ISIS carried out at least 69 confirmed attacks in March in the Aleppo, Homs,
Hama, Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 84
pro-Assad regime soldiers and 44 civilians and wounded at least 51 more
soldiers and civilians. There were also 19 high quality* attacks during the
month. March was, by every metric, the most violent month of ISIS’s Badia
insurgency since late 2017, when the group first lost control of its territory
in central Syria. The number of attacks conducted in March exceeded the
previous high point in January 2021, when ISIS cells were battling against
significant regime operations across much of the desert. This month’s
activities also far outpaced those of last year’s truffle season, when ISIS
cells killed at least 115 people in April. However, most of the attacks that
month —as well as the two preceding high-intensity months—were against
civilians.





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In March 2024


Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In March 2024 by clicking here
<[link removed]>
.



ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In March 2024

By Gregory Waters



Following is the March 2024 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. All previous monthly installments can be foundhere
<[link removed]>, as well as a
review of developments throughout 2023
<[link removed]>,
2022
<[link removed]>
, and 2021
<[link removed]>.
A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also beexplored here
<[link removed]>, here
<[link removed]>
,and here
<[link removed]>
.



ISIS carried out at least 69 confirmed attacks in March in the Aleppo, Homs,
Hama, Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 84
pro-Assad regime soldiers and 44 civilians and wounded at least 51 more
soldiers and civilians. There were also 19 high quality* attacks during the
month. March was, by every metric, the most violent month of ISIS’s Badia
insurgency since late 2017, when the group first lost control of its territory
in central Syria. The number of attacks conducted in March exceeded the
previous high point in January 2021, when ISIS cells were battling against
significant regime operations across much of the desert. This month’s
activities also far outpaced those of last year’s truffle season, when ISIS
cells killed at least 115 people in April. However, most of the attacks that
month —as well as the two preceding high-intensity months—were against
civilians.



The unique and alarming difference in March was the scale of attacks against
security forces. Across Homs, Hama, and Deir Ez Zor, ISIS cells successfully
and consistently targeted regime outposts and ambushed patrols, frequently
capturing and executing soldiers. The group also continues to expand its urban
operations in Deir Ez Zor, where multiple attacks were conducted against local
religious officials and intelligence members inside Mayadin. Civilians also
came under increased threat as the truffle season reached its zenith. Groups of
armed and unarmed civilians were ambushed, kidnapped, and executed across
Raqqa, Deir Ez Zor, and Hama, and others fell prey to mines.



However, less than one-third of all documented attacks in March involved mines
or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Most attacks against both security
forces and civilians were from ISIS militants actively engaging with and
ambushing their victims. This more aggressive and confident posture has been
evident since the fall of 2023, and so far, shows no signs of abating. As in
recent months, March also saw the continuation of confirmed ISIS losses both
from Russian airstrikes and battles with regime forces. Journalist Zain
al-Abidindocumented <[link removed]> at
least eight ISIS fighters killed across central Syria in March, compared with
18 killed inFebruary
<[link removed]>
and 20 killed and captured inJanuary
<[link removed]>
.



Violent activity continues to be concentrated in Homs province, where the
group has been conducting a high tempo of offensive activity against regime
positions since October 2023. As in February, March was marked by consistent
ISIS attacks against regime positions in the Jubb Jarah area north of Palmyra.
ISIS cells also greatly expanded operations in eastern Hama, particularly along
the Hama side of Jubb Jarah and the Bala’as mountains, effectively creating one
long front of continued attacks from southeast Hama into northeast Homs. In
Deir Ez Zor and Raqqa, ISIS cells continued to expand their operations inside
urban areas, particularly in Mayadin and in the Ma’adan area, respectively.



ISIS began to claim Badia attacks consistently for the first time since 2022,
during their global “And Kill Them Where You Find Them” campaign in January
2024. This higher rate of claims has continued into March, when the group
claimed 12 attacks in central Syria (twice what they claimed in February).



*Indicates attacks in Damascus City claimed by ISIS. Two additional IED
attacks occurred in Homs City in June 2023 and Damascus in March 2024 that went
unclaimed but were suspected to be conducted by ISIS.



Confirmed ISIS attacks increased in every governorate, more than doubling in
Deir Ez Zor (17) and Raqqa (14). Hom (25) reached a record number of attacks
while Hama (12) saw more attacks in March than in any month over the past three
years. Only Aleppo (1) followed the normal trends in activity.



Deir Ez Zor and Raqqa



ISIS expanded its low-level insurgency within the urban belt of Deir Ez Zor in
January, when it conducted three assassinations of local security members.
Sleeper cells continued this trend in February, carrying out two assassinations
of local pro-regime fighters inside Mayadin city, and again in March when
unidentified gunmen conducted three attacks inside Mayadin and one attack on
the edge of Shamitiyah. However, the bulk of attacks this month occurred around
the traditional ISIS stronghold of Jabal Bishri.



On March 2, two truffle hunters were killed by a mine in the desert outside
Masrib, west Deir Ez Zor. On March 5, suspected ISIS militants conducted two
attacks against regime positions in west Deir Ez Zor. One targeted the army’s
4th Division position at the Shamitiyah water tower, killing at least two,
including a colonel. The second hit an outpost outside Shoula, killing at least
two 17th Division soldiers (local opposition media claimed there were four dead
in each of the two attacks, but loyalist media only announced the names of two
soldiers in each).



On March 9, six locals were killed when their truck hit a mine in the Harbisha
area along the Homs-Deir Ez Zor border, just north of the highway. On March 12,
at least one soldier was killed when his position was attacked in the Dweir
desert. The next day, gunmen attacked a group of truffle pickers in the Bishri
desert, leaving two dead and one wounded. One of the killed men was a member of
the local pro-regime National Defense Forces (NDF). On March 15, another
solider was shot to death in Dweir, this time closer to the city itself. On
March 16, a member of the 4th Division’s 42nd Brigade was killed when his truck
hit a mine in the Jabal Bishri area. That same day, suspected ISIS militants
assassinated the head of religious endowments in Mayadin, Talal Al-Khater, as
he left a mosque. On March 17, ISIS fighters attacked another group of truffle
hunters and their NDF escorts, this time in the Masrib area.



On March 20, at least two NDF fighters were killed and one injured when their
motorcycle hit a mine in the Bishri desert area. That same day, three soldiers
were killed when their position was attacked in the Shamitiyah desert. The next
day, two gunmen attacked a State Security patrol inside Mayadin. Both
assailants were detained following a shootout. On March 23, another NDF
fighter, Aboud al-Zamal, was killed by a mine as he searched for truffles in
the Bishri desert. According to Zain al-Abidin, al-Zamal had been a refugee
living in Turkey until 2023, when he was deported by local authorities.
Following his return to his home in western Deir Ez Zor, he joined the local
NDF.



On March 25, unknown gunmen targeted another State Security patrol inside
Mayadin, the third attack of the month inside the city. On March 26, loyalist
media reported the disappearance of seven soldiers near Kabajib as they
traveled along the Sukhnah-Deir Ez Zor road. On March 29, two more soldiers
were reported killed in clashes near the village. Another soldier was reported
killed in Deir Ez Zor by his hometown on March 31, however it is likely that he
was part of the March 26 group.



In Raqqa, ISIS’s low-level but significant insurgency escalated in March.
Security forces recaptured the Zamleh hamlet, reopening the Kawm-Resafa
highway, but ISIS cells stepped up attacks in and around the town of Maadan and
in the area west of Resafa. Raqqa saw the greatest number of civilian deaths in
March, with 26 slain and most attacks targeting truffle hunters.



On March 1, three truffle hunters were killed by a mine near Maadan. On March
2, ISIS gunmen assassinated a 17th Division soldier as he drove home in Maadan.
The group later claimed the attack and published a picture of the moment the
militants opened fire. This is the first attack of its kind in regime-held
Raqqa and directly mirrors the type of assassinations ISIS cells regularly
conduct against Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters north of the Euphrates
River.



On March 11, a 4th Division soldier was injured by a landmine south of Resafa,
according to Zain al-Abidin. The next day, at least one local NDF fighter
disappeared while searching for truffles near the village of Sweida. His body
was found with a gunshot to the head on March 13. On March 15, one local was
wounded by a mine while truffle hunting in the Mansoura desert, south of Tabqa
and west of Resafa. The next day a truck carrying a group of truffle hunters
hit a mine in the Sabkha desert, killing 12 and wounding 10. On March 18, two
mines hit civilians in the Maadan area, leaving one dead and two injured in
total. As Zain al-Abidin rightlynotes
<[link removed]>, this area has never
seen mine incidents before, suggesting that these are newly laid by the same
ISIS cells who conducted the March 2 assassination in Maadan.



On March 21, a group of seven truffle hunters and their four local NDF escorts
disappear in the Maadan countryside. All bodies were found over the ensuing
days. One member of the search party drove over a mine on March 23, resulting
in injuries. On March 25, a pro-regime militia fighter was wounded by a mine
west of Resafa. On March 28, five locals were wounded by a mine while truffle
hunting along the Tabqa-Ithriyah road. On March 29, two locals were killed by a
mine on a road outside Maadan.




Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in Dier Ez Zor (top) and Raqqa
(bottom) in March 2024 alongside all other attacks in January and February 2024.



Homs



ISIS activity in eastern Homs decreased in December, but remained focused
around the Doubayat Oil Field, which the group had temporarily captured in
November. January likewise saw most ISIS activity concentrated in this area,
though the group also expanded operations west into the desert just south of
Palmyra and Arak. In February, ISIS largely abandoned the southern Palmyra
front, likely because of pro-regime ground and air operations, and shifted its
focus to the Taybeh sector north of Sukhnah and the Jubb Jarah mountains north
of Palmyra. This focus continued into March, with the bulk of attacks occurring
in Jubb Jarah and around Sukhnah. ISIS cells had much more success in the
former, while security forces continue to stand their ground in the latter.



On March 1, ISIS claimed two attacks in the east Sukhnah countryside. The
group claimed to have infiltrated a regime position and detonated an IED under
a tank, publishing a picture of an explosion, also claiming a small arms attack
against a separate barracks. On March 2, two shepherds were executed in the
northeast Jubb Jarah area. That same day, two members of the pro-regime
al-Assad Shield Forces were wounded during an attack on their position in Jubb
Jarah. The militia established new outposts in this area at the beginning of
2024, which have since been a regular target of ISIS attacks.



On March 6, a civilian convoy was attacked in the Wadi Didi area along the
Homs-Deir Ez Zor border, north of the highway, leaving three dead, seven
wounded, and 12 cars burned. Attackers could be seen in pictures driving away
in two trucks. On March 7, ISIS claimed it captured and executed three soldiers
in the Sukhnah countryside, releasing a picture of one of the executed men.
That same day, two civilians disappeared while truffle hunting around the Abyad
Dam, north of Palmyra. On March 12, four members of the Iran-backed Local
Defense Forces were captured and executed near the Tuwaynan field, north of
Sukhnah. ISIS later released pictures of the men claiming they were captured
while truffle hunting outside of their outpost. Also that day, ISIS militants
launched an attack on Taybeh, wounding three Iran-backed Afghan foreign
fighters.



On March 14, loyalist media reported the disappearance of three soldiers from
the eastern Wadi Doubayat axis. On March 17, ISIS militants launched attacks
against regime forces near Qulay, northeast of Sukhnah, followed by attacks on
the nearby al-Hayr al-Sharqi hamlet on March 18. Elsewhere on March 18, three
soldiers were killed and three injured when their position was attacked near
the Abyad dam, while ISIS militants continued to attack positions east of the
Doubayat field. These last attacks ultimately failed due to the intervention of
Russian jets, which killed at least four ISIS members.



On March 19, two local NDF members went missing while truffle hunting outside
their position in Jubb Jarah. Their bodies were found several days later. Also
on March 19, a soldier was killed and two wounded in an attack near Tuwaynan.
On March 20, a soldier was killed in an attack near Sukhnah. On March 22, ISIS
cells launched attacks against regime positions east of Taybeh and on the
southern axis of Doubayat Gas Field, according to Zain al-Abidin. On March 23,
a member of the regime’s 25th Division was killed by a mine while driving in
the Jubb Jarah region.



On March 24, ISIS militants kidnapped several shepherds and killed dozens of
sheep in an attack in Jubb Jarah. That same day, the group claimed to have
captured and executed two soldiers in the Palmyra countryside. The next day,
the group again claimed to have captured and executed four soldiers, this time
west of Sukhnah. On March 27, two soldiers were reported missing in action
while traveling outside Sukhnah. ISIS later published pictures showing them
captured and executed. On March 28, five soldiers were killed and two wounded
near the Abyad Dam when their position was attacked.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Homs (highlighted) in March 2024 alongside
all other attacks in January and February 2024.



Hama and Aleppo



Significant ISIS activity returned to east Hama in January, when the group
conducted five attacks in the province, three of which were deemed high
quality. Likewise, ISIS conducted three high quality attacks in eastern Hama in
February. This is the first time eastern Hama has had back-to-back months of
three or more high quality attacks since spring of 2021, amid the regime’s
semi-successful campaign to suppress ISIS activity in the province. In
hindsight, it is clear this sustained escalation presaged the surge in activity
seen in March, when ISIS cells conducted no less than 12 attacks, of which five
can be deemed high quality. Unlike Raqqa, which saw a similar number of
attacks, most of the Hama activity focused on security forces.



On March 6, a militia fighter was wounded by a mine near Ithriyah. The next
day, seven members of the al-Assad Shield Forces were killed when their
position near Tel Salama was attacked. ISIS quickly claimed credit for the
assault and published pictures of the dead. On March 11, ISIS claimed to kill
three more militia fighters in the eastern countryside while they were
searching for truffles. On March 13, a shepherd was wounded by a mine in the
Hamra subdistrict, north of Salamiyah. That day, four more militia fighters
were reported killed when their position came under attack southwest of
Duwazin, in the Jubb Jarah area of Hama. ISIS later claimed the attack, saying
they had captured and executed one of the fighters. On March 15, a civilian car
hit a mine near Wadi Azeeb, killing two and wounding one.



On March 16, local Facebook pages reported the disappearance of a member of a
Military Intelligence militia while traveling on the road towards the Bala’as
mountains from Uqayribat. On March 30, ISIS released pictures of four soldiers
they had captured and executed, claiming the attack occurred “west of Palmyra”.
However, one of the men clearly matched the soldier reported missing on March
16. Therefore, it appears a group of four soldiers in total were captured that
day and later executed.



On March 19, a regime fighter was wounded by a mine on the Ithriyah-Tabqa
road. He later died of his wounds. On March 24, regime forces clashed with ISIS
militants east of Ithriyah. On March 27, four shepherds were kidnapped and
hundreds of sheep were killed on the same Ithriyah road. On March 29, a local
was shot and wounded while truffle hunting south of Ithriyah. On March 31, one
soldier was killed and one wounded in clashes near Tel Salama.



On March 27, two NDF fighters were killed by a mine in Kulah al-Bawaidar, in
the Khanasir desert of southern Aleppo.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Hama (highlighted) in March 2024 alongside
all other attacks in January and February 2024.



Looking Ahead



While March saw an unprecedented level of activity, it is not an isolated
case. January and February likewise saw an extraordinary degree of attacks
specifically targeting security forces (compared to this time last year when
the surge in attacks was driven by violence against civilians). It is deeply
concerning that ISIS cells have been able to maintain and even increase this
degree of activity nearly unabated since October 2023, despite multiple regime
operations that either stunted or pushed back ISIS’s offensives over the past
six months. It cannot be denied at this point that ISIS has successfully
replenished at least some of its manpower and equipment over the past two years.



The apparently bolstered Badia network has deployed these new resources in a
much more aggressive manner than in past years. Since fall 2023, ISIS attacks
have utilized more small arms than mines or IEDs. In other words, ISIS has for
many months now shifted away from the more passive and defensive approach it
largely adopted from late 2021 through early 2023. This more confident posture
resulted in distinct and sustained offensive action at the end of 2023, when
ISIS cells seized several strategic areas from regime forces. However, as
expected ISIS eventually withdrew in the face of regime and allied operations.



It is important to set clear bounds on this unprecedented escalation in
central Syria. ISIS is not poised to capture major cities like Sukhnah or
Palmyra, and likely will be unable to capture smaller strategic objectives like
Taybeh or al-Kawm (as long as Russian and Syrian jets continue to operate over
the area). However, March’s attacks appear to show a pattern in which ISIS
cells have seized control over much of the “empty” space outside hardened
regime positions. At the very least these areas have been turned into
no-man’s-land for the time being. Many attacks this month occurred when
soldiers left their posts to look for truffles, while others successfully hit
the positions themselves. This suggests that ISIS cells enjoy substantial
freedom of movement between regime positions. This would limit the regime’s
ability to conduct widespread, synchronized sweeping operations that might push
cells out of key areas.



At this point it is unclear how long ISIS will sustain this level of activity.
As long as the group continues to conduct these smaller raids, rather than
large operations seeking to capture key areas, cells will likely continue to
find success. However, as the truffle season comes to a close over April and
May, the overall number of attacks may also decrease simply because there are
fewer targets available. It remains to be seen if and how the regime can
meaningfully change the current dynamics on the ground.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in March 2024 alongside all other
attacks in January and February 2024. To view an interactive version of this
map, please clickhere
<[link removed]>
.





*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.



###







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