Following is the July 2023 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria.





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In July 2023


Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In July 2023 by clicking here
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In July 2023
By Gregory Waters




Following is the July 2023 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2022 and 2021 can be found
here
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andhere
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The January 2023 edition can be foundhere
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, February’shere
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, March’shere
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, April’shere
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, May’shere
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, and June’shere
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. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also be exploredhere
<[link removed]>, here
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, andhere
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.



ISIS carried out at least 12 confirmed attacks in July in Homs, Hama, Raqqa,
and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 16 pro-Assad regime
soldiers and three civilians and wounded seven additional people. There were
also three high quality* attacks during July. Overall, ISIS activity increased
slightly compared to June, but stand in stark contrast to March and April, in
which at least 187 people died in 75 confirmed attacks in central Syria. High
quality attacks in July dropped compared to June, reflecting a generally more
passive month dominated by attacks utilizing mines and improvised explosive
devices (IED).



ISIS media took credit for two attacks in the Badia in July, while also
claiming <[link removed]> a July
27 IED attack in central Damascus. This was the second claimed ISIS attack in
Damascus City this year, and the third since September 2021, when the group
publicized its first attack in Damascus since being ousted from the southern
suburbs in spring 2018. The most serious attack in July came on the last night
of the month, when ISIS cells ambushed an oil tanker convoy on the highway
connecting Hama with Raqqa, destroying six trucks and killing five soldiers.
This was the first serious ISIS attack on a main highway convoy since January
2021. That attack and a similar one a week earlier in December triggered the
widespread regime operations that have significantly dampened ISIS activity in
central Syria since early 2021. This latest attack along Hama’s main east-west
highway follows several months of gradually escalating ISIS activity in eastern
Hama—as documented in ISIS Redux reports—mirroring in many ways ISIS’s
expansion in early 2020.



*Indicates an attack in Damascus City claimed by ISIS. Two additional IED
attacks occurred in Homs City in June 2023 that went unclaimed but were
suspected to be conducted by ISIS.



ISIS attacks dropped for the third month in a row in Homs (1), stayed stable
in Deir Ez Zor (3) and increased in both Hama (5) and in southern Raqqa (3). No
incidents were documented in Aleppo.



Deir Ez Zor and Raqqa



The number of ISIS attacks in Deir Ez Zor in April (18) was unprecedented,
more than in any month since the beginning of the insurgency in 2018. A
dramatic reversal was witnessed in May (4), June (3), and July (3). While most
of the attacks in these months consisted of mines or IEDs—which would generally
be considered a more passive style of attack—these incidents occurred within
Deir Ez Zor’s urban centers, rather than in the desert where ISIS traditionally
enjoys more freedom of movement.



On July 1, a member of the pro-regime Liwa al-Quds militia was killed by an
IED near Shoula. On July 13, an ISIS cell attacked security forces and
civilians in the Shumaytah Oil Field, just outside the villages north of Deir
Ez Zor City. The next week, on July 22, two members of the regime’s local state
security branch were killed in a small arms attack inside the nearby town of
Tabni.



Three attacks were documented in southern Raqqa in July, matching the total
number of attacks documented there between April and June. On July 16, two
pro-regime militiamen were killed by a mine or IED while driving along the
Resafa-Ithriya highway. On July 23, another regime soldier was reported killed
somewhere in southern Raqqa. On July 28, suspected ISIS militants attacked a
group of shepherds three kilometers south of Maadan. The attackers, which
witnesses described as using three motorcycles and two pickups, killed and
captured hundreds of sheep. One shepherd was kidnapped and later found
executed. The attack is similar to dozens of attacks on shepherds in eastern
Hama and western Deir Ez Zor in recent years.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Dier Ez Zor and Raqqa (highlighted) in July
2023 alongside all other attacks in 2023. Not mapped is one attack that
occurred somewhere in the Raqqa countryside.



Homs and Hama



April witnessed the end of the month-long regime offensive to secure al-Kawm,
the strategic village in northeast Homs. While documented ISIS activity
continued in this region through May and June, confirmed ISIS attacks in Homs
dropped significantly in July. The only confirmed attack in Homs occurred on
July 22, when four pro-regime fighters were killed by an IED east of Tuwaynan.
ISIS claimed this attack several days later, though the group’s statement used
exaggerated casualty numbers that appeared to be copied from opposition news
networks.



Most ISIS activity in July occurred in east Hama, where the group has
gradually been increasing its presence since February of this year. Mines and
IEDs continue to kill civilians and security forces alike. A civilian was
killed near Sa’an on July 5, while one soldier was killed and another wounded
by a mine near Tel Salama on July 8. Tel Salama has been a focal point of ISIS
activity in eastern Hama since February. On July 28, a child was severely
wounded by a mine northeast of Salamiyah, while on the same day an oil worker
was killed by an IED while exploring an oil field east of Uqayribat. This last
attack was claimed by ISIS on July 31.



Hama’s biggest attack occurred on July 31, when ISIS cells launched an evening
assault on an oil convoy traveling on the Hama-Raqqa highway near Wadi Azeeb.
Five soldiers were killed and four wounded in the fighting. Six trucks were
also destroyed. This is the most serious highway attack since the December 31,
2020 ambush of military vehicles near Shoula, Deir Ez Zor, and a smaller ambush
of an oil convoy a week later, also near Wadi Azeeb.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Homs and Hama (highlighted) in July 2023
alongside all other attacks in 2023.



Looking Ahead



Some new trends are beginning to solidify in ISIS’s 2023 Badia insurgency.
Activity in Hama continues to gradually grow following more than a year of
general malaise. Small arms attacks returned in February, followed by multiple
attacks claimed in June—the first such claims by ISIS in east Hama in two
years. The July 31 highway attack marked a further escalation. When ISIS first
expanded into eastern Hama in mid-2020, most of the attacks were concentrated
in the Tel Salama-Wadi Azeeb-Ithriya triangle—the same region now seeing
consistent ISIS activity. The gradual return to 2020-style attacks in this same
area this year suggests that ISIS has either re-activated or re-introduced
cells to eastern Hama and is placing particular emphasis on conducting
operations there. It should be noted that this area was—and possibly still is—a
keyfinancial hub
<[link removed]>
for the group.



In Deir Ez Zor, suspected ISIS militants continue to conduct attacks inside
the urban belt. While conducting only a small number of shootings and IED
attacks each month, the expansion into what was for years a secure area is
noteworthy. It is not clear, however, if this security issue will escalate into
anything that threatens governance structures. More likely, ISIS’s decision to
conduct attacks in these areas is indicative of a degree of general
infiltration that is more focused on human, financial, and supply smuggling
than direct confrontations.



Lastly, ISIS’s second IED attack in Damascus City since May should raise
concerns about the extent of ISIS’s infiltration in the city. This author has
long argued—based on conversations with regime officers overseeing anti-ISIS
operations over the years—that part of the ISIS Badia strategy was to
re-infiltrate Damascus and Homs cities. The IED attacks in the outskirts of
Damascus in September 2021 marked the first ISIS attacks in the city since the
group was ousted from its southern suburbs in spring 2018. May and July’s IED
attacks bookend two additional unclaimed IED attacks in Homs City, both of
which bear the hallmark of ISIS attacks in southern Syria. Altogether, the
gradual escalations in the Badia combined with the consistent IED attacks in
Homs and Damascus during the past three months may reflect a new strategy:
Maintain a low level of pressure on regime forces in the desert that enables
economic attacks (i.e. the attacks on the convoy and Shumaytah Oil Field) while
directing resources towards insurgent cells in urban centers.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in July 2023 alongside all other
attacks in 2023 (green for Quarter 1 and blue for Quarter 2). Not shown is one
attack somewhere in southern Raqqa. To view an interactive version of this map,
please clickhere
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.



*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.



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