[The CIA & MI6 Staged Coup in Iran 70 Years Ago, Destroying
Democracy in Iran]
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“IT’S ALWAYS ABOUT OIL”  
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Amy Goodman, Juan González, Ervand Abrahamian, Taghi Amirani
August 23, 2023
Democracy Now!
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_ The CIA & MI6 Staged Coup in Iran 70 Years Ago, Destroying
Democracy in Iran _

Screen grab from show video, Democracy Now

 

We look at the 70th anniversary of the August 19, 1953, U.S.- and
U.K-backed coup in Iran, which took place two years after Iran’s
democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh nationalized
Iran’s oil industry that had been controlled by the company now
known as British Petroleum. “If nationalization in Iran of oil was
successful, this would set a terrible example to other countries where
U.S. oil interests were present,” explains Ervand Abrahamian,
Iranian historian and author of _Oil Crisis in Iran: From Nationalism
to Coup d’Etat_ and _The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of
Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations_. While the CIA has historically taken
credit for Mosaddegh’s overthrow, “the British have not admitted
their leading role,” notes Iranian filmmaker Taghi Amirani, whose
documentary film _Coup 53_ uncovers the influence of MI6 agents who
sought to preserve their imperial-era access to Iranian oil and pulled
in the Americans by promising a “slice.” Seventy years later, says
Amirani, “We are still living with the ripples of this disastrous
event.”

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: This is _Democracy Now!_, democracynow.org, _The War
and Peace Report_. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan González.

We turn now to look at the 70th anniversary of an event that reshaped
the Middle East: the 1953 U.S.- and U.K.-backed coup in Iran that
overthrew Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad
Mosaddegh. The aftershocks of the coup are still being felt today.

The coup came two years after Mosaddegh nationalized Iran’s oil
industry. He argued Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil
reserves, which had been exclusively controlled by the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company. The company later became known as British Petroleum, BP.

The coup was led in part by a CIA agent named Kermit Roosevelt, the
grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt. The crushing of Iran’s
first democratic government ushered in more than two decades of
dictatorship under the shah, who relied heavily on U.S. aid and arms.
The anti-American backlash that toppled the shah in 1979 shook the
whole region.

In moment, we’ll be joined by two guests who have researched the
coup for years. But first, we turn to the trailer of the
documentary _Coup 53_.

RICHARD NIXON: In 1953, the United States, together with Britain,
participated in a coup in Iran that got rid of Mosaddegh.

NEWSREEL: Mosaddegh and his government were swept from power in favor
of General Zahedi. Three hundred killed and hundreds wounded is a
conservative estimate.

TAGHI AMIRANI: The British government has never officially
acknowledged its role in the coup.

GEORGE MIDDLETON: I don’t think at any time we really planned a
coup d’état.

TAGHI AMIRANI: These words have not been heard or seen for over 34
years, evidence that has the potential to turn a dark chapter in
history inside out.

“Your British counterpart was in fact [blank]. Could you tell me
something about the man, [blank]?

Norman Darbyshire, take one.

HUMPHREY TREVELYAN: He was somebody who felt that there were things
to be said that hadn’t been said.

TAGHI AMIRANI: A member of the British government was involved in
the assassination of the chief of police.

UNIDENTIFIED: How did it come to this?

TAGHI AMIRANI: So, they tied him up, strangled him and shot him.

“Were you involved in Afshartus assassination?”

NORMAN DARBYSHIRE: [played by Ralph Fiennes] Yes.

ARDESHIR ZAHEDI: My father is the real prime minister.

STEPHEN KINZER: The coup in Iran is shaping politics to this day.
The United States does not want democracy in the Middle East.

AMY GOODMAN: That’s the trailer of the documentary _Coup 53_,
directed by the Iranian filmmaker Taghi Amirani, who’s joining us
now. He made the film with the Oscar-winning filmmaker Walter Murch.
We’re also joined by Ervand Abrahamian. He’s a retired professor
of history at the City University of New York, Baruch College. His
most recent book is titled _Oil Crisis in Iran: From Nationalism to
Coup d’Etat_, the author of several books, including _The Coup:
1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations_.

We are talking about an event 70 years ago that has shaped not only
the Middle East, but, I think you could say, geopolitics in the world
today. Ervand Abrahamian, if you can start off by talking about the
significance of this moment? I mean, a year after, the same model
would be used to overthrow the democratically elected leader in
Guatemala. But what happened, why the United States and Britain were
so hell-bent on toppling democracy in Iran?

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN: Well, the official argument, that is constantly
repeated, was it was to save Iran from communism and the Soviet
threat. In reality, when you look at the documents, there was no
communist threat or Soviet interest in Iran.

The main concern of the United States was that if nationalization in
Iran of oil was successful, this would set a terrible example to other
countries where U.S. oil interests were present, countries such as
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Indonesia. So, the nightmare in
Washington was that if you have a successful nationalization in Iran,
this would be a contagious disease that would spread throughout the
world, and this would change the whole balance of power. And this was
really the main interest.

But, of course, American politicians don’t want to admit that
economic issues are at play with their foreign policies, so they’ve
underplayed this. They never mentioned this publicly. What they
insisted was the so-called communist threat. The British, in fact,
were quite honest about this. They said they used the bogey of
communism to basically persuade people that the coup was justifiable.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: But, Professor, when you say there was no communist
threat to take over the country, but there certainly was a vibrant
communist party in Iran at that time, the Tudeh Party, which backed
nationalization, even though it also opposed Mosaddegh on a bunch of
issues. Wasn’t the attempt of the United States to use — and
actually, as I understand it, some of the documents revealed recently
show that the British and the U.S. actually tried to stir up the
population in Iran against the communists by actually backing false
flag operations in the weeks before the overthrow?

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN: They did that, but, you know, the Tudeh Party,
you could say, had its strength in the factories, in the street. They
organized strikes, demonstrations. But people in Washington, people
like Roosevelt, the Dulleses, Eisenhower, were hard-nosed realists.
They knew that there’s a difference between, you know, organizing a
demonstration in Tehran to carrying out a revolution or a coup. And
the CIA reports from Tehran — these are the actual CIA analysts
on the ground — they said that the Tudeh Party was not a threat. It
wasn’t even prepared for a coup. It wasn’t talking and thinking of
a coup.

And even the readings that was required for Tudeh Party members in
1953 was Lenin’s work on ultra-leftism, infantile leftism. So, a
communist party that was thinking about a coup or a revolution would
not be using Lenin’s infantile leftism as a main instruction book.

So, this was an imagined threat. And, of course, the press,
especially _The New York Times_, played up with this. They
exaggerated Tudeh’s strength, the size of their demonstrations, in
order to create the mood in the American public that there was
actually a major threat coming from the left in Iran.

AMY GOODMAN: Let’s turn to an excerpt from _Coup 53_, where we
see our other guest, the filmmaker Taghi Amirani, as he meets with
Malcolm Byrne at the National Security Archive.

MALCOLM BYRNE: I am the deputy director and research director at the
National Security Archive, which is a nongovernmental organization
based at George Washington University. There are at least three
internal histories that the CIA has produced. In probably the late
1970s, one of these items was produced.

TAGHI AMIRANI: Is this when you write to them asking for
information?

MALCOLM BYRNE: Well, this is the response letter to me, saying,
“We’re enclosing this document that you requested.”

TAGHI AMIRANI: Right.

MALCOLM BYRNE: And then here’s the document itself, called “The
Battle for Iran.”

TAGHI AMIRANI: “The Battle for Iran,” which is still going on.

MALCOLM BYRNE: This is what’s new about this release: covert
action. In earlier versions, which you will see, this is all blotted
out. Keep that out, in case we want to look at it.

TAGHI AMIRANI: So we can take this one out.

MALCOLM BYRNE: There’s still a lot that’s not there.

TAGHI AMIRANI: I like the fact that there’s still a lot of blank
pages.

MALCOLM BYRNE: They’re supposed to show you what was there.

TAGHI AMIRANI: Right.

MALCOLM BYRNE: What was new was essentially this page. This: “the
military coup that overthrew Mosadeq and his National Front cabinet
was carried out under CIA direction.” They had never, to my
knowledge, officially acknowleged their role —

TAGHI AMIRANI: Right.

MALCOLM BYRNE: — in the coup.

TAGHI AMIRANI: I’m standing in front of a filing cabinet of a
drawer full of documents that essentially changed the fate of my
country and changed my fate, you know, what happened to me, what
happened to my family. It’s just like how your lives, your destiny,
your fate is —

MALCOLM BYRNE: Yeah.

TAGHI AMIRANI: — encapsulated.

MALCOLM BYRNE: Yeah, in a half a file drawer.

TAGHI AMIRANI: In a half a — this is it. This just changed Iran,
this box of papers.

AMY GOODMAN: In this next clip from _Coup 53_, Taghi Amirani reads
from the interview transcripts he found with the MI6 spy Norman
Darbyshire, that were done for the British TV series _End of Empire_.

TAGHI AMIRANI: “Excellent — if we want the coup in detail — &
even if not!”

Why did they select bits of interview from him, cut it out, paste it
into a script, probably edit it into the film, but he didn’t make
the final cut? He’s not in the finished film.

In a remarkable stroke of luck, we’ve discovered that the British
Film Institute Archive hold all the unused footage from the _End of
Empire_ Iran episode, freely available to the public but never
digitized until now, 36 cans of film, 520 minutes of interview, among
which we hope to find Norman Darbyshire.

WALTER MURCH: And it’s recording. Great.

TAGHI AMIRANI: We digitized the entire collection of _End of
Empire_ given to us by the BFI. We did not find Norman Darbyshire.

AMY GOODMAN: And in this clip from _Coup 53_, Taghi Amirani goes
through the photographs and film clips he accessed from _End of
Empire_, the British TV series about the end of British Empire, as he
searched for footage of the MI6 spy Norman Darbyshire.

TAGHI AMIRANI: British Embassy staff photograph, Tehran, class of
1952. And this is Norman Darbyshire, looking very much the cool
undercover spy. Darbyshire would have been 29 when this photograph was
taken. He was born on the 1st of October, 1924, and he died on the
17th of June, 1993.

His CIA counterpart was Stephen Meade. We found his can of film even
though he’s not in the finished film. Stephen Meade on Iran. This is
what the _End of Empire_ production team thought of Stephen Meade”
A young 69, hatchet-faced, like a bit part player in a B movie
thriller … and above all, GOOD.” This is brilliant. Wow. “Your
British counterpart was in fact [blank]. Could you tell me something
about the man, [blank]?

ALISON ROOPER: Your British counterpart was in fact Norman
Darbyshire.

STEPHEN MEADE: Yes.

bq. ALISON ROOPER: Could you tell something about the man,
Norman Darbyshire?

STEPHEN MEADE: Oh, I didn’t know him at all before I met him.

TAGHI AMIRANI: “What kind of a man was [blank]?

ALISON ROOPER: What kind of a man was Norman Darbyshire?

TAGHI AMIRANI: What kind of a man was Norman Darbyshire? And why has
his name been blanked out in these documents?

AMY GOODMAN: And in this clip from _Coup 53_, the actor Ralph
Fiennes reenacts the part of the Norman Darbyshire interview
transcript found after he was interviewed but did not appear in
the _End of Empire_ series.

TAGHI AMIRANI: Norman Darbyshire, take one. What you’re about to
see here, as the team sets up at the Savoy, is the result of a failure
to find any film or audio of the Darbyshire interview. So we resorted
to bringing his words to life.

Ah, there it is. OK.

Ralph Fiennes is about to speak Darbyshire’s words recorded back in
1983 telling us things the British didn’t want anyone to hear.

And these are the bits that the people who made the original
documentary loved, which is also what we love.

RALPH FIENNES: Sorry, I’m getting drawn into the —

TAGHI AMIRANI: Just imagine how I felt when I came across it. It was
one late night in the office.

AMY GOODMAN: Again, a clip from _Coup 53_. Taghi Amirani was an
Iranian physicist who became a filmmaker and directed this
documentary, _Coup 53_, released August 19th, 2019, the anniversary
of the U.S.-backed, MI6-backed — or, I should say, “created” —
coup that overthrew the democratically elected leader of Iran.

This is an astounding documentary. This is a documentary, Taghi, the
likes of which we rarely see. If people are wondering why Ralph
Fiennes is in it, the famous actor, it’s because he was replacing
the cutout words of this British spy. If you can talk about what
Darbyshire means in terms of British history in Iran, and also, on the
U.S. side, Kermit Roosevelt, who will later talk quite honestly about
how he went on behalf of the Dulles brothers — right? — John
Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA and the State
Department, John Foster Dulles who had represented corporations
interested in overthrowing democracies, and overthrew Mosaddegh?

TAGHI AMIRANI: Thank you so much. It’s a pleasure to join you, and
I’m delighted that you find the film astounding. And if it’s
astounding, it’s entirely due to Walter Murch and the incredible
cast of interviewees, including Professor Abrahamian, along with
Stephen Kinzer and David Talbot and Malcolm Byrne, who were the
backbone of commentary and knowledgeable information on the coup.

In the absence of the British official admission to their leading role
in this coup, Norman Darbyshire’s interview and its transcript
stands in for that admission. Imagine you’re making a film about the
most important pivotal event in your country’s history, which
didn’t just affect Iran but the region and the world, as we’ve
discussed and we will discuss more, and you find the man who was
essentially the writer and director of this coup, in his own words,
revealing the most incredible amount of data, going rogue, for
whatever — we can speculate as to why he went rogue, as the leading
MI6 officer in charge of the coup — giving this incredible
interview, and then vanishing. And for whatever reason, the _End of
Empire_ producers, Brian Lapping, Norma Percy and Mark Anderson and
Alison Rooper, could not or did not use this interview in any form in
their film.

We got lucky. I got lucky. I am not the world’s best documentary
maker, but I am the luckiest in the team I got together, the
interviewees I managed to persuade to appear, and just a lucky break
to come across this transcript, which was, ironically, in the basement
of Mosaddegh’s grandson in Paris, until I showed up and found it by
chance. And my mind just blew by the level of revelation and
staggering amount of detail.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Taghi Amirani, I wanted to ask you — the lessons
for today, especially for people in other parts of the world, about
these coups is the way that the British government and the U.S.
government often tried to mask their actions by promoting so-called
demonstrations or uprisings in the street against governments that
they wanted overthrown — particularly, I think, in the Iranian
situation, the use of radical Islamic clerics. For instance, there was
at the time Ayatollah Kashani, who had been a collaborator with the
Nazis during World War II, but then was utilized by the British and
the Americans to stir up protest against the Mosaddegh regime. And, of
course, there was a young cleric, Khomeini, a follower of Kashani, who
was in the street protesting against Mosaddegh at the time. Could you
talk about the use of the — by the United States and the British
— because, of course, they went on to do it in Afghanistan, against
Sadat in Egypt, and others — to use radical Islamic clerics as a
means to attack modernists or progressive political leaders?

TAGHI AMIRANI: My enemy’s enemy is always my friend. And, in fact,
Ayatollah Kashani was very much on Mosaddegh’s side. They were
working together in trying to nationalize oil and stand up to the
British. They parted ways in July 1952 in a huge demonstration, when
Mosaddegh resigned because he wanted to have more control and
executive power and wanted the shah to be just a simple symbolic
monarch. But they parted ways because, in Kashani’s eyes, Mosaddegh
was [inaudible] hungry dictator and trying to keep too much control in
his hands.

The melting pot of the currents against Mosaddegh was multifaceted.
The mob was created. The religious community turned against him. Of
course, agents were on the ground. Bribery was obviously a key point.
The press were bought. These are the key ingredients of any coup, we
sense, and once you’ve got those key elements in place, including
assassination of key allies, it’s a repeat-and-rinse process.

I don’t have information of Ayatollah Khomeini, a young Khomeini,
being in the crowd, but I know in Oliver Stone’s series, _The
Secret History of the United States_ — or, _The Untold History of
the United States_, it is mentioned. But there is a lot of debate
about the conflict between Kashani and Khomeini — sorry, Kashani
and Mosaddegh. He certainly expressed delight at the fall of Mosaddegh
post-coup. And he had ambitions about being a leader of the Muslim
world, not just in Iran.

But Mosaddegh had his — he had written his own death sentence the
moment he nationalized oil. The British decided he had to go that
moment. In fact, we have people in our interviews from _End of
Empire_ saying, “The moment he came into office, we knew we had to
get rid of him.” The bogeyman of communism was exactly that. We have
documents which we will put out in our new sequel. We are making a
coda about what happened to _Coup 53_ since its release,
called _Coup 53.1_. And in that, we will show these documents, where
the Americans are discussing with the British whether they’ll come
in and join the coup, and they’re discussing share of the oil,
basically saying, “Yeah, we’ll help you, if we can have a slice
of, you know, Iranian oil,” which is exactly what happened post-coup
in the consortium that was formed, in which the American oil companies
walked away with 40%.

And so, yeah, it’s still debated. It’s still a hot topic. Of
course, the impact is still with us. We are living with the
consequences of the coup. And, of course, it emboldened the CIA to
go out and do it again in Guatemala. In fact, this year we’re
marking the 50th anniversary of the Chilean coup, Pinochet replacing
Allende like the shah replaced Mosaddegh. History is not the past. The
past is not the past. And we are still living with the ripples of this
disastrous event.

AMY GOODMAN: Taghi Amirani, if you can talk about specifically the
U.S. role? You have this fascinating interview. What is it? The
interview with Kermit Roosevelt, Teddy Roosevelt’s grandson, who was
an official within the CIA. He says he takes a couple suitcases
filled with money, a million dollars, but actually it only cost him
$60,000. But talk about what he did in Iran, and doing this at the
behest of the British. It was Anglo-Iranian Oil, now BP. Iran had
thrown out the British, seeing Mosaddegh realized that the British
were fomenting a coup. So they called on the U.S. And ultimately, it
would be under Eisenhower that they would overthrow Iran.

TAGHI AMIRANI: Yeah. See, I grew up, we all grew up, with the story
of the CIA coup run by Kermit Roosevelt, as Professor Abrahamian
puts it very eloquently in our film. Kermit didn’t speak Persian. He
was only in Iran for three weeks. He didn’t know Iran at all. He was
more of a bagman and an adventurist. And he was allowed to go and take
credit for the coup. He wrote books about it. He was on chat shows,
talk shows. He had contracts. He had audiences with the shah. He did
really well out of this coup.

And Darbyshire, as Ralph Fiennes tells us in a brilliant interview
in _The New Yorker_, essentially wanted his curtain call. He wanted
to reclaim credit for what was his show. In fact, just last week,
there was a huge profile
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Darbyshire in _The Guardian_ by Julian Borger, the foreign affairs
editor of _The Guardian_, went in great detail about his life and his
motives. And so, this is, essentially, partly professional rivalry.
“I do all the hard work.” Darbyshire was in Iran from the age of
19 as a soldier. He spoke probably better Persian than me. He knew the
Iranian street. He really understood the psyche of the Iranian mob, as
he says in the interview in our film. He knows how to turn them, what
buttons to press. This was a Darbyshire project.

And as we talked about earlier, the British wanted their oil back.
This coup was always about oil. It’s always about oil. Iraq was
about oil. Venezuela is about oil. It’s always about oil. As the
great Robert Fisk said, if Iraq’s only export was turnips, we
wouldn’t be there.

And so, Darbyshire is the main star of this film. For whatever reason,
he didn’t appear. We got lucky we found him. We got lucky we got
Ralph Fiennes to be his avatar. And everything that happened to _Coup
53_, the incentive for me making this film, is the British have not
officially admitted to their key role, their leading role. This was an
MI6 coup, aided by the CIA, who was dragged in. It was a new
organization in 1953. It was the first time it went off campus to
play. And it did well. You know, it was quick. It was cheap. And no
Americans were killed. A few hundred Iranians died, but who cares
about that? So, it emboldened them to do it again. And it was — you
know, there’s a letter from Allen Dulles to Kermit after he comes
back from Iran, saying, “Have a great weekend. Come in on Monday.
I’ve got some other ideas” — obviously, Guatemala coming up.

There was one other thing I had to say. Kermit Roosevelt, in not
really being an expert, given the lead and the playing field to write
his book and give that interview to [inaudible] as the clip that we
see in the film where he says, “I had a million, and I spent
$60,000.” He gives another interview in which he says, “I had
$700,000. I only spent $10,000.” I wouldn’t take anything Kermit
Roosevelt says at face value as the truth. He was a fabricator of
stuff and a self-aggrandizing guy. And that, I can see, will also not
sit well with Darbyshire, you know, Kermit just spewing out different
stories about how much money he spent. Darbyshire says, in his
interview, you know, “The coup cost 700,000 pounds. I know, because
I spent it.”

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Yeah, I’d like to bring in Professor Abrahamian
into the conversation again. Professor, this whole issue of the change
in administrations in the United States? Because the nationalization
happened during the Truman administration, but President Truman was
reluctant to intervene, according to some accounts. It was only when
Eisenhower came in, and, of course, the Dulles brothers as part of his
administration, that the coup moved forward, as far as the United
States was concerned. Could you talk about the change in
administrations, and also the impact on Iran subsequent to the coup,
of course, leading up to eventually the Iranian Revolution of 1979?

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN: Yes. I mean, the conventional view, as you said,
it’s that Truman, a Democratic administration, was willing to
negotiate and deal with Mosaddegh; it was the Republican Eisenhower
administration that carried out the coup. The trouble is, if you look
at the documents, right from the beginning, as soon as Mosaddegh was
elected prime minister and nationalized, the Americans — at that
time, the Truman administration was just as eager to actually get rid
of Mosaddegh. They weren’t thinking about a coup; they were thinking
of a political means of getting rid of him. In fact, they asked the
shah to dismiss him. They had misunderstood the Iranian Constitution.
The shah didn’t have the power to dismiss him. So, right from the
beginning, the Truman administration was already trying to ease
Mosaddegh out.

But the interesting thing is, the reason for that was not because they
were against coups. It was, much more surprisingly, the shah’s
reluctance to carry out a coup. The shah, right in ’51, said that
“If I go against Mosaddegh in oil nationalization, I will
delegitimize my monarchy, the whole of my authority. I cannot do
that.” And he was the one who was very reluctant to carry out the
coup. And the —

AMY GOODMAN: We have 30 seconds, Professor.

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN: Right. What the Truman administration really
wanted to do was get rid of Mosaddegh through the political process.
It was only when that failed that the new administration then actually
put into effect a military coup.

AMY GOODMAN: We want to thank you both for being with us, Ervand
Abrahamian, retired professor of history at the City University of New
York, most recent book, _Oil Crisis in Iran: From Nationalism to Coup
d’Etat_, and Taghi Amirani, the Iranian filmmaker, director
of _Coup 53_. Everyone should see it. This is the 70th anniversary of
the coup in Iran.

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* Mohammad Mosaddegh
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