This report focuses on operations throughout the Sahel in July 2023 claimed by
the propaganda outlets of al-Qaeda and ISIS. In total, 45 different operations
were claimed by these groups.





<[link removed]>
<[link removed]>



CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring July 2023



Read CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring July 2023 by clicking here
<[link removed]>.



CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring July 2023

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen



This report focuses on operations throughout the Sahel in July 2023 claimed by
the propaganda outlets of al-Qaeda and ISIS. In total, 45 different operations
were claimed by these groups.



Noteworthy are two separate clashes on the Burkina Faso-Togo border, resulting
in the first claimed attack by Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) in
Togo since reporting began in December 2022. In July, all high-impact attacks
with a significant number of casualties were claimed by this al-Qaeda
affiliate, including attacks on the Wagner Group and the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Although
the number of claimed attacks decreased during July 2023, the number of
casualties rose significantly, with around 185 killed in Burkina Faso alone.



Interestingly for about one week in July, the propaganda outlets of the
Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) and the Islamic State in Western
Africa Province (ISWAP) as well as JNIM fell silent. The 398th edition of the
ISIS online propaganda outlet an-Naba’, published on July 6, did not mention a
single attack by ISWAP or ISGS. JNIM-linked online propaganda outlets also
reported no activities for a period of about 10 days in July.



The most significant event in July by far, however, was the coup in Niger
<[link removed]>.
Democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum was sequestered by his own
presidential guard, after which the military claimed control over the country,
closed the airspace and borders, and ordered allforeign forces
<[link removed]>
to leave—meaning a significant number of Westerners will have toevacuate the
country
<[link removed]>
sooner or later. Although Niger does not have a close bilateral relationship
with Russia, there is concern theWagner Group
<[link removed]>
or other Russian paramilitary units may fill the security gap created by the
potential withdrawal of Western forces from the country.



Map 1: Jihadist Activity in the Sahel (January 2023 – July 2023)



Source: [link removed]
<[link removed]>



Attacks in the Sahel – General Trend



Although an increase in terrorist attacks in the region seemed likely, the
total number of claimed attacks in July decreased. This is partially due to the
peculiar silence of the regional ISIS- and al-Qaeda-linked propaganda outlets.
In addition, ISWAP, ISGS, and JNIM online outlets encountered technical issues
with their online presence in July. On Telegram, several channels linked to
ISIS as well as az-Zallaqa Media, an important online propaganda outlet linked
to JNIM, were suspended. The pause in reporting in combination with these
technical issues very likely caused under reporting of these groups’ operations
in the region.



Furthermore, recently leaked internal ISIS documents
<[link removed]>
demonstrate disagreements within the group concerning its propaganda strategy
and prove that ISIS’s central media apparatus sometimes does not publish claims
of attacks prepared by its local media branches. This underreporting was always
suspected but unproven until now. Although the leaked documents concern ISIS’s
propaganda output in Syria, it is very likely that ISIS’s regional affiliates
in West Africa and the Sahel region face the same challenges. As stated byDr.
Haid Haid
<[link removed]>
of Chatham House who analyzed the leaked documents:



“It … shows that analysts solely relying on the number of claimed attacks will
not get an accurate measure of a militant group’s strength. Therefore,
policymakers should exercise caution and take a comprehensive approach when
assessing the group’s capabilities and the threat it poses.”



However, despite this likely systematic underreporting of ISIS operations, it
is still possible to discern the overall trend of the group’s activities in the
region from its official propaganda outlets, even if these do not cover the
full extent of its operations in West Africa and the Sahel.



In July 2023, several high-profile attacks occurred. Nineteen attacks were
claimed by az-Zallaqa Media on behalf of JNIM, some of them with extremely high
impact and number of casualties. For example, on July 2, JNIM claimed to have
killed around 100 servicemen during an attack on the Burkinabe army. In
addition, JNIM linked propaganda outlets also reported on the first ever attack
of the group in northern Togo, on the border with Burkina Faso. Az-Zallaqa
Media claimed that this attack resulted in seven casualties.



Seven claims were posted in the name of ISGS, a slight rise compared to June.
But, as noted above, there is strong reason to believe that ISGS, just like
ISIS in Syria, is underreporting attacks. ISWAP claimed a total of 19 attacks,
all of these had a low-impact rate with few casualties. Most of these attacks
targeted the Nigerian army but also executions of so-called magicians occurred
as well as an attack on a Christian village.



The most impactful event of the month, however, was the coup in Niger. Given
the current situation in the country, there is a risk that Western forces may
have to leave the country, and the repatriation ofWestern civilians
<[link removed]>
from the country has already begun. Niger was a target for both regional ISIS
affiliates as well as JNIM. The destabilization and increasing chaos caused by
the military coup will most likely result in increasing infiltrations of the
Nigerien borders by terrorist cells coming from neighboring countries.
Furthermore, the Wagner Group might profit heavily from the withdrawal of
Western and U.N. military personnel and peacekeepers from the region as MINUSMA
isdrawing down <[link removed]> its operations the
neighboring Mali, following the decision of theU.N. Security Council
<[link removed]> not to extend its mandate in
June.



Table 1: Claimed Attacks (December 2022 – July 2023)



Table 2: Claimed Attacks per Group (December 2022 – July 2023)



Table 3: Claimed Attacks per Country (December 2022 – July 2023)



Map 2: Spread of JNIM and ISGS in the Sahel (First Half of 2023)



Source: [link removed]
<[link removed]>



Attacks per Country



* Nigeria. As in previous months the highest number of attacks was claimed in
Nigeria. With a total of 18 claims ISWAP maintained a rather steady pace of
operations. As in previous months, most of the claimed attacks were of minor
scale and did not cause any significant number of casualties. However,
instability continues to expand in Nigeria. As before, ISWAP is not only
focusing its attacks on the Nigerian army and militia. The group also attacks
Christians, and in July, killed at least one. Another recurring target are the
so-called magicians, people accused of “sahra” or sorcery. Their executions are
continuously highlighted in ISWAP-linked online propaganda outlets in an
apparent attempt to spread fear among the general population.


* Mali. July 2023 witnessed a total of 12 attacks. The majority of these were
claimed by JNIM, and four incidents were claimed by ISGS. ISGS focused its main
operations on attacking JNIM forces as well as the Malian army and the Wagner
Group supporting the Malian government forces. In total, ISGS claimed nine
casualties, including an alleged spy working for the army and an alleged
sorcerer, who was, as usual, executed on the spot.


Source: Mali_2023-scaled.jpg (2560×1687) (africacenter.org)
<[link removed]>



The operations of JNIM in Mali are on a different level. JNIM took down a
Russian helicopter of the Wagner Group, attacked one of the Wagner bases,
claimed an attack in Timbuktu, and attacked MINUSMA forces. During an attack on
an army base in Mali, JNIM once again used a suicide vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device (SVBIED), demonstrating a growing sophistication of its
terrorist operations.



During July, the overall impact of JNIM’s operations in Mali was clearly
significantly larger than the operations claimed by ISGIS in the country. JNIM
attacks resulted in about 20 casualties, and the group was able to loot a
significant amount of equipment during its attacks.




In the coming days it will become clear to what extent Mali is supporting the
recent coup in Niger. The Economic Community of Western-African States (ECOWAS)
is threatening tointervene militarily
<[link removed]>
in Niger, while bothMali and Burkina Faso
<[link removed]>
have sided with the Nigerien putschists.



Map 3: Mali Supports the Nigerien Coup Together with Burkina Faso Opposing
ECOWAS



Source: [link removed]
<[link removed]>

* In Burkina Faso, a slight decrease of claimed operations was noticeable in
July. In total, 11 operations were claimed—nine by al-Qaeda’s affiliate JNIM
and two by ISGS. The impact of these operations was dramatic. At least 190
casualties were reported in some of the biggest attacks the country witnessed
since this reporting began in December 2022. According to the claims, on July
26 alone, around 140 Burkinabe soldiers were killed in three separate
operations by JNIM targeting the Burkinabe army. Furthermore, JNIM also claimed
that it was able to acquire significant amount of equipment during these
attacks.


* No attacks were claimed in Cameroon.


* Niger witnessed just three attacks claimed in July, with ISGS, ISWAP, and
JNIM each claiming one. In total, around a dozen casualties among army and
gendarmerie personnel were claimed during these attacks.


* Togo witnessed its first attack this year. The operation was carried out by
JNIM. Its fighters crossed into Togo from Burkina Faso, killing 12 Togolese
soldiers.
Table 4: Total Number of Claims






Attacks per Affiliate



ISGS



As in the past, online propaganda outlets linked to ISGS shared only a few
details of the group’s operations. However, given the opaqueness of ISIS
overall propaganda reporting outlined above, it is very likely that more
attacks were conducted by the group in July but not reported by ISIS’s central
media apparatus. In July, ISGS claimed just seven operations—four in Mali, two
in Burkina Faso, and one in Niger. All attacks were relatively low impact, with
the largest attack only resulting in four casualties. Two ISGS operations
targeted JNIM forces, and one attack involved forces of the Wagner Group. The
most remarkable operation occurred in Seytenga, Burkina Faso, where four
soldiers guarding a goldmine were killed.



Table 5: Number of Attacks by ISGS



ISWAP



In northern Nigeria, ISWAP continued to focus its operations on the provinces
of Borno and Yobe. Most attacks were directed at the Nigerian army or
supporting militia. One attack was claimed in Niger. ISWAP also attempted to
demonstrate its continuous efforts to implement its extremist version of Sharia
law in territories under its control and in an apparent attempt to terrorize
any potential local opposition, ISWAP propaganda also highlighted the execution
of two so-called magicians and an attack on a Christian village. All attacks
were of low impact, with the largest resulting in seven casualties.



Map 4: Yobe and Borno Provinces – Northern Nigeria



Table 6: Number of Attacks by ISWAP



JNIM



Nineteen operations were claimed by JNIM in July. Although this is a decrease
in the number of attacks claimed compared to June, the number of casualties
rose dramatically. In total, the nine operations in Burkina Faso, eight
operations in Mali, one in Niger, and one in Togo caused at least 215
casualties. Therefore, JNIM is developing into a highly impactful terror group
in the region. Not only does the group maintain a steady number of attacks
month by month, but the number of casualties caused by its operations has
increased significantly.



Table 7: Number of Attacks by JNIM



Conclusion



Even though the number of attacks claimed by JNIM-, ISGS-, and ISWAP-linked
propaganda outlets dropped in July, a significant increase in high-impact
operations occurred. In July, JNIM was responsible for the highest number of
casualties in the region by a significant margin. Overall, the security
situation in the Sahel is reaching a tipping point. After the French andMINUSMA
<[link removed]>
forces were driven out of Mali and Burkina Faso, the coup in Niger and the
potential withdrawal of Western forces from the country has the potential to
further destabilize the region.



The situation in Niger is highly precarious. The recent coup and the ensuing
chaos and violence in the country has been stronglycondemned by France
<[link removed]>
, theUnited States, and the United Nations
<[link removed]>
, as well as by theEuropean Union
<[link removed]>
. Furthermore, since the coup, rumors have spread aboutincreasing Russian
influence
<[link removed]>
in Niger, and clearly the coup leaders seem to favorRussia and the Wagner Group

<[link removed]>
as a new partner.



Tension is rising as ECOWAS has threatened to intervene in Niger if the former
regime is notreinstated by August 6
<[link removed]>
.Mali and Burkina Faso
<[link removed]>
back the coup leaders in Niger, and both are supported by the Wagner Group.
All indications are that the region will likely descent further into chaos and
instability, giving significantly more breathing room for JNIM, ISGS, and ISWAP
to expand their operations and territorial reach.



Source: [link removed]
<[link removed]>





###







Click here to unsubscribe.
<[link removed]>