From Inside Expression, by ARTICLE 19 <[email protected]>
Subject Inside Expression: March 2024
Date March 28, 2024 1:06 PM
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[1]

INSIDE EXPRESSION: MARCH 2024

THIS MONTH: HOW TECH COMPANIES CAN SAFEGUARD DEMOCRACY, OUR NEW PRIZE FOR
ETHICAL JOURNALISM, AND HOW SOUTH AFRICA’S MORAL LEADERSHIP BENEFITS FREE
SPEECH TOO.

[2]

HERE’S HOW THE WORLD’S BIGGEST SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES CAN SAFEGUARD
DEMOCRACY THIS SUPER ELECTION YEAR

FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS ARE A CORNERSTONE OF DEMOCRACY: A CHANCE FOR US TO
SPEAK OUT, BE HEARD, AND SHAPE OUR COLLECTIVE FUTURE.

To do this, it is vital that we can access diverse and accurate sources of
information, form and freely express our opinions, and choose our
representatives without interference.

This Super Election Year, 4 billion people in over 50 countries are heading
to the polls. Yet a quarter of the way through 2024, it’s clear that
governments and political candidates are pulling out all the stops to
prevent people from casting a free and informed vote – from deepfakes to
disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and hate speech against
minorities.

THE LARGEST ONLINE PLATFORMS (YOUTUBE, FACEBOOK, INSTAGRAM, TWITTER/X, AND
TIKTOK) ARE UNIQUELY PLACED TO MITIGATE THESE CHALLENGES AND SAFEGUARD
DEMOCRACY FOR ALL.

Their global reach means that information has never been more free:
wherever we are in the world, we can use platforms to learn about political
parties and candidates, to campaign for progressive change, and to share
our opinions across borders.

But their reach also means that platforms wield an enormous amount of power
over what we can see, say, and share – and many of the traditional
safeguards to protect the fairness of elections are hard to apply online.

WITH GREAT POWER COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY. YET INSTEAD OF USING THEIR
POWER FOR GOOD, PLATFORMS ARE WASHING THEIR HANDS OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS (AT
BEST) AND EXACERBATING THE PROBLEMS (AT WORST).

Amplifying false or polarising information.

Removing too much content – or moderating too little.

Not being transparent about their relationships with governments, electoral
authorities, and political advertisers.

These failures pose a grave threat to election integrity, which could be
disastrous for billions.

IT DOESN’T HAVE TO BE THIS WAY – AND, INDEED, IT SHOULDN’T.

Under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, online
platforms have a responsibility to respect freedom of expression. These
principles require platforms to identify and address any risks emanating
from their practices or platforms that affect people’s right to freely
participate in elections.

THERE’S STILL TIME FOR PLATFORMS TO STEP UP, TAKE RESPONSIBILITY, AND
SAFEGUARD EXPRESSION, INFORMATION, AND DEMOCRACY FOR ALL.

Here’s how.

[3]

OUR 7 PRIORITIES FOR ONLINE PLATFORMS DURING ELECTIONS

1. PREPARE

Online platforms are failing to invest sufficient resources to manage the
risks to peace and people’s safety during election time. Resources are
typically allocated depending on the potential for profit, rather than on
the basis of the human rights risks specific to each country.

Companies must:

* Conduct human rights due diligence prior to elections, and consider how
conflict and violence could escalate – regardless of the size of a
country or its markets.

* Analyse risks – such as existing ethnic tensions, low levels of
digital literacy, or deepening inequalities – and provide sufficient
measures to mitigate these risks.

* Invest enough money and time so that human reviewers and crisis-response
teams are properly trained, have the necessary language skills, and receive
sufficient support to ensure that quality information can be accessed by
all – without exceptions.

2. BE OPEN, BE TRANSPARENT, BE ENGAGED

Platforms have responsibilities to conduct human rights due diligence and
acquire an in-depth understanding of the election dynamics in the countries
they operate in – including risks regarding online hate speech and
disinformation, and implications of specific government censorship
requests.

This requires continuous engagement with independent external stakeholders.
Yet such engagement is notoriously lacking, particularly in countries that
they do not see as strategically important.

Platforms must:

* Talk – and listen – to not only governments and politicians but also
civil society: the groups representing people’s needs.

* Be transparent about the steps they take to help secure safe and
well-informed elections: from hiring experts and establishing bespoke
election centres to removing harmful content.

3. ENSURE THAT RECOMMENDER SYSTEMS AND CONTENT-MODERATION PRACTICES PROMOTE
ACCESS TO DIVERSE VIEWPOINTS AND DO NOT SILENCE ANY VOICES

Everyone must have access to diverse viewpoints about elections and
democratic processes. To enable this, platforms must:

* Invest resources in trained and skilled human content reviewers.

* Ensure content-moderation policies and practices are in line with
international freedom of expression standards, especially those relating to
political speech, disinformation, and hate speech.

4. BE HONEST ABOUT ADVERTISING

Free and diverse debate is central to election integrity – yet
micro-targeted advertising undermines this, hindering debate on matters of
public interest during elections. Some platforms fail to detect adverts
containing content that violate their own advertising policies, such as
incitement or conspiracy theories.

Funding sources of political messaging are also opaque, preventing
policymakers, journalists, and civil society from scrutinising the role of
online political adverts in elections. Moreover, platforms often implement
their transparency requirements for such adverts inconsistently across
different countries. Together, this lack of transparency leaves people
unaware of why they are targeted with specific ads.

When platforms allow political advertising, they must:

* Undertake due diligence on how political advertising complies with their
human rights responsibilities at election time.

* Ensure their policies on political adverts clearly outline the content
allowed, transparency requirements, and permissible targeting methods.

* Clearly identify political ads and key information such as the
sponsor’s identity, location, and amount spent.

* Limit targeted advertising, give users more control over how their data
is processed, and be honest with users about why they are seeing specific
ads.

5. BE TRANSPARENT AND PRIORITISE HUMAN RIGHTS IN RELATIONSHIPS WITH
ELECTORAL AUTHORITIES

Platforms must be aware of whether each country’s electoral authority is
independent, biased, or politically controlled. To avoid jeopardising free
expression online, they must:

* Acknowledge the potential risks in agreements they make.

* Refrain from entering into any agreements that allow electoral
authorities to flag content for restrictions without a court order, and
that could restrict freedom of expression.

* Engage with civil society to enhance people’s digital literacy and
access to official electoral content.

6. RESIST AND CHALLENGE GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP

During elections, governments often place pressure on platforms to grant
them access to user data, restrict content, or block accounts. When
threatened with severe sanctions, such as fines, advertising bans, or
throttling, platforms often yield to this pressure.

To avoid being complicit in free expression violations, platforms must:

* Interpret government demands that are at odds with freedom of expression
standards as narrowly as possible, in terms of scope and duration,
especially requests to remove speech that could impact election results or
public interest content.

* Evaluate the negative implications for freedom of expression resulting
from potential sanctions around elections, and consider the likelihood of
these sanctions being imposed.

* Explore all legal avenues to challenge censorship and data-access
demands that violate international human rights standards.

* Coordinate with other companies to enhance leverage concerning
authorities’ takedown and data-access requests, and be sure to report
these requests.

* Engage with civil society to assess the potential significance of
specific content and accounts, the probability of sanctions being imposed,
and their impact on the electoral process.

7. PROTECT USER ACCESS DURING INTERNET SHUTDOWNS OR THROTTLING

Online platforms must make every effort to preserve user access when
governments shut down the internet during election periods. They must:

* Openly communicate about government threats to impose shutdowns, and
coordinate with civil society and other platforms to jointly push back
against shutdown orders.

* Publicly disclose details about shutdown orders and explore all legal
avenues to challenge them.

* Invest in technical tools to help circumvent restrictions, such as
making the platform accessible through proxy servers, or providing
‘data-light’ versions of services that can function with significantly
reduced internet speed.

THIS SUPER ELECTION YEAR, JOIN OUR CALL FOR PLATFORMS TO PROTECT OUR
RIGHTS, OUR FUTURES, AND OUR DEMOCRACIES.

SHARE OUR 7 PRIORITIES [3]

[4]

FREE SPEECH IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S CASE AGAINST ISRAEL

ONLINE PLATFORMS WOULD ALSO DO WELL TO PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE ONGOING
CASE AGAINST ISRAEL AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ).

This was a strong message from ARTICLE 19’s webinar [5] on 6 March, which
explored the free expression implications of the case, brought by South
Africa under the Genocide Convention.

Our key takeaways from the discussion, which featured panellists Mai
El-Sadany, David Kaye, Jiries Saadeh, and Yuval Shany, included:

* It can be argued that the ICJ’s provisional measures order, requiring
Israel to preserve and prevent the destruction of evidence, also
encompasses protecting freedom of expression. Killing journalists or
imposing communication blackouts also breach the order.

* The inciting statements made by senior Israeli officials and soldiers
could serve as evidence for the ICJ to determine not only whether Israel
breached its obligations to PREVENT and PUNISH incitement to genocide, but
also whether the requirement of INTENT under the Genocide Convention has
been met.

* Major online platforms should pay close attention to these proceedings:
they host some of the incendiary statements that are at issue, as well as a
lot of evidence that could be presented to the Court. They also have
broader responsibilities under international law regarding the ongoing
conflict.

> _‘This is an ever-changing world where we now have social media … we
> have this great amount of access to information, and I think that really
> necessitates [a change in] the way in which we think about how
> international law can better serve populations.’_
>
> _– Mai El-Sadany_
> _(Executive Director, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy)_
>
> __

WATCH THE WEBINAR [4]

[6]

APPLY NOW: ARTICLE 19’S ETHICAL JOURNALISM AWARDS FOR THE WESTERN
BALKANS

Are you a journalist in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, or
Serbia? Does your work provide unique insights into one of these countries
while demonstrating the key principles of ethical journalism?

IF THIS IS YOU (OR SOMEONE YOU KNOW), APPLY BY 12 APRIL FOR OUR ETHICAL
JOURNALISM AWARDS – YOU COULD WIN €1,000 AND 5 DAYS IN BRUSSELS AND
LONDON!

These awards are part of #CheckitFirst [6]: ARTICLE 19’s new campaign to
promote ethical journalism as a defence against disinformation in the
Western Balkans. Stay tuned for more campaign news!

APPLY NOW [7]

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