[ Argentina’s new president, Javier Milei, has issued a decree
with over 350 reforms tearing up labor rights and privatizing
industries. The “shock therapy” plan marks a dangerous expansion
of the president’s powers — but it also faces fierce oppositi]
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JAVIER MILEI’S SHOCK THERAPY WOULD BE A DISASTER FOR WORKING-CLASS
ARGENTINIANS  
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Andrew Stoughton
December 27, 2023
Jacobin
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_ Argentina’s new president, Javier Milei, has issued a decree with
over 350 reforms tearing up labor rights and privatizing industries.
The “shock therapy” plan marks a dangerous expansion of the
president’s powers — but it also faces fierce oppositi _

Argentine President Milei's plans would deregulate broad swathes of
the economy, erode labor rights, and pave the way for mass
privatization of state-owned enterprises., [Natacha Pisarenko/AP
Photo]

 

Javier Milei became Argentina’s president this month
promising “shock therapy” to curb inflation
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resolve the country’s foreign debt and currency reserve woes. Last
Wednesday, the Argentine public got its first taste of what that
therapy will look like. Declaring a state of economic emergency, the
Milei administration issued a Decree of Necessity and Urgency
(DNU) containing over 350 measures
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Unless struck down by Congress, the plans will deregulate broad
swathes of the economy, erode labor rights, and pave the way for mass
privatization of state-owned enterprises like airline Aerolíneas
Argentina and gas and oil company YPF.

The depth and breadth of deregulation has sent a shockwave through
Argentina, as has Milei’s unprecedented use of executive power
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Though the DNU has been used fairly liberally since the country’s
return to democracy four decades ago, no DNU has ever contained such a
vast array of changes. Moreover, the language of the decree declares
an emergency period of two years
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meaning that the administration would be able to continue passing
certain measures as part of that decree well into 2025. The aggressive
use of executive power, combined with repressive new antiprotest laws,
seems especially troubling following an election in which both Milei
and his running mate Victoria Villarruel espoused apologia
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the country’s last dictatorship, responsible for over thirty
thousand disappearances of activists and regime critics between 1976
and 1983.

 

Residents in Buenos Aires took to the streets to protest against the
measures on the nights of December 22 and 23. This challenged Security
Minister Patricia Bullrich’s new antipicketing protocol
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which now authorizes federal forces to break up protests that block
the street (known as _piquetes_), and mandates the creation of a
national registry of organizations, leaders, and participants in such
protests. Similar marches have taken place in Córdoba
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the country’s second- and third-largest cities, even as Milei and
other administration officials threaten to take away or reduce social
benefits
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health plans of those found guilty of violating the antipicketing
protocols. The waves of _cacerolazos_, as pot-banging marches are
known, had inspired the government to organize a rally in Buenos Aires
on Saturday to demonstrate support for the administration, but the
decision to gather supporters was quickly reversed
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Some members of Milei’s own coalition, which includes more
established center, center-right, and right-wing parties, have
expressed discomfort with the DNU and its measures, though often
taking greater issue with its use of executive authority than its
contents. Senator Martín Lousteau, president of the Radical Civic
Union (UCR), which backed Milei in the runoff election, voiced his
opposition to the DNU
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called for legislation with the same reforms to be introduced on the
floor of Congress. Similar calls came from Maximiliano Ferraro,
president of the Civic Coalition, a smaller centrist bloc that
supported Milei in the general election. Representative Rodrigo De
Loredo, head of the UCR bloc in the lower house of Congress, has
suggested that the administration compromise by breaking the
“megaDNU” into smaller decrees. The administration nonetheless
seems confident that it will have the votes necessary to avoid a
congressional veto of the plan.

Opposition Mobilizes

Still, there surely are major obstacles in the government’s way. The
DNU represents a unique challenge to Argentina’s robust organized
labor movement, and to the weakened Peronist coalition that now sits
in the minority in Congress. It will automatically take effect on
December 28, unless both houses of Congress vote to reject the
measure, or the country’s supreme court declares it
unconstitutional. If the measures enter into law, the anti-Milei
factions will find themselves engaged in a multifront war to protect
tenants, workers, students, public health and education, and more. The
effective period of the DNU, the liberal use of executive power, and
the new administration’s apparent appetite for police repression
paint a grim picture for social democracy in the Argentine Republic.

That said, a multifront war for the opposition is a multifront war for
the administration as well. Numerous organizations released statements
or took to the streets within hours of the announcement, ranging from
unions like the State Workers Association (ATE), Bank Employee
Association, and Confederation of Education Workers (CTERA), to
activist groups like Inquilinos Agrupados (a tenants’ rights
organization), Polo Obrero (a labor rights group), Somos Barrios de
Pie (a grassroots community network), and the communist political
group Corrientes Clasista y Combativa. The Center for Pharmaceutical
Professionals has announced that it will be petitioning the courts to
declare the DNU unconstitutional
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The General Confederation of Labor (CGT), the nation’s largest labor
union, has already filed multiple injunctions with the same
intent. As Mariano Martín reports in _Ámbito_
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the CGT held a board meeting last week with over fifty other unions,
where it began to plan the rest of its response to the DNU. The
organization is for now placing heavy emphasis on its legal strategy
to try and prevent the measures from taking effect, even if only in
part. They have also planned a general strike in February, which will
include both extant working groups of the CGT and the Popular Economy
Workers’ Union (UTEP), which should guarantee strong attendance.

Also in attendance at the meeting were members of the opposition
Unión por la Patria. This Peronist coalition, which currently has 102
of 257 seats in the lower house of Congress, and thirty-one of
seventy-two in the upper chamber, holds the immediate fate of the DNU
in its hands. The unease among the independent parties that helped
bring Milei to power opens the door to a Peronist victory in Congress.
If they can gather the votes to achieve simple majorities in both
houses, the DNU will not pass.

However, despite the mathematical possibility of victory, it remains
to be seen whether this coalition will manage to join forces with
anti-Peronist legislators. Figures like Ferraro and Lousteau have both
voiced opposition to the decree in part because of concerns about the
consequences of this expansion of executive authority, should Peronism
return to power in the future. That fear may not be enough to create
an oppositional consensus.

Milei garnered support from the center in November’s runoff election
precisely because of his strong anti-Peronist sentiment — a rallying
cry able to unite his far-right La Libertad Avanza with UCR, Propuesta
Republicana (PRO) and other parties that had originally rallied behind
Bullrich for president. In the runoff election, they sided with Milei
over Peronist candidate Massa even though the far-right candidate was
running on a platform much more extreme than the one he is today
advancing by decree. An even temporary split with Milei’s agenda
would represent a marked shift in their attitude toward the
administration.

Manufacturing Consent

Regardless, the independent parties in Milei’s coalition and the
opposition forces both recognize the same danger: it is exceptionally
difficult to organize meaningful resistance to this kind of use of
executive authority. The precedent this order would establish would
completely change the role of the presidency in Argentinean democracy.
Milei, however, has little recourse but executive power if he is to
enact the parts of his agenda he values most. His La Libertad Avanza
only holds seven out of seventy-two seats in the Senate. The closely
aligned PRO only has six, leaving twenty-six seats independent from
the opposition block of thirty-three. In the lower house, the
government only holds 78 of 257, much less than the Peronist
coalition.

This situation highlights a fundamental contradiction at the heart of
Milei’s administration. He was decisively elected president,
yet few of his ideas
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actually popular. He rode to victory on a wave of resentment at
Argentina’s elites, promising to make “_la casta_” pay for their
decades-long mismanagement of the country; that very caste now runs
his administration. Former president Mauricio Macri, the neoliberal
who ran the country from 2015 to 2019, has played an integral part in
staffing Milei’s cabinet with figures like Bullrich, his former
security minister, and Luis Caputo, the economy minister who worked
with Macri to take out the largest loan in International Monetary Fund
(IMF) history — a loan that has been the single biggest driver of
Argentina’s inflation and foreign currency reserve depletion over
the last four years. Milei’s less militant supporters, who backed
him in the election runoff out of frustration with inflation and
economic mismanagement, may chafe against some of his more extreme
measures, making legislating through Congress a tricky prospect. The
reliance on the DNU, coupled with the new antipicketing protocols,
paint a picture of what is to come over the next four years of
Milei’s presidency: if the administration is to succeed in
privatizing national industry, gutting labor protections, and
deregulating the economy, it is going to have to rely on executive
power and repression.

Of course, no administration can truly rule by diktat alone. Milei
will have to find ways to manufacture consent, and give cover to the
more “moderate” forces in the country that also want to see his
program enacted. For now, it seems that the president’s office will
seek to legitimize its authoritarian impulses under the guise of
economic necessity. The DNU itself states, “The severity of the
[fiscal] crisis puts at risk the very survival of the constituted
social, juridical, and political organization, affecting its normal
development in providing for the common good.” Bullrich, meanwhile,
said following the first implementation of the ant-picketing protocol
last Wednesday, “Today, there was free circulation throughout the
whole country. . . . People could go to work in peace, and move around
without issue.” If Milei is to succeed in his attempts to crush the
Left, this will be the path forward for him: to convince the public
that the repression of left-wing organizations, unions, and protesters
is necessary for the well-being of the economy. The early returns seem
to indicate that the public is not buying the line.

Ultimately, the success of the opposition’s response will depend on
how willingly the independent parties like the UCR back Milei’s
ambitions. Support from the center could further embolden the
administration’s authoritarian tendencies. Rejection could equally
drive the government to rely even more on executive power. For now,
the next phase of the fight depends on the courts. Should they decide
that the decree is valid, it will change not only the country’s
trajectory for the next four years, but that of Argentine democracy
itself long after.

_Andrew Stoughton is a writer and translator based in Buenos Aires._

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* Argentina
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* Javier Milei
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* anti-working class
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* Austerity
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