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IMMIGRANTS ARE NOT HURTING U.S.-BORN WORKERS – SIX FACTS TO SET THE
RECORD STRAIGHT  
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Daniel Costa and Heidi Shierholz
February 20, 2024
Economic Policy Institute
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_ The economy does not have a fixed number of jobs, and today we see
a growing economy adding jobs for both immigrants and U.S.-born
workers. Here are six key facts that show immigrants are not hurting
the employment outcomes of U.S.-born workers. _

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The immigrant share of the labor force reached a record high of 18.6%
in 2023, according to our analysis of Current Population Survey (CPS)
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.1
[[link removed]] Anti-immigration
advocates have been out in full force, using this as a talking point
for deeply misguided commentary and analysis that roughly translates
to “immigrants are taking all our jobs
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The reality is that the economy does not have a fixed number of jobs,
and what we see today is a growing economy that is adding jobs for
both immigrants and U.S.-born workers. HERE ARE SIX KEY FACTS THAT
SHOW IMMIGRANTS ARE NOT HURTING THE EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES OF U.S.-BORN
WORKERS.

* THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE FOR U.S.-BORN WORKERS AVERAGED 3.6% IN 2023,
THE LOWEST RATE ON RECORD_._ Obviously, immigration is not causing
high unemployment among U.S.-born workers.
* THE SHARE OF PRIME-AGE U.S.-BORN INDIVIDUALS WITH A JOB IS AT ITS
HIGHEST RATE IN MORE THAN TWO DECADES. In 2023, the prime-age (ages
25–54) employment-to-population ratio (EPOP) for U.S.-born
individuals was 81.4%, up from 80.7% in 2019 and now at its highest
rate since 2001.2
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* THE PRIME-AGE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE (LFPR) FOR U.S.-BORN
INDIVIDUALS IS ALSO AT ITS HIGHEST RATE IN MORE THAN TWO DECADES. In
2023, the LFPR for prime-age U.S.-born individuals was 83.9%, up from
83.3% in 2019 and now at its highest rate since 2002. Further, the
increase in the U.S.-born prime-age LFPR over the last year was the
second highest on record—below only the increase that occurred the
year before last.4
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* THE PRIME-AGE LFPR OF U.S.-BORN MEN WITHOUT A BACHELOR’S DEGREE
GREW AT A RECORD PACE IN EACH OF THE LAST TWO YEARS AND IS ABOVE ITS
PRE-COVID TREND. We focus here on prime-age men without a
bachelor’s degree because though the immigrant population is
comprised of men and women of all education levels, immigrants are
somewhat disproportionately concentrated among men without a college
degree (in 2023, the immigrant share of the overall labor force was
18.6%, but it was 20.0% of men without a college degree). That means
that if recent immigration were affecting labor market outcomes of
U.S.-born workers, it would be more easily detected among workers in
this group. However, the LFPR of these workers is also beating
expectations. _It is clear the__ labor market is both absorbing
immigrants and generating strong job opportunities for U.S.-born
workers, including those in demographic groups potentially most
impacted by immigration. 6
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* THOUGH THE IMMIGRANT _SHARE_ OF THE LABOR FORCE REACHED A RECORD
HIGH IN 2023, IMMIGRANT LABOR FORCE _GROWTH_ IS NOT OCCURRING AT AN
UNPRECEDENTED RATE. From 2019 to 2023, the immigrant labor force grew
2.3% annually on average, according to our analysis of CPS data. That
is strong growth, but it’s roughly one-third the rate the economy
experienced between 1996 and 2000 (which, just like 2022 and 2023, was
a period of very low unemployment—and strong employment growth—for
U.S.-born workers). Immigrant inflows into the labor force over the
last year alone were also not unprecedentedly high—for example, the
pace was slower than in 2022 and slower than three of the years from
1996–2000.
* IMMIGRANTS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR LABOR MARKET, FILLING GAPS
CAUSED BY DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CONTRIBUTING TO
STRONG ECONOMIC GROWTH. The immigrants that make up 18.6% of the U.S.
labor force are playing key roles in numerous industries
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are employed in a mix of lower, middle, and higher-wage jobs
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And as the Congressional Budget Office recently reported
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to strong economic growth—with future immigration forecasted to
boost real gross domestic product by 2% over the next 10 years—as
well as increasing government revenue. Immigrants are also
complementing U.S.-born workers by contributing to overall population
and workforce growth. The U.S. Census Bureau projects
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if the U.S. were to have lower-than-expected immigration levels, the
population would begin to decline in 20 years, and if there were
suddenly zero immigration, the population would begin to decline next
year, deeply harming economic growth.  

AS THESE SIX FACTS SHOW, THE IDEA THAT IMMIGRANTS ARE MAKING THINGS
WORSE FOR U.S.-BORN WORKERS IS WRONG. The reality is that the labor
market is absorbing immigrants at a rapid pace, while simultaneously
maintaining record-low unemployment for U.S.-born workers.

Claiming that immigrants are making things worse for U.S.-born workers
is often used as an intentional distraction from dynamics that are
actually hurting working people
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as weak labor standards and enforcement, anti-worker deregulation,
weak labor law that fails to protect workers’ rights to unions and
collective bargaining in the face of coordinated and well-funded
attacks, and other dynamics that result in too much power in the hands
of corporations and employers.

While there’s no question that the immigration system desperately
needs updating so that workers are adequately protected, it’s
important to remember that it is _employers_ that underpay and
exploit workers based on their immigration status—committing
workplace violations against those who lack status at a vastly higher
rate
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U.S.-born workers. And it is employers that regularly
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even systematically
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wages from workers who only have a temporary, precarious status
provided by a work visa. The resulting two-tiered system of rights in
the workplace prevents immigrants from asserting and enforcing their
rights. Reform efforts in Congress and the executive branch should
thus focus on providing status and work authorization to those who
lack it and compelling employers to follow the law, rather than more
funding
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and draconian measures
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border enforcement, deportations, and detaining immigrants.

If those who mischaracterize immigration as bad for the economy and
for U.S.-born workers really care about improving wages and working
conditions for U.S.-born workers, they should focus on pushing for
labor law reform and strong labor standards and helping ensure that
all workers—regardless of immigration status—have equal and
enforceable rights in the workplace.

NOTES

1. 
[[link removed]]Some
data notes: We use full-year CPS data throughout this piece because
breakdowns by immigration status aren’t available on a seasonally
adjusted basis. Also, breakdowns by immigration status are only
available since 1994 in the CPS, so any time we talk about records in
this piece, we mean since 1994.

2. 
[[link removed]]While
the _overall_ U.S.-born EPOP grew substantially in each of the last
three years, it is still below its pre-COVID level. However, the fact
that it has not attained its pre-COVID level is not about immigration,
it’s largely about retiring baby boomers. Remember, the overall EPOP
considers everyone age 16 and over, so when a large group of
workers—like the baby boomers—hits retirement age, the EPOP
“mechanically” drops. A common way to side-step this issue and to
focus on trends that are actually related to the strength of job
opportunities is to look only at so-called prime-age workers, workers
ages 25–54, as we have done.  

3. 
[[link removed]]These
findings hold if we restrict to data from the fourth quarter in every
year.  The prime-age EPOP of US-born workers was 81.6% in 2023Q4, up
from 81.3% in 2019Q4 and now at its highest levels since 2000.

4. 
[[link removed]]As
with the EPOP, the _overall_ LFPR for U.S.-born workers, though
increasing at a record pace in the last two years, remains below its
2019 level—but again, that is not about immigration, it’s about
retiring baby boomers.

5. 
[[link removed]]These
findings hold if we restrict to data from the fourth quarter in every
year.  The prime-age LFPR of US-born people was 84.1% in 2023Q4, up
from 83.8% in 2019Q4 and now at its highest level since 2002.

6. 
[[link removed]]Details
on the trend analysis: Due in large part to slack labor markets for
much of the period (resulting from fiscal and monetary policy
failures) and the erosion of job quality as a result of the dynamics
mentioned in the conclusion of this piece, the LFPR of this group has
been steadily declining in recent decades. Between the business cycle
peaks of 2000 and 2019, the LFPR of this group declined from 89.4% to
84.9%, a decline of 0.24 percentage points per year, on average. If
that trend had continued from 2019 to 2023, the LFPR of this group
would have been 83.9% in 2023 instead of what it was, 84.5%. In other
words, this group is beating expectations.

7. 
[[link removed]]These
findings hold if we restrict to data from the fourth quarter in every
year.  The prime-age LFPR of US-born men without a college degree has
risen strongly in each of the last three years and is above its
pre-COVID trend.

Economic Policy Institute [[link removed]]
1225 Eye St. NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC xxxxxx
Phone: 202-775-8810 • [email protected]
 

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