This tenth monthly report monitoring activities of al-Qaeda and Islamic State
branches throughout the Sahel will focus on the propaganda output of these
groups in September 2023.





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CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring September 2023



Read CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring September 2023 by clicking here.
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CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring September 2023

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen



This tenth monthly report monitoring activities of al-Qaeda and Islamic State
branches throughout the Sahel will focus on the propaganda output of these
groups in September 2023.



An initial observation is that the number of claimed attacks remains at the
same level when compared to August. Fifty-seven separate incidents have been
registered. But perhaps the most remarkable fact is that ISGS was last
mentioned in an-Naba’ 405 and did not claim a single attack even though it is
very clear that they continue to be highly active in the Jihadist insurgency in
Mali and Niger. This results in the somewhat strange observation that Jama’a
Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) is now more active than both branches of
the ISIS throughout the region. Similar to previous months, most attacks
reported by the Islamic State in Western Africa Province (ISWAP) are of
relatively low impact, with a lower number of casualties per attack. The
deadliest attack was reported on September 8 in an-Naba’ issue 407, with a
death toll of 15 killed and wounded. Although it is clear that the Islamic
State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) is by far more lethal and impactful in its
attacks, their propaganda outlets did not report any terrorist operations at
all this month and therefore there is no output that can be analyzed for this
report. The strategic silence of ISGS is deafening. It remains to be seen
whether or not the group is preparing a larger scale operation or campaign,
which would explain its current silence.



Attacks in the Sahel: General Trend



Given the fact that not a single claim was published by ISGS, the steady trend
of a rising number of attacks throughout the months has come to a halt. Only 57
incidents were reported by az-Zallaqa Media and an-Naba’. As mentioned, most
incidents were claimed by JNIM, totalling 35. The overall majority of these
attacks was claimed in Mali, with a total of 20 attacks. Burkina Faso was
struck by at least 14 different attacks by JNIM, one resulting in the claimed
killing of over50 Burkinabe soldiers
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on September 4. For the first time since systematic monitoring started at the
end of 2022, Benin was hit by JNIM.



Although ISGS did not claim a single attack in its propaganda outlets, there
are strong indications from other sources that the group was involved in
several highly impactful attacks throughout Mali and Niger in September.



Mali is rapidly descending into further general chaos
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. On September 4, JNIM even communicated via az-Zallaqa Media that the group is
besieging the entire city ofTimbuktu
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, the largest city in the north of Mali.



On September 7, 64 civilians were killed by JNIM on a ferry in the area of
Mopti. Interestingly, JNIM’s propaganda outlets subsequentlydenied
<[link removed]> the group’s
involvement.




Another worrying event that became clear in late August already is the alleged
ceasefire <[link removed]> between
ISGS and JNIM. In the past few months, ISGS hadrepeatedely attacked
<[link removed]>
JNIM fighters in an apparent conflict over territory and influence. However,
currently, it seems that both groups have reached some kind of agreement and
seem to focus on their common enemies: the Malian Army and the Wagner Group.
Therefore, a mutual weakening of these two terrorist groups can currently not
be expected.



This agreement seems to be a strategic ceasefire, as both JNIM and ISGS are
dividing Mali into separate areas of control.




The crash referred to by Pawel in his last tweet above refers to a significant
accident <[link removed]> in which an
overloaded Iliouchine76 TZ98 airplane overestimated the runway and fatally
crashed and exploded, killing at least 16 Wagner mercenaries and three Malian
soldiers, including an air force Colonel.



Given the developments and incidents outlined above, it is clear that overall
the trend of an ever increasing intencity of terrorist operations in the region
is continuing, despite the fact that the propaganda outlets of the terrorist
groups are not claiming more attacks this month when compared to August. It
will be important to see whether or not ISGS continues its strategic silence
beyond September. Undeniably, the group continues to play a central role in the
deteriorating security situation in Mali and Niger.



Table 1 : Claimed Attacks (December 2022- September 2023)



Table 2 : Claimed Attacks per Group (December 2022 - September 2023)



Table 3 : Claimed Attacks per Country (December 2022 – September 2023)



Attacks Per Country



Even though ISGS remained silent and has conducted, unclaimed, attacks in
Niger in the last month, the only attacks the propaganda outlets of the other
terrorist groups claimed were conducted in Nigeria (20), Mali (20), Burkina
Faso (14), Cameroon (2) and Benin (1). The attack in Benin was the first time
that any of the terrorist networks operating in the region claimed an operation
in that country. Currently, this was clearly only a spill-over of terrorist
violence into Benin. However, given the overall intensity of terrorist violence
in Burkina Faso and the increase in terrorist violence in Niger, Benin is at
risk of more terrorist intrusions into its territory. This is a significant
development as Benin is one of the coastal states on the Gulf of Guinea and
remained unaffected by terrorist violence until now.



Map 1: Frequency and spatial distribution of al-Qaeda and Islamic State
affiliates (January 2013 – July 2023)



Source: [link removed]
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Map 2: Frequency and spatial distribution of incidents by type of violence



Source: [link removed] fu20
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* Mali
The situation in Mali has reached a critical state. The agreement between ISGS
and JNIM means that both terrorist groups will no longer divert resources to
their competition but are dividing the country into separate areas of
operation. Given that both ISGS and JNIM were able to significantly increase
their operational areas in the country over recent months, a complete
destabilization of the country is now a distinct possibility.



Source: (Video still JNIM Bamba)
[link removed]
<[link removed]>



On September 14, 2023, another Wagner helicopter was taken down by JNIM.



On September 17 Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso established the so-called Sahel
security alliance <[link removed]>: “Our priority is the fight against
terrorism in the three countries,” they stated, ”any attack on the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of one or more contracted parties will be considered
an aggression against the other parties.”

* Nigeria
Twenty attacks were claimed in Nigeria and were of relatively small impact.
The reporting by terrorist propaganda outlets concerning casualty numbers of
these attacks was relatively vague but it became clear that only a relatively
small number of casualties occurred per attack. One consistent trend since the
monitoring started at the end of 2022 is the lower level but very persistent
attack strategy of ISWAP in Nigeria. The violence by ISWAP in its attacks is
relatively small in scale, but attacks occur regularly, creating a constant
sense of insecurity in the operational area of ISWAP.

* Burkina Faso
In 14 different attacks, around 100 Burkinabe soldiers and militia members
were killed by JNIM. The most impactful attack was on September 4 when JNIM
overrun an army base, killed over 50 Burkinabe soldiers, and captured a
signficiant number of weapons and ammunition.






* Niger
Not a single attack was claimed in Niger by any of the propaganda outlets
linked to the terrorist networks operating in the region. However, other
credible sourcesreported
<[link removed]> that ISGS did
attack the Nigerien army during September.



“Niger: 55 soldiers killed in two days.



“Elements of the Nigerien Armed Forces fell into an ambush by the Islamic
State in the Great Sahara (EIGS) in Imbalagan 4 km north of Ezza (border with
Mali). A first unofficial assessment reports 33 dead, 12 injured, 6 vehicles
destroyed and 5 taken away. Last Thursday, September 28, in the Tillabéri
region (west), ‘a unit of Operation Almahaou on a security mission in Kandadji,
was violently attacked by several hundred terrorists’, according to Minister
and General Salifou Mody, appointed by the military regime resulting from a
coup d'état. If the first assessment reported 7 soldiers killed, it has
increased in recent hours, now to 22. These two attacks mentioned above now
bring to 55, the number of soldiers of the Nigerien armed forces killed in 48
hours. According to Nigerien sources, 3 terrorists were neutralised including
Goumbi, Abu Harouna.”



* Cameroon
Two incidents were claimed on the border of Nigeria and Cameroon. In total, 30
Cameroonian soldiers were killed by ISWAP.

* Togo
No incidents were claimed in Togo.

* Benin
In one single attack on the border with Benin JNIM killed 3 Benin soldiers.



Table 4: Total Number of Attacks




Attacks per affiliate



JNIM



During September a total of 35 attacks were claimed by JNIM. On multiple
occasions the Malian army and the Wagner Group were targeted. The most
impactful attacks in the entire Sahel in September were conducted by JNIM.



Table 5: Attacks by JNIM



ISGS



As outlined above, not a single attack was claimed by ISGS.



ISWAP



A total of 22 incidents were claimed by ISWAP. The attacks on the border
between Nigeria and Cameroon were of relatively high-impact, resulting in the
killing of 30 Cameroonian soldiers.



Table 6: Attacks by ISWAP



Conclusion



Since the last few months, the evolution of the Jihadi terrorist violence in
the Sahel has continuously increased and is approaching critical levels. This
situation is caused by several worrying occurences and trends. First, the
ceasefire agreement between ISGS and JNIM frees up resources of both terrorist
networks which are now devoted against Malian security forces and Wagner
troops. Both terrorist groups are dividing Mali into distinct operational
zones, which is likely going to increase the operational impact of both groups.
The first terrorist attack in Benin is a stark reminder of the strategic risks
that will develop if terrorist networks are able to reach the Gulf of Guinea.
The military coup in Niger and the withdrawal of French and other Western
forces from the country and the suspension of EU security cooperation means
that a key regional security hub, stemming terrorist violence is no longer
operational. This developing security vaccum is continuously filled by the
Wagner Group, which is increasing its footprint in the region. The tri-partite
security pact between the coup regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger is not
primarily geared towards increased cooperation against terrorist violence but
clearly meant as a deterrence against other regional countries aiming to
restore civilian and democratic rule in these three countries. The combination
of these various factors means that the regional security outlook is further
deteriorating.



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