[When questions are raised about militarism towards the Global
South, the liberal-to-left militarists will to resort to claims of
whataboutism, a mind-numbing concept which attempts to link opposition
to militarism with solidarity with Putin. ]
[[link removed]]

CAN LEFT PARTIES OPPOSE MILITARISM?  
[[link removed]]


 

Jonathan Michael Feldman
July 23, 2023
The Global Teach-In
[[link removed]]


*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

_ When questions are raised about militarism towards the Global
South, the liberal-to-left militarists will to resort to claims of
whataboutism, a mind-numbing concept which attempts to link opposition
to militarism with solidarity with Putin.  _

,

 

THE MILITARIST TURN OF THE LEFT

Sweden is a useful test regarding how vigilant left parties are in
opposing the militarism that props up mass murder, authoritarianism
and anti-democratic forces.  I argue that these parties’ efforts
are often vaguely well-minded, but grossly inadequate.  NATO
propaganda and “solidarity” with Ukraine has crowded out other
concerns.  Narratives about Swedish government malfeasance are
crowded out by a hard power nationalist juggernaut directed
by homegrown militarists
[[link removed]] and
elite apologists for the defense industry
[[link removed]]. 
Heroic opposition by such parties seems to have de-evolved into moral
pleading without sufficient political engagement.

The leading parties help shape the media space for all other parties,
often defining the boundaries on how much time, attention or focus
critics of society have.  Underlining all this is the alliance
between NATO and the Swedish military. Ola Tunander wrote an
important article [[link removed]] which
discusses a key foundation of these forces.  In “Swedish
Geopolitics: From Rudolf Kjellén to a Swedish ‘Dual
State’,” _Geopolitics_, Vol. 10, Issue 3, he described the
Swedish geopolitical scholar Rudolf Kjellén who “suggested that in
the twentieth century various empires would eventually force Central
Europe to unify into a bloc of states under the protection of a
powerful Germany.” Tunander said that this concept  “is also very
similar to what later became NATO, but now with the United States, not
Germany, as its central protecting power.”  Hans Morgenthau
described a “dual state” involving “a regular state hierarchy of
the nation-state versus a parallel security hierarchy, now linked to
the central power.”  After World War II, “Sweden, despite its
‘policy of neutrality’, was placed under the US nuclear umbrella,
creating a duality that typified Morgenthau’s idea of the ‘dual
state.’” On the one side was “the regular ‘democratic
hierarchy’” which on the other side “was confronted by the
US-leaning ‘security hierarchy’, with the latter intervening in
the event of emergency.”  During the 1980s, “the strength and
unpredictability of the Swedish Social Democratic government became
worrisome to the US security network.”  Today, NATO and the US help
control Western and European politics, with leading parties
subservient to or ratifying their militarist agenda.  Left parties
opposing these forces must oppose not only the hegemonic power of
national militarists, but also the global hegemonic power of the US. 
This power involves US media, US military actors, and global trade
relations involving the US, not to mention political exchanges with
the US typified by Swedish engagement in the Atlantic Council
[[link removed]].

Despite or perhaps because of these powerful forces, the left’s
engagement is also thoroughly inadequate, one reason may be that
asking critical questions yields little in a political and media
environment dominated by NATO preferences and those subservient to its
agenda.  A poll
[[link removed]] published in
July showed that _only 2.8% of voters_ in mid-to-late-June supported
the Green Party, although 8.7% supported the Left Party.  This
creates an environment in which “controversial” positions can be
thoroughly marginalized. They might not pay off with respect to many
voters’ preferences.  Messages that must be exchanged for votes
often involve the lowest common denominator because much of the media,
politicians, and the military “dumb down” understandings of
complex foreign policy questions (often assisted by academics or think
tank operatives paid for by the state).  Or, principled positions
might lead to political suicide. The Social Democrats, the party with
the most support at 34.1%, sidestepped NATO’s hegemonic power by
embracing entry into the alliance.  No political suicide required.

As many of us know, Russia is engaged in a vicious slaughter against
the people of Ukraine.  This recognition that some critics of Swedish
militarism have is devalued by supporters of the war after the critics
start asking questions as to why things came to pass.  The other day
I engaged in a social media debate with a former member of the Swedish
parliament about the role of NATO in triggering the war in Ukraine. 
I suggested that it was false to suggest that NATO was irrelevant to
triggering this war.  My views on this matter are based on reviewing
lots of material including one of the most important analyses of this
question by Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne in
Harper’s, _Why are We in Ukraine?
[[link removed]]_, in the
June issue. Andrew Bacevich at the Quincy Institute has made similar
arguments
[[link removed]] to
Schwarz and Layne.  Some argue that Biden and the US wanted the war
to try to effect regime change in Russia
[[link removed]].
I originally thought the person I was debating with was a Social
Democrat or perhaps someone in a right-wing party who I happened to
have befriended.  The politician stated: “Worth underlining:
Putin’s invasion of Ukraine had ZERO to do with NATO. The motive was
to expand Russia’s territory, to create a larger empire.”  I
tried to correct this misinformation but was told, that I had “a lot
of Russian propaganda” in my comments.  Russia may like to expand,
of course, but NATO likes to expand _even more_, _even faster_
[[link removed]]. The
counter-argument is that NATO represents the “free world,” and
“free choices,” but that’s belied by the railroading of
NATO which did not involve any deep or authentic debate in Sweden
[[link removed]] and the very
anti-democratic weapons transfers endorsed by the Swedish state (as
chronicled below).

What surprised me most was that this former politician has been
associated with Sweden’s Green Party, whose leading foreign policy
spokesperson is actually against Sweden joining NATO.  I have called
for decentralization of power in Russia
[[link removed]] and
expansion of democracy there.  It is self-evident that Russia is
engaged in a terrorist-like war campaign against Ukrainian civilians,
an approach which basically replicates what Russia did to Chechnya as
can be seen in photographic documentation
[[link removed]] published
by the National Security Archive. In any case, my exchange with this
allegedly “left” politician got me to wonder whether or not left
parties actually have a capacity to critically engage in foreign
policy questions.

In April of last year, Erik Pettersson, a reporter for _Syre_, one
of the few anti-militarist news outlets left in Sweden
[[link removed]],
wrote a rather important article
[[link removed]] touching
on this question.  He explained that Maria Ferm, the Green Party’s
foreign policy spokesperson, says the party would not change its mind
and would not support joining NATO. In contrast, Anders Schröder,
former defense policy spokesperson in the party, believed that Sweden
should join NATO.  The background to the party’s internal
deliberations is that while the Green Party has its roots in the peace
movement and has always opposed membership in NATO and Swedish arms
exports, its board nevertheless supported military equipment shipments
to Ukraine, including 5,000 anti-tank rounds.

I’ve tried to document the European left’s embrace of militarism
in various articles.  These include an analysis of arguments
published by  Daniel Marwecki and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation
[[link removed]], the
nominal anti-imperialist Gilbert Achcar
[[link removed]],
Daniel Suhonen who is a leading Swedish Social Democrat on the left
[[link removed]],
and as well as Swedish left parties’ embrace of the arms shipments
to Ukraine
[[link removed]].
In each case, moralistic short-term thinking has concealed the
Faustian bargain of allying with brutal militaristic forces triggered
and encouraged by the US warfare state. Sweden had the historical
opportunity to be a more critical third party force, pushing for
diplomacy. Instead, with the aid of part of its left, it decided to be
just another in a string of NATO satellites.

ARMS EXPORTS IN GENERAL

My engagement with one of the Green Party’s NATO champions, or at
least NATO’s version of the truth, led me to inquire as to what
aspects of foreign policy Sweden’s left parties are able to
consider.   Three critical issues now are that: (a) Sweden recently
authorized arms shipments to Turkey, (b) Swedish arms exports that
have ended up supporting the war in Yemen and (c) Swedish weapons have
endorsed and enabled the anti-democratic state in Thailand. 

The Green Party is generally against weapons exports
[[link removed]], aside from shipments to
Ukraine.  It has supported a stop of EU arms exports to dictators,
peace cooperation, work for global disarmament, and an ethical
requirement related to weapons exports.  In 2007, three Green Party
parliamentarians, Peter Rådberg, Bodil Ceballos, and Karla López
(with Max Andersson and Ulf Holm)  launched a parliamentary proposal
[[link removed]] Motion 2007/08:U230
entitled, “Swedish arms exports contribute to fueling wars and
conflicts.”   This important initiative is worth quoting at length
(translated as follows): “We must do our utmost to free our peoples
from the scourge of war which, in conflicts within and between
countries, has claimed more than five million lives in the last
decade.  This declaration was adopted in September 2000 by the
Millennium Summit organized by the United Nations. If Sweden and the
countries of the world mean what they say, there must of course be
consequences. Parts of the world are characterized by profound and
complicated conflicts, which often lead to war and gross violations of
human rights. The international arms trade is an important driving
force behind military armaments, and thus contributes to wars and
armed conflicts. Therefore, Sweden should work for a radical Swedish
and global disarmament, and for resources that are currently wasted on
military armor to be redistributed to efforts that can prevent wars
and conflicts.”

For its part the Left Party has stated
[[link removed]] that
in 2018 their party was the only one “that voted for an absolute ban
on exports to dictatorships, states that are at war or commit gross
and extensive crimes against human rights.” They also note that
“exports to dictatorships, states that are at war or commit gross
and extensive crimes against human rights are increasing with each
passing year” and they also sought “to tighten the rules for
importing, lending and renting military equipment.”  These concerns
are honorable, but without economic alternatives for the defense
industry
[[link removed]] reformist
proposals will likely go nowhere.  This was recently proven in the
case of Swedish government authorization of weapons sales to
Turkey, a case of disposable morality
[[link removed]] explained
in some detail below. The Turkish case revealed the Sweden’s attempt
to regulate arms exports resembled an empty promise and public
relations gesture.

Given left parties’ general platforms on arms exports and NATO, what
problems arise?  The key problem or limitation with the general
opposition is that foreign policy currents within left parties are
driven by the larger narratives shaped by competing parties, mass
media, and the focal points monopolized by militarists and their
experts attached to specific conflicts.  For example, the Green
Party’s website had 105 references to Ukraine
[[link removed]], in contrast to the Left Party which
had only twenty-six
[[link removed]]. 
As we will see, other conflict areas get less coverage.  It is
obvious that the brutal war, with its extensive damage and flood of
news coverage and matching political moves explains part of this
discrepancy.  Yet while right-wing and militarist apologists always
claim “whataboutism [[link removed]]”
when other conflicts are discussed, the problem is that the NATO
militarist push has crowded out narratives about such conflicts. And
some critics of US foreign policy argue that _there are virtues to
whataboutism
[[link removed]]_ when
it concerns comparisons between Putin’s actions and U.S. militarism.
 

In the Swedish case it is clear that the dominant media narrative
emphasizing solidarity with Ukraine, joining NATO, and the need to
sell weapons to Ukraine, have all drowned out other competing
narratives about Swedish transgressions against human rights in other
countries, which include Turkey, Yemen and Thailand. Therefore, it is
important to see how left parties treat these other conflicts and what
narratives they construct—if any—around them.  The militarist
tendency within the Green Party linked to Russia and Ukraine, clearly
shows one limit to generalist propositions about arms exports.  _The
political capital of anti-militarists on the left (or right for that
matter) are linked to the capacity to repeat narratives of
transgressions against democracy and human rights in specific
cases._  If such narratives are missing, the general position against
militarism will likely dilute and deteriorate.  Militarist critics
should not disarm themselves.  Let us see how two Swedish left
parties do in perpetuating alternative narratives related to just
three cases: Turkey, Yemen and Thailand.

TURKEY

Turning to the first case, the Institute for Strategic Products (ISP)
provides authorization for Swedish weapons exports. In a September 30,
2022 statement, updated October 3, 2022, the ISP announced
authorization of Swedish weapons exports to Turkey
[[link removed]].
This statement (translated below) reads as follows: “Sweden’s
application for membership in NATO greatly strengthens the defense and
security policy reasons for granting the export of military equipment
to other member states, including Turkey. With regard to the changed
defense and security policy circumstances, ISP has, after an overall
assessment, decided to grant a permit for follow-on deliveries from
the Swedish defense industry to Turkey. The permit concerns other
military equipment within the categories ML11 (electronic equipment),
ML21 (software) and ML22 (technical assistance)….The decision to
grant permission for follow-on deliveries to Turkey has been preceded
by consultation with the Export Control Council.”

The ISP decision came _about two weeks after the UN reported that
Turkey may have committed war crimes in Syria_ and reports a few
months earlier about Turkish attacks on civilians in Iraq. Levent
Kennez in an article 
[[link removed]]the _Nordic
Monitor_ (September 16, 2022) explains: “the UN Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic…in a
report published on September 14” referred “to mortar shells that
may have been fired from Turkey and several drone attacks killing
civilians at various times in 2022.” Another report 
[[link removed]]in _Middle
East Eye_ described a Turkish attack in August 2022 as follows: “At
least 15 civilians have been killed, including five children, and 30
others wounded in government shelling that hit a busy market and other
civilian buildings in the Turkish-controlled city of Al-Bab in
northern Syria.” 

The Green Party’s website [[link removed]] had
twenty-four references to Turkey, in one such reference
[[link removed]] they argued that Sweden
should not “adapt its foreign policy to the demands of authoritarian
states in order to become a member of NATO and that Sweden should not
start selling weapons to Turkey.”  The Left Party website
[[link removed]] had
twenty-eight references to Turkey. In one
[[link removed]] such
reference they pointed out, how “the party leader of the pro-Kurdish
party HDP and nine other parliamentarians were arrested in Turkey”
and condemned “Turkey’s undemocratic actions” and demanded
“that Sweden’s foreign minister immediately summons Turkey’s
ambassador and then acts to stop the EU negotiations with Turkey.” 
That was in 2016, however. In a later post
[[link removed]],
the party declared, “we do not want to see the government make
concessions to Turkey that go against fundamental Swedish values”
and “we will always stand up to that.”  

In sum, these parties correctly point out the limits to engaging with
Turkey and the human rights costs of doing so.  Yet, they offer very
few specifics about Swedish engagement with such arms exports, aside
from a moral condemnation.  In contrast to Ukraine coverage, the
Green Party appears circumspect.  An earlier condemnation
[[link removed]] by
the party of arms exports to the country is not followed up on in a
consistent way.

YEMEN

Turning to the second case, Swedish weapons have used in the conflict
in Yemen.  This linkage has been documented by Swedish television
channel TV4 and circulated by the Swedish Development Forum
[[link removed]] and
Vijay Prashad in _Salon
[[link removed]]_.
An August 13, 2019 report
[[link removed]] by
Thea Mossige-Norheim in _Dagens Nyheter_ identified various military
items linked to satellite images of the port Assab in Eritrea,
“strategically important for, among others, the United Arab
Emirates.” Images identified “patrol ships with a cannon made by
Swedish Bofors…ships from the Swedish company Swede Ship, armed with
cannons and missiles” and “also armed ships with radar systems
from Saab.” In 2018, Afrah Nasser wrote in _Open Democracy
[[link removed]]_ that
“despite the documented crimes of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen,
Sweden continues to sell arms to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates.”  Nasser noted that  “between 2010 and 2016, the arms
sales to Saudi Arabia was worth almost 6 billion Swedish kronor.”
Figure 1 identifies the pattern of Swedish weapons exports to United
Arab Emirates, which entered the Yemen conflict in 2015
[[link removed]]. By
the end of 2021, the war in Yemen was expected to have killed 377,000
[[link removed]].
In December 2022, UNICEF reported
[[link removed]] that
more than 11,000 children were killed or injured in Yemen. In 2021,
Sweden sent $80 million
[[link removed]] worth
of weapons (in 1990 US dollars) to United Arab Emirates; the
country pulled back from its military engagement in Yemen
[[link removed]] in 2019, but not
completely according to a February 2022 report
[[link removed]].

FIGURE 1: SWEDISH WEAPONS SALES TO UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

[[link removed]]

Source: Trading Economics
[[link removed]],
2023 using Comtrade Data.

The Green Party website had only five references
[[link removed]] to Yemen. One key reference (which
linked to an editorial
[[link removed]] by
Green party member Bodil Valero, the aforementioned Bodil Celabos)
argued that Sweden needed “to freeze its exports to Saudi and its
allies” and that the parties and parliament’s  EU Committee
“can and should immediately put the issue of a Swedish and European
arms embargo on their agenda.” Valero clearly made the connection
between human rights and Swedish arms exports.   Valero sponsored
the earlier discussed Motion 2007/08:U230
[[link removed]]. 
The motion stated the following: “Saudi Arabia is one of the
world’s most brutal dictatorships, and in its own report the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly criticizes the lack of respect
for human rights. It is not allowed to publicly criticize Islam or the
royal family. Political parties are banned and demonstrations are
illegal. In accordance with Shariah, corporal punishment is imposed in
the form of flogging and amputation. The death penalty is applied. In
2005, Sweden signed a far-reaching military cooperation agreement with
Saudi Arabia.”  Yet, ten years later (June 2015), Peter Eriksson
the former Green Party leader, criticized
[[link removed]] then
party leader Åsa Romson and others in his party  “for their
reluctance to call Saudi Arabia a dictatorship.”  In contrast, the
Left Party’s website had only one reference
[[link removed]] to
Yemen, which referenced refugees fleeing the conflict there.  There
was nothing about arms exports and Sweden’s role. The Swedish
Defence Research Agency (FOI) attempted to build a weapons factory in
Saudi Arabia
[[link removed]] starting
in 2007 but was exposed in 2012
[[link removed]] and thwarted.

In sum, the Yemen case shows a deficit in the Left Party’s
engagement on the Yemen question, at least as reflected in their
website. The Green Party’s Valero makes the essential arguments and
her efforts on Yemen seemed to have had wide coverage in .  But this
engagement does not appear to have been followed up on in a consistent
matter. Eriksson’s observations identify a clear de-evolution of
Green Party policies towards Saudi Arabia.

THAILAND

In 2007, the Green Party’s Motion 2007/08:U230
[[link removed]] stated
the following about Thailand: “Extrajudicial executions, capital
punishment, systematic discrimination against ethnic minorities and
migrant workers, and serious human rights abuses in the context of the
conflict in southern Thailand.”  Yet Swedish Arms exports to these
countries involved “robots, anti-tank weapons, torpedoes and more
for SEK 324 million.”

On October 18th of that year, _Dagen Nyheter_ published an article
[[link removed]] by
Torbjörn Petersson, “The Military Junta decides in favor of the Jas
Gripen” (_Militär juntan avgjorde till Jas Gripens fördel_), which
quoted then Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt as saying, “we welcome
that there is an interest in the Jas Gripen as it positively
influences jobs and the economy in Sweden.” A companion article
[[link removed]] by
Henrik Brors, “Again a flexible interpretation of export rules”
(_Åter en flexibel tolkning av exportreglerna_) explained that the
reasons for approving sales that went against the spirit of
legislation limiting such weapons was the crass interests of defense
companies, the view that if Sweden didn’t sell such weapons another
country would, and the need to balance for then military budget
reductions (as Swedish-based defense suppliers could compensate for a
decreased Swedish military budget by selling their weapons to other
countries).  The second item, the idea that Sweden does what another
nation would not do has had limits, however. On October 29,
2007,  Kittisak Siripornpitak
[[link removed]] in an article
[[link removed]] in _ScandAsia _explained
that Royal Thai Air Force sources  “suggested that Thailand was
close to a deal to replace its aging F-5Es with U.S. F-16s, but the
plan faltered due to U.S. rules governing the sale of military
equipment to countries whose governments have been ousted in coups.”

In his article Siripornpitak writes that Reinfeldt responded to
criticism of the sale by saying that the country was making
“constant progress” in a movement towards establishing
democracy.  Reinfeldt said then, “I accept that Thailand cannot be
classified as a true democracy, but rather as a nation that is moving
towards democratic rule…We must not ignore this development, and we
must be encouraged by its progression. We must also welcome
Thailand’s interest in Swedish technology.”  The pattern has been
that various democracy initiatives and movements helped dull criticism
of Thailand.  Yet, a country that is more democratic one day, can
easily be less democratic another day—particularly when militaries
are empowered.  These militaries have been empowered by
Swedish-government-sanctioned arms exports. In fact, in March of this
year, the Economist declared
[[link removed]] Thailand
to be “the most improved democracy of 2022.”  

This improvement was tenuous at best, short-lived at worst. Freedom
House classifies Thailand
[[link removed]] as an unfree nation,
noting the current regime’s use of  “authoritarian tactics,
including arbitrary arrests, intimidation, lèse-majesté charges, and
harassment of activists.”  In 2022, Amnesty International reported
[[link removed]] that
rights attached “to freedom of expression, association and peaceful
assembly came under renewed attack” in Thailand.  Refugees who fled
Myanmar “continued to face arrest, detention and extortion by Thai
authorities.”  In addition, “Malay Muslims in the southern border
arena remained subject to mass and discriminatory DNA collection.” 
Earlier this month, _The New York Times_ reported
[[link removed]] on
the country’s general election in May.  At that time, voters
“dealt a crushing blow to the ruling military junta” and supported
“a progressive party that challenged not only the generals but also
the nation’s powerful monarchy.”  In response,  “the Thai
military’s hold on the Senate blocked” the opposition party’s
leading prime minister candidate, Pita Limjaroenrat, and
“potentially” thrust Thailand “further toward autocracy.” 
Thailand faced what “looked like another intense period of political
unrest and nationwide protests.”

In 2023, a Human Rights Watch report
[[link removed]] watch
noted that in 2022 the Thai government “failed to prosecute members
of its security forces responsible for torture, unlawful killings, and
other abuses of ethnic Malay Muslims.” In a number of cases,
“authorities provided financial compensation to victims or their
families in exchange for their agreement not to speak out against the
security forces, and not file criminal cases against officials.”

In May 2023, Sui-Lee Wee reported
[[link removed]] in _The
New York Times_ that Pita Limjaroenrat “promised to undo the
military’s grip on Thai politics and revise a law that criminalizes
criticism of the monarchy.” Wee raised questions about whether this
leading opposition figure would be allowed to lead as he needed “to
gather enough support in the 500-member House of Representatives to
overcome a 250-member, military-appointed Senate.”  Yet, Swedish
engagements in Thailand have a slightly surreal quality.  In February
of this year, the country won the award for being the best tourist
destination
[[link removed]].
  In June of this year, the _Bangkok Post
[[link removed]]_ reported
that the Royal Thai Air Force planned to purchase three fighter
aircraft from Swedish military contractor Saab after the US government
had refused to sell Thailand F-35A fighter jets.  According to one
source cited by the _Bangok Post_, Swedish suppliers would “update
a radar system” used by the Thai Air Force.  Here again, Sweden may
end up selling weapons to Thailand to compensate what they can’t get
from another country.

On June 9, 2020, there was an announcement
[[link removed]] on
Saab’s system upgrades to the Thai air force. On July 7, 2021, Saab
proudly announced
[[link removed]] the
tenth anniversary of its sale of Gripen fighter jets to Thailand, the
company which also gave the country “a complete integrated air
defence system.”  Saab explains that it has been present in the
country “since the mid-1980s” and supplied “Carl-Gustaf infantry
weapons, Giraffe radars and RBS70 missile systems.” Saab’s Bangkok
office established in 2000 was part of Thailand’s plan “to
modernise its air defences.” In other words, despite the autocratic
tendency in Thailand, Saab showed its solidarity with the country’s
militarists.

In 2008, Hans Linde of the Left Party initiated a
parliamentary inquiry
[[link removed]] about
what initiatives the Swedish government intended “to take to ensure
that respect for human rights and democracy is guaranteed in Thailand
before a sale of the JAS Gripen to the country [was] completed?” 
Carl Bildt, then Foreign Minister, answered this inquiry by writing:
“The Inspectorate for Strategic Products, ISP, granted permission in
February 2008 for the export of the JAS Gripen to Thailand. The
decision was made after hearing the Export Control Council, which
consists of representatives from all [parliamentary] parties. The
basis for the assessment was the parliamentary-anchored guidelines for
munitions exports.”  He then used human rights language to
rationalize the arms sale: “In my own contacts with the interim
government installed by the military after the bloodless coup of 19
September 2006, I stated that respect for human rights and a return to
democracy were a necessity for our relations to return to normal. That
also happened. In conclusion, I can assure that we in the government
are doing what we can to ensure that human rights and the democratic
system are not compromised in Thailand.”

Bildt’s wishful thinking follows a standard formula where human
rights language is used to rationalize arms transfers to regimes which
have proven to be instable and revert to military control.  In May
2014,  Thomas Fuller reported
[[link removed]] that
the Swedish-supplied Thai military “seized control of the country”
and also “detained at least 25 leading politicians in a culmination
of months of maneuvering by the Bangkok establishment to sideline a
populist movement that has won every national election since 2001.”
This was “the second time in a decade that the army had overthrown
an elected government.” In a major expose
[[link removed]],
investigative journalist Nils Resare cited a source who argued that
the situation in the country “was embellished to the point that it
became possible to approve Swedish armament exports.” 
A_ ScandAsia_ report
[[link removed]] published
on June 2, 2014, explained that the military coup did not have any
“impact on the planned delivery of Swedish Gripen fighter jets with
supplies and support,” with the Thais then in possession of twelve
such aircraft. The arms exports regulator, Inspectorate for Strategic
Supplies,  believed that the coup was not so serious as to bar supply
of the aircraft.    Jan-Erik Lövgren, deputy director general of
the Inspectorate for Strategic Supplies, was quoted as saying about a
weapons ban, “no, not right now, but we are following this
closely.”   In 2006, Lövgren was elected
[[link removed]] as a member of the Royal Academy of
Military Sciences.

What kind of vigilance do political parties engage today in when it
comes to Thailand? On their web page, the Green Party had only four
references [[link removed]] to the country, but none
addressed the arms exports question. The Left Party had only one
reference
[[link removed]],
which did not discuss arms exports question.  So the Thailand case
reveals the biggest deficit in both parties’ approach to building
counter-narratives on Swedish malfeasance.

CONCLUSIONS

While both left parties oppose various forms of arms exports, the
engagement appears to have diluted in terms of _the force
applied _behind the opposition, particularly as concerns Thailand.
Politicians like Hans Linde and Bodil Valero represented an authentic
left anti-militarist commitment, yet Linde left the Swedish parliament
in 2017 and Valero left the EU parliament in 2019.  Today, both
parties endorse arms transfers to Ukraine and their willingness or
ability to speak out about arms exports is partially limited by media
and political indifference.

The absence of specifics by left parties is underlined by the absence
of any discussion about how to restructure the Swedish defense
industry, support its conversion to civilian production, and de-link
the Swedish military economy and foreign policy from the drive to
cooperate with its American and European counterparts. This
anti-militarist agenda is considered inappropriate because of the view
that Russian transgressions in Ukraine threaten Western Europe and
Scandinavia. This view has no substance whatsoever and is complicated
by various factors including: (a) NATO’s role in initiating the
conflict; (b) the fact that Western Europe did not feel its security
threatened by US transgressions in Afghanistan
[[link removed]], Iraq
[[link removed]] and Libya
[[link removed]] (three
episodes supported by Swedish military or defense industries),
(c) Nordic involvement in military exercises near the Russian border
[[link removed]] and
(d) the systemic aid which Sweden provided to Russia in the form
of massive oil imports after Russia slaughtered tens of thousands in
Chechnya
[[link removed].].
In 2003, Sweden even helped bomb Iraq
[[link removed]].

When questions are raised about militarism towards the Global South,
the liberal-to-left militarists will to resort to claims of
whataboutism, a mind-numbing concept which attempts to link opposition
to militarism with solidarity with Putin.  This move is aided by
Eastern European militarists who also claim that left critics of
perpetuating the war in Ukraine are “Westsplaining
[[link removed]].” This term reveals an
Eastern European form of _politically correct xenophobia_, ironic in
that many critics of NATO’s policies (such as this author) have
their ancestral roots in present-day Ukraine.   Solidarity with
Ukraine also appears to crowd out raising other issues.  This
solidarity is defined by the democracy which the Swedish state aborts
when it comes to the rights of Kurds bombed by Turkey, the hundreds of
thousands slaughtered in Yemen or democracy champions in
Thailand.  _Whataboutism_ is precisely what is called for. Those
who deploy this term as an epithet are begging the question and often
engaged in a militarist _feelgoodism_.

_Jonathan Michael Feldman specializes in research related to political
economy, disarmament, green economics and studies related to
democracy. He writes periodically for Counterpunch and xxxxxx. He is
an associate professor at The Department of Economic History and
International Relations at Stockholm University._

* Sweden
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* arms production
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* Militarism
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* Ukraine
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* Russia
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* Yemen
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* Thailand
[[link removed]]
* Turkey
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