[At best, the U.S. and China will avoid a major blow-up over
Taiwan or the South China Sea in 2023, while making progress on issues
like climate change and drug trafficking. At worst, the two great
powers could take the world to hell and back.]
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THE U.S. AND CHINA AT YEAR’S END  
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Michael Klare
December 21, 2023
TomDispatch [[link removed]]

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_ At best, the U.S. and China will avoid a major blow-up over Taiwan
or the South China Sea in 2023, while making progress on issues like
climate change and drug trafficking. At worst, the two great powers
could take the world to hell and back. _

,

 

This hasn’t exactly been a year of good news when it comes to our
war-torn, beleaguered planet, but on November 15th, U.S. President Joe
Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping took one small step back from
the precipice. Until they talked in a mansion near San Francisco, it
seemed as if their countries were locked in a downward spiral of
taunts and provocations that might, many experts feared, result in a
full-blown crisis, even a war — even, god save us all, the world’s
first nuclear war. Thanks to that encounter, though, such dangers
appear to have receded. Still, the looming question facing both
countries is whether that retreat from disaster — what the Chinese
are now calling the “San Francisco vision
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— will last through 2024.

Prior to the summit, there seemed few discernible obstacles to some
kind of trainwreck, whether a complete breakdown in relations, a
disastrous trade war, or even a military clash over Taiwan or
contested islands in the South China Sea. Beginning with last
February’s Chinese balloon incident
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continuing with a series of bitter trade disputes and recurring naval
and air incidents 
[[link removed]]over the summer
and fall, events seemed to be leading with a certain grim
inevitability toward some sort of catastrophe. After one such incident
last spring, _New York Times_ columnist Thomas Friedman warned
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“the smallest misstep by either side could ignite a U.S.-China war
that would make Ukraine look like a neighborhood dust-up.”

In recent months, top leaders in both Beijing and Washington were
becoming ever more concerned that a major U.S.-China crisis — and
certainly a war — would prove catastrophic for all involved. Even a
major trade war, they understood, would create economic chaos on both
sides of the Pacific. A complete breakdown in relations would
undermine any efforts to come to grips with the climate crisis,
prevent new pandemics, or disrupt illegal drug networks. And a war?
Well, every authoritative nongovernmental simulation of a U.S.-China
conflict has ended in staggering losses
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both sides, as well as a significant possibility of nuclear escalation
(and there’s no reason to assume that simulations conducted by the
American and Chinese militaries have turned out any differently).

As summer turned into fall, both sides were still searching for a
mutually acceptable “offramp” from catastrophe. For months, top
officials had been visiting each other’s capitals in a frantic
effort to bring a growing sense of crisis under control. Secretary of
State Antony Blinken traveled to Beijing in June (a trip rescheduled
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he cancelled a February visit thanks to that balloon incident);
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen arrived
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July; and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo in August
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Similarly, Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled
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Washington in October. Their meetings, according to
[[link removed]] _New
York Times_ reporters Vivian Wang and David Pierson, were arranged
“in the hope of arresting the downward spiral” in relations and to
pave the way for a Biden-Xi meeting that might truly ease tensions.

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED?

Not surprisingly, for both Biden and Xi, the primary objective of the
San Francisco summit was to halt that downward spiral. As Xi
reportedly asked
[[link removed]] Biden,
“Should [the U.S. and China] engage in mutually beneficial
cooperation or antagonism and confrontation? This is a fundamental
question on which disastrous mistakes must be avoided.”

From all accounts, it appears that the two presidents did at least
stop the slide toward confrontation. While acknowledging that
competition would continue unabated, both sides agreed to “manage”
their differences in a “responsible” manner and avoid
conflict-inducing behavior. While the United States and China “are
in competition,” Biden reportedly told
[[link removed]] Xi,
“the world expects the United States and China to manage competition
responsibly to prevent it from veering into conflict, confrontation,
or a new Cold War.” Xi reportedly endorsed this precept, saying
[[link removed]] that
China would strive to manage its differences with Washington in a
peaceful fashion.

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Buy the Book
[[link removed]]

In this spirit, Biden and Xi took several modest steps to improve
relations and prevent incidents that might result in unintended
conflict, including a Chinese promise to cooperate with the U.S. in
combating the trade in the narcotic drug fentanyl and the resumption
of high-level military-to-military communications. In a notable first,
the two also “affirmed the need to address the risks of advanced
[artificial intelligence] systems and improve AI safety through
U.S.-China government talks.” They also put their stamp of approval
on a series of cooperative steps agreed to by
[[link removed]] their
climate envoys John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua to mutually combat climate
change.

Still, neither president agreed to any fundamental alterations in
policy that might have truly shifted bilateral relations in a more
cooperative direction. In fact, on the most crucial issues dividing
the two countries — Taiwan, trade, and technology transfers — they
made no progress. As Xue Gong, a China scholar at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, put it
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whatever the two presidents did accomplish, “the Biden-Xi meeting
will not change the direction of U.S.-China relations away from
strategic competition.”

With that still the defining constant in relations and both leaders
under immense pressure from domestic constituencies — the military,
ultra-nationalist political factions, and assorted industry groups —
to hang tough on key bilateral issues, don’t be surprised if the
slide towards crisis and confrontation regains momentum in 2024.

THE TRIALS TO COME

Assuming U.S. and Chinese leaders remain committed to a
nonconfrontational stance, they will face powerful forces driving them
ever closer to the abyss, including both seemingly intractable issues
that divide their countries and deeply entrenched domestic interests
intent on provoking a confrontation.

Although several highly contentious issues have the potential to
ignite a crisis in 2024, the two with the greatest potential to
provoke disaster are Taiwan and territorial disputes in the South
China Sea.

A self-governing island that increasingly seeks to pursue its own
destiny, Taiwan is viewed by Chinese officials as a renegade province
that should rightfully fall under Beijing’s control. When the U.S.
established formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) in 1979, it acknowledged the Chinese position “that
there is one China and Taiwan is part of China.” That “one China
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Washington’s official policy ever since, but is now under increasing
pressure as ever more Taiwanese seek to abandon their ties with the
PRC and establish a purely sovereign state — a step that Chinese
leaders have repeatedly warned
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result in a military response. Many American officials believe that
Beijing would indeed launch an invasion of the island should the
Taiwanese declare their independence and that, in turn, could easily
result in U.S. military intervention and a full-scale war.

For now, the Biden administration’s response to a possible Chinese
invasion is governed by a principle of “strategic ambiguity” under
which military intervention is implied but not guaranteed. According
to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, any attempt by China to seize
Taiwan by military means will be considered a matter “of grave
concern to the United States,” but not one automatically requiring a
military response. In recent years, however, increasing numbers of
prominent Washington politicians have called for the replacement of
“strategic ambiguity” with a doctrine of “strategic clarity,
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which would include an unequivocal pledge to defend Taiwan in case of
an invasion. President Biden has lent credence to this stance
by repeatedly claiming 
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it is U.S. policy (it isn’t), obliging his aides to eternally walk
back his words.

Of course, the question of how China and the U.S. would respond to a
Taiwanese declaration of independence has yet to be put to the test.
The island’s current leadership, drawn from the pro-independence
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has so far accepted that, given
the way Taiwan is slowly achieving de facto independence through
diplomatic outreach and economic prowess, there’s no need to rush a
formal declaration. But presidential elections in Taiwan this coming
January and the possible emergence of another DPP-dominated
administration could, some believe
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such a move — or, in anticipation of it, a Chinese invasion.

Should the DPP candidate William Lai win on January 13th, the Biden
administration might come under enormous pressure
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Republicans — and many Democrats — to accelerate the already
rapid pace [[link removed]] of arms
deliveries to the island. That would, of course, be viewed by Beijing
as tacit American support for an accelerated drive toward independence
and (presumably) increase its inclination to invade. In other words,
Joe Biden could face a major military crisis remarkably early in 2024.

The South China Sea dispute could produce a similar crisis in short
order. That fracas stems from the fact that Beijing has declared
sovereignty over nearly the entire South China Sea — an extension of
the western Pacific bounded by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo,
and Vietnam — along with the islands found within it. Such claims
have been challenged by that sea’s other bordering states, which
argue that, under international law (notably the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea) they are entitled to sovereignty over the islands
that fall within their individual “exclusive economic zones”
(EEZs). In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the
Hague ruled
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petition from the Philippines that China’s claims were invalid and
that the Philippines and its neighbors were indeed entitled to control
their respective EEZs. China promptly both protested the ruling and
announced its intention to disregard it.

Chinese control over those islands and their surrounding waters would
have significant economic and strategic implications. To begin with,
it extends China’s defense perimeter several hundred miles from its
coastline, complicating any future U.S. plans to attack the mainland
while making a PRC assault on U.S. and allied bases in the region far
easier. The South China Sea also harbors major fisheries, an important
source of sustenance for China and its neighbors, as well as vast
reserves
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oil and natural gas coveted by all the states in the region. China has
consistently sought to monopolize those resources.

To facilitate its control over the area, the PRC has established
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on many of the islands, while using its coast guard and maritime
militias to drive off the fishing boats and oil-drilling vessels of
other states, even ramming
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of those ships. On October 22nd, for example, a large Chinese coast
guard vessel bumped into a smaller Philippine one seeking to reinforce
a small outpost of Philippines Marines located on the Second Thomas
Shoal, an islet claimed by both countries.

In reaction to such moves, officials in Washington have repeatedly
asserted that the U.S. will assist allies affected by Chinese
“bullying.” As Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin declared
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July at a meeting with Australian officials in Brisbane, “We’ll
continue to support our allies and partners as they defend themselves
from bullying behavior.” Three months later, following that clash at
the Second Thomas Shoal, Washington reaffirmed
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obligation to defend the Philippines under the 1951 Mutual Defense
Treaty, should Filipino forces, ships, or aircraft come under armed
attack, including “those of its coast guard — anywhere in the
South China Sea.”

In other words, a future clash between Chinese vessels and those of
one of Washington’s treaty partners or close allies could easily
escalate into a major confrontation. Just what form that might take or
where it might lead is, of course, impossible to say. But it’s worth
noting that, in recent South China Sea exercises, the U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command has conducted large-scale combat drills
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involving multiple aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and
submarines. Any U.S. military response on such a scale would
undoubtedly prompt a comparable Chinese reaction, setting in motion a
potential spiral of escalation. Assuming that China continues its
policy of harassing the fishing and exploration activities of its
southern neighbors, a clash of this sort could occur at almost any
time.

RESISTING BELLICOSE IMPULSES

Given the dangers in Taiwan and the South China Sea, Presidents Biden
and Xi will have to exercise extreme patience and prudence to prevent
the ignition of a full-blown crisis in 2024. Hopefully, the
understanding they developed in San Francisco, along with new
crisis-management tools like enhanced military-to-military
communications, will help them manage any problems that do arise. In
doing so, however, they will have to overcome both the escalatory
dynamics built into those disputes and bellicose domestic pressures
from powerful political and industrial factions that view intense
military competition with the other side (if not necessarily war) as
attractive and necessary.

In both the U.S. and China, vast military-industrial operations have
blossomed, fed by mammoth government disbursements intended to
bolster their ability to defeat the other’s military in all-out,
high-tech combat. In this hothouse environment, military bureaucracies
and arms-makers on each side have come to assume that perpetuating an
environment of mutual suspicion and hostility could prove
advantageous, leaving key politicians ever more obliged to shower them
with money and power. On December 13th and 14th, for example, the U.S.
Senate and House, seemingly incapable of passing anything
else, approved
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record defense policy bill that authorized $886 billion in military
spending in 2024 ($28 billion more than in 2023), with most of the
increase earmarked for ships, planes, and missiles intended primarily
for a possible future war with China. American military leaders —
and politicians representing districts with a high concentration of
defense contractors — are sure to request even greater spending
increases in future years to overcome “the China threat.”

A similar dynamic fuels the funding efforts of top Chinese
military-industrial officials, who no doubt are citing evidence of
Washington’s drive to overpower China to demand a reciprocal
buildup, including (all too ominously) of their country’s nuclear
forces
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In addition, in both countries, various political and media figures
continue to benefit by harping on the “China threat” or the
“America threat,” adding to the pressure on top officials to take
strong action in response to any perceived provocation by the other
side.

That being the case, Presidents Biden and Xi are likely to face a
series of demanding challenges in 2024 from the seemingly intractable
disputes between their two nations. Under the best of circumstances,
perhaps they’ll be able to avoid a major blow-up, while making
progress on less contentious issues like climate change and drug
trafficking. To do so, however, they’ll have to resist powerful
forces of entrenched bellicosity. If they can’t, the fierce wars in
Ukraine and Gaza in 2023 could end up looking like relatively minor
events as the two great powers face off against each other in a
conflict that could all too literally take this planet to hell and
back.

Fingers crossed.

_Follow _TomDispatch _on Twitter
[[link removed]] and join us on Facebook
[[link removed]]. Check out the newest Dispatch
Books, John Feffer’s new dystopian novel, _Songlands
[[link removed]]_ (the
final one in his Splinterlands series), Beverly Gologorsky’s
novel _Every Body Has a Story
[[link removed]]_, and
Tom Engelhardt’s _A Nation Unmade by War
[[link removed]]_,
as well as Alfred McCoy’s _In the Shadows of the American Century:
The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power
[[link removed]]_, John
Dower’s _The Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World
War II
[[link removed]], _and
Ann Jones’s_ They Were Soldiers: How the Wounded Return from
America’s Wars: The Untold Story
[[link removed]].

Copyright 2023 Michael Klare

Featured image: Now America will disturb China from Taiwan’s land
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by Quick Spice [[link removed]] is
licensed under CC BY 2.0
[[link removed]] / Flickr

Michael T. Klare, a _TomDispatch_ regular
[[link removed]],
is the five-college professor emeritus of peace and world security
studies at Hampshire College and a senior visiting fellow at the Arms
Control Association. He is the author of 15 books, the latest of which
is _All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate
Change
[[link removed]]_.
He is a founder of the Committee for a Sane U.S.-China Policy
[[link removed]].

_Tom Engelhardt launched TomDispatch
[[link removed]] in October 2001 as an informal
listserv offering commentary and collected articles from the global
media to a select group of friends and colleagues. In November 2002,
it gained its name and, as a project of the Nation Institute (now the
Type Media Center), became a web-based publication aimed at providing
“a regular antidote to the mainstream media.”_

_In the 18 years since, TomDispatch has regularly published three
original articles weekly on subjects ranging from the American way of
war and this country’s “forever wars” to economic inequality to
the climate crisis. It has served as a syndicated source for websites
ranging from Alternet and Common Dreams to the Nation magazine
and Salon. Republished in newspapers, magazines, and scores of
websites worldwide over the years, TomDispatch articles have
garnered millions of pageviews, been translated into more than a dozen
languages, and been cited in publications from the New York Times to
the Washington Post and myriad media outlets in between._

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