[ The historical record documents the darker side of Kissinger’s
controversial tenure in power: his role in the overthrow of democracy
and the rise of dictatorship in Chile; disdain for human rights;
support for dirty, and even genocidal, wars abroad..]
[[link removed]]

HENRY KISSINGER: THE DECLASSIFIED OBITUARY – THE PRIMARY SOURCES ON
KISSINGER’S CONTROVERSIAL LEGACY  
[[link removed]]


 

Peter Kornbluh, William Burr and Tom Blanton (eds)
November 29, 2023
National Security Archive
[[link removed]]


*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

_ The historical record documents the darker side of Kissinger’s
controversial tenure in power: his role in the overthrow of democracy
and the rise of dictatorship in Chile; disdain for human rights;
support for dirty, and even genocidal, wars abroad.. _

Henry Kissinger, 1975, Wikimedia Commons

 

WASHINGTON, D.C., NOVEMBER 29, 2023 - Henry Kissinger’s death
today brings new global attention to the long paper trail of secret
documents recording his policy deliberations, conversations, and
directives on many initiatives for which he became famous—détente
with the USSR, the opening to China, and Middle East shuttle
diplomacy, among them.

This historical record also documents the darker side of Kissinger’s
controversial tenure in power: his role in the overthrow of democracy
and the rise of dictatorship in Chile; disdain for human rights and
support for dirty, and even genocidal, wars abroad; secret bombing
campaigns in Southeast Asia; and involvement in the Nixon
administration’s criminal abuses, among them the secret wiretaps of
his own top aides.

To contribute to a balanced and more comprehensive evaluation of
Kissinger’s legacy, the National Security Archive has compiled a
small, select dossier of declassified records—memos, memcons, and
“telcons” that Kissinger wrote, said and/or read—documenting TOP
SECRET deliberations, operations and policies during Kissinger’s
time in the White House and Department of State.

The revealing “telcons”—over 30,000 pages of daily transcripts
of Kissinger’s phone conversations which he secretly recorded and
had his secretaries transcribe—were taken by Kissinger as
“personal papers” when he left office in 1977 and used,
selectively, to write his best-selling memoirs. 

The National Security Archive forced the U.S. government to recover
these official records by preparing a lawsuit that argued that both
the State Department and the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) had inappropriately allowed classified U.S.
government documentation to be removed from their control. Archive
senior analyst William Burr filed a FOIA request for their
declassification. The draft lawsuit—which was never filed—is
included in this dossier, since Kissinger’s effort to remove, retain
and control these highly informative and revealing historical records
should be considered a critical part of his official legacy, and the
full texts have been published in the Digital National Security
Archive series from ProQuest.

This special posting also centralizes links to dozens of previously
published collections of documents related to Kissinger’s tenure in
government that the Archive, led by the intrepid efforts of William
Burr, has identified, pursued, obtained and catalogued over several
decades. Together, these collections constitute an accessible, major
repository of records on one of the most consequential U.S. foreign
policy makers of the 20th century.

“Henry Kissinger’s insistence on recording practically every word
he said, either to the presidents he served (without their knowledge
that they were being taped) or the diplomats he cajoled, remains the
gift that keeps on giving to diplomatic historians,” remarked Tom
Blanton, director of the National Security Archive. “Kissinger’s
aides later commented that he needed to keep track of which lie he
told to whom. Kissinger tried to keep those documents under his own
control. His deed of gift to the Library of Congress would have kept
them closed until five years from now, but the Archive brought legal
action and forced the opening of secret documents that show a
decidedly mixed picture of Kissinger’s legacy, and enormous
catastrophic costs to the peoples of Southeast Asia and Latin
America.”
 

I. SECRET BOMBING AND WIRETAPS

[7.1]
[[link removed]]

Document 1.1

WHITE HOUSE, TELCON, [SUMMARY OF KISSINGER CONVEYING NIXON ORDER TO
COMMENCE SECRET BOMBING OF CAMBODIA TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN
LAIRD], MARCH 15, 1969
[[link removed]]

Mar 15, 1969

Source

Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), The Kissinger Telephone
Conversations: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977.

After receiving an order from President Nixon at 3:35pm on March 15,
1969, for “immediate implementation of Breakfast plan,” Kissinger
transmits Nixon’s decision to begin the secret bombing of Cambodia,
to the Secretary of Defense. “K said to lay on above for Monday
afternoon our time, Tuesday morning their time. L said he would,”
according to the summary. Kissinger warns Laird that “there is to be
no public comment at all from anyone at any level, either complaining
or threatening.” This is intended to be a TOP SECRET operation.

[7.2]
[[link removed]]

Document 1.2

WHITE HOUSE, TELCON, “THE PRESIDENT MR. KISSINGER 3-17-69 1:20
PM,” [KISSINGER BRIEFING TO NIXON ON PREPARATIONS FOR FIRST SECRET
BOMBING RAID OVER CAMBODIA], MARCH 17, 1969
[[link removed]]

Mar 17, 1969

Source

DNSA, The Kissinger Telephone Conversations: A Verbatim Record of U.S.
Diplomacy, 1969-1977.

Only hours before the first secret aerial bombing of Cambodia,
Kissinger briefs Nixon on preparations. “K said it is all in
order,” according to the summary of their phone conversation. The
two comment on how South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu has
already agreed to private talks.

[7.3]
[[link removed]]

Document 1.3

WHITE HOUSE, TELCON, “3/18/69 8 P.M. GENERAL WHEELER,” [BRIEFING
KISSINGER ON SUCCESS OF FIRST BOMBING RAIDS], MARCH 18, 1969
[[link removed]]

Mar 18, 1969

Source

DNSA, The Kissinger Telephone Conversations: A Verbatim Record of U.S.
Diplomacy, 1969-1977.

Kissinger gets a short briefing from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Earle Wheeler on the success of the initial bombing
raids. He advises the military to undertake additional “hits.”
“HAK said they should put in 2 or 3 more hits along the whole area
if we get the right intelligence.” Kissinger also shares his
assessment of the impact of the sudden, secret raids:
“Psychologically, the impact must have been something,” he states.
In response, General Wheeler suggests the shock of the bombing will
force the North Vietnamese back to the Paris peace talks: “Wheeler
said they probably already had their speech written for Paris.”

[7.4]
[[link removed]]

Document 1.4

NSC, TELCON, KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON, DECEMBER 9,
1970, 8:45 P.M.
[[link removed]]

Dec 9, 1970

Source

DNSA, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Home File, Box 29, File 2

In the wake of a year of secret bombing raids, President Nixon remains
anxious about the Cambodian situation. In this telephone call, Nixon
orders Kissinger to direct bombing attacks on North Vietnamese forces
there ”tomorrow.” He wanted to ”hit everything there,” using
the ”big planes” and the ”small planes.” ”I don't want any
screwing around,” Nixon says.

[7.5]
[[link removed]]

Document 1.5

WHITE HOUSE, TELCON, KISSINGER AND GENERAL ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.,
DECEMBER 9, 1970, 8:50 P.M.
[[link removed]]

Dec 9, 1970

Source

DNSA, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Home File, Box 29, File 2, 106-10

A few minutes after receiving Nixon’s call on Cambodia, Kissinger
telephones his military assistant, Alexander Haig, about the orders
from ”our friend.” After he describes Nixon’s instructions for a
”massive bombing campaign” involving ”anything that flys [sic]
on anything that moves,” the notetaker apparently heard Haig
”laughing.” Both Haig and Kissinger knew that what Nixon had
ordered was logistically and politically impossible so they translated
it into a plan for massive bombing in a particular district (not
identifiable because the text is incomplete). These two phone calls
illustrate an important feature of the Nixon-Kissinger relationship:
while Nixon would, from time to time, make preposterous suggestions
(no doubt depending on his mood), Kissinger would later decide whether
there was a rational kernel in what Nixon had said and whether, and/or
how, to follow up.

[7.6]
[[link removed]]

Document 1.6

FBI, MEMORANDUM, “COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE
REQUEST,” TOP SECRET, MAY 12, 1969
[[link removed]]

May 12, 1969

Source

Elliot Richardson Papers, LIbrary of Congress.

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover transmits a TOP SECRET report to Attorney
General John Mitchell on Kissinger’s request for telephone
surveillance on four U.S. officials “to determine if a serious
security problem exists.” According to the memo, the names have been
brought to the FBI by Kissinger’s military deputy, Col Alexander
Haig, who states that the matter is “of most grave and serious
consequence to our national security.” Nixon and Kissinger
had directed
[[link removed]] the
FBI to begin a leak investigation and wiretaps almost immediately
after the_ New York Times_ broke the story on the secret bombing
raids over Cambodia.

[7.7]
[[link removed]]

Document 1.7

FBI, J. EDGAR HOOVER WIRETAP SURVEILLANCE REPORT TO PRESIDENT NIXON,
TOP SECRET MAY 11, 1970
[[link removed]]

May 11, 1970

Source

Richard Nixon Presidential Library Mandatory Declassification Review
Request

In one of a series of reports to President Nixon on individuals
targeted for wiretap surveillance by Kissinger’s office, FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover shares information on three
individuals: _London Sunday Times_ reporter Harry Brandon;
Kissinger’s former aide Morton Halperin, and State Department
official William Sullivan, who is overheard speaking to former
ambassador W. Averell Harriman. The wiretaps capture innocuous
conversations by Brandon’s wife about opposition to Kissinger’s
Vietnam policies among his former Harvard colleagues, and Halperin’s
plans to quietly resign from the White House staff where he has been a
part time consultant since stepping down as a top specialist on
Kissinger’s NSC. The wiretap on Sullivan produces information that
Ambassador Harriman plans to host a gathering at his home of State
Department officials who had signed a letter of protest against the
secret bombing of Cambodia. The FBI subsequently uses this information
to physically surveil the meeting at Harriman’s house—a fact that
emerges in congressional hearings on the wiretap scandal four years
later.

[7.8]
[[link removed]]

Document 1.8

WHITE HOUSE, TELCON, “THE PRESIDENT/MR. KISSINGER 7:00PM., JUNE 1,
1973 [DISCUSSING WIRETAP SCANDAL]
[[link removed]]

Jun 1, 1973

Source

DNSA, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations

After the wiretap scandal breaks into the media, Nixon orders a report
on wiretapping under previous administrations. He calls Kissinger in
anger to tell him: “Let’s get away from the bullshit. Bobby
Kennedy was the greatest tapper.” He accuses the former attorney
general of tapping the phones of 300 people in 1963 and tells
Kissinger that he is going to publish the names of those individuals
Kennedy had placed under surveillance. “And let the[se] assholes
know that they’re going to get this, Henry.” Kissinger responds:
“I think you should.” “They started it,” Nixon reiterates.
“They want to have a g[ood] fight; they’re going to get one,
Henry, you understand.”

[7.9]
[[link removed]]

Document 1.9

WHITE HOUSE, TELCON, “ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI/SECRETARY KISSINGER,
MARCH 13, 1976, TIME: 4:13 P.M. [CONVERSATION ABOUT HALPERIN LAWSUIT
ON ILLEGAL WIRETAPS]
[[link removed]]

Mar 13, 1976

Source

DNSA, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations

In one of a number of conversations with Attorney General Edward Levi,
Kissinger complains about how the Justice Department is handling the
Halperin suit against him. Halperin’s lawyers are telling the press
that there are “inconsistencies” between his story and other
testimony in the case [likely witnesses such as Alexander Haig stating
that Kissinger provided the names for the FBI of individuals to be put
under surveillance as potential leakers.] Kissinger complains that the
lawsuit is undermining his ability to do his job. “Right now the
Secretary of State is being accused of lying, perjury, [and] conflicts
are being printed in newspapers,” he tells the Attorney General.
“I had a senior official of the Russian Embassy ask me whether my
effectiveness was being damaged the other day.” Kissinger adds:
“My philosophy is when in doubt attack.”

 

Chile’s ruler Augusto Pinochet meeting U.S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger in Santiago, June 8, 1976 (Wikimedia Commons)
II. KISSINGER AND CHILE

Chile is arguably the Achilles heel of Kissinger's legacy. The
declassified historical record leaves no doubt that HAK was the chief
architect of U.S. efforts to destabilize the democratically elected
government of Salvador Allende. In the weeks before Allende was
inaugurated, CIA documents reveal, Kissinger supervised covert
operations—codenamed FUBELT—to foment a military coup that led
directly to the assassination of Chile’s commander-in-chief of the
Army, General René Schneider. After initial coup plotting failed,
Kissinger personally convinced Nixon to reject the State
Department’s position that Washington could establish a _modus
vivendi_ with Allende, and to authorize clandestine intervention to
“intensify Allende’s problems so that at a minimum he may fail or
be forced to limit his aims, and at a maximum might create conditions
in which collapse or overthrow might be feasible,” as Kissinger’s
talking points called for him to tell the National Security Council,
three days after Allende’s inauguration. The U.S. “created the
conditions as great as possible,” Kissinger informed Nixon only days
after Allende was overthrown 50 years ago on September 11, 1973.
“[I]n the Eisenhower period, we would be heroes,” he added.

Kissinger designed U.S. policy to keep Allende from consolidating his
elected government; but once General Augusto Pinochet’s forces
violently took power, the documents demonstrate, Kissinger
reconfigured U.S. policy to assist the consolidation of a brutal
military dictatorship. “I think we should understand our
policy—that however unpleasant they act, this government is better
for us than Allende was,” he told his deputies as they reported to
him on the human rights atrocities in the weeks following the coup. At
a private June 1976 meeting with Pinochet in Santiago, Kissinger told
the Chilean dictator: “My evaluation is that you are a victim of all
left-wing groups around the world and that your greatest sin was that
you overthrew a government which was going communist.”

“We want to help, not undermine you,” Kissinger informed the
General, disregarding advice from his own ambassador to give Pinochet
a direct, tough message on human rights. “You did a great service to
the West in overthrowing Allende.”

[1.1]
[[link removed]]

Document 2.1

WHITE HOUSE, TELCON, CONVERSATION ON BLOCKING ALLENDE BETWEEN NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR HENRY KISSINGER AND SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM
ROGERS, SEPTEMBER 12, 1970.
[[link removed]]

Sep 12, 1970

Source

DNSA

Only days after Salvador Allende’s election, Kissinger speaks to
Secretary of State William Rogers about plans to block his
inauguration. Rogers reluctantly agrees that the CIA should
“encourage a different result” in Chile but warns it should be
done discreetly lest U.S. intervention against a democratically
elected government be exposed. Kissinger firmly tells Rogers that
“the president’s view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an
Allende takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low
posture.” (Note: this page of the telcon has been misdated as
September 14; page 1 makes it clear that the conversation took place
on September 12, 1970.)

[1.2]
[[link removed]]

Document 2.2

NSC, MEMORANDUM, “CHILE—40 COMMITTEE MEETING, MONDAY – SEPTEMBER
14,” SECRET, SEPTEMBER 14, 1970
[[link removed]]

Sep 14, 1970

Source

Clinton Administration Chile Declassification Project

In a memorandum to prepare Henry Kissinger for a 40 Committee meeting
on covert options to block Allende’s inauguration in Chile, his top
deputy for Latin America, Viron Vaky, takes the opportunity to warn
against U.S. efforts to block Allende. In addition to the costs of
possible exposure to the reputation of the United States abroad, he
advances a bold moral argument: “What we propose is patently a
violation of our own principles and policy tenets.” Over the coming
days, weeks, and months, Kissinger will chair the 40 Committee
meetings determining and overseeing covert operations to undermine
Allende’s presidency.

[1.3]
[[link removed]]

Document 2.3

CIA, HELMS NOTES, “MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ON CHILE AT 15:25 SEPT 15,
’70, PRESENT: JOHN MITCHELL + HENRY KISSINGER,” SEPTEMBER 15, 1970
[[link removed]]

Sep 15, 1970

Source

Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973.

On September 15, 1970, Kissinger participates in a fifteen-minute Oval
Office meeting with President Nixon and CIA director Richard Helms on
Chile. Notes taken by the CIA director record Nixon’s orders to the
CIA to “make the economy scream” and to prevent Allende from being
inaugurated as president of Chile. Nixon directs Helms to put together
a “game plan” in 48 hours, which is then shared with Kissinger who
becomes the de facto supervisor of the initial CIA efforts to foment a
military coup before the inauguration in early November.

[1.4]
[[link removed]]

Document 2.4

CIA, MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, “DR. KISSINGER, MR. KARAMESSINES,
GEN. HAIG AT THE WHITE HOUSE—15 OCTOBER 1970,” SECRET, OCTOBER 15,
1970
[[link removed]]

Oct 15, 1970

Source

Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973.

This memorandum of conversation summarizes a meeting between Henry
Kissinger, his deputy, Alexander Haig, and the CIA's Thomas
Karamessines to evaluate the status of coup plotting in Chile. The key
plotter who is receiving CIA support, retired General Roberto Viaux,
“did not have more than one chance in twenty-perhaps less-to launch
a successful coup,” Karamessines reports. After Kissinger lists the
negative consequences of a failed coup, they decide to send a message
to Viaux warning him not to take precipitate action and advising him
that “The time will come when you with all your other friends can do
something. You will continue to have our support.“ Dr. Kissinger
instructs Karamessines that the CIA “should continue keeping the
pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight—now, after the 24th of
October, after 5 November and into the future…” A CIA report
cabled to Santiago immediately following the Kissinger meeting states
that “it is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by
a coup.”

[1.5]
[[link removed]]

Document 2.5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CIVIL
COMPLAINT, RENE SCHNEIDER ET AL, V. HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, "FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR SUMMARY
EXECUTION, TORTURE, CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT, ARBITRARY
DETENTION, ASSAULT AND BATTERY, NEGLIGENCE, INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, WRONGFUL DEATH," NOVEMBER 12, 2002
[[link removed]]

Nov 12, 2002

Source

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

The covert CIA operation that Kissinger supervised to foment a coup
before Allende’s inauguration led directly to the assassination of
the pro-Constitution Chilean commander-in-chief of the Army, General
Rene Schneider. On September 10, 2001, the sons of General Schneider,
Raul and Rene Schneider, filed a civil lawsuit against Henry Kissinger
and the U.S. government for the “wrongful death“ of their father.
This complaint, as amended in November 2002, cited the declassified
U.S. record as evidence of liability in the case. According to the
petition: “Recently declassified U.S. government documents and
congressional reports have provided Plaintiffs with the information
necessary to bring this action. The documents show that the knowing
practical assistance and encouragement provided by the United States
and the official ultra vires acts of Henry Kissinger resulted in
General Schneider’s summary execution, torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, arbitrary detention, assault and battery,
negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful
death.” The civil lawsuit was eventually dismissed because the
judges ruled that Kissinger had immunity for actions he took as part
of his official responsibilities as national security advisor to the
President.

 

Document 2.6

WHITE HOUSE, KISSINGER, MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT, "SUBJECT: NSC
MEETING, NOVEMBER 6-CHILE," SECRET, NOVEMBER 5, 1970
[[link removed]]

Nov 5, 1970

Source

Peter Kornbluh, _The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on
Atrocity and Accountability_
[[link removed]] (The New Press, 2013)
pp. 121-128.

After the failure of the CIA to foment a coup to prevent Allende’s
inauguration, the Nixon White House scheduled an NSC meeting on
November 5 to determine US policy toward an Allende government. But
Kissinger asks that the meeting be postponed a day to November 6, in
order to lobby Nixon to reject the State Department’s position that
Washington foster a modus vivendi with Allende. Instead, Kissinger
argues, Nixon should "make a decision that we will oppose Allende as
strongly as we can and do all we can to keep him from consolidating
power,” as he writes in this pivotal memorandum, explaining why the
first freely elected Marxist government in the world must not be
allowed to succeed. “The election of Allende as President of Chile
poses for us one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this
hemisphere,” Kissinger submits in his opening sentence, underlining
it for effect. “Your decision as to what to do about it may be the
most historic and difficult foreign affairs decision you will have to
make this year,” he dramatically advised Nixon, “for what happens
in Chile over the next six to twelve months will have ramifications
that will go far beyond just US-Chilean relations.”

[1.7]
[[link removed]]

Document 2.7

NSC, TELCON, KISSINGER DISCUSSION WITH NIXON ON THE COUP IN CHILE,
SEPTEMBER 16, 1973
[[link removed]]

Sep 16, 1973

Source

DNSA.

In their first substantive conversation following the military coup in
Chile, Kissinger and Nixon discuss the U.S. role in the overthrow of
Allende, and the adverse reaction in the news media. When Nixon asks
if the U.S. “hand” will show in the coup, Kissinger admits “we
helped them” and that “[deleted reference] created conditions as
great as possible.” The two commiserate over what Kissinger calls
the “bleating” liberal press. In the Eisenhower period, he states,
“we would be heroes.” Nixon assures him that the people will
appreciate what they did: “let me say they aren’t going to buy
this crap from the liberals on this one.”

[1.8]
[[link removed]]

Document 2.8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, "U.S.-CHILEAN
RELATIONS," [KISSINGER CONVERSATION WITH PINOCHET], SECRET, JUNE 8,
1976
[[link removed]]

Jun 8, 1976

Source

National Security Archive U.S.-Chile Relations collection

In Santiago for an Organization of American States (OAS) meeting,
Kissinger meets privately with General Pinochet. Despite being briefed
by his aides that the regime’s rampant human rights violations have
made Chile “a symbol of rightwing tyranny” and advised to press
Pinochet on that issue, Kissinger takes a decidedly solicitous
approach. “My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing
groups around the world and that your greatest sin was that you
overthrew a government which was going communist,” he tells
Pinochet, avoiding any pressure on human rights or a return to
civilian rule. “We want to help, not undermine you."

[1.9]
[[link removed]]

Document 2.9

NSC, TELCON, CONVERSATION BETWEEN KISSINGER AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR LATIN AMERICA, WILLIAM D. ROGERS, JUNE 16, 1976
[[link removed]]

Jun 16, 1976

Source

DNSA.

Following his visit to Chile and his meeting with Pinochet, Kissinger
read an article in the _Washington Post_ reporting on remarks made
by Robert White, a member of the State Department delegation to the
OAS conference (and later U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador). White
criticized the Pinochet regime for rejecting the OAS report on ongoing
human rights abuses in Chile. Unbeknownst to White, only a few days
earlier, Kissinger privately told Pinochet that ”we want to help,
not undermine you.” Now, Kissinger is angry that a U.S. official has
publicly challenged Pinochet on his human rights record. ”This is
not an institution that is going to humiliate the Chileans,” he
states. ”It is a bloody outrage.” Kissinger tells Rogers, the
State Department’s top official for Latin America, that they should
fire White.

III. KISSINGER AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Secretary Kissinger’s abject embrace of the Pinochet regime, and
disregard for its repression, contributed to a broad public and
political movement to institutionalize human rights as a priority in
U.S. foreign policy. As Congress began passing laws restricting U.S.
assistance to regimes that violated human rights, Kissinger’s
distain for the human rights issue escalated. His willingness to
endorse, support and accept mass bloodshed, torture and disappearance
by allied, anti-Communist military regimes, is reflected in various
declassified documents.

[2.1]
[[link removed]]

Document 3.1

STATE DEPARTMENT, TELCON, [KISSINGER CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, HARRY SHLAUDEMAN ,ON ARGENTINA], JUNE 30, 1976
[[link removed]]

Jun 30, 1976

Source

DNSA.

In this brief conversation, Henry Kissinger berates his aide after
learning that the State Department’s Latin America bureau has issued
a demarche to the Argentine military junta for escalating death squad
operations, disappearances and reports of torture following the coup
in March 1976. The demarche was recommended by Ambassador Robert Hill
and conveyed by him to Foreign Minister Guzzetti on May 27. A similar
message was given to the Argentine ambassador in Washington, D.C., by
one of Shlaudeman’s deputies, Hewson Ryan. But the demarche appears
to contradict a message that Kissinger had personally given to
Guzzetti during a private meeting in Santiago on June 10; to act ”as
quickly as possible
[[link removed]]” to repress
leftist forces in Argentina. Now Kissinger demands to know ”in what
way is it [the demarche]
[[link removed]] compatible
with my policy.” He tells Shlaudeman: ”I want to know who did this
and consider having him transferred.”

[2.2]
[[link removed]]

Document 3.2

STATE DEPARTMENT, MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, “SECRETARY'S MEETING
WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER GUZZETTI,” SECRET, OCTOBER 7, 1976
[[link removed]]

Oct 7, 1976

Source

Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive,
released November 2003.

As a follow up to a meeting they held in Santiago in June, Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister César
Guzzetti meet again at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City and
discuss the Argentine military regime’s repressive campaign to
eradicate the left. Kissinger offers U.S. support: “Look, our basic
attitude is that we would like you to succeed. I have an old-fashioned
view that friends ought to be supported. What is not understood in the
United States is that you have a civil war. We read about human rights
problems but not the context. The quicker you succeed the better.”

[2.3]
[[link removed]]

Document 3.3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MEMO, “FOREIGN MINISTER GUZZETTI EUPHORIC OVER
VISIT TO UNITED STATES,” OCTOBER 19, 1976
[[link removed]]

Oct 19, 1976

Source

U.S. State Department, Argentina Declassification Project (1975-1984),
August 20, 2002
[[link removed]]. Transcription
[[link removed]]

U.S. Ambassador Robert Hill sends this protest to Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger that he has emboldened the Argentine military by not
giving Foreign Minister Guzzetti a strong disapproval from Washington
for their human rights violations. ”Guzzetti's remarks both to me
and to the Argentine press since his return are not those of a man who
has been impressed with the gravity of the human rights problem as
seen from the U.S.” Ambassador Hill reports. “Both personally and
in press accounts of his trip Guzzetti’s reaction indicates little
reason for concern over the human rights issue. Guzzetti went to US
fully expecting to hear some strong, firm, direct warning of his
govt’s human rights practices. Rather than that, he has returned in
a state of jubilation. Convinced that there is no real problem with
the USG over this issue.” Hill concludes that “While that
conviction lasts it will be unrealistic and unbelievable for this
embassy to press representations to the GOA over human rights
violations.”

IV. KISSINGER AND OPERATION CONDOR

Kissinger’s resistance to pressing the Southern Cone military
regimes on human rights extended to their international assassination
operations known as Operation Condor. In early August 1976, Kissinger
was briefed by his deputy on plans, under Condor, “to find and kill
terrorists … in their own countries and in Europe.” His aides
convinced him to authorize a demarche that would be delivered to
General Pinochet in Chile, General Videla in Argentina, and junta
officers in Uruguay—the three Condor states most involved in
transnational murder operations. But when the U.S. ambassadors to
Chile and Uruguay raised objections to delivering the demarche,
Kissinger simply rescinded it, ordering that “no further action be
taken on this matter.”

Five days later, Condor’s boldest and most infamous terrorist attack
took place in downtown Washington, D.C., when a car bomb planted by
Pinochet’s agents killed former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier
and his young colleague, Ronni Moffitt.

[3.1]
[[link removed]]

Document 4.1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR KISSINGER, “OPERATION
CONDOR,” SECRET, AUGUST 30, 1976
[[link removed]]

Aug 30, 1976

Source

National Security Archive FOIA request

In his memo to Kissinger dated August 30, 1976, Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs Harry Shlaudeman advises him on the U.S.
position on Condor assassination plots: ”What we are trying to head
off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage
to the international status and reputation of the countries
involved.” Shlaudeman’s memo requests approval from Kissinger to
direct the U.S. ambassador to Uruguay, Ernest Siracusa, to proceed to
meet with high officials in Montevideo and present the Condor
demarche.

[3.2]
[[link removed]]

Document 4.2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CABLE, “ACTIONS TAKEN,” CONFIDENTIAL,
SEPTEMBER 16, 1976
[[link removed]]

Sep 16, 1976

Source

Department of State FOIA website

In this cable, sent from Lusaka where Kissinger was traveling, the
Secretary of State refuses to authorize sending a telegram to U.S.
ambassador to Uruguay Ernest Siracusa instructing him to proceed with
the Condor demarche. Kissinger then broadens his instructions to
cover the delivery of the demarche in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay:
”The Secretary has instructed that no further action be taken on
this matter.” These instructions effectively end the State
Department initiative to warn the Condor military regimes not to
proceed with international assassination operations, since
the demarche has not yet been delivered in Chile or Argentina. Five
days later, former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and his
colleague, Ronni Moffitt, are assassinated by a car bomb in
Washington, D.C., planted by Chilean secret intelligence operatives.

V. KISSINGER AND THE SOUTH ASIA CRISIS

Kissinger’s indifference to human rights extended to what the head
of the U.S. Consulate in Dacca, Archer Blood, called “genocide” in
East Pakistan, committed by Pakistan’s military dictator, General
Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (Yahya). Estimates of mass murder range as
high as three million civilians in East Pakistan in the spring of
1971; but Nixon and Kissinger’s policies tacitly supported Yahya,
who played a secret role in the administration’s efforts to
negotiate an opening with China. Archive analyst Sajit Gandhi created
a comprehensive dossier, “The Tilt and the South Asian Crisis of
1971 [[link removed]]” that contains
dozens of documents recording reports of the genocide and the
Nixon/Kissinger policies. The famous “Blood Telegram” and an
example of Nixon and Kissinger’s positions are below:

[4.1]
[[link removed]]

Document 5.1

STATE DEPARTMENT, U.S. CONSULATE (DACCA) CABLE, "DISSENT FROM U.S.
POLICY TOWARD EAST PAKISTAN," CONFIDENTIAL APRIL 6, 1971
[[link removed]]

Apr 6, 1971

Source

NARA, RG 59, SN 70-73 Pol and Def. From: Pol Pak-U.S. To: Pol 17-1
Pak-U.S. Box 2535

In one of the first ”Dissent Cables,” Consul General Archer Blood
transmits a message denouncing U.S. policy towards the South Asia
crisis. The transmission suggests that the United States is ”bending
over backwards to placate the West Pak [sic] dominated government and
to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public
relations impact against them.” The cable goes on to question U.S.
morality at a time when “unfortunately, the overworked term genocide
is applicable.”

[4.2]
[[link removed]]

Document 5.2

WHITE HOUSE, MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT, "POLICY OPTIONS TOWARD
PAKISTAN," SECRET, APRIL 28, 1971
[[link removed]]

Apr 28, 1971

Source

NARA, Richard Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), NSC Files,
Country Files: Middle East, Box 625

Kissinger presents Nixon with U.S. policy options directed towards the
crisis in East Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger both feel the third
option is the best, as Kissinger writes, because it "would have the
advantage of making the most of the relationship with Yahya, while
engaging in a serious effort to move the situation toward conditions
less damaging to US and Pakistani interests." At the end of the last
page Nixon writes, "To all hands: Don't squeeze Yahya at this time.
[[link removed]] “

VI. KISSINGER, SUHARTO AND EAST TIMOR

U.S. support for the repressive Indonesian dictatorship of General
Suharto and his regime’s murderous invasion of East Timor in
December 1975 is another documented example of Kissinger’s polices
of indifference to human violations and national sovereignty. The
declassified records obtained by the National Security Archive record
more than “a tilt” toward Suharto’s aggression; they reveal
a clear green light
[[link removed]] from the
highest level of the U.S. Government, given to Suharto only hours
before Indonesian troops launched an incursion and occupation that
cost an estimated 100,000 to 180,000 Timorese lives. An East Timor
Truth Commission report completed years later stated that U.S.
“political and military support were fundamental to the Indonesian
invasion and occupation.
[[link removed]]”

[5.1]
[[link removed]]

Document 6.1

STATE DEPARTMENT, EMBASSY JAKARTA, TELEGRAM, [TEXT OF
FORD-KISSINGER-SUHARTO DISCUSSION], SECRET, DECEMBER 6, 1975
[[link removed]]

Dec 6, 1975

Source

Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger-Scowcroft Temporary Parallel File,
Box A3, Country File, Far East-Indonesia, State Department Telegrams
4/1/75-9/22/76

On the eve of Indonesia’s full-scale invasion of East Timor,
Kissinger accompanied President Ford to Jakarta to meet with General
Suharto. The meeting focuses on wider U.S.-Indonesian security
cooperation. In the middle of a discussion of guerrilla movements in
Thailand and Malaysia, Suharto raises the issue of East Timor and his
plans to take “rapid or drastic action” against the newly
independent former colony of Portugal. This memorandum of conversation
records both Ford and Kissinger supporting the invasion. “We will
understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the
problem and the intentions you have,” Ford responds. [See pages 8,9,
and 10 of the memcon.] Kissinger stresses that “the use of US-made
arms could create problems,” but then adds, “It depends on how we
construe it; whether it is in self-defense or is a foreign
operation.” In any case, Kissinger states: “It is important that
whatever you do succeeds quickly.” Suharto deploys his troops into
East Timor the next day, with an understanding of approval from the
Ford White House.

VII. KISSINGER AND CUBA

In mid-1974, Secretary of State Kissinger initiated protracted
historic and secret diplomatic talks to normalize relations with Cuba
— which included furtive meetings between U.S. and Cuban emissaries
at La Guardia airport and an unprecedented three-hour negotiating
session at the five-star Pierre Hotel in New York City. At the time,
this secret back-channel diplomacy marked the most significant and
promising effort to bring about a Caribbean détente and end what
Kissinger called “the perpetual hostility” in U.S.-Cuba relations.

But his diplomatic initiative unraveled after Fidel Castro decided to
send Cuban troops to support the anti-colonial struggle in Angola in
the fall of 1975. In Oval Office meetings with President Ford,
Kissinger angrily referred to the Cuban leader as a ”pipsqueak”
whose bold deployment of military forces on the African continent
threatened U.S. geopolitical strategies in the Third World. Concerned
that Castro would eventually broaden his military incursion beyond
Angola, Kissinger counseled Ford that they would have to ”crack the
Cubans.” ”If they move into Namibia or Rhodesia, I would be in
favor of clobbering them,” Kissinger told the president.

 

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, with President Gerald R. Ford,
was angered by Fidel Castro’s 1975 incursion into Angola  (Photo:
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library).
 

In the March 24 meeting with an elite national security team known as
the Washington Special Actions Group, Kissinger expanded on the domino
scenario. ”If the Cubans destroy Rhodesia then Namibia is next and
then there is South Africa,” Kissinger argued. To permit the
”Cubans as the shock troops of the revolution” in Africa, he
argued, was unacceptable and could cause racial tensions in the
”Caribbean with the Cubans appealing to disaffected minorities and
could then spillover into South America and even into our own
country.” Moreover, the lack of a U.S. response to the global
exercise of military power by a small Caribbean island nation,
Kissinger feared, would be seen as American weakness. ”If there is a
perception overseas that we are so weakened by our internal debate
[over Vietnam] so that it looks like we can't do anything about a
country of eight million people, then in three or four years we are
going to have a real crisis.”

Warfare planning papers, obtained by Archive Senior Analyst Peter
Kornbluh through a mandatory declassification review request to the
Gerald Ford Presidential Library, revealed that Kissinger ordered the
Washington Special Actions Group to draft contingency options that
ranged from economic and political sanctions to acts of war, such as
mining Cuba's harbors, a naval quarantine, and strategic airstrikes
”to destroy selected Cuban military and military-related targets.”
“If we decide to use military power it must succeed. There should be
no halfway measures,” Kissinger instructed General George Brown of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The contingency planners warned Kissinger,
however, that any act of aggression could trigger a superpower
confrontation. Unlike the 1962 missile crisis, stated one planning
paper, ”a new Cuban crisis would not necessarily lead to a Soviet
retreat.”

[6.1]
[[link removed]]

Document 7.1

DOS, KISSINGER AIDE-MEMOIRE TO CUBA, JANUARY 11, 1975
[[link removed]]

Jan 11, 1975

Source

National Security Archive Cuba Dialogue collection

This conciliatory message approved by Secretary of State Kissinger was
given to the Cuban side at the first furtive meeting between U.S. and
Cuban representatives in January 1975, which took place at a cafeteria
in La Guardia airport. ”We are meeting here to explore the
possibilities for a more normal relationship between our two
countries,” it begins. The objective is to ”determine whether
there exists an equal determination on both sides to settle the
differences that exist between us.” While the ideological
differences are wide, Kissinger expresses hope that such talks will
”be useful in addressing concrete issues which it is in the interest
of both countries to resolve.” As a gesture to the Cubans, the U.S.
will permit Cuban diplomats (accredited to the UN) to travel from New
York to Washington and may begin granting additional visas to Cubans
for cultural, scientific and educational meetings. For Kissinger,
”no purpose is served in attempting to embargo ideas.”

[6.2]
[[link removed]]

Document 7.2

DOS, MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, “CUBA POLICY: TACTICS BEFORE AND
AFTER SAN JOSE,” JUNE 9, 1975
[[link removed]]

Jun 9, 1975

Source

National Security Archive Cuba Dialogue collection

As a vote in the OAS to end the multilateral trade sanctions against
Cuba looms in the summer of 1975, Kissinger instructs his top aides to
make another attempt to set up a negotiating session on normalizing
relations. “It is better to deal straight with Castro,” he
instructs them. “Behave chivalrously; do it like a big guy, not like
a shyster. Let him know: We are moving in a new direction; we’d like
to synchronize…steps will be unilateral; reciprocity is
necessary.” The effort to reach out to Cuba leads to the first
serious set of negotiations to normalize relations since the Cuban
revolution, held secretly a month later at the Pierre Hotel in New
York city between Kissinger and Castro’s top aides.

[6.3]
[[link removed]]

Document 7.3

WHITE HOUSE, MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND
KISSINGER, FEBRUARY 25, 1976
[[link removed]]

Feb 25, 1976

Source

National Security Archive Cuba Dialogue collection

After Castro decides to send Cuban troops to Angola, Kissinger sours
on pursuing talks to normalize relations. During a conversation with
President Ford in the Oval Office, Kissinger raises the issue of
Cuba’s military incursion into Angola, implying that Latin American
nations are concerned about a ”race war” because of Cuba’s
efforts in Africa. ”I think we are going to have to smash Castro. We
probably can't do it before the elections.” The president responds,
”I agree.”

[6.4]
[[link removed]]

Document 7.4

WHITE HOUSE, MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND
KISSINGER, MARCH 15, 1976
[[link removed]]

Mar 15, 1976

Source

National Security Archive Cuba Dialogue collection

In another Oval Office conversation, Kissinger raises the Cuban
military involvement in Africa and expresses concern that Castro may
deploy troops elsewhere in the region. ”I think sooner or later we
have to crack the Cubans … I think we have to humiliate them.” He
continues to argue that, ”If they move into Namibia or Rhodesia, I
would be in favor of clobbering them. That would create a furor …
but I think we might have to demand they get out of Africa.” When
President Ford asks, “what if they don't?” Kissinger responds,
”I think we could blockade.”

[6.5]
[[link removed]]

Document 7.5

STATE DEPARTMENT, MEETING MINUTES, WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP
MEETING, CUBA, SECRET, MARCH 24, 1976
[[link removed]]

Mar 24, 1976

Source

National Security Archive Cuba Dialogue collection

Kissinger convenes The Washington Special Actions Group—a small,
elite team of national security officials—on March 24 to discuss a
range of options and capabilities to move against Cuba. ”We want to
get planning started in the political, economic and military fields so
that we can see what we can do if we want to move against Cuba,” he
explains. “In the military field there is an invasion or
blockade.” Kissinger shares his domino theory of Cuban military
involvement in the region. ”If the Cubans destroy Rhodesia then
Namibia is next and then there is South Africa. It might only take
five years,” Kissinger argues. In discussing military options, he
states, “if we decide to use military power it must succeed. There
should be no halfway measures - we get no reward for using military
power in moderation.” Kissinger orders the group to secretly draw up
plans for retaliation if Cuban troops go beyond Angola.

[6.6]
[[link removed]]

Document 7.6

WSAG, CUBAN CONTINGENCY PLAN SUMMARY, SECRET (CA. APRIL 1976)
[[link removed]]

Apr 1, 1976

Source

National Security Archive Cuba Dialogue collection

This document is a summary of the Cuban Contingency survey considering
the possible U.S. diplomatic, economic and military responses to
continued Cuban and USSR "Angola style" intervention. Among the
options are “a series of military actions on a graduated scale of
seriousness which would involve the possibility of hostilities and
would be considered acts of war.”

VIII. THE KISSINGER TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS (TELCONS)

In 2001, the National Security Archive drafted a legal complaint
directed at the State Department and the National Archives for
abdicating their duty under the Federal Records Act to recover the
Kissinger “telcon” documents, which were produced on government
time with government resources. “Most, if not all, the telephone
transcripts are agency records as defined by federal law,” the suit
stated, “and Mr. Kissinger had no authority to remove them under the
governing federal statutes and regulations.” A previous legal effort
by reporters using the FOIA two decades earlier had failed to force
Kissinger to return thousands of pages of transcripts his secretaries
produced from listening to and recording his phone calls; Kissinger
had resisted earlier efforts by the U.S. government to access these
important records. “Mr. Kissinger,” the Archive’s draft lawsuit
stated, “who has no legal authority to restrict access to agency
records by federal officials charged with preserving such records,
continues to assert unbridled discretion to control access to and
maintain the secrecy of the telephone transcripts.”

The State Department Legal Adviser William Howard Taft IV agreed with
the Archive’s legal arguments; he asked the Archive to postpone
filing its legal action; Taft then formally notified Kissinger that he
was required to return the documents or complete copies thereof and
sent a team of lawyers to arrange the transfer. When Kissinger finally
relinquished the records in August 2001—almost 24 years after he had
misrepresented U.S. government documentation as “personal” papers
and taken them—the Archive promptly filed a FOIA request for the
telcons. After obtaining over 15,500 telcons in 2004, the Archive has
since published the conversations in the Digital National Security
Archive series through the online publisher ProQuest—and has also
made them available through multiple postings such as this one.

The telephone conversations record Kissinger’s conversations with
U.S. presidents, with several CIA directors, other cabinet members,
foreign ministers and diplomats, including Soviet Ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin, as well as celebrities such as Frank Sinatra. They also
capture his many conversations with major reporters who actively
sought information from him, and who Kissinger sought to influence for
advantageous press coverage. As a collection of records, the telcons
remain a unique treasure trove of history. Since obtaining them, the
Archive has made a maximum effort to call international attention to
these papers that record the conversations, policies, actions and
attitudes that are a profound and revealing part of Henry
Kissinger’s historical legacy.

[8.1]
[[link removed]]

Document 8.1

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, DRAFT COMPLAINT, “NATIONAL SECURITY
ARCHIVE V. THE ARCHIVIST OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SECRETARY OF
STATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 13, 2001.
[[link removed]]

Feb 13, 2001

Source

National Security Archive

Rather than sue Henry Kissinger, in early 2001 the National Security
Archive targeted the two U.S. government agencies that “failed to
initiate action…as required by federal law, to recover the telephone
transcripts.” The draft complaint, written by Archive general
counsel Kate Martin and the Archive’s pro-bono counsels Lee H. Rubin
and Craig Isenberg from Mayer, Brown, & Platt, proved so compelling
that U.S. Government lawyers acted upon its arguments to regain
possession of the Kissinger telcons before it was ever filed. The
complaint contains a statement of facts that reveals how Kissinger
stored the transcripts in a set of “personal” files, removed U.S.
government records, some of them clearly classified, and selectively
used them for personal gain in violation of federal regulations and to
the detriment of accurate history for over two decades when they were
in his possession.

[8.2]
[[link removed]]

Document 8.2

STATE DEPARTMENT, TELCON, “KEN FRIED/HAK 4/29/1975 – 10:31 P.M.”
[KISSINGER RECEIVES THE NEWS OF THE FALL OF SAIGON AND END OF THE
VIETNAM WAR]
[[link removed]]

Apr 29, 1975

Source

DNSA, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations

In one of the most dramatic conversations recorded by Kissinger’s
secret taping system, he receives a late-night call from wire service
reporter Ken Fried who informs him that Saigon has fallen and General
Duong Van Minh (”Big Minh”) had unconditionally surrendered to the
"VC" (Viet Cong), a reference to North Vietnam's People's Liberation
Armed Forces. “Is it true?” Kissinger asks initially, before
attempting to disguise the fact that he had not yet heard this
history-changing news that the Vietnam war was finally over and that
the U.S. had lost.

[8.3]
[[link removed]]

Document 8.3

STATE DEPARTMENT, TELCON, “SEC KISSINGER/TED KOPPEL, 7/9/76; 12:30
P.M.
[[link removed]]

Jul 9, 1976

Source

DNSA, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations

In this wide-ranging telephone conversation, journalist Ted Koppel
converses with Kissinger about the prospects for the November 1976
election and whether Kissinger will remain in office or not. Koppel
bets Kissinger five dollars that Ford will lose, but Kissinger insists
“I think Carter is beatable.” At one point, Kissinger jokes that
Jimmy Carter, who is leading President Ford in the polls, might
actually keep him on as secretary of state. Koppel tells Kissinger
that he is going to take a break from journalism to write a political
novel in which the central figure “resembles you—you will be
terribly pleased.” The fictional Kissinger-esque character will be
named “Vanderburg.”

[8.4]
[[link removed]]

Document 8.4

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, KISSINGER TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR
ANATOLI DOBRYNIN, 9 DECEMBER 1975, 6:06 P.M.
[[link removed]]

Dec 9, 1975

Source

Digital National Security Archive [DNSA]

As Kissinger prepares to leave for Moscow for Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT), he calls Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
about a difficult subject—the Moscow Signal. For decades, the
Soviets have been transmitting microwave energy beams at the U.S.
Embassy building in an apparent effort to recharge listening devices
planted in the walls. The current U.S. ambassador is threatening to
brief the staff about the health issues related to the constant
microwave exposure. “Maybe you could turn it off until I get
there,” Kissinger presses, attempting to use a bit of humor to
impress Dobrynin with the gravity of the situation. “And then you
could switch it back on again,” Dobrynin responds. “You could give
me a radiation treatment,” Kissinger banters. “Then you will be
radioactive,” Dobrynin concludes. Worried about a leak which could
cause an uproar in U.S. relations with the Kremlin, Kissinger warns
Dobrynin that “We really are sitting on it here but too many people
know about it.”

[8.5]
[[link removed]]

Document 8.5

STATE DEPARTMENT, TELCON, RUMSFELD-SEC. KISSINGER DECEMBER 23, 1974,
9:35 A.M. [CONVERSATION ABOUT _NEW YORK TIMES_ EXPOSÉ ON THE
CIA’S DOMESTIC OPERATIONS]
[[link removed]]

Dec 23, 1974

Source

DNSA, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations

After Seymour Hersh’s front page _New York Times_ story on
December 22, 1974, reveals CIA domestic operations against U.S.
anti-Vietnam war movements, Kissinger calls White House Chief of Staff
Donald Rumsfeld about the revelations. Kissinger denounces Hersh as a
“son-of-a-bitch,” but claims he did not know about the activities
himself. Kissinger agrees with Rumsfeld that Colby should prepare a
report for the President. Eventually the CIA’s internal
investigation compiles a slew of domestic spying operations and other
illegal activities that become known as “the family jewels.”
[[link removed]]

[8.6]
[[link removed]]

Document 8.6

STATE DEPARTMENT, TELCON, “FRANK SINATRA/SECRETARY KISSINGER JANUARY
16, 1976, 8:09 PM,” [CONVERSATION ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR MAJOR
DIPLOMATIC DINNER IN LOS ANGELES]
[[link removed]]

Jan 16, 1976

Source

DNSA, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations

Kissinger's friendship with Frank Sinatra dated back to Nixon's first
term, and reflected his famous hob-knobbing with major celebrities.
Sinatra’s call is about arrangements for a major dinner for Israeli
Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin being held at the Beverly Hilton in Los
Angeles. But the conversation begins and ends with Sinatra joking
“do you want me to straighten out Angola for you?” With the U.S.
Congress barring CIA intervention in Angola, Kissinger responds that
he needs some of Sinatra's "enforcers" to solve the Angola problem.
Sinatra asks Kissinger to speak at the Rabin event after the band
plays and tells him “I will bring the formula for Angola.”

* Henry Kissinger
[[link removed]]
* war criminals
[[link removed]]
* war crimes
[[link removed]]
* Vietnam
[[link removed]]
* Vietnam War
[[link removed]]
* Cambodia
[[link removed]]
* Laos
[[link removed]]
* Chile
[[link removed]]
* Argentina
[[link removed]]
* Cuba
[[link removed]]
* South Africa
[[link removed]]
* Angola
[[link removed]]
* Chile coup
[[link removed]]
* Argentina Dirty War
[[link removed]]
* South Africa apartheid
[[link removed]]
* Israel
[[link removed]]
* Vietnam carpet bombings
[[link removed]]
* Richard Nixon
[[link removed]]
* Gerald Ford
[[link removed]]
* China
[[link removed]]
* Soviet Union
[[link removed]]
* CIA
[[link removed]]
* FBI
[[link removed]]

*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

 

 

 

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