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President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the White House on April 10, 2024, in Washington, DC. (Photo by Chen Mengtong/VCG via Getty Images)
Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell gave a high-level account [[link removed]] of the crucial United States–Japan relationship following President Joe Biden’s summit with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Read on to see his key points and analysis on why they matter from Hudson’s Japan Chair.
Watch, read, or listen to the full event. [[link removed]]
Key Insights
1. Japan sets the example for America’s other allies and partners.
“What we are involved in right now . . . is a decisive effort that involves not just Japan but other countries in the Indo-Pacific and Europe to do a proof of concept to show that it is possible, and it improves American security to work closely and actively with allies and partners.”
— Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell
Secretary Campbell’s focus on this “proof of concept” in the aftermath of Prime Minister Kishida’s historic visit to Washington, DC, was part of a “decisive effort” to show that working with allies and partners ultimately enhances US security. The US is engaged simultaneously in diplomacy, enhanced technological cooperation, and a fundamental reshaping of technology and weapons-export regulations to make way for a new era in which America’s allies and partners can take care of their own security more effectively. As this proof of concept bears fruit with Japan, it will be exported elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Accordingly, the preeminence of the US-Japan alliance goes well beyond meeting today’s challenges in the Indo-Pacific: it stands as the test for a new model of alliance relations. Our allies in Europe should pay closer attention.
— Japan Chair Ken Weinstein [[link removed]]
2. The comprehensive US-Japan alliance did not form overnight.
“But if you jump forward from the 1990s in which [a small group of experts] were deeply involved in an effort that tried to make the argument about the relevance of the US-Japan relationship, even in a post–Cold War world . . . [there was] a lot of rethinking in Japan about whether they wanted a different kind of relationship with China, thinking more about international institutions and maybe downgrading the US-Japan relationship through this period.”
— Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell
When Secretary Campbell started working on Asia in the 1990s, only a few experts understood the importance of the US-Japan alliance. Much of the focus was limited to the maintenance of US bases in Japan, especially in Okinawa. But now, bipartisan support for the alliance reflects how it has grown globally. As the Biden-Kishida summit showed, the US-Japan alliance is vital for military, economic, and technological reasons—especially in the current geostrategic environment.
— Japan Chair Fellow Komei Isozaki [[link removed]]
3. Japan is a leader in the rules-based order.
“One of the big deliverables that came out of the summit . . . was the cable project. One of the biggest challenges in the Pacific is extremely unstable and easily disrupted internet connectivity. . . . What both of our countries are seeking to do is to strengthen civil society, enhance connectivity, support stronger institutions that we think will be central and critical to addressing problems.”
— Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell
Japan, the US, and their partners like Australia and South Korea are demonstrating that the most effective way to build support for a free and open Indo-Pacific is through tangible benefits for those who live in the region. Through investments in critical infrastructure such as undersea cables, Washington and Tokyo can help promote the free flow of information, bolster civil society, and strengthen the rule of law.
— Japan Chair Fellow William Chou [[link removed]]
4. The US needs to develop greater operational coordination with Japan.
“There are manifestations of the US‐Japan relationship that were formed 70 years ago that need to be updated—that Japan has to be more integrated into how we think about operational concepts and actual application of military power. And the Japanese are demanding that they want some rethinking of how planning and operational concepts are developed. They want them not just done in the United States and Hawaii, they want them done in Japan. Completely appropriate. It will challenge us. We will need to think carefully how we make some of those changes.”
— Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell
It is important to integrate Japan into US military operational concepts. Tokyo is seeking a greater voice in policy formulation, and the US needs to accommodate it. This will require new ways of thinking here in Washington with respect to the sharing of key technologies with Japan and other allies. The red tape that has caused delays in the AUKUS technology sharing agreement among the US, the United Kingdom, and Australia is an example.
— Senior Fellow James Przystup [[link removed]]
5. Japan is key to building out the lattice-like partnership framework.
“I’ll also just point out here that [the US-Japanese alliance] is one of the singular relationships that enjoys an enormous amount of bipartisan support in Congress. . . . It sets the scene for an expansion of our multilateral framings. . . . We held a trilateral, first ever, with the Philippines, with President [Ferdinand] Marcos. In all of these evolving, new, and hopefully innovative architectures—in almost every single one—Japan plays a central, key, leading role.”
— Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell
The first US–Japan–Philippines summit is a good example of the lattice-like partnership framework. Japan and the Philippines are trying to harmonize their security policies while taking each other's domestic politics into account. This includes the US Army’s Typhoon ground-based missile system, which was deployed in the Philippines as part of a joint exercise. The dangerous security environment means Japan also needs to deploy such a system. The fact that the Philippines already hosts the missile battery could mitigate political opposition in Japan. Deft diplomacy, awareness of domestic politics, and burden-sharing across partners are pathways toward enlisting the support of defense partners such as Singapore and Thailand, as well as others in Southeast Asia.
— Japan Chair Fellow Masashi Murano [[link removed]] and Senior Fellow Riley Walters [[link removed]]
Quotes may be edited for clarity and length.
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