Following is the September 2023 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2022 and 2021 can be found
here and here. The January 2023 edition can be found here, February’s here,
March’s here, April’s here, May’s here, June’s here, July’s here, and August’s
here. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including
the methodology used to collect this data, can also be explored here, here, and
here.





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In September 2023


Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In September 2023 by clicking
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In September 2023

By Gregory Waters



Following is the September 2023 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2022 and 2021 can be found
here
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andhere
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The January 2023 edition can be foundhere
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, February’shere
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, March’shere
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, April’shere
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, May’shere
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, June’shere
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, July’shere
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, and August’shere
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. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also beexplored here
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, andhere
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.



ISIS carried out at least 11 confirmed attacks in September in the Homs, Hama,
Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 11 pro-Assad
regime soldiers and seven civilians and wounded at least four additional
soldiers and one civilian. There were also four high quality* attacks during
September. ISIS activity in central Syria decreased in September following one
of the most violent months of the year in August. However, like in August,
nearly all of the documented attacks in September occurred in Deir Ez Zor and
southern Raqqa. Militants were able to carry out several significant attacks,
including capturing a regime military position, establishing a fake checkpoint,
and attempting (but ultimately failing) to ambush a military convoy. Documented
ISIS activity in southern Raqqa has steadily increased since June. September
matched a nine-month record for attacks in Raqqa and followed local claims in
August that ISIS cells had established numerous checkpoints throughout the
desert for extortion and levying taxes against local traders.



Despite the lower number of attacks in September compared to August, ISIS
continued to maintain an aggressive posture. At least seven of the 11
documented attacks were conducted with small or medium arms, while only two
attacks used mines or Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). The apparent
confidence with which ISIS cells conducted operations over the past two months
stands in stark contrast with the militants’ posture during the past two years,
focusing more on using mines, IEDs or distant harassing attacks in order to
avoid Russian air support and a heavy regime security presence. However, regime
forces have this year returned to their 2019 and 2020 practice of often
transporting soldiers in small, unguarded bus convoys that are highly
vulnerable to attacks, while Russian and Syrian airpower has been increasingly
rare. Compounding this vulnerability is the recent conflict between Russian
mercenary group Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), culminating
in the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin on August 23. Since then, the
Wagner forces that played a key role in establishing defensive lines and leading
offensives
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against ISIS in central Syria have gradually withdrawn from the region.
According to multiple credible sources, Wagner forces have withdrawn from the
Shoula area of western Deir Ez Zor, (their only permanent presence in Deir Ez
Zor) and as of late September had fully withdrawn from the Sukhnah area of Homs.


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*Indicates attacks in Damascus City claimed by ISIS. Two additional IED
attacks occurred in Homs City in June 2023 that went unclaimed but were
suspected to be conducted by ISIS.



ISIS attacks dropped in Deir Ez Zor (5), Homs (1) and Hama (1) while doubling
in southern Raqqa (4).


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Deir Ez Zor and Raqqa



The number of ISIS attacks in Deir Ez Zor in April (18) was unprecedented,
more than in any month since the beginning of the insurgency in 2018. There was
a dramatic reversal in activity in May (4), June (3), and July (3) followed by
another surge in activity in August (8). Throughout this period, ISIS cells
began targeting regime security forces inside the urban centers along the
Euphrates River. However, ISIS activity in Deir Ez Zor dropped again in
September, and attacks appeared to be concentrated more in the west Deir Ez Zor
region around Shoula.



A regime soldier was killed in Deir Ez Zor on each of September 8 and 9,
although the exact location and means of death were not reported. Also on
September 9, ISIS militants attacked a group of shepherds and their guards
south of Shoula. At least seven shepherds, one local Liwa al-Quds fighter, and
two local National Defense Forces fighters were killed in the attack. Local
militiamen who ventured into the countryside in search of the stolen sheep
after the attack hit a mine or IED, leaving one dead and between one and three
men wounded. On September 11, ISIS militants killed three local guards in a
nighttime attack on the outskirts of the Kharrata Oil Field, northwest of Deir
Ez Zor City.



In southern Raqqa, locals reported throughout August that ISIS cells had
established fake checkpoints in the Mansoura and Resafa regions, which they
used to extort money from shepherds and local traders. This author was informed
of at least one of these checkpoints operating on August 15 near Mansoura. This
type of brazen ISIS activity continued through September. On September 13, ISIS
militants attacked regime forces northwest of the Zamla Gas Field. On September
21, two soldiers were killed and at least two wounded in an ISIS attack on
their position west of Resafa. Three days later, an ISIS cell captured and
looted a regime position in an early morning operation near the Bir Rahum
hamlet on the southern Raqqa border. On September 26, an ISIS cell set up a
fake checkpoint near Resafa using stolen uniforms and flags of the regime’s 5th
Corps (potentially captured in the September 24 Bir Rahum attack) but
reportedly fled when they were identified by security forces.


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Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Dier Ez Zor (highlighted) in September 2023
alongside all other attacks in 2023. Not mapped are two attacks that occurred
somewhere in the Deir Ez Zor countryside.



Homs and Hama



Confirmed ISIS activity continues to be muted in eastern Homs since the end of
the month-long battles around al-Kawm village in April. However, the
aforementioned withdrawal of Wagner forces from the Sukhnah sector will likely
result in ISIS renewing pressure on this front in the near future. The only
confirmed ISIS attack in Homs occurred on September 10 when militants attacked
a regime transport south of al-Kawm, though no soldiers died or were wounded in
the ambush.



Attacks in Hama dropped for the second month in a row, with only one incident
documented in September. On September 27, a mine exploded, wounding a
13-year-old child outside the village of Um Miyal.


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Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Homs and Hama (highlighted) in September 2023
alongside all other attacks in 2023.



Looking Ahead



The withdrawal of Wagner forces from much of the Badia over the past month
will likely be the defining factor for ISIS’s insurgency across much of central
Syria in the near term. Wagner forces have reportedly been replaced by Iranian
advisers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and foreign and
Syrian militias under their control. The question now is whether these units
will be as effective as Wager fighters have been during the past two years at
fending off major ISIS pushes into the strategic centers around Sukhnah, such
as al-Kawm and Wadi Doubayat, and around the Shoula region of Deir Ez Zor.



Compounding this question is the past month’s fighting in eastern Deir Ez Zor,
in the region controlled by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Locals, mostly from the Akidat, Bakir, and Shaytat tribes,rose up against
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SDF there at the end of August. While the SDF was able to quickly retake the
dozens of towns that had initially expelled their security forces, a robust
anti-SDF insurgency appears to have already taken hold. This area was already a
hot bed for ISIS cells, which had exploited a weak security presence and deep
animosity between locals and the Kurdish-run administration, to build an
expansive financial, recruitment, and insurgent network. The Syrian regime has
also spent the past several years building its own insurgent network in the
region—though it has remained far smaller and weaker than ISIS’s. The evolution
of anti-SDF sentiment into action by locals has likely opened the door for both
ISIS and regime cells to expand their activity. Here it should be emphasized
that most locals in Deir Ez Zor are staunch opponents of the regime. However,
the general degradation of security networks combined with some locals turning
to armed insurgency will inevitably create openings for either active or
unwitting cooperation between ISIS, regime, and tribal cells.



Given the chaotic nature of the unfolding events in eastern Deir Ez Zor, it is
unclear exactly how ISIS will utilize its resources (it is worth noting that
the group explicitly denounced the tribal uprisings in one of its weekly
al-Naba publications shortly after the fighting began). ISIS still has limited
resources to work with and has, over the past years, had to move men between
regime- and SDF-held regions depending on the viability of the operating
environments. Now the group will likely have to weigh the costs and benefits of
trying to exploit the withdrawal of Wagner in eastern Homs and the crisis in
eastern Deir Ez Zor, while continuing its high level of activity in southern
Raqqa.


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Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in September 2023 alongside all
other attacks in 2023 (green for Quarter 1 and blue for Quarter 2). Not shown
are two attacks somewhere in Deir Ez Zor. To view an interactive version of
this map, please clickhere
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.



*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.



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