ISIS carried out at least 17 confirmed attacks in November in the Homs, Hama,
Raqqa, Aleppo, and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 67
pro-Assad regime soldiers and wounded at least 23 more. One civilian was killed
as well. There were also nine high quality* attacks during November. High
quality attacks usually represent about a quarter to a third of all attacks, so
the high proportion (53 percent) in November suggests there were additional
attacks not documented by this author this month (more on this later).





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In November 2023


Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In November 2023 by clicking here

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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In November 2023

By Gregory Waters



Following is the November 2023 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2022 and 2021 can be found
here
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andhere
<[link removed]>.
The January 2023 edition of ISIS Redux can be foundhere
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, February’shere
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, March’shere
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, April’shere
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, May’shere
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, June’shere
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, July’shere
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, August’shere
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, September’shere
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, and October’shere
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. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also beexplored here
<[link removed]>, here
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, andhere
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.



ISIS carried out at least 17 confirmed attacks in November in the Homs, Hama,
Raqqa, Aleppo, and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 67
pro-Assad regime soldiers and wounded at least 23 more. One civilian was killed
as well. There were also nine high quality* attacks during November. High
quality attacks usually represent about a quarter to a third of all attacks, so
the high proportion (53 percent) in November suggests there were additional
attacks not documented by this author this month (more on this later). While
the overall number of ISIS attacks in central Syria decreased slightly compared
to October, a qualitative assessment of the month’s fighting suggests an
overall increase in the severity of the insurgency’s attacks. November was the
deadliest month for regime forces in central Syria this year (while there were
more deaths in February and April, most of those killed werecivilians
<[link removed]>
). ISIS forces followed up their capture of the Doubayat Gas Field in October
by opening a new front in November, on theal-Kawm axis
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, and expanding operations in southern Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor. November marks
the third month in a row that ISIS militants have captured and looted regime
positions in the Badia.



Regime forces concentrated their efforts in November on recovering the
Doubayat Gas Field, while also deploying additional reinforcements to southern
Raqqa. The regime was able to re-capture more than half of the gas field by the
end of the month, thanks in part to the participation of local tribesmen who
had suffered from ISIS massacres earlier this year. Iranian-backed foreign
fighters also participated in the fighting, reporting at least 12 deaths around
Doubayat in early November. Meanwhile Syrian regime, and presumably, Russian
jets, stepped up bombing runs in both Homs and southern Raqqa in response to
the significant ISIS activity there.



ISIS claimed two of the attacks in central Syria this month, breaking a
three-month bout of silence. ISIS began making official claims for Badia
activity in June 2023 after releasing no information on its activities in the
region for six months.


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*Indicates attacks in Damascus City claimed by ISIS. Two additional IED
attacks occurred in Homs City in June 2023 that went unclaimed but were
suspected to be conducted by ISIS.



Confirmed ISIS attacks remained steady in Deir Ez Zor (4) and Aleppo (1), rose
in Raqqa (3) and decreased in Homs (8) and Hama (1).


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Deir Ez Zor and Raqqa



ISIS continues to conduct a low-level insurgency within the urban belt of Deir
Ez Zor. On November 12, a Syrian soldier from the Russian-backed 5th Corps, 7th
Brigade was killed somewhere in the Deir Ez Zor countryside. On November 22,
two members of the 4th Division were gunned down in an ISIS ambush inside the
town of Muhassan, between Deir Ez Zor and Mayadeen. The attack was reported
locally and claimed by ISIS several days later. On November 24, a Syrian member
of the Iran-backed Local Defense Forces was kidnapped and assassinated in
Mayadeen, his body discovered several days later. Lastly, on November 28, a
large group of local tribesmen affiliated with the regime’s Liwa al-Quds
militia drove into a minefield outside the village of Shujairi, in Jabal
Bishri. Eight were killed and 14 wounded, some seriously. It’s worth noting
that Jabal Bishri is likely a key base of operations for ISIS cells across
southern Raqqa and western Deir Ez Zor.



ISIS militants continue to operate aggressively across southern Raqqa as well.
On November 8, ISIS militants ambushed a group of regime fighters near the key
Resafa junction, killing nine soldiers. On November 13, ISIS attacked another
regime position along the highway to the north, overrunning the outpost and
looting food trucks, according to journalist Zain al-Abidin. Regime media
reported three Republican Guard soldiers killed in the attack. On November 23,
a regime military truck driving near the Waheb Oil Field in southwest Raqqa hit
a mine or improvised explosive device (IED), leaving five soldiers dead
according toZain al-Abidin
<[link removed]>. Regime airstrikes
were reported in southern Raqqa in response to the November 13 attack as well
as on November 24.


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Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Dier Ez Zor and Raqqa (highlighted) in
November 2023 alongside all other attacks in 2023. Not mapped is one attack
that occurred somewhere in the Deir Ez Zor countryside.



Homs, Hama and Aleppo



ISIS activity in eastern Homs surged in October. This increase came after five
months of generally muted activity in the region following the conclusion of
the battles around al-Kawm. However, the withdrawal of Wagner Group forces from
the Sukhnah and western Deir Ez Zor sectors seems to have spurred a new ISIS
push to test the regime’s defenses around this key city. In October, large
groups of ISIS militants launched coordinated, sustained assaults on regime
positions south of Sukhnah, resulting in the group’s capture of the Doubayat
Oil Field on October 18. Fighting in November was again heavy around the
Doubayat front, but ISIS was also able to open a second front north of Sukhnah
on the Kawm axis, utilizing cells in southern Raqqa and along the Hama-Homs
border.



On November 5, ISIS captured a regime position several kilometers south of the
Doubayat field. This marked the farthest expansion of ISIS control in and
around the field, yet regime forces were already massing for a renewed
offensive following multiple failed attempts in late October. Also on November
5, regime forces in the nearby Arak field successfully killed an ISIS cell in
the area. Between November 5 and November 7, the Iranian-commanded Liwa
Fatemiyoun lost at least 12 of its Afghan foreign fighters in clashes with ISIS
south of the field (this has been coded as one incident due to a lack of
details). By November 8, regime forces had begun pushing ISIS cells back
towards the field thanks to the participation of a new group of local
tribesmen. Fighting over the Doubayat Oil Field continued off and on for the
next two weeks, with regime forces reportedly securing about half the field by
November 21. However, there are not enough details available about the fighting
for this author to code any additional attacks (see the caveat stated at the
beginning of this report that more than 17 attacks likely occurred this month).



Meanwhile, ISIS opened a second front on November 8 when militants overran a
regime base near the Rasm al-Kawm Gas Field, southwest of the strategic Kawm
Oasis. Local media reported 24 militia fighters killed and nine wounded in the
attack. ISIS officially claimed responsibility several days later, saying that
its fighters burned down two barracks and looted trucks and weapons. On
November 9, regime forces in the Bir Barbar hamlet along the Homs-Hama border
came under heavy attack but managed to hold their positions. That same day,
ISIS militants to the north of Kawm besieged regime forces in the Kadir hamlet
and captured several positions along the Kawm-Resafa highway, cutting off the
northern route to Kawm. During the fighting, ISIS reportedly managed to capture
night vision equipment from security forces (ISIS has previouslyshowcased
<[link removed]> its possession
of thermal optics in the Badia in 2021). On November 12, ISIS militants
launched an attack on regime positions west of Kawm. ISIS pressure around the
Kawm axis eased late in the month, and regime forces were able to re-open the
Kawm corridor on November 24.



There was only one attack reported in eastern Hama in November, a drop in
activity following several serious ISIS attacks in October. On November 28,
local pages reported a civilian was gunned down near Tel ‘Ada by two unknown
men.



Suspected ISIS activity was reported in southern Aleppo for the second month
in a row. On November 7, two soldiers were killed by a mine or IED in the
Khanasir countryside.


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Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Homs and Hama (highlighted) in November 2023
alongside all other attacks in 2023.



Looking Ahead



ISIS will eventually lose control of the Doubayat Oil Field over the next
weeks or months. Holding territory long-term (meaning functioning oil and gas
fields or inhabited villages) is not part of ISIS’s strategy nor does it help
the group achieve its near-term goals. The question then becomes whether or not
ISIS will manage to withdraw from Doubayat without taking significant
casualties. If so, October’s offensive and November’s defensive stand will have
been a resounding success, allowing the group to seize materiel from regime
positions, win an important moral victory and morale-boost for its fighters in
the desert, and potentially leave the cells even better equipped for the next
operation. It is important to remember that, based on visual and anecdotal
evidence, ISIS is heavily focused on training its child recruits in central
Syria right now. Each successful operation means real-time experience for these
new militants and helps the group shore up its mid-term resiliency.



ISIS’s ability to maintain the fight in Doubayat while simultaneously
launching heavy attacks along the Kawm and Resafa axes is an important marker
for the group’s strength. It suggests that ISIS has multiple large groupings in
the Badia right now that are well supplied and commanded, and confident enough
in their strategic depth, to be able to engage in close and sustained combat
with regime forces in a manner that has strategic impact (the regime had to
divert forces from Kawm in October to assist with the Doubayat fighting).
ISIS’s ability to partially exploit that in November should not be downplayed).
Meanwhile, ISIS maintains a small but steady assassination campaign along the
Euphrates River, the one part of the Badia that had always remained secure even
during the height of ISIS’s offensives in 2020. The permeability of the
Euphrates remains the key underlying factor of ISIS’s resiliency in central
Syria. The Syrian regime and its local affiliates would do well to remember
this fact as ISIS works to expand the smuggling networks that cross the river.


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Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in November 2023 alongside all
other attacks in 2023 (green for Quarter 1, blue for Quarter 2, and black for
Quarter 3). Not shown is one attack somewhere in Deir Ez Zor. To view an
interactive version of this map, please clickhere
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.



*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.



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