This report is the seventh installment in a monthly series focused on al-Qaeda
and Islamic State operations throughout the Sahel. This report will focus on
operations claimed in the month of June 2023, where the general threat
environment observed during previous reporting periods continued. In total, 60
different operations were claimed by the various terrorist groups. Although the
number of operations did not rise significantly (only one more claimed attack
compared to May), the number of casualties did increase.





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CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring June 2023



Read CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring June 2023 by clicking here
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CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring June 2023

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen



This report is the seventh installment in a monthly series focused on al-Qaeda
and Islamic State operations throughout the Sahel. This report will focus on
operations claimed in the month of June 2023, where the general threat
environment observed during previous reporting periods continued. In total, 60
different operations were claimed by the various terrorist groups. Although the
number of operations did not rise significantly (only one more claimed attack
compared to May), the number of casualties did increase.



A notable trend is the continued increasing infighting between the Islamic
State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’
(JNIM) throughout Mali and Burkina Faso, where the Islamic State is trying to
push out the al-Qaeda affiliate, while JNIM targets the two countries’ armies
respectively.



In addition, in Nigeria, the Islamic State in Western Africa Province (ISWAP)
continues to wreak havoc in the northern provinces of Borno and the tri-border
area around Lake Chad. This increased violence is also spilling over to Niger
and Cameroon, which also experienced increased terrorist activities and attacks.


Attacks in the Sahel – General Trend



Since reporting began in December 2022, a gradual increase of the number of
terrorist attacks can be observed throughout the region. Currently the largest
number of attacks occurred during this year’sRamadan
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(March 23 – April 20). Should this trend continue, it is likely that the number
of claimed attacks per month will nearly double over the course of one year.



Another worrying trend is the impact of the attacks. Most claimed attacks were
of relatively low impact the last few months, but the casualty numbers are
rising steeply. This relates both to those claimed by terrorist propaganda and
the officially reported number of casualties. Another shift in operations
points to a more international focus rather than local. For example, the
conflict zone around Borno State in Nigeria is expanding towards Niger and
Cameroon. Similarly, JNIM operations have expanded from Mali into Burkina Faso,
where JNIM claims to have killed at least 45 Burkinabe soldiers and militia
members.



In June 2023, 32 operations were claimed by the regional affiliates of the
Islamic State, some of them with major impact and casualties. JNIM was
responsible for the remainder of the 60 attacks. As in previous months, ISGS is
not only the slowest in claiming its operations but also the least
communicative. Consequently, it is very likely that ISGS conducts far more
operations than its propaganda reports in any given month. Underreporting on
operations is as much a part of a terrorist propaganda strategy as is boasting
about rather insignificant events.



Table 1: Claimed Attacks (December 2022 – June 2023)



Table 2: Claimed Attacks per Group (December 2022 – June 2023)



Table 3: Claimed Attacks per Country (December 2022 – June 2023)



Map 1: Mali – Evolution in Jihadi Activity (2021-2022)



Source: Conflict Watchlist 2023: The Sahel (acleddata.com)
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Attacks Per Country



* Nigeria, again, suffered the brunt of the attacks, continuing the trend
from previous months. In June, 20 attacks were claimed by terrorist propaganda.
The overall impact of these operations remains low again, with few casualties
reported in most cases. However, major operations have been claimed, killing
nearly 60 Nigerian soldiers. The first high impact attack was claimed on June
4. On the previous day, ISWAP attacked a Nigerian army patrol that aimed to
reinforce the troops of the African Coalition MNJTF-forces (Multi National
Joint Task Force). After the initial attack, ISWAP used a suicide vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to kill nearly 20 soldiers. This seems to
be part of ongoing operations from both antagonists, as ISWAP advances towards
the area of Lake Chad, and the Nigerian Army and MNJTF coalition-forces try to
secure the tri-border area that is under continuous strain from ISWAP
operations and attacks.


On June 8, ISWAP released a picture, allegedly from the attack, praising the
suicide attacker Abu ‘Ali al-Ansari.




ISWAP is not only focusing its attacks on the Nigerian army and militia, but
they also claimed renewed clashes with Christians, killing at least eight
Christian villagers. Another recurring target are the so-called magicians.
People accused of “sahra” or sorcery are executed without any excuse.

* In total, 17 claims came from Mali. Two of these were by ISGS, and all
others were attacks claimed by JNIM and published in az-Zallaqa Media, the
JNIM-linked propaganda outlet. Following the withdrawal of French forces from
Mali in 2022, in part due to pressure by the Malian government, the United
Nations are also scheduled to leave. Following a passionate demand by the
current coup government in Bamako during the deliberations of the United
Nations Security Council in June that the United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) should leave the country,
the Security Council decided to not renew the mandate of the U.N. mission,
which ended on June 30. Consequently, all MINUSMA forces are expected to leave
the country by the end of this year at the latest and for theforeseeable future
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. This is already causing significant unrest throughout the entire region, with
a highly likely impact on Jihadi-terrorist presence throughout neighboring
countries. It is now feared that Mali will succumb further into the terrorist
quagmire—not only because of the absence of Western forces but also due to the
continued presence of theWagner Group
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in the country.


* A worrying evolution can also be observed in neighboring Burkina Faso. For
the second month in a row, around 15 operations have been documented. One
operation was claimed by ISGS, targeting JNIM and killing around 40 al-Qaeda
members. This attack was deemed so important by the Islamic State propaganda
that it made the front-page of an-Naba’ 393.


All other operations throughout the country, all small scale, were claimed by
JNIM.



The situation in Burkina Faso is becoming more dire by the week. As Michael
Shurkin described it forWar on the Rocks
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demise places its southern neighbors, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo in
serious jeopardy. These countries have already been the site of jihadist
attacks, and jihadists are using Burkina Faso as a safe haven. As a result, the
potential for jihadist insurgencies to take root in those countries is growing.”



* ISWAP claimed five operations in Cameroon, the highest monthly toll since
December 2022. Cameroon saw its first Jihadi terrorist claimed attacks this
year only in March, with only one claimed attack. All these attacks were low
impact with few casualties. However, given the current regional situation, it
is very likely that the Jihadi terrorist insurgency will increase in Cameroon
as well.


* Niger also began to experience the spillover of terrorist violence. In
total, four operations were claimed. One had significant impact in which a
Nigerien army patrol, advancing on Islamic State positions, was attacked. In
total, 16 Nigerien soldiers were killed or wounded in this one attack.


Table 4: Total Number of Claims




Attacks Per Affiliate



ISGS



In June, as in previous months, ISGS was very scarce in sharing operational
details through its propaganda outlets. Only three attacks were claimed. Two
low impact attacks with few casualties were reported in Mali, and one report
was released on a daring operation targeting JNIM. According to its own
reporting, ISGS killed at least 40 JNIM-fighters in Burkina Faso.



Table 5: Number of Attacks by ISGS





ISWAP



In northern Nigeria, ISWAP continues to focus its operations on the regions of
Borno and Lake Chad. These operations of ISWAP are part of the larger campaign
for control of the Lake Chad area. This includes operations targeting the
forces of Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon.



Table 6: Number of Attacks by ISWAP



JNIM



For the first time since December 2022, the number of attacks claimed by JNIM
exceeded 25, with a total of 28 claimed operations. Most attacks were conducted
in Mali, where a total of 15 operations were claimed. The rest of the attacks
occurred in Burkina Faso. The attacks in Mali were of relatively low impact
with few casualties, with two exceptions. On June 9, JNIM clashed with U.N.
forces in the area of Timbuktu and reportedly killed several U.N. peacekeepers.



The most impactful operations claimed targeted the Burkinabe army and militia
forces. On June 11, az-Zallaqa Media, the JNIM-linked propaganda outlet,
reported on an attack that JNIM forces had allegedly conducted on May 30,
killing 12 Burkinabe soldiers. On June 12, the group claimed that it had
conducted an attack on June 9, killing a total of 20 soldiers.



It is very likely that the situation in Mali and neighboring Burkina Faso will
quickly deteriorate as the Malian coup government succeeded in persuading the
U.N. Security Council to not extend the mandate of MINUSMA, with forces already
beginning to leave the country. Some security gaps left behind by the
withdrawing U.N. blue helmet forces will likely be filled by the Malian army in
cooperation with theWagner Group
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. However, it is likely that the overall security situation will most certainly
be exploited by ISGS and JNIM. It seems safe to state that both countries will
face an increase of Jihadi terrorist attacks in the coming months.



Table 7: Number of Attacks by JNIM



Conclusion



Unfortunately, the trend observed throughout the last months continues, and
the Sahel’s security situation continues to steeply decline. If the pace in
which terrorist operations and attacks have increased since the end of 2022
continues throughout the rest of 2023, it is very likely that by the end of the
year, the region will experience on average of more than 100 attacks per month.



Obviously, this is just a statistical model. It has not considered external
factors such as changing weather conditions, new deployments of security
forces, and increasing involvement of the Wagner Group that could both mitigate
or exacerbate the increasing security challenges the region experiences.

Nonetheless, what is clear is that the region experiences a sustained
evolution towards increased terrorist violence and control. At this point, the
overall situation in the Sahel is so precarious that further escalation is most
likely. Even more concerning, an increased number of reports indicate thatother
countries
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in the wider region are also being drawn into the quagmire and that insecurity
is spreading beyond the core operational areas of JNIM, ISGS, and ISWAP.



As a high-ranking officer at Belgium Defense puts it: “If we want to tackle
this, we need a lot more people and resources and a different approach to
development cooperation. We've been saying that for years, but it's not going
to happen. No people, no resources and development cooperations are still
giving money without questioning whether the money is being used effectively.
(…) This will come back to us like a boomerang. Extra migrants at the door if
the Sahel falls and extra attacks are unavoidable.”



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