[The documented U.S. role in the months, days and hours before the
overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende. Nixon and Kissinger
commiserated over the fact that they wouldn’t receive laudatory
credit in the media for Allende’s demise. ]
[[link removed]]

CHILE’S COUP AT 50: COUNTDOWN TOWARD A COUP  
[[link removed]]


 

Peter Kornbluh
September 8, 2023
National Security Archive
[[link removed]]


*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

_ The documented U.S. role in the months, days and hours before the
overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende. Nixon and Kissinger
commiserated over the fact that they wouldn’t receive laudatory
credit in the media for Allende’s demise. _

,

 

SEPTEMBER 8, 2023, WASHINGTON D.C. - “In the Eisenhower period, we
would be heroes,” Henry Kissinger told President Richard Nixon
several days after the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile,
lamenting that they would not receive credit in the press for this
Cold War accomplishment. Fifty years later, as Chileans and the world
commemorate the anniversary of the U.S.-backed military takeover that
brought General Augusto Pinochet to power, a fierce debate over the
extent of the U.S. contribution to the coup continues. On September 6,
a leading Chilean television channel, Chilevision, broadcast a major
documentary film titled “Operation Chile: Top Secret
[[link removed]],”
featuring dozens of U.S. declassified records obtained by the National
Security Archive’s Chile Documentation Project, including recently
obtained documents published in the new Chilean edition of Archive
analyst Peter Kornbluh’s book, “Pinochet Desclasificado.”

On the eve of the 50th anniversary, the Archive is posting an edited
section of Kornbluh’s book—_The Pinochet File_—on the
“Countdown Toward the Coup.” The essay records U.S. government
actions, internal debates and policy deliberations as conditions for
the coup evolved between March and September 1973. “This is an
intricate, complicated and extraordinarily revealing history,”
Kornbluh said, “that holds many lessons on the secret abuses of U.S.
power and the danger of dictatorship over democracy for today’s
world community.”

["coup attempt will be initiated on sep 11"]
[[link removed]]

COUNTDOWN TOWARD A COUP

On September 12, 1973, a day after the Chilean military violently took
power, State Department officials met to discuss press guidelines for
Henry Kissinger on “how much advance notice we had on the coup.”
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Jack Kubisch noted that
one Chilean military official had told the embassy that the plotters
had withheld from their U.S. supporters the exact date they would move
against Allende. But Kubisch said he “doubted if Dr. Kissinger would
use this information, for it would reveal our close contact with coup
leaders.”

In the months leading up to the coup, the CIA and the Pentagon had
extensive contacts with Chilean plotters through various assets and
agents and at least three days’ advance knowledge of a concrete date
for a military takeover. Their communications derived from refocused
covert operations targeting the military after the March 1973
congressional elections in Chile. The dismal electoral outcome
convinced many CIA officials that the political and propaganda
operations had failed to achieve their goals, and that the Chilean
military, as Agency documents suggested, was the final solution to the
problem posed by Allende’s Popular Unity alliance.

Until the spring of 1973, the political operations and propaganda
generated by El Mercurio and other CIA-funded media outlets focused on
a major political opposition campaign to decisively win the March 4
congressional elections, when all Chilean representatives and half of
Chilean senators were up for reelection. The CIA’s maximum goal was
to gain a two-thirds majority for the opposition in order to be able
to impeach Allende; its minimum goal was to prevent Popular Unity from
obtaining a clear majority of the electorate. Of the 3.6 million votes
cast, the opposition polled 54.7 percent; Popular Unity candidates
garnered 43.4 percent, picking up two Senate seats and six seats in
the Congress. “Actions undertaken by CIA in the 1973 elections have
made a contribution to slowing down the Socialization of Chile,”
proclaimed a “Briefing on Chile Elections” written at Langley
headquarters.

The reality was quite different, as both CIA headquarters and the
Santiago Station understood. In the first national test of its
popularity since Allende took office, his Popular Unity government had
actually increased its electoral strength—despite concerted CIA
political action, a massive, covert anti-Allende propaganda campaign,
and a U.S.-directed socioeconomic destabilization program. “The UP
program still appeals to a sizeable portion of the Chilean
electorate,” the Station lamented in one cable. The CIA now had to
reassess its entire clandestine strategy in Chile. “Future
options,” headquarters cabled on March 6, “now being reviewed in
light of disappointing election results, which will enable Allende and
UP to push their program with renewed vigor and enthusiasm.”

The Station, now under the direction of a new Chief of Station, Ray
Warren, took a forceful position on what “future options” would be
necessary. In a pivotal March 14 postmortem on the congressional
elections, the CIA Station articulated plans to reinforce its focus on
the military program. “We feel that during foreseeable future,
Station should give emphasis to [covert] activity, to widen our
contacts, knowledge, and capability in order to bring about one of
following situations:”

* Consensus by leaders of armed forces (whether they remain in govt
or not) of need to move against the regime. Station believes we should
attempt induce as much of the military as possible, if not all, to
take over and displace the Allende govt ....
* Secure and meaningful Station relationship with a serious military
planning group. Should our re-study of the armed forces groups
indicate that would-be plotters are in fact serious about their
intentions and that they have the necessary capabilities, Station
would wish to establish a single, secure channel with such elements
for purposes of dialoguing and, once basic data on their collective
capabilities is obtained, to seek HQS authorization to enter into an
expanded ... role.

At the same time, the Station also reaffirmed the need to refocus
attention on creating a coup climate—the long-standing goal of U.S.
policy. “While the Station anticipates giving additional impetus to
our [military] program”

Other political power centers (political parties, business community,
media) will play an essential support role in creating the political
atmosphere which would allow us to accomplish objectives (A) or (B)
above. Given the outcome of the election results, Station feels that
creation of a renewed atmosphere of political unrest and controlled
crisis must be achieved in order to stimulate serious consideration
for intervention on part of the military.

The Station’s gung-ho position, which clearly influenced its
attitude and actions on the ground in Chile, was supported by a number
of hardliners within the Western Hemisphere directorate who pushed for
a far more aggressive, violent approach—an approach that clearly did
not count “saving democracy” in Chile as an objective. In a bald
and blunt internal challenge to the strategy of pursuing political
operations, on April 17 a group of CIA officers sent a memorandum to
WH/C Shackley on “Policy objectives for Chile” calling for cutting
covert support for the mainstream opposition parties. Such support
“lulled” those parties into believing they could survive until the
1976 election. Moreover, if the CIA helped the opposition Christian
Democrats win in 1976, the authors argued, it would be a “pyrhic
victory” [sic] because the PDC would pursue leftist “communitarian
policies.”

[1] [[link removed]]

Instead, the CIA should directly seek “to develop the conditions
which would be conducive to military actions.” This involved
“large-scale support” to the terrorist elements in Chile, among
them Patria y Libertad and the “militant elements of the National
Party” over a fixed time frame—six to nine months—“during
which time every effort would be made to promote economic chaos,
escalate political tensions and induce a climate of desperation in
which the PDC and the people generally come to desire military
intervention. Ideally, it would succeed in inducing the military to
take over the government completely.” [42]

But the position of the Station and the hardliners at Langley was not
shared by the State Department, nor by key senior CIA officials who
feared the consequences of precipitous military action and believed in
the prudence of caution given the ongoing congressional committee
investigation into ITT (International Telephone & Telegraph) and
covert operations in Chile. There was disagreement on a number of
fundamental and strategic questions:

* Could the Chilean military be counted on to act against Allende?
* Should the CIA be encouraging violent demonstrations through
covert funding of militant groups before knowing for sure that the
military would not move to put down the demonstrators?
* Given the current congressional inquiry on the CIA in Chile, did
the risks of exposure outweigh potential gains of working directly
with the militant private sector and the Chilean military to sponsor a
coup?

These questions were discussed repeatedly as the process of
formulating the Agency’s Fiscal Year 1974 proposals and budget for
covert action became grounds for a significant internal debate—kept
secret for 27 years—over the strategic nuances of U.S. intervention
in Chile.

The State Department, led by a new Assistant Secretary for
Inter­American Affairs, Jack Kubisch, opposed the Station’s desire
to foment a coup through direct support for the Chilean military or
collaboration with extremist private-sector groups. Along with
Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, who replaced Edward Korry in mid-1971,
Kubisch preferred to concentrate covert action on an opposition
victory in the 1976 elections. In addition, CIA officers at
headquarters, such as former Chile Task Force director David Atlee
Phillips—who would return to Chile operations as the new chief of
the Western Hemisphere Division in June—well remembered the
Schneider fiasco and remained skeptical of the Chilean military’s
commitment to a coup. Cables from headquarters to Santiago reflected
their uncertainty over whether the Chilean military would be more
likely to move against the government than to move against street
demonstrators and strikers that the Station wanted to support.
Promoting “large-scale protests such as a strike,” cautioned a
March 6 cable from Langley, “should be avoided, as should any action
which might provoke military reaction against the opposition.” In a
March 31, 1973, budget proposal, ‘‘Covert Action Options for
Chile-FY 1974,“ headquarters argued that,

Although we should keep all options open, including a possible future
coup, we should recognize that the ingredients for a successful coup
are unlikely to materialize regardless of the amount of money
expended, and thus we should avoid encouraging the private sector to
initiate action likely to produce either an abortive coup or a bloody
civil war. We should make it clear that we will not support a coup
attempt unless it becomes clear that such a coup would have the
support of most of the Armed Forces as well as the CODE [Chilean
opposition democratic] parties, including the PDC.

[4] [[link removed]]

On May 1, Langley sent a cable to Chief of Station Warren stating
“we wish to defer any consideration of action program designed to
stimulate military intervention until we have more definite evidence
that military is prepared to move and that opposition, including PDC,
would support a coup attempt.” The Chief of Station responded with a
request that headquarters postpone its request for FY 1974 funding
until the proposal could be re­drafted to reflect current Chilean
realities. “The most militant parts of the opposition,” including
CIA-supported organizations such as El Mercurio and the National
Party, the Station reported, were mobilizing to foment a coup:

The planning focus and action of all the opposition forces is on the
period immediately ahead rather than on 1976. If we are to maximize
our influence and help the opposition in the way it needs help, we
should work within this trend rather than try to oppose and counter it
by trying to get the opposition as a whole to focus on the distant and
tenuous goal of 1976. In sum, we believe the orientation and focus of
our operational effort should be on military intervention.

On April 10, the Western Hemisphere division did secure the approval
from CIA director James Schlesinger for “accelerated efforts against
the military target.” These covert actions, according to a May 7
memorandum to Schlesinger from WH division chief Theodore Shackley,
were “designed to better monitor any coup plotting and to bring our
influence to bear on key military commanders so that they might play a
decisive role on the side of the coup forces when and if the Chilean
military decides on its own to act against Allende.” Headquarters
authorized the Santiago Station “to move ahead against military
target in terms of developing additional sources” and promised to
seek appropriations for an expanded military program when “we have
much more solid evidence that military is prepared to act and has
reasonable chance of succeeding.”

The Chilean high command provided evidence that the military was not
yet ready to act on June 29, when several rogue units of the Chilean
armed forces deployed to take over the presidential palace known as La
Moneda. In his secret “Sit Rep # 1” for President Nixon, Kissinger
reported that Chilean army units had “launched an attempted coup
against the government of Salvadore Allende.” Later that day,
Kissinger sent Nixon another memo, “Attempted Chilean Rebellion
Ends,” noting that “the coup attempt was an isolated and poorly
coordinated effort,” and that the leaders of all three branches of
the military “remained loyal to the government.” The failed coup
attempt reinforced the hand of cautious U.S. policy makers who opposed
a more activist CIA role to directly support the Chilean military.

This ongoing internal debate led to a delay in approval for the
CIA’s FY 1974 covert action budget as the CIA and the State
Department worked out compromises on how funding authorizations would
be used in Chile. Finally, on August 20, the 40 Committee—an
interagency group charged with overseeing covert
operations—authorized, via telephone, $1 million for clandestine
funding to opposition political parties and private­-sector
organizations—but designated a “contingency fund” for the
private­-sector operations that could only be spent with approval
from Ambassador Davis. Within three days, the Station was pressing for
approval to use the money to sustain strikes and street demonstrations
as well as to orchestrate a takeover from within—pushing the
military to take key positions in Allende’s cabinet where they could
wield the power of state and reduce him to a “figurehead”
president. “Events are moving very fast and military attitudes are
likely to be decisive at this moment,” the Station cabled on August
24. “It is a time when significant events or pressures could affect
[Allende’s] future.”

In Washington the next day, CIA director William Colby sent a memo to
Kissinger, submitting the Station’s arguments—word-for-word—and
requesting authorization to move forward with the funds. The memo,
“Proposed Covert Financial Support of Chilean Private Sector,”
used language designed to assuage State Department sensitivities.
“The Santiago Station would not be working directly with the armed
forces in an attempt to bring about a coup nor would its support to
the overall opposition forces have this as its result,” Colby
submitted. But he added this caveat: “Realistically, of course, a
coup could result from increased opposition pressure on the Allende
government.”

By then, the CIA had multiple, and promising, reports of coup
plotting. In mid-August, C/WHD Phillips had dispatched a veteran agent
to Santiago to assess the situation. He cabled back that “in the
past several weeks we have again received increased reporting of
plotting and have seen a variety of dates listed for possible coup
attempt.” One report noted that military plotters had chosen July 7
as the “target date” for another coup attempt, but the date was
now being postponed because of the opposition of Commander in Chief
Carlos Prats, as well as the difficulty in lining up “the key Army
regiments in the Santiago area.” According to the CIA source:

Key problem for the military plotters is now how to overcome this
vertical command impediment. One way would be for the plotting Army
generals to meet with General Prats, advise him he no longer enjoyed
the confidence of the Army high command, and thus remove him. The
plotters’ choice to replace Prats, at the time of the coup d’état
is to be attempted, is General Manuel Torres, commander of the fifth
army division and the third ranking Army general. The plotters do not
regard General Augusto Pinochet, who is the second most senior officer
in the army, as a suitable replacement for Prats under such
conditions.

In late July, the CIA reported that a coordinated coup plan was
“near completion.” The plotters were still dealing with the Prats
problem. “The only way to remove Prats,” the Station noted,
“would appear to be by abduction or assassination. With the memory
of the affair of the former Army Commander, Rene Schneider, ever
present in their minds, it will be difficult for the plotters to bring
themselves to carry out such an act.”

The CIA also reported that the military was attempting to coordinate
its takeover with the Truck Owners Federation, which was about to
initiate a massive truckers strike. The violent strike, which
paralyzed the country throughout the month of August, became a key
factor in creating the coup climate the CIA had long sought in Chile.
Other factors included the decision by the leadership of the Christian
Democrats to abandon negotiations with the Popular Unity government
and to work, instead, toward a military coup. In a CIA “progress
report” dated in early July, the Station noted “there has been
increasing acceptance of the part of PDC leaders that a military coup
of intervention is probably essential to prevent a complete Marxist
takeover in Chile. While PDC leaders do not openly concede that their
political decisions and tactics are intended to create the
circumstances to provoke military intervention, Station [covert]
assets report that privately this is generally accepted political
fact.” The Christian Democrat position, in turn, prompted the
traditionally moderate Chilean Communist Party to conclude that
political accommodation with the mainstream opposition was no longer
feasible and to adopt a more militant position, creating deep
divisions with Allende’s own coalition. The military’s hardline
refusal to accept Allende’s offer of certain cabinet posts also
accelerated political tensions. “The feeling that something must be
done seems to be spreading,” CIA headquarters observed in an
analytical report on “Consequences of a Military Coup in Chile.”

[5] [[link removed]]

The resignation of Commander-in-Chief Carlos Prats in late August
after an intense public smear campaign led by El Mercurio and the
Chilean right wing eliminated the final obstacle for a successful
coup. Like his predecessor, General Schneider, Prats had upheld the
constitutional role of the Chilean military, blocking younger officers
who wanted to intervene in Chile’s political process. In an August
25 intelligence report stamped “TOP SECRET UMBRA,” the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) noted that the departure of Prats “has
removed the main factor mitigating against a coup.” On August 31,
U.S. military sources within the Chilean army were reporting that
“the army is united behind a coup, and key Santiago regimental
commanders have pledged their support. Efforts are said to be underway
to complete coordination among the three services, but no date has
been set for a coup attempt.”

By then, the Chilean military had established a “special
coordination team” made up of three representatives of each of the
services and carefully selected right-wing civilians. In a series of
secret meetings on September 1 and 2, this team presented a completed
plan for overthrowing the Allende government to heads of the Chilean
army, air force, and navy. The incipient Junta approved the plan and
set September 10 as the target date for the coup. According to a
review of coup plotting obtained by the CIA, the general who replaced
Carlos Prats as commander-in-chief, General Augusto Pinochet, was
“chosen to be head of the group” and would determine the hour for
the coup to begin.

On September 8, both the CIA and the DIA alerted Washington that a
coup was imminent and confirmed the date of September 10. A DIA
intelligence summary stamped TOP SECRET UMBRA reported that “the
three services have reportedly agreed to move against the government
on 10 September, and civilian terrorist and right-wing groups will
allegedly support the effort.” The CIA reported that the Chilean
navy would “initiate a move to overthrow the government” at 8:30
A.M. on September 10th and that Pinochet “has said that the army
will not oppose the navy’s action.”

On September 9, the Station updated its coup countdown. A member of
the CIA’s covert agent team in Santiago, Jack Devine, received a
call from an asset who was fleeing the country. “It is going to
happen on the eleventh,” as Devine recalled the conversation. His
report, distributed to Langley headquarters on September 10, stated:

A coup attempt will be initiated on 11 September. All three branches
of the Armed Forces and the Carabineros are involved in this action. A
declaration will be read on Radio Agricultura at 7 A.M. on 11
September. The Carabineros have the responsibility of seizing
President Salvador Allende.

According to Donald Winters, a CIA high-ranking agent in Chile at the
time of the coup, “the understanding was they [the Chilean military]
would do it when they were ready and at the final moment tell us it
was going to happen.” On the eve of the putsch, however, at least
one sector of the coup plotters became nervous about what would happen
if fighting became protracted and the takeover did not go as planned.
On the night of September 10, as the military quietly assumed
positions to violently take power the next day, a “key officer of
[the] Chilean military group planning to overthrow President
Allende,” as CIA headquarters described him, contacted a U.S.
official—it remains unclear whether it was a CIA, defense or embassy
officer—and “asked if the U.S. government would come to the aid of
the Chilean military if the situation became difficult.” The officer
was assured that his question “would promptly be made known to
Washington,” according to a highly classified memo sent by David
Atlee Phillips to Henry Kissinger on September 11, as the coup was in
progress.

At the time of the coup, both the State Department and the CIA were
making contingency plans for U.S. assistance if the military move
appeared to be failing. On September 7, Assistant Secretary Kubisch
reported to State and CIA officers that high-level department
officials had discussed Chile and determined the following: “If
there should be a coup attempt, which appears likely to be successful
and satisfactory from our standpoint, we will stand off;” but “if
there should be a coup, which might be viewed as favorable but which
appears in danger of failure we may want a capability for influencing
the situation.” Kubisch tasked the CIA to “give this problem
attention.”

That issue proved to be irrelevant. “Chile’s coup d’etat was
close to perfect,” Lt. Col. Patrick Ryan, head of the U.S. military
group in Valparaiso, reported in a “Sitrep” to Washington. By 8:00
A.M. on September 11, the Chilean navy had secured the port town of
Valparaiso and announced that the Popular Unity government was being
overthrown. In Santiago, Carabinero forces were supposed to detain
President Allende at his residence, but he managed to make his way to
La Moneda, Chile’s White House, and began broadcasting radio
messages for “workers and students” to come “and defend your
government against the armed forces.” As army tanks surrounded La
Moneda firing on its walls, Hunter Hawker jets launched a pinpoint
rocket attack on Allende’s offices at around noon, killing many of
his guards. Another aerial strafing attack accompanied the
military’s ground effort to take the inner courtyard of the Moneda
at 1:30 P.M.

During the fighting, the military repeatedly demanded that President
Allende surrender and made a perfunctory offer to fly him and his
family out of the country. In a now famous audiotape of General
Pinochet issuing instructions to his troops via radio communications
on September 11, he is heard to laugh and swear “that plane will
never land.” Forecasting the savagery of his regime, Pinochet added:
“Kill the bitch and you eliminate the litter.” Salvador Allende
was found dead from a self-inflicted gunshot wound in his inner office
around 2:00 P.M. At 2:30 P.M., the armed forces radio network
broadcast an announcement that La Moneda had “surrendered” and
that the entire country was under military control.

International reaction to the coup was immediate, widespread, and
over­whelmingly condemnatory. Numerous governments denounced the
military takeover; massive protests were held throughout Latin
America. Inevitably, finger-pointing was directed at the U.S.
government. In his confirmation hearings as secretary of state—only
one day after the coup—Kissinger was peppered with questions about
CIA involvement. The Agency “was in a very minor way involved in
1970 and since then we have absolutely stayed away from any coups,”
Kissinger responded. “Our efforts in Chile were to strengthen the
democratic political parties and give them a basis for winning the
election in 1976.”

“Preservation of Chilean democracy” summed up the official line,
spun after the fact, to obfuscate U.S. intervention against the
Allende government. On September 13, CIA Director Colby sent Kissinger
a secret two-page overview of “CIA Covert Action Program in Chile
since 1970,” meant to provide guidance on the questions concerning
the Agency’s role. “U.S. policy has been to maintain maximum
covert pressure to prevent the Allende regime’s consolidation,”
the memo stated candidly. After a selective review of the political,
media and private-sector covert operations, Colby concluded: “while
the agency was instrumental in enabling opposition political parties
and media to survive and to maintain their dynamic resistance to the
Allende regime, the CIA played no direct role in the events which led
to the establishment of a new military government.”

By the most narrow definition of “direct role”—providing
planning, equipment, strategic support, and guarantees—the CIA does
not appear to have been involved in the violent actions of the Chilean
military on September 11, 1973. The Nixon White House sought,
supported, and embraced the coup, but the political risks of direct
engagement simply outweighed any actual necessity for its success. The
Chilean military, however, had no doubts about the U.S. position.
“We were not in on planning,” recalled CIA operative Donald
Winters. “But our contacts with the military let them know where we
stood—that was we were not terribly happy with [the Allende]
government.” The CIA and other sectors of the U.S. government,
moreover, were directly involved in operations designed to create a
“coup climate” in which the overthrow of Chilean democracy could
and would take place. Colby’s memo appeared to omit the CIA’s
military deception project, the covert black propaganda efforts to sow
dissent within the Popular Unity coalition, the support to extremist
elements such as Patria y Libertad, and the inflammatory achievements
of the El Mercurio project, which agency records credited with playing
“a significant role in setting the stage” for the coup—let alone
the destabilizing impact of the invisible economic blockade. The
argument that these operations were intended to preserve Chile’s
democratic institutions was a public relations ploy contradicted by
the weight of the historical record. Indeed, the massive support that
the CIA provided to the ostensible leading representatives of Chilean
democracy—the Christian Democrats, the National Party, and El
Mercurio—facilitated their transformation into leading actors in,
and key supporters of, the Chilean military’s violent termination of
Chile’s democratic processes.

“You may also recall discussion of a Track Two in late 1970—which
has not been included in this summary,” Colby wrote to Kissinger on
the routing slip of his September 13 memorandum. Fundamental to the
Chilean generals’ understanding of Washington’s support was the
knowledge that the CIA had sought to directly instigate a coup three
years earlier. “Track II never really ended,” as Thomas
Karamessines, the top CIA official in charge of covert operations
against Allende, testified in 1975. “What we were told to do was to
continue our efforts. Stay alert, and to do what we could to
contribute to the eventual achievements and of the objectives and
purposes of Track II. I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that
effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973. I do not have any question
about that in my mind.”

[3] [[link removed]]

** ** ** **

“Our policy on Allende worked very well,” Assistant Secretary
Kubisch commented to Kissinger on the day after the coup. Indeed, in
September of 1973, the Nixon administration had achieved Kissinger’s
goal, enunciated in the fall of 1970, to create conditions which would
lead to Allende’s collapse or overthrow. At the first meeting of the
Washington Special Actions Group, held on the morning of September 12
to discuss how to assist the new military regime in Chile, Kissinger
joked that “the President is worried that we might want to send
someone to Allende’s funeral. I said I did not believe we were
considering that.” “No,” an aide responded, “not unless you
want to go.”

On September 16, President Nixon called Kissinger for an update; their
conversation was recorded by Kissinger’s secret taping system. The
two candidly discussed the U.S. role. Nixon seemed concerned that the
U.S. intervention in Chile might be exposed. “Well we didn’t—as
you know—our hand doesn’t show on this one though,” the
president noted. “We didn’t do it,” Kissinger responded,
referring to the issue of a direct involvement in the September 11
coup. “I mean we helped them. [Omitted word] created the conditions
as great as possible.” “That is right,” Nixon agreed.

Nixon and Kissinger commiserated over the fact that they wouldn’t
receive laudatory credit in the media for Allende’s demise. “The
Chile thing is getting consolidated,” Kissinger reported, “and of
course the newspapers are bleating because a pro-Communist government
has been overthrown.” “Isn’t that something,” Nixon said,
excoriating the “liberal crap” in the media. Kissinger suggested
that the press should be “celebrating” the military coup. “In
the Eisenhower period,” Kissinger told Nixon, “we would be
heroes.”

Peter Kornbluh is the author of Pinochet desclasificado: Los archivos
secretos de Estados Unidos sobre Chile (Spanish Edition)
[[link removed]] and The
Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability
[[link removed]].

_Founded in 1985 by journalists and scholars to check rising
government secrecy, the National Security Archive
[[link removed]] combines a unique range of
functions: investigative journalism center, research institute on
international affairs, library and archive of declassified U.S.
documents ("the world's largest nongovernmental collection" according
to the _Los Angeles Times_), leading non-profit user of the U.S.
Freedom of Information Act, public interest law firm defending and
expanding public access to government information, global advocate of
open government, and indexer and publisher of former secrets._

* Chile
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* Chile coup
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* Richard Nixon
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* Henry Kissinger
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* Salvador Allende
[[link removed]]

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