Following is the July 2023 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The
authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat
in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and
ISIS-K propaganda.





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Afghanistan Terrorism Report: July 2023



Afghanistan Terrorism Report: July 2023

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

Read CEP’s Latest Afghanistan Terrorism Report
<[link removed]>

Following is the July 2023 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The
authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat
in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and
ISIS-K propaganda.



In July, ISIS-K and pro-ISIS propaganda outlets continued to highlight only
terrorist attacks of symbolic importance. In addition to mentioning an ISIS-K
attack on a patrol of the Taliban in Kunar province and the execution of an
alleged “spy” of the Taliban, pro-ISIS outlets highlighted a series of
assassinations of Taliban officials, such asSayed Azim Agha
<[link removed]>, the head of the
foreign relations department of the Taliban Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled
Affairs and the alleged killing of Mullah Yakoob Omari. According to pro-ISIS-K
propaganda outlets, Omari was an intelligence official of the Taliban in Kunduz.



The attack most prominently discussed in ISIS-K linked propaganda outlets was
the suicide attack on the gathering of the Pakistani political partyJamiat
Ulema Islam (JUI-F)
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in the town of Khar, in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan on July
30th. This attackkilled at least 54 people
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and wounded at least 200. Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI-F) is a Deobandi Islamist
political party in Pakistan and ideologically close to theTaliban movement
<[link removed]>
in Afghanistan. The party leader, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, was reportedly
involved in organizing theearly Taliban movement
<[link removed]>. This attack on a
political gathering drew international condemnation, including by theUnited
Nations Security Council <[link removed]>. Both
the Afghan Taliban as well as theTehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
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condemned the attack
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. Interestingly, evenal-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
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issued a statement
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criticizing the attack. AQIS was formed in 2014 and serves as the regional
affiliate of the global al-Qaeda network. While maintainingpropaganda machinery
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, AQIS rarely issues statements concerning events in the region, and the fact
that the group commented on this attack can be seen as another indication of
the ongoing symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and the al-Qaeda network.



In what could be interpreted as a sign of ISIS-K’s weakening position in the
north of Afghanistan, ISIS-K-linked outlets carried a plea by the group to the
people of the Panshir Valley to join them in their resistance to the Taliban.
Panshir Valley is the last remaining area of operations of theNational
Resistance Front of Afghanistan
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(NRF), which brings together fighters who continue to be loyal to the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan. As highlighted in theprevious report
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the Taliban are engaged in an increasingly violent campaign against the NRF.
Therefore, this is an apparent attempt of ISIS-K to take advantage of this
situation and expand its social support base in the area.



Of course, ISIS-K-linked and pro-ISIS propaganda outlets continued their
ideological attacks against the Taliban regime. In July, Afghan Shiites
celebrated Ashura <[link removed]> with religious
processions in Afghanistan. Pro-ISIS outlets repeatedly mocked the Taliban,
claiming that they were religious deviants for not preventing the celebration
of these Shiite religious festivals. Indeed, the Taliban regime allowed these
religious celebrations to go ahead but placed anumber of restrictions
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on them, citing security reasons.



A second issue highlighted in pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets in July was the
developing commercial relationship between the Taliban regime and China.
Indeed, as claimed by pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets, there are multiple media
reports that the Haqqani-led Taliban Ministry of Interior Affairs has agreed
with Chinese company Huawei toinstall security cameras
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to increase domestic security. Furthermore, at the beginning of July, the
Taliban regime announced that it had begun extracting oil in Afghanistan’s
northern Sar-e Pol province, reportedly through acontract with a Chinese company

<[link removed]>
. InJanuary 2023
<[link removed]>
, the Taliban regime signed a contract with Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and
Gas Co (CAPEIC) for this project.



In an apparent attempt to give the impression that the Chinese are slowly
taking over Afghanistan, pro-ISIS-K propaganda posts repeatedly emphasized a
video that allegedly shows Chinese women cycling in Kabul without headscarves.
These propaganda posts argued that while the Taliban oppress Afghan women, they
let foreign women violate even basic Islamic clothing requirements. Indeed, the
United Nations Assistance Mission In Afghanistan (UNAMA), in the July update of
its regularhuman rights reporting
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, highlighted increasing restrictions on Afghan women and girls, such as the
decision of the Taliban regime in May that only males would be allowed to
attend the entrance exam forspecialized medical training
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.



Finally, pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets picked up on the meeting between U.S.
officials and the Taliban
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in Qatar. At the end of July, Thomas West, special representative for
Afghanistan; Rina Amiri, special envoy for Afghan women; and Karen Decker,
chief of the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan based in Doha, met with a delegation
led by Taliban foreign ministerAmir Khan Muttaqi
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. This was thefirst official bilateral meeting
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since the Taliban took over power by force in Afghanistan in August 2021. The
spokesman of the Taliban foreign ministry, Abdul Qahar Balkhi, claimed after
the meeting that, among other issues, both sides had discussed theremoval of
sanctions
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, a topic that was not confirmed by theofficial readout
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from the U.S. side. Of course, pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets used this meeting
to argue that the Taliban regime has become a client of the U.S., particularly
since during the meeting, the Taliban restated their commitment that
Afghanistan will not be used to attack theU.S. or its allies
<[link removed]>.



Demonstrating the increasing role that ISIS affiliates in West Africa play for
this terror network, ISIS-K Voice of Khorasan web magazine headlined its 27th
issue at the end of July with an article on ISIS operations in that region. The
article highlights the increasing difficulties of international and United
Nations forces caused by the military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso and
highlights that the coup in Niger will result in a further withdrawal of
international forces. The article claims that ISIS has many supporters and its
operations are successful, including inflicting casualties on al-Qaeda. Indeed,
the operational areas of the two ISIS affiliates in the region, Islamic State
West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS), continue
toincrease in the region
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. Since March 2022, ISGS has renamed itself toIslamic State Sahel Province
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, an elevation from an ISIS-affiliated group to an ISIS “province” status. Its
fighters nowregularly clash
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forces belonging toJamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)
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, the coalition of al-Qaeda-linked groups in the region.

Click Here For More CEP Analysis
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