ISIS carried out at least 42 confirmed attacks in April in the Homs, Hama,
Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 50 pro-Assad
regime soldiers and six civilians and wounded at least 23 more soldiers and
civilians. There were also 12 high quality* attacks carried out during the
month. The level of violence in April did not approach that of March, but
nonetheless qualified as an abnormally active month in the Badia, and there
were more attacks and high quality attacks than in both January and February.
Notably, April was the first month this year with fewer than 10 civilian
deaths. ISIS targeted civilians at a much lower rate compared to previous
months, with two thirds of all attacks directed against security forces and
nearly all civilian deaths resulting from mines or improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). This change likely reflects the truffle season coming to a close and
civilians increasingly avoiding entering the desert.





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In April 2024


Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In April 2024 by clicking here
<[link removed]>
.



ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In April 2024

By Gregory Waters



Following is the April 2024 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. All previous 2024 monthly installments can be foundhere
<[link removed]>, as well as a
review of developments throughout2023
<[link removed]>,
2022
<[link removed]>
, and2021
<[link removed]>.
A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also beexplored here
<[link removed]>, here
<[link removed]>
, andhere
<[link removed]>
.



ISIS carried out at least 42 confirmed attacks in April in the Homs, Hama,
Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 50 pro-Assad
regime soldiers and six civilians and wounded at least 23 more soldiers and
civilians. There were also 12 high quality* attacks carried out during the
month. The level of violence in April did not approach that of March, but
nonetheless qualified as an abnormally active month in the Badia, and there
were more attacks and high quality attacks than in both January and February.
Notably, April was the first month this year with fewer than 10 civilian
deaths. ISIS targeted civilians at a much lower rate compared to previous
months, with two thirds of all attacks directed against security forces and
nearly all civilian deaths resulting from mines or improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). This change likely reflects the truffle season coming to a close and
civilians increasingly avoiding entering the desert.



ISIS did not experience as much success in April capturing regime outposts as
in March. Still, the group managed to maintain consistent serious operations
against the critical Taybeh-Kawm axis while also ambushing regime transports
and outposts across Homs, Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor. Russia also continued its
extremely active bombing campaign against both static ISIS targets and in
providing close air support during larger ISIS attacks against fixed regime
positions.According <[link removed]>
to journalist Zain al-Abidin, these airstrikes killed at least 15 ISIS fighters
during the month, bringing the number of confirmed ISIS deaths in the Badia
this year to 61.



Despite these losses, which include the loss of several trucks, ISIS cells
maintained an aggressive posture, carrying out 12 high quality attacks,
capturing several regime positions, and even using mortars and an anti-tank
guided missile (ATGM) in two attacks —an extremely rare occurrence in the
Badia. As in March, fewer than one third of all attacks in April relied on
mines or IEDs, again indicating a more aggressive ISIS posture. Most mine
incidents occurred in southern Raqqa, where ISIS had issued a warning to locals
in the beginning of the month not to venture into the countryside or they would
be considered “spies” of the regime and targeted.



*Indicates attacks in Damascus City claimed by ISIS. Two additional IED
attacks occurred in Homs City in June 2023 and Damascus in March 2024 that went
unclaimed but were suspected to be conducted by ISIS.



Confirmed ISIS attacks decreased in April in every governorate compared to
March. The biggest drops came in Homs (13) and Hama (4), with smaller drops in
Deir Ez Zor (13) and Raqqa (12). No attacks were recorded in Aleppo.



Deir Ez Zor and Raqqa



ISIS expanded its low-level insurgency within the urban belt of Deir Ez Zor in
January, when it conducted three assassinations of local security members.
Sleeper cells continued this trend in February, carrying out two assassinations
of local pro-regime fighters inside Mayadin city, and again in March, when
unidentified gunmen conducted three attacks inside Mayadin and one attack on
the edge of Shamitiyah. This pattern continued into April, with two attacks
inside and one adjacent to towns in Deir Ez Zor.



On April 3, two civilians were killed by a mine near Harbisha, west of Shoula,
while two others were killed by a mine in the countryside north of Deir Ez Zor
City. ISIS cells also attacked a regime position in the Tabni countryside,
killing one soldier. On April 5, ISIS conducted three attacks in west Deir Ez
Zor. First, cells targeted a regime position in a house on the outskirts of
Shamitiyah, killing two soldiers from the 17th Division and wounding three
others (it is worth noting that in March, ISIS carried out a similarly deadly
attack inside this same town, killing a colonel). To the northwest, another
ISIS cell attacked the Majbal checkpoint along the highway outside Maadan Atiq,
near the border with Raqqa, killing two National Defense Forces (NDF) fighters.
Later that evening, a third attack targeted a regime barracks in the
countryside outside of Tabni.



On April 8, three local fighters from an Iranian-backed militia were killed
when their position was attacked in the Mayadin desert near Muzailiyah. That
same day, ISIS fighters attacked and robbed a group of truffle hunters in the
west Deir Ez Zor countryside, though they left all alive (presumably because
they were women and an elderly man). On April 15, a 17th Division position was
attacked in the nearby Dweir desert. ISIS cells returned to Tabni on April 18,
targeting another 17th Division position in the countryside outside the town.
There were no known casualties from these three attacks.



According to Zain al-Abidin, ISIS conducted another insider attack inside
Mayadin on April 26, firing on a military intelligence patrol and wounding one
of the officers. Leaflets then appeared in part of the city threatening all
locals who work with the regime and Iran. The next day, two Iraqi foreign
fighters operating under Iran’s control were killed in an attack in the Mayadin
countryside. On April 28, at least one local NDF fighter was killed in an
attack in the Masrib countryside in west Deir Ez Zor, near Tabni.



In Raqqa, ISIS’s low-level but significant insurgency escalated in March and
has continued since then, focused around Maadan and the Resafa countryside. As
in March, most of the mine or IED incidents in April occurred in Raqqa. On
April 3, two mine incidents occurred in the Maadan countryside, one damaging a
tractor in a field and the second killing a civilian and wounding another. On
April 7, a woman was wounded by a mine while truffle hunting outside Maadan,
while that same day an ISIS cell fired mortars at a Liwa al-Quds position in
the area. This was the first ISIS mortar attack since October 23, 2023, when
mortars landed outside Sukhnah. On April 8, two more mine incidents occurred in
the Maadan desert, leaving one civilian dead and two wounded. On April 14, a
woman was wounded by a mine outside Ghanem Ali, west of Maadan.



On April 17, an ISIS cell attacked an oil convoy on the Tabqa-Ithriya road in
southwest Raqqa, damaging some of the vehicles. The next day, a local NDF
member was wounded by a mine outside Resafa. On April 23, a civilian was
wounded by a mine outside Sabkha, near Maadan. And on April 27, ISIS cells
conducted two attacks against regime positions in Raqqa. The first targeted a
regime position south of Tabqa, leaving three soldiers dead and four wounded
during a protracted battle that included the deployment of regime
reinforcements and Russian airstrikes. The second occurred near Bir Rahum,
south of Resafa, resulting in an unknown number of casualties.




Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in Dier Ez Zor (top) and Raqqa
(bottom) in April 2024 alongside all other attacks in 2024.



Homs



ISIS activity in eastern Homs decreased in December, but remained focused
around the Doubayat Oil Field, which the group had temporarily captured in
November. January likewise saw most ISIS activity concentrated in this area,
though the group also expanded operations west into the desert just south of
Palmyra and Arak. In February, ISIS largely abandoned the southern Palmyra
front, likely because of pro-regime ground and air operations, and shifted its
focus to the Taybeh sector north of Sukhnah and the Jubb Jarah mountains north
of Palmyra. This focus continued into March, with activity remaining
concentrated in the Sukhnah-Taybeh-Kawm axis in April. However, security forces
continued to largely stand their ground.



On April 1, ISIS ambushed a truck carrying 18th Division soldiers southeast of
the T3 Station, killing five. The next day, local Facebook pages reported the
disappearance of a civilian from Palmyra who had been truffle hunting near
Taybeh. On April 7, ISIS cells conducted two large attacks, one targeting
regime positions west of Sukhnah, in which at least one soldier was killed, and
the other north of Kawm. According to Zain al-Abidin, Russian jets were called
in to hit the attackers near Kawm as well as suspected ISIS positions south of
Sukhnah near Doubayat.



On April 14, local Facebook pages reported the theft of 150 sheep from
shepherds outside the village of Jabab Hamad, south of Jubb Jarah and just 30
miles outside of Homs City. The next day, ISIS cells again targeted military
vehicles east of the T3 Station, this time shooting at trucks belonging to the
Iranian-led Afghan Fatemiyoun. On April 18, ISIS captured a checkpoint east of
Sukhnah, looting it before withdrawing. The biggest attack of the month
occurred on the same day, when ISIS fighters ambushed a truck loaded with Liwa
al-Quds fighters traveling between Kawm and Taybeh. The attack killed all 21 of
the militiamen, and ISIS later claimed responsibility and published a picture
of the immediate aftermath. On April 21, three Military Intelligence soldiers
were ambushed and killed while also traveling near Taybeh as part of the regime
reinforcements sent to that front.



The next day, ISIS militants target the T3 Station itself, which has been
defended by tanks from the 4th Division since late March. On April 24, ISIS
members fired on a regime truck with an ATGM just two miles east of Sukhnah,
though they missed the vehicle. This was the seventh documented ATGM attack in
the Badia since the ISIS insurgency began, the others occurring in 2019 (2),
2020 (1), 2021 (1), and 2022 (2). On April 26, ISIS again carried out two large
attacks in Kawm and Sukhnah. One resulted in the capture and looting of two
regime positions west of Sukhnah while the other, involving a large group of
militants, resulted in the deaths of at least two Afghan foreign fighters in
Kawm and the intervention of Russian jets, according to reporter Zain al-Abidin.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Homs (highlighted) in April 2024 alongside
all other attacks in 2024.



Hama



Significant ISIS activity returned to east Hama in January, when the group
conducted five attacks in the province, three of which were deemed high
quality. Likewise, ISIS conducted three high quality attacks in eastern Hama in
February. This was the first time eastern Hama had back-to-back months of three
or more high quality attacks since spring of 2021, amid the regime’s
semi-successful campaign to suppress ISIS activity in the province. March
continued this trend with five high quality and 12 total attacks, almost all
against security forces. However, activity reduced significantly in April, with
only four confirmed attacks all month.



On April 1, the bodies of four local men, all from the same family and serving
in the NDF were found east of Tel Salamah. On April 6, a soldier was wounded in
clashes near Tanahij. On April 11, a young teenager was wounded by a mine while
tending to sheep in the Sa’an district and on April 16, a young girl was
wounded by a mine outside her town of Soha.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Hama (highlighted) in April 2024 alongside
all other attacks in 2024.



Looking Ahead



The reduction of ISIS activity in April compared to March should not be taken
as a sign that the group is now on its backfoot in the Badia. As this author
said in last month’s report, what we saw in March was unprecedented and would
not continue into April. However, that does not mean March was a total
aberration. What we are witnessing is a clear, six months and counting trend of
elevated ISIS activity in the Badia.



It remains deeply concerning that ISIS cells have been able to maintain such a
high degree of activity nearly unabated since October 2023, despite multiple
regime operations that either stunted or pushed back ISIS’s offensives. During
this period, ISIS has demonstrated a clear ability to adapt to the regime’s
defenses, moving significant manpower and resources to new fronts and
apparently withstanding a low but sustained degree of attrition from Russian
airstrikes. Again, it must be emphasized that all signs point to ISIS having
successfully replenished at least some of its manpower and equipment over the
past two years.



All of this ISIS activity is occurring simultaneously with ISIS’s equally
elevated and sustained degree of activity in northeast Syria. As analyst
Charles Listerreported
<[link removed]>
last month, “According to SDF authorities, there were 30-40% increases
consecutively each month from January, more than 115 attacks recorded in
total,” nearly matching the 135 attacks conducted in the Badia during that
time. Never before has ISIS carried out such a significant and simultaneous
surge in attacks in both central and northeast Syria. It is unclear how
effective the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Coalition’s counter-ISIS
activities have been of late. According to a Coalitionannouncement
<[link removed]> on April 22, the SDF
has only conducted 28 counter-ISIS operations during the first three and a half
months of the year, resulting in 27 detained and seven killed ISIS members.
However, 16 militants were detained in just one of these operations, calling
into question the success of the majority of the 28 operations. All of this
points to the worrying possibility that the SDF and Coalition are now
struggling to uncover and remove ISIS networks in the northeast faster than
they are being created.



It remains unclear how long ISIS will sustain this level of activity in both
central and northeast Syria. History suggests the group will have to reduce
attacks at some point in order to rest, refit, and recover. However, as it
currently stands, it seems that the most pressing question is whether Russia
will be able to sustain its current high level of air support longer than ISIS
can continue conducting large attacks against key regime positions. ISIS may be
attempting to outlast this airpower, hoping that it can absorb losses long
enough for the Russians to ease off, opening a hole in the defenses around Kawm
or Taybeh.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in April 2024 alongside all other
attacks in 2024. To view an interactive version of this map, please clickhere
<[link removed]>
.



*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.



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