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IRREMEDIABLE DEFEAT: ON ISRAEL’S OTHER UNWINNABLE WAR  
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Ramzy Baroud
April 5, 2024
CounterPunch
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_ The Israeli economy, according to recent data by the country’s
Central Bureau of Statistics, has shrunk by over 20 percent in the
fourth quarter of 2023. Moreover, the army is struggling, fighting an
unwinnable war without realistic goals. _

, Image by Sohaib Al Kharsa.

 

Historically, wars unite Israelis. Not anymore.

Not that Israelis do not agree with Benjamin Netanyahu’s war; they
simply do not believe that the prime minister is the man who could win
this supposedly existential
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But Netanyahu’s war remains unwinnable simply because liberation
wars, often conducted through guerrilla warfare tactics, are far more
complicated than traditional combat. Nearly six months after the
Israeli attack on Gaza, it has become clear that Palestinian
Resistance groups are durable
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well-prepared for a much longer fight.

Netanyahu, supported by far-right ministers and an equally hardline
Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, insists that more firepower is the
answer. Though the unprecedented amount of explosives, used
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Israel in Gaza, killed and wounded over 100,000 Palestinians, an
Israeli victory, however it is defined, remains elusive.

So, what do Israelis want and, more precisely, what is their prime
minister’s end-game in Gaza, anyway?

Major opinion polls since October 7 continued
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produce similar results: the Israeli public prefers Benny Gantz,
leader of the National Unity Party, over the prime minister and his
Likud party.

A recent poll conducted
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the Israeli newspaper Maariv also indicated that one of Netanyahu’s
closest and most important coalition partners, Finance Minister and
leader of the Religious Zionist Party, Bezalel Smotrich, is virtually
irrelevant in terms of public support. If elections were to be held
today, the far-right minister’s party would not even pass the
electoral threshold.

Most Israelis are calling [[link removed]] for
new elections this year. If they are to receive their wish today, the
pro-Netanyahu coalition would only be able to muster 46 seats,
compared to its rivals with 64.

And, if the Israeli coalition government – currently controlling
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seats out of 120 Knesset seats – is to collapse, the rightwing
dominance over Israeli politics will shatter, likely for a long time.

In this scenario, all of Netanyahu’s political shenanigans, which
served him well in the past, would fall short from allowing him to
return to power, keeping in mind he is already 74 years of age.

A greatly polarized society, Israelis learned to blame an individual
or a political party for all of their woes. This is partly why
election outcomes can sharply differ between one election cycle to
another. Between April 2019 and November 2022, Israel held
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general elections, and now they are demanding yet another one.

The November 2022 elections were meant to be decisive, as they ended
years of uncertainty, and settled on the “most right-wing
government in the history of Israel” – an oft-repeated description
of Israel’s modern government coalitions.

To ensure Israel does not delve back into indecision, Netanyahu’s
government wanted to secure its gains for good. Smotrich, along with
National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, wanted to fashion a new
Israeli society that is forever tilted towards their brand of
religious and ultranationalist Zionism.

Netanyahu, on the other hand, simply wanted to hold on to power,
partly because he became too accustomed to the perks of his office,
and also because he is desperately hoping to avoid jail time due to
his several corruption trials
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To achieve this, the right and far-right parties have diligently
worked to change the rules of the game, by curtailing
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power of the judiciary and ending the oversight of the Supreme Court.
They failed at some tasks, and succeeded at others, including an
amendment to the country’s Basic Laws to curtail the power of
Israel’s highest court, thus its right to overturn the
government’s policies.

Though Israelis protested
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masse, it was clear that the initial energy of these protests,
starting in January 2023, was petering out, and that a government with
such a substantial majority – at least, per Israel’s standards –
will not easily relent.

October 7 changed all calculations.

The Palestinian Al-Aqsa Flood Operation is often examined in terms of
its military and intelligence components, if not usefulness, but
rarely in terms of its strategic outcomes. It placed Israel at a
historic dilemma that even Netanyahu’s comfortable Knesset majority
cannot – and most likely will not – be able to resolve.

Complicating matters, on January 1, the Supreme Court
officially annulled [[link removed]] the
decision by Netanyahu’s coalition to strike down the power of the
judiciary.

The news, however significant, was overshadowed by many other crises
plaguing the country, mostly blamed on Netanyahu and his coalition
partners: the military and intelligence failure leading to October 7,
the grinding war, the shrinking economy, the risk of a regional
conflict, the rift between Israel and Washington, the growing global
anti-Israel sentiment, and more.

The problems continue to pile up, and Netanyahu, the master politician
of former times, is now only hanging by the thread of keeping the war
going for as long as possible to defer his mounting crises for as long
as possible.

Yet, an indefinite war is not an option, either. The Israeli economy,
according to recent data by the country’s Central Bureau of
Statistics, has shrunk
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over 20 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023. It is likely to
continue its free fall in the coming period.

Moreover, the army is struggling, fighting an unwinnable war without
realistic goals. The only major source for new recruits can
be obtained
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ultra-Orthodox Jews, who have been spared the battlefield to study in
yeshivas, instead.

70 percent of all Israelis, including many in Netanyahu’s own party,
want the Haredi to join the army. On March 28, the Supreme
Court ordered
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suspension of state subsidies allocated to these ultra-Orthodox
communities.

If that is to happen, the crisis will deepen on multiple fronts. If
the Haredi lose their privileges, Netanyahu’s government is likely
to collapse; if they maintain them, the other government, the post
Oct-7 war council, is likely to collapse as well.

An end to the Gaza war, even if branded as a ‘victory’ by
Netanyahu, will only further the polarization and deepen Israel’s
worst internal political struggle since its founding on the ruins of
historic Palestine. A continuation of the war will add to the schisms,
as it will only serve as a reminder of an irremediable defeat.

_RAMZY BAROUD is a journalist and the Editor of The Palestine
Chronicle. He is the author of five books. His latest is “These
Chains Will Be Broken
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Palestinian Stories of Struggle and Defiance in Israeli Prisons”
(Clarity Press, Atlanta). Dr. Baroud is a Non-resident Senior Research
Fellow at the Center for Islam and Global Affairs (CIGA), Istanbul
Zaim University (IZU). His website is www.ramzybaroud.net
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* War on Gaza
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* Israel
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* Palestine
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* sustainable economy
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* draft
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