Following is the August 2023 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria.





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2023


Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2023 by clicking here
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2023

By Gregory Waters



Following is the August 2023 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2022 and 2021 can be found
here
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andhere
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The January 2023 edition can be foundhere
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, February’shere
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, March’shere
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, April’shere
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, May’shere
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, June’shere
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and July’shere
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. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also beexplored here
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, andhere
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.



ISIS carried out at least 17 confirmed attacks in August in the Homs, Hama,
Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 40 pro-Assad
regime soldiers and wounded 21 additional soldiers and two civilians. There
were also seven high quality* attacks during August. August was the most
violent month in central Syria since the end of ISIS’s spring campaign when the
group heavily targeted civilian truffle hunters across eastern Homs and western
Deir Ez Zor. However, as in the months following those attacks, August’s
activity was focused on regime security forces rather than civilians.



ISIS media took credit for three attacks in the Badia in August, marking eight
official ISIS claims for central Syria attacks this year. All eight claims
occurred after mid-June, suggesting that there may have been an intentional
shift in ISIS media strategy around that time.



The most serious ISIS activity in August was concentrated in Deir Ez Zor and
Raqqa. On August 7, ISIS launched multiple attacks on regime checkpoints across
western Deir Ez Zor, triggering nearly 24 hours of fighting and leaving more
than a dozen soldiers dead and wounded. On August 10, ISIS cells ambushed a
small Syrian army convoy on a highway in Dier Ez Zor, killing at least 25
soldiers and destroying two buses. This is the second serious highway ambush in
central Syria in as many months. Elsewhere, ISIS’s quiet campaign of
assassinations and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks inside the towns
along the western bank of the Euphrates River continued, further fueling the
likelihood that the group has heavily infiltrated pro-regime security forces in
the area. In southern Raqqa, locals reported throughout the month that ISIS
cells had established fake checkpoints in the Mansoura and Resafa regions which
they used to extort from shepherds and local traders.



*Indicates attacks in Damascus City claimed by ISIS. Two additional IED
attacks occurred in Homs City in June 2023 that went unclaimed but were
suspected to be conducted by ISIS.



After two months of stagnation, ISIS attacks doubled in Deir Ez Zor (6), ended
a three- month decline in Homs (3) and droped slightly in Hama (4) and Raqqa
(2).



Deir Ez Zor and Raqqa



The number of ISIS attacks in Deir Ez Zor in April (18) was unprecedented,
more than in any month since the beginning of the insurgency in 2018. A
dramatic reversal was witnessed in May (4), June (3), and July (3). While most
of the attacks in these months consisted of mines or IEDs—which would generally
be considered a more passive style of attack—these incidents occurred within
Deir Ez Zor’s urban centers, rather than in the desert where ISIS traditionally
enjoys more freedom of movement. The locations of these attacks support
allegations from locals that ISIS has infiltrated local security
forces—primarily the pro-regime National Defense Forces (NDF) network. Over the
past two years, the NDF has conducted “reconciliation” events designed to bring
displaced locals back to the area and have them join the network to complete
their mandatory service.



These “infiltrator” style attacks surged in August. First, on August 7, ISIS
launched multiple attacks on regime checkpoints across western Deir Ez Zor,
leaving at least eight soldiers dead and five wounded over the course of the
night. ISIS cells captured the largest regime checkpoint south of Shoula late
in the day, resulting in the need to use regime warplanes and IRGC-supported
foreign fighters to dislodge the militants during the night. It was not until
the morning of August 8 that the ISIS militants withdrew. To the north, an ISIS
cell likely based in Jabal Bishri captured one or two checkpoints just outside
the town of Maadan Atiq (reports vary), leaving five local NDF dead. The
attackers withdrew after looting the position and the arrival of regime
reinforcements. However, a few hours later an NDF vehicle was attacked at a
fake checkpoint further south along the highway, leaving three men dead and
five wounded. The fake checkpoint was likely established by the same cell the
conducted the raid near Maadan Atiq.



On August 8, a local pro-regime militia fighter was shot dead outside his
village of Kashmeh, south of Mayadeen. On August 10, ISIS cells ambushed a
small Syrian Army convoy on the Mayadeen-T2 highway, killing at least 25
soldiers and destroying two buses. On August 13, ISIS members conducted an
evening attack at the Salt Mine in western Deir Ez Zor. On August 17, a police
officer was gunned down outside of his home within the city of Mayadeen and on
August 25, a soldier was reported killed somewhere in the governorate.



In southern Raqqa, locals reported throughout the month that ISIS cells had
established fake checkpoints in the Mansoura and Resafa regions, which they
used to extort from shepherds and local traders. This author was informed of at
least one of these checkpoints operating on August 15 near Mansoura. On August
16, an NDF patrol hit an IED near Resafa, leaving two soldiers wounded. These
attacks follow renewed financial activity in the area in late July, when ISIS
cells ambushed a group of shepherds just outside of Maadan.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Dier Ez Zor (highlighted) in August 2023
alongside all other attacks in 2023. Not mapped is one attack that occurred
somewhere in the Deir Ez Zor countryside.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in west Dier Ez Zor and Raqqa (highlighted) in
August 2023 alongside all other attacks in 2023.



Homs and Hama



Confirmed ISIS activity continues to be muted in eastern Homs since the end of
the month-long battles around al-Kawm village in April. In August, there were
three confirmed ISIS attacks in the province, all in the southeast. On August
16, a soldier from the regime’s 3rd Division was killed when he “entered a mine
field”—according to loyalist media—somewhere near the 55km Tanf zone. Also on
August 16, a second soldier was killed also near al-Tanf, though whether it was
from an explosive or shooting was not specified. On August 29, local security
forces reported that ISIS cells had taken hold of a small abandoned hamlet east
of Humaymah, also near the Tanf zone and along the Homs-Deir Ez Zor
administrative border. It is not clear if there was any security presence
nearby when ISIS moved in.



ISIS activity remained high in east Hama, where the group has gradually been
increasing its presence since February of this year. On August 3, ISIS claimed
to have conducted two IED attacks targeting military vehicles east and west of
the town of Ithriyah. On August 28, two local regime fighters were killed by a
mine or IED while patrolling south of the town of Sheikh Hilal. On August 29,
two children were wounded by a mine outside their village of Soha, near
Uqayribat.




Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Homs (1) and Hama (2) (highlighted) in August
2023 alongside all other attacks in 2023.



Looking Ahead



Each month, several trends are becoming clearer across the Badia. Firstly,
ISIS has refocused its efforts in eastern Hama, which had served as a key
financing
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region for the group in past years. Secondly, ISIS militants have likely
infiltrated security forces in Deir Ez Zor and southern Raqqa, enabling the
group to continually conduct attacks within or close to urban centers.
According to local activists who spoke with this author this year, ISIS retains
many supporters in southern Raqqa, including former ISIS commanders now serving
within the regime’s NDF Raqqa center. And lastly, ISIS appears to have directed
resources towards infiltrating Damascus and Homs cities in order to conduct IED
attacks against regime forces. It is not clear how sustainable these operations
will be.



The impact of the recent violence
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eastern Deir Ez Zor on ISIS’s insurgency remains to be seen. However, the
U.S.-led Coalition appears to have not stepped in to end the fighting,
resulting in their allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) slowly retaking major
towns from local tribal forces in part due to the new use of artillery. The
mounting civilian casualties and growing likelihood that the conflict will be
“resolved” militarily rather than through a negotiated settlement does not bode
well for future stability. It is unlikely that the SDF or Coalition will be
able to maintain effective local intelligence networks should locals in eastern
Deir Ez Zor feel that the SDF has retained its power in the region without
addressing any of their core security and governance concerns. This will
severely hamper the defeat ISIS campaign and may allow ISIS cells to regain
some degree of power in the region. If ISIS finds that eastern Deir Ez Zor has
become a more permeable operating environment, then the group may shift some
resources out of central Syria, which could impact the level of ISIS activity
there in short term.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in August 2023 alongside all other
attacks in 2023 (green for Quarter 1 and blue for Quarter 2). Not shown is one
attack somewhere in Deir Ez Zor. To view an interactive version of this map,
please clickhere
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.



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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.


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