will be long-lasting. Research and policy
analysis centers
[[link removed]] have
been studying the concepts and scenarios of the results of this war
and what it will entail in the short, medium, and long term. Israeli
Prime Minister Netanyahu has referred
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in Gaza as the second war of independence for the State of Israel,
 just as the Palestinian Nakba was the first war of independence, and
the term "the day after the war on the Gaza Strip" is commonly used by
Israeli politicians as a term that refers to transcending the presence
of Hamas in the future of the Gaza Strip.

However, the Israeli government, represented by its leaders or the War
Cabinet, was unable to present a clear vision for this future,
although they expressed some features of it in the context of the
military campaign, such as Israeli ministers declaring repeatedly that
they do not want UNRWA, the Palestinian National Authority, or Fatah
to participate in the future of Gaza. These Israeli goals partially
intersected with the US vision of dealing with the war on Gaza,
which was represented
[[link removed]] in
the vision of US Secretary of State Blinken: First, defeating Hamas
and rejecting a role for it as part of Gaza's future, second: the US
refusal to displace the population of Gaza, and third, the refusal of
Israel permanently reoccupying Gaza. Talking about the day after the
war became one of the most important results of the convergence of the
desire to defeat Hamas. While recognizing that the answer to the
question "What comes the day after the war?" carries with
it divergent views
[[link removed]]:
the United States wants to see a Palestinian National Authority with
radical reforms in the Gaza Strip, while Israel opposes the presence
of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and does not want to
see unity within the Palestinian political system.

The day after the war: Possible scenarios

This paper attempts to anticipate the future by examining possible
scenarios for managing the Gaza Strip after the end of the war and
analyzing the possibilities and obstacles of each scenario.

Before reviewing these scenarios, it should be noted that the question
of the day after the war on Gaza has become an important question to
be answered by Israel after the failure of the plan to deport the
residents of the Gaza Strip to Egypt. Israel tried to gain Western
sympathy in the first days of the war to pass the plan to deport Gaza
residents, but this plan failed because of Arab and international
rejection, especially from Egypt, which firmly refused to open its
territory [[link removed]], in addition to the
resistance of the residents of Gaza and their refusal to be deported
again. Netanyahu and the Israeli War Cabinet went on to destroy all
forms of life in the Gaza Strip by targeting all the basic elements of
life, such as water, energy, and sanitation networks, shelling
hospitals, schools, churches, and mosques, in addition to turning to
rubble all government offices, residential towers and hundreds of
thousands of housing units as well as refusing to allow in fuel and
rationing food and medical aid, in an attempt to submit life in Gaza
to the power of death. Interestingly, it is the US administration that
has taken the initiative to develop scenarios to manage the governance
of the Gaza Strip after the war.

Blinken's multiple visits to the region during the first months of the
war came within the framework of presenting scenarios for governing
the Gaza Strip after the end of the war, as the US administration
identifies with Israel’s goal and continues to support by all means
its war against the Palestinian people in Gaza. In his meeting with
Arab foreign ministers in Jordan, the US Secretary of State put
forward the idea of managing the Gaza Strip through a joint Arab
force, a proposal that was rejected by the foreign ministers. This
prompted him to visit President Mahmoud Abbas and present the proposal
to him, which Abbas conditionally accepted the governance and
management of the Gaza Strip but only within a political process that
leads to a Palestinian state according to international legitimacy
resolutions, which Israel certainly rejects. In light of these
changes, the Israeli war on Gaza opened the door wide for all possible
scenarios for managing the governance of the Gaza Strip, and some of
the possible scenarios are as follows:

1- Hamas containment scenario

This scenario assumes that the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip will not
intentionally or effectively succeed in eliminating Hamas, but the
continuous Israeli pressure on Hamas using all means of war, including
killing, destruction, starvation, and humiliation, will push it to
make fundamental concessions that affect the foundations and
principles of the movement. These concessions include recognizing
Israel's right to exist, renouncing violence, and accepting a
political-negotiating approach. The movement may then have the
opportunity to survive, preserve what remains of its capabilities,
participate in governing the Strip, and engage in its reconstruction
on new political bases. If Israel succeeds in achieving this, it will
have completely domesticated the Palestinian situation.

In a recent statement by the Hamas leadership, Khalil al-Haya said: 
Hamas is ready to abandon the military approach and give up weapons
[[link removed]] if
a Palestinian state is approved.

Arguably, this most recent Hamas position represents a radical change
from its previous positions.

Getting Hamas to abandon its military program is the strategic goal
that Israel is trying to achieve in this war, and if it succeeds, it
will have won. This would mean Hamas entering the path of compromise
and abandoning the armed struggle, which is the same scenario the PLO
had in 1982, after Israel invaded Beirut and PLO forces and its head
at the time, Yasser Arafat, left the country. Israel would have
succeeded in maintaining the separation of the Gaza Strip from the
West Bank and keeping the Palestinian political divide intact, thus
not having to respond to international and regional calls for the need
to open a political track for the conflict that ends with a two-state
solution. This scenario also guarantees Israel freedom of security and
military action in the Gaza Strip, including raids, arrests, and
suppression of any Palestinian resistance, without an actual military
presence on the ground. This scenario has strong prospects because it
is consistent with Israel's traditional policy toward Hamas since
it took control
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the Strip in 2007, which is a policy of mowing the grass rather than
eliminating it. There has been a change in the stated goal of the
Israeli war on Gaza from eliminating Hamas and overthrowing its rule
to destroying the group's military capabilities and preventing it from
repeating the October 7th attack. A report
[[link removed]] published by Al Jazeera
lists the opinions of some Israeli experts that Hamas will remain in
Gaza the day after the war and that any authority cannot fill the
vacuum, and must participate in the civil affairs of Gazans. The
realization of this scenario depends on the results of the ongoing
battle on the ground, how and when it ends, and whether Hamas will be
able to survive and realize some achievements that enable it to
possess some power cards.

Influential parties, such as Qatar and Turkey in particular, may
contribute to convincing the movement's leadership abroad to accept
this scenario, but this scenario would cause Hamas to lose the support
and allegiance of the resistance forces such as Syria, Iran, and
Hezbollah. This approach will greatly affect the future of Hamas,
especially in front of its supporters and in its ideological stance
against Israel, and may lead to a partial collapse and a split in the
movement, in addition to the major rift that may occur with other
resistance factions such as Islamic Jihad, and the axis of resistance
(Hezbollah and Iran). This scenario will also find strong opposition
from some Arab parties such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which
prefer Hamas to disappear from the scene and its integration into the
Palestinian political system, as they are at odds with Hamas and the
Muslim Brotherhood.

2- Interim international, regional and local supervision of the Gaza
Strip

This scenario assumes that after the end of the war, and to fill the
vacuum that may arise as a result of the collapse of the regime in the
Gaza Strip, influential powers (USA, the European Union, Arab
countries influential in the Palestinian case, Egypt and Jordan in
particular) may be forced to form an Arab and international force with
the participation of local representatives from Gaza to manage the
Strip. This entity will manage the reconstruction process and
supervise sectors such as education and health and may be supported by
an external military force to maintain security, such as a UN
peacekeeping force.

This scenario is very much on the table, as Arab countries
have announced their readiness
[[link removed](alhurra.com)] to
send troops to the Gaza Strip to contribute to its security. The
realization of this scenario is mainly linked to Israel's success in
achieving all of its goals and effectively eliminating Hamas and
weakening it to the point where it cannot resist. The resistance
factions
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announced their rejection of this proposal. This scenario, even if it
is on the table, requires a legitimate cover from the Arab League or
the United Nations as well as acceptance by the Palestinian Authority,
which may see this scenario as a transgression against it, especially
in light of the legitimacy of Palestinian representation in the PLO
and questions over the roles the Arab participants wish to play in the
Gaza Strip, especially since they may not be eager to engage in the
quagmire of the Gaza Strip in the absence of a permanent political
solution
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Under this scenario, the PA would not be able to extend its control
from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip. Over time and as the situation
evolves, its presence in the West Bank would be eliminated by moving
its center to the Gaza Strip, or by replacing it entirely with another
authority in the Gaza Strip. The outcome of this path could be the
realization of a two-state solution by establishing a Palestinian
state in the Gaza Strip, which could enjoy certain aspects of
sovereignty. The price for this would be to keep the status of
Jerusalem and the West Bank suspended and separate from that of the
Gaza Strip, while keeping hope aflame, in line with a step-by-step
policy, that the fate of that area will be dealt with in the future.
Of course, land annexation, Judaization, and settlement will continue
until Israel ends up swallowing the entire West Bank, including
Jerusalem.

3- The scenario of returning the authority to the Gaza Strip

This scenario requires Israel to agree to enable the Palestinian
National Authority to reorganize itself in the Gaza Strip, including
security control over the Strip, which may require recruiting local
elements, bringing in forces from the West Bank or diaspora refugee
camps, or containing the existing security forces in the Gaza Strip
according to new security principles and doctrine. The PA favors this
scenario, as it has already prepared itself for it after Prime
Minister Mohammed Ishtia resigned and President Abbas appointed
Mohammed Mustafa to form a new government, predominantly from experts
and technocrats, in response to repeated calls from the European Union
and the United States for the reforming of the PA. This scenario
requires Palestinians to build genuine Palestinian reconciliation,
form a national technocratic government that would be tasked with
rebuilding the Gaza Strip under international auspices, curb Israel's
aggressive policies, establish Palestinian elections, and introduce
political reforms in the structure of the political system to prevent
the escalation of the conflict and unify the Palestinian decision in
time of peace and war, paving the way for a political path in the
future.

The Israeli government announced earlier that it would not allow
a Fatahistan
[[link removed]] state
in the Gaza Strip, as this scenario would force Israel to go through a
comprehensive political process that would eventually lead to a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, a
change in Israel's attitude toward the PA has become evident with
secret meetings held between influential Palestinian security figures
and Israel. Given these changes in Israeli attitudes, it is worth
considering the price Israel will demand from the PA for allowing it
to administer the Gaza Strip after the war, which will be in the
context of completing Israel's mission to eliminate
[[link removed]] pockets
of resistance and prevent them from being armed.

However, if this scenario is the most likely to happen, then the
survival of Hamas as an active part of the Palestinian political
system depends on three factors. The first factor is the acceptance of
Hamas to fully integrate into the structure of the political system,
abandon dependence on the resistance axis, and abide by the PLO
agreements, without requiring it to explicitly recognize the State of
Israel. The second is the extent of the international community's
enthusiasm to accept the presence of Hamas in the Palestinian
political system the day after the war. And the third factor is
Fatah's acceptance of Hamas in the political system after its defeat
and declining strength, as undoubtedly Fatah views Hamas as a
political rival that has repeatedly presented itself as an
alternative.

4- Scenario of the return of the Israeli civil administration to the
Gaza Strip

This scenario assumes that the Israeli military will remain present
– permanently or temporarily – in the Gaza Strip the day after the
war. This scenario is imposed in specific parts of the Gaza Strip,
such as the northern area, Gaza City, and even the center of the
Strip, without being applied in the southern area of the Strip, which
includes the governorates of Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah. If
so, it will require re-establishing the civil administration in the
same fashion the occupation forces used to run the Gaza Strip before
withdrawing from it in 1994 under the Oslo Accord. Under this
scenario, the occupation forces would provide services to the
residents of the Gaza Strip, and the army and Shin Bet would take over
the security management of the Gaza Strip. This scenario will also
push the Israeli army to strengthen measures it has already put in
place, such as what is known as the logistics road linking Israel and
Gaza City, which has become like the border of the buffer zone between
northern and southern Gaza. This road is equipped with two military
posts on the Gaza shore and near Salah al-Din Street, with both posts
equipped with air-conditioned rooms and sleeping quarters for soldiers
similar to those in the West Bank. In addition, the establishment of
the port in an area south of Gaza City indicates that the measures
taken are not for the short term but may remain effective in the long
term.

This scenario requires the complete elimination of Hamas's power in
the Gaza Strip, especially in Gaza City and northern Gaza. In any
case, Israel has considerable experience in civilian administration of
PNA areas, and so it will not start from scratch, especially with its
tendency in recent years to deploy mobile apps that directly address
Palestinian citizens and facilitate communication with them, such as
the "Coordinator's App." However, the cost of this option is very high
for Israel, both in human and financial capital, especially given the
deteriorating living conditions of citizens in the Gaza Strip after
the war, the cost of reconstruction, and its assumption of full
responsibility for providing services to citizens as the occupying
power and its need to manage popular resistance and Palestinian and
regional rejection of occupation. This option would make Israel the
occupier of all Palestinian territories, a return to the pre-Oslo era,
and would mean the end of the two-state solution. This scenario was
rejected by the United States and Europe, which clearly demanded that
Israel not remain in the Gaza Strip and that the PNA return to it. In
mid-February 2024, Blinken announced the US rejection of any "new
occupation" of Gaza after the end of the war, in response to
Netanyahu's announcement
[[link removed]] of a plan for
after the end of the ongoing war in the Strip.

5- Restoring village ties with Israeli military rule

This scenario is based on the formation of a group of Palestinian
local administrations made up of family, tribal, and community figures
to manage the life affairs of Palestinian citizens in their areas of
influence and cooperate with the international community in the
reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, while the issue of security remains
in the hands of the Israeli army. This would be similar to the
administrative formations established by Israel in 1978 to manage the
Palestinian areas in the West Bank and create an alternative
leadership to the PLO that is locally acceptable. It should be noted
here that since November 2023, the occupation forces have begun
communicating with tribal figures to explore the prospects of managing
the Gaza Strip through local collaborators working at this stage to
manage the humanitarian aid file. However, the occupation forces did
not achieve any breakthrough in this regard as of the time of the
writing of this paper, in light of a public refusal to cooperate with
the occupation. The Gaza Mukhtars Association announced their refusal
to cooperate with the Israeli war government to manage the affairs of
the Gaza Strip. Gaza's tribes and families announced their rejection
of the Israeli proposal through an official statement
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an alternative to any political system." Hamas also rejected
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Israel's attempt to communicate with Gaza's mukhtars and clans "a
betrayal that we will not allow." This scenario is difficult to
realize for two reasons; first, Israel will not find acceptable family
or local figures in the Gaza Strip with influence and tribal respect
that would accept to play this role, as it is a national betrayal, in
addition to the Palestinian Authority and Arab countries in the region
rejecting it, not to mention that it would fuel popular resistance in
the Gaza Strip against it. This scenario has been proven to fail in
the past
[[link removed]] when
Israel tried to form village associations in the West Bank as an
alternative to the Palestinian leadership.

6- Egyptian management of the Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip represents strategic depth for Egypt, which
administered the Gaza Strip from 1948 until June 1967, when Israel
occupied the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt may have to
play this role to fill any vacuum that may arise as a result of
Hamas's military defeat and the fear that extremist terrorist forces
will fill this vacuum, as Egypt has bitter experience in the war
against terrorism in Sinai, whose borders are connected to the
southern Gaza Strip. Egypt would not necessarily administer the Gaza
Strip directly but could do so by expanding the influence of the
Egyptian intelligence service in the Gaza Strip, as it is currently
doing in eastern Libya, which is controlled by General Khalifa Haftar
without an actual Egyptian administration. This means that Egypt may
view the border that Israel is trying to impose in the northern Gaza
Strip through what is known as Route 749 as the border of its national
security area, similar to the Sirte-Jufra line, which Egypt set up in
2020 and declared it to be its area of influence and a red line
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security.

Although this option is unattractive from the Egyptian point of view
at the moment, important factors may push it to consider this scenario
in one form or another. These are: (1) Egypt's national security, (2)
the desire to benefit from the gas fields in the Gaza Strip, where
Egypt, represented by the Egyptian Gas Holding Company (EGAS),
previously signed an agreement with the Palestinian National Authority
to develop the Marin Gaza gas field
[[link removed]],
and (3) Egypt's desire to manage the reconstruction process and
benefit from contracts for large-scale infrastructure rehabilitation
operations expected to be launched after the war on Gaza. On the
Palestinian side in particular, Hamas may view Egypt's management of
the Gaza Strip as a way to preserve itself from completely
disappearing as a result of the occupation of the Gaza Strip. However,
this scenario would not be welcomed by the Palestinian Authority,
which considers the Gaza Strip an essential part of the territory of
the Palestinian state, giving it the exclusive right to govern the
Strip.

A perspective on what Gazans aspire to the day after the war

In reviewing the various scenarios for the situation in the Gaza Strip
the day after the end of the war, it is important to take into account
what the Gazans themselves, the first and foremost stakeholders in
this context, aspire and expect. After the end of the war, civilians
in the Gaza Strip look for a future of peace and prosperity. The wars
and escalations of the past 17 years have cast a bloody shadow on the
daily lives of the population, and the people of Gaza are steadfast in
their desire to end the cycle of violence and build a bright future
for the next generations
[[link removed]]. The
Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip are demanding an end to the
war and a Palestinian leadership capable of bringing peace and
stability to civilians, promoting reconstruction, and implementing
development projects that restore the health system, food security,
job opportunities, and freedom of travel, demands they have been
making since the imposition of the blockade on the Gaza Strip in June
2007.

The humanitarian crises in the Gaza Strip are threatening the lives of
hundreds of civilians, in addition to the scourge of the war, which
has destroyed the economic life and future of thousands of young
people. People in the Gaza Strip aspire to restore the democracy they
have been deprived of since 2007 by holding parliamentary,
presidential, and university council elections. On the tenth
anniversary of the division in 2017, PalThink published an open
letter [[link removed]] signed by 52 NGOs
calling on the Palestinian government to hold local government
elections in the Gaza Strip.

This would lead to a phase of stability and development with a unified
and youthful Palestinian political system, working with all available
means to achieve political and development goals and build a better
future for all. This was emphasized in the research paper published by
MIFTAH in 2021, which included the following: civil society
organizations affirm their position that local elections must be held
in accordance with the requirements of the law, and believe that there
is still time for the government, political forces and parties to stop
the first phase and not to fragment the elections
[[link removed]] and
hold them on one day and in all governorates.

Gazans also aspire to begin the process of rebuilding what was
destroyed by the multiple wars, which caused a significant
deterioration in all economic and social indicators.  The citizens of
the Gaza Strip realize that the years of siege and multiple wars have
not achieved any political goal for the Palestinian people, but rather
have been a huge burden on them and an obstacle to the realization of
the Palestinian national project. It is worth mentioning here that the
preparations for the legislative elections that were scheduled for May
2021 witnessed the submission
[[link removed]] of
36 electoral lists to participate in the elections, 26 of which were
formed by young people who are not known and are not from the
traditional Palestinian political system. The residents of the Gaza
Strip are part of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and
Jerusalem, and since the division and the suspension of the nascent
democratic process, they have not stopped demanding an end to this
division
[[link removed]] and
the holding of elections.

The citizens of the Gaza Strip believe that the best and only scenario
for them is to be under an elected Palestinian national leadership
that represents them and works to achieve their goals and aspirations.

Conclusion

It may be easy to start a war, but it is not easy to end it, and it is
even more difficult to decide the day after. This is true of Israel's
seven-month war on the Gaza Strip. At the beginning of the war, the
objectives were clear, as announced by the Israeli War Cabinet, but as
time passes these objectives seem less clear and unfulfilled. Hamas
has not been completely defeated, the hostages have not been freed,
and the population of Gaza has not been abandoned. The ambiguity of
how to end the war and decide the next day stems from the fact that
most proposals are “wishful thinking” and are out of touch with
reality. The October 7th offensive was indeed a pivotal event that can
be said to mark a new historical era in the life of the Palestinian
people, an era that is currently being termed "the day after the war
on Gaza." This term has become synonymous with the unknown future of
Gaza, not only from the Palestinian perspective but also from the
Israeli and regional perspectives, as positions within the Israeli
government, as well as within the War Cabinet, diverged towards the
future of Gaza. This means that discussing the issue of the day after
the war on Gaza may take us  to think about the future of the current
Israeli government, whose possible fall would represent the fall of
the Israeli extreme right-wing forces and the fall of Israeli
proposals to displace the population of the Gaza Strip. It may also
represent the fall of normalization proposals between some Arab
countries and Israel without resolving the Palestinian issue. It can
be said with confidence that the war on Gaza has not only destroyed
the Gaza Strip but also dispelled political ideas and extremist
proposals that some in Israel and the region thought were achievable.

Therefore, we must go to the most realistic scenario, one that is most
consistent with the principles of international law and legitimacy. It
is a scenario that is based on ending the Israeli occupation of the
Palestinian territories and enabling the Palestinians to restore unity
and decide on the form of the political system they want and the way
to achieve it freely and without external interference. The war on the
Gaza Strip, with all the killing and destruction it has caused, must
provide a historic opportunity to start a new path towards a landmark
settlement that ends the century-old conflict and achieves stability
and peace in the Middle East.

The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its
staff, or its board.

_OMAR SHABAN is the director of PalThink for Strategic Studies,
Palestine ._

_THE ARAB REFORM INITIATIVE: [[link removed]]
In 2004, policy research centres from ten Arab countries, four
European think tanks, and one from the United States collaborated to
set the agenda for political and social reforms in the region based on
the priorities that the region’s societies themselves formulated.
ARI BECAME A THINK TANK IN ITS OWN RIGHT with 20 peer partners
across the region, acting as resources for exclusive knowledge on
their respective governments and societies._

_ARI’s strategy has evolved over the years, reflecting changes in
the avenues for achieving democratic reform._

_The Arab reform initiative [[link removed]]
(ARI) is a collaborative think tank established in 2004 to articulate
a home-grown agenda for democratic change in the Arab region._

_ARI strives to become the leading regional hub for progressive ideas
supporting inclusive democracy, full and equal citizenship, social
justice, and environmental justice in the Arab region._

_We operate on the principles of impartiality, gender equality, and
diversity and work to foster vibrant democratic societies in the Arab
countries. ARI conducts research, policy analysis, and policy
dialogues, while providing a platform for inspirational voices._

_ARI’s focus areas have expanded to address social justice issues,
political economy, and pressing environmental concerns from a
perspective of justice, good governance, and sustainability._

_ARI has evolved its partnerships to include new research centres,
initiatives, independent media, and emerging political and social
actors such as youth and feminist movements, diasporas, and
professional syndicates._

_influence policy was by BUILDING PRESSURE FROM BELOW to instigate
long-term social and institutional change._

_FOLLOWING 2011, ARI’s work shifted towards ACCOMPANYING AND
CONSOLIDATING THE TRANSITION OUT OF AUTHORITARIANISM by addressing
how street mobilization could lead to genuine political
participation._

_A third phase followed, as the legacy of authoritarian rule and the
proliferation of terrorism destabilized and created conflict in
several countries. IN THIS DEFINING MOMENT, THE ARI COMMUNITY FELT
THE NEED TO MAKE A DIFFERENT KIND OF CONTRIBUTION._

* _First, by producing analytical work that alerts to the risks of
breaking up national entities._
* _Second, by defining security arrangements and developing
comprehensive security frameworks that set the stage for permanent
political organization._
* _Third, by providing a platform for citizens to articulate new
terms and principles to guide the process of rebuilding their national
body._

* Gaza
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* Israel
[[link removed]]
* Palestine
[[link removed]]

*
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*
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