This report focuses on operations throughout the Sahel in August 2023, which
were claimed by al-Qaeda and ISIS propaganda outlets. In total, 57 different
operations were claimed by these groups.





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CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring August 2023



Read CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring August 2023 by clicking here
<[link removed]>.



CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring August 2023

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen



This report focuses on operations throughout the Sahel in August 2023, which
were claimed by al-Qaeda and ISIS propaganda outlets. In total, 57 different
operations were claimed by these groups.



One of the most important events in August was the official announcement of
the death of the previous Islamic State Caliph, Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni
al-Qurashi, who led the group’s so-called caliphate for a mere 150 days. His
successor, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, was announced to have taken over in
an audio message spread by al-Furqan, the Islamic State’s central media
apparatus, on August 3.



Quickly after the dissemination of the announcement, on August 5, the round of
pledges of allegiance (bay’a) from ISIS cells and “provinces” began. Notably,
after photos of fighters pledging bay’a was sent from ISIS-core in Iraq, the
Islamic State in Western Africa Province (ISWAP) swiftly followed. While images
from Iraq showed only a few small cells, the first pictures of a bay’a ceremony
from ISWAP showed an impressive display of power. ISWAP showcased dozens of
men, all well-armed and wearing military fatigues, to give the impression that
ISWAP runs a professional army.



The ISWAP bay’a was followed on August 8 by a first one of the Islamic State
in the Greater Sahel (ISGS). It is this picture set that provides an insight
into the true power of the Islamic State in the Sahel. Hundreds of fighters
were shown. Although these individuals did not wear uniforms, they were
featured on motorcycles in pairs. The image conveys that ISGS commands a large
number of rapid intervention units, consisting out of loosely coordinated cells.



On August 9, ISWAP issued a second bay’a pledge. The pictures again showed
well-armed and uniformed men, looking far more professional than the fighters
that ISGS chose to display in its propaganda.



The same day, ISGS also published another photoset, which displayed several
dozens of fighters. They do not appear as structured and organized as ISWAP,
but once again, ISGS aimed to demonstrate that it commands a large number of
forces.



On August 9, a third set of photos was distributed by ISWAP, where heavily
armed individuals dressed in military uniforms swore bay’a.



On August 10, the Sahel Province ISGS responded again. As usual in the
previous style of reporting.



August 10 also witnessed another bay’a from the Sahel, again a picture set
from ISWAP, this time showing two different cells.




August 15 marked the last bay’a round from the Sahel by ISGS.



It is not coincidental that the majority of the bay’a pictures come from the
Islamic State’s African provinces. In addition to the propaganda output from
ISWAP and ISGS, there were bay’a messages from Somalia, Central-Africa, and
Mozambique (though, interestingly not from Libya or Sinai). The message the
Islamic State is propagating is clear: Africa is the new epicenter of their
fight.



Attacks in the Sahel: General Trend



As expected, the number of claimed attacks, both from the Islamic State’s
affiliates as well as from al-Qaeda in the region are on the rise again. This
trend, first identifiedin June 2023
<[link removed]>,
seems to be continuing, and it is likely that the number of monthly claimed
attacks in the region will reach over 100 by early 2024. Given the systematic
underreporting
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attacks by these groups, this will mean a devastating level of violence and
instability in the region.



The impact of the recent coup in Niger, the French withdrawal from Mali and
Burkina Faso, the beginning withdrawal ofFrench forces from Niger
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, as well as thewinding down
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of the operations of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) are already clearly showing in the
rising number of claimed attacks. In August 2023, the number of claimed attacks
in Mali and Niger were the highest since CEP reporting started in December 2022.



In August, Mali suffered increased activity from both ISGS and Jama’a Nusrat
ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM). Both groups focus on the same targets: the
Malian military regime, militias, and the Wagner Group. In fact, the Russian
mercenaries have never played such a prominent role before in the propaganda of
these terror groups from the Sahel.



Intense fighting between ISGS and JNIM continued in August. For example, ISGS
claimed to have killed and wounded around 40 JNIM fighters in just one attack.
In total, an-Naba’ reported three clashes with JNIM. ISGS also targeted the
Wagner Group in one attack near Menaka. JNIM attacked the Malian army and the
Wagner Group on at least four occasions in the area of Timbuktu. It seems that
the battle for control of central Mali between ISGS and JNIM is fully
developing. Generally, ISGS focuses on the eastern part of the country whereas
JNIM is mostly active in the north and in the center, meaning the center of the
country is the main area of competition between both groups. A brazen attack by
JNIM on MINUSMA forces, wounding four blue helmet soldiers, was claimed to have
been executed near Timbuktu. Furthermore, Niamey, Niger witnessed an attack on
a presumed German aid worker by ISGS.



Another notable trend are the increasing attacks on Christians in Nigeria by
ISWAP. At least 23 Christians were killed in raids by ISWAP, both in the North
(Yobe) as in the South (Borno). ISGS meanwhile is becoming more and more
engaged in implementing Islamic penal law (Hudud, Ta’zir and Qisas). Throughout
Mali, ISGS meted out Hudud punishments in public on at least six different
occasions. All of these events featured in the group’s propaganda output,
sending a clear message to the local population as well as its wider circle of
sympathizers. The harshest sentence (Hadd) was for Sariqa (theft), by
amputating the alleged thief’s right hand.



One of the most important events this month was the public call for a general
mobilization for the fight against the Malian army and the Wagner Group,
published by JNIM on August 21. Since the publication of the statement, an
increased number of attacks were claimed by JNIM, trying to portray that its
call was successful.




Table 1: Claimed Attacks (December 2022 – August 2023)



Table 2: Claimed Attacks per Group (December 2022 – August 2023)





Table 3: Claimed Attacks per Country (December 2022 – August 2023)



Attacks per Country



When CEP reporting began in December 2022, the terrorist insurgency in the
Sahel was still rather limited. Some attacks occurred in Nigeria and Mali, and
one single incident occurred in Burkina Faso. However, terrorist violence
quickly spread. From February 2023 onwards, Niger was also affected by
terrorist violence. Cameroon was first struck in March, and in July, Togo was
hit. The overall impact of the terrorist insurgency in the region is growing by
the month. Therefore, slowly the entire region is engulfed with terrorist
violence. The withdrawal of French, other Western, and MINUSMA forces coupled
with coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and recently Niger are significantly
excacerbating the situation. The resulting security vacuum is not filled by
other forces—as Wagner is only playing a minor and mostlynegative role
<[link removed]>
in counterterrorism operations—but by the terrorist groups.



Map 1: Armed Violence Involving Jihadist Groups



Source : https
://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/08/01/fanatics-and-putschists-are-creating-failed-states-in-west-africa

<[link removed]>



Source : https ://twitter.com/J_LuengoCabrera/status/1686365881343856640?s=20
<[link removed]>

* Mali. For the first time, the attacks in Mali surpass the number of claimed
attacks in all other countries of the region. A total of 24 attacks were
claimed in August. It is important to take into account that ISGS is likely
underreporting
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Therefore, the number of security incidents is likely higher. In August,
infighting between JNIM and ISGS intensified. Increasingly, mercenaries of the
Wagner Group are now regularly targeted. Other important events were the public
call by JNIM for a general mobilization and a marked increase in propaganda
messages by ISGS, demonstrating that it is implementing the harshest and most
extremist interpretation of Islamic law in the areas that the group controls.
Multiple propaganda reports were published focusing on the execution of Islamic
penal law in the areas under the control of ISGS. As it recently announced in
an-Naba’ they will continue the implementation of Islamic Law throughout the
territories under control. This seems to demonstate that ISGS feels
sufficiently in control in these areas and no longer has to take potential
hostility of the local population into account.


* Nigeria. In total, 17 attacks were committed in Nigeria, and all claimed by
ISWAP. Most of the attacks by ISWAP were of low impact, with few casualties per
attack. A worrying trend in Nigeria is the increasing number of attacks on
Christian villages. At least 20 Christians and militia-members were killed in
total. For example, in one attack on a village the local church and several
houses were destroyed.


* Burkina Faso. Nine attacks were claimed by JNIM in Burkina Faso. Around 54
casualties were reported by az-Zallaqa Media.


* Niger. Following last month’s coup in Niger, all groups in the region seem
to see this situation as an opportunity and extended their operations in the
country. In total, around 35 casualties were claimed in seven different
incidents. The most impactful attack was claimed by JNIM. On August 17, JNIM
fighters attacked the Nigerien army near Boni, killing 17 soldiers.


* Cameroon. One attack was claimed in Cameroon. On August 20, ISWAP fighters
killed and wounded eight Cameroonian soldiers in Marwa.
Table 4: Total Number of Claims




Attacks per Affiliate



JNIM



Az-Zallaqa Media published a total of 24 messages in August. Two statements
stand out. The first published on August 18 strongly condemned an attack by the
Wagner Group in the area of Koulikoro, Mali. Wagner Forces allegedly killed
around 40 villagers and arrested a few dozen people. Dozens more were claimed
missing or wounded in the attack. In response to this and several previous
heinous attacks by the Russian mercenary group, JNIM published a general call
for mobilization in Mali on August 21. It remains to be seen whether this
general call for mobilization will cause any significant effects on the level
of violence by JNIM fighters in the coming weeks and months.



Table 5: Number of Attacks by JNIM



ISWAP



Nineteen attacks were claimed by ISWAP, with 16 in the heartland of Nigeria,
two in Niger, and one in Cameroon. Nearly all attacks were of relatively low
impact with only a few casulaties per attack. As noted above, a worrying trend
are increasing attacks on the Christian population of Nigeria.



Table 6: Number of Attacks by ISWAP



ISGS

ISGS posted only 16 claims concerning attacks of its fighters in August.
However, as noted inprevious reports
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ISGS seems to be generally underreporting its operations. In August, JNIM was
hit hard by its terrorist competitor, ISGS claimed to have killed at least 47
JNIM members. An-Naba’ also published a lengthy article on the application of
Islamic Penal Law in the areas under control. At least five people had their
right hand amputated for theft and one person was stoned to death for adultery.



Table 7: Number of Attacks by ISGS



Conclusion



The number of terrorist attacks in the region is rising again. This confirms
the trend of the last few months. JNIM is increasing its activities, not only
military but also attempting to portray itself as the “defender” of the local
population. The fact that the group openly condemned the brutal attacks by the
army and the Wagner Group and issued a call for general mobilization in Mali is
telling. All of these actions are part of its strategy of winning hearts and
minds and build further local support.



As we have seen about a decade ago in Syria and Iraq, ISIS is following a
different strategy. Once the group is sufficiently entrenched in an area it
immediately begins imposing the most extremist implementation of Islamic law.
ISIS strategy is rule through fear among the local population rather than
compassion. Therefore, the emphasis of ISGS propaganda of public punishments in
August indicates that the terror group feels sufficiently in control and
entrenched in the areas it controls and no longer fears popular discontent to
its harsh rule.



Overall the situation continuous to deteriorate. Further withdrawals of
Western and multinational forces following the recent coup in Niger will
accelerate this negative trend. The potential increased presence ofRussian
mercenaries
<[link removed]>
in the region will not fill the security vacuum resulting from these
withdrawals. This vacuum presents an opportunity for the terrorist groups in
the region, which they are eagerly exploiting.



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