[The war has gradually revealed Putin to be an ’emperor with no
clothes,’ which even his inner circle will soon be forced to admit]
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PRIGOZHIN’S COUP ATTEMPT EXPOSES PUTIN’S VULNERABILITY  
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Maxim Trudolyubov
June 25, 2023
Me
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_ The war has gradually revealed Putin to be an ’emperor with no
clothes,’ which even his inner circle will soon be forced to admit _


Putin declares Prigozhin, his protégé, a traitor. St. Petersburg
(the home city of both Putin and Prigozhin), June 24, 2023, Artem
Priakhin / SOPA Images / ZUMA Press Wire / Scanpix / LETA

 

There’s no doubt that Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin and his
“army” were Putin’s personal project. Otherwise, Wagner
wouldn’t have become involved in conflicts in Africa, the Syrian
war, or the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Without Putin’s
approval, Wagner wouldn’t have access to Russian penal colonies to
recruit fighters, and wouldn’t have been able to put their
advertisements up all over Russia. There would be no pictures of
Russian politicians holding sledgehammers
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by Prigozhin, and no law
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prohibits discrediting “volunteer” combatants, which make up a
portion of Wagner’s forces. That all changed on the morning of June
24, 2023, when the president was forced to abandon his strategic
ambivalence toward Prigozhin, and instead publicly denounce him as a
“traitor.”

Putin's political theory

A mercenary army led by a “nominal” commander is a natural element
of Putinism. Such a structure carries out the orders of the
country’s top leadership, but exists in a legal gray zone, operating
largely outside of the law. Putin considers this approach to be a
crowning achievement of governance and efficiency. Over the course of
Putin’s 23-year rule and due to his distrust of regular government
institutions, he has created quasi-businesses, registered
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the names of his friends and former servicemen. He has even created
entire quasi-states like the “DNR” and “LNR.” These tactics
have allowed him to enrich himself, while simultaneously giving him
the ability to disassociate himself from these endeavours at any
moment, if need be.

This political strategy is based on the assumption that people are
always under someone’s control and that their loyalty can only be
secured financially. Once one boss stops paying them, they’ll look
for another. If no one will pay them, they’ll stop working
altogether. Putin’s laws on “foreign agents,” “undesirable,”
and “extremist” organizations demonstrate this belief in the
fundamental lack of human autonomy, as such agents and organizations
are considered to be acting in the interests of his opponents.

Prigozhin, however, didn’t stop when he was cut off from his
resources and stripped of his autonomy. Perhaps, he felt cornered.
Those in power have long wanted Prigozhin out of the picture, but
Prigozhin understood that without a source of power, he would become a
criminal — both in Russia and abroad.

Prigozhin's political program

Realizing the circumstances he found himself in, Prigozhin began
building a public communications strategy that would eventually turn
into political activity. Prigozhin’s “agenda” has all the
elements of a radical populist movement. Dutch political scientist Cas
Mudde, a leading expert on the topic, describes
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agenda’s main elements: a rigid division of society into a “good
population” and a “bad elite,” a demand and promise to save the
nation, and authoritarian methods to achieve these goals.

Prigozhin’s populist (anti-elite) position
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obvious: generals don’t give out enough ammo, while the children of
elites frolic in luxury destinations and on social media. He sees the
elite as the cause of the army’s decay. While the army is the most
obvious example in his rhetoric, all of society is in trouble. The
elite must be put on trial in order to save the nation. Prigozhin
considers only authoritarian methods to be effective, such as a
general mobilization and the introduction of a planned economy.

It’s not clear to what extent this crudely constructed scheme
reflects his real views, which, generally speaking, differ little
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inner circle. But based on this agenda, Prigozhin has managed to mold
himself into a national opposition political figure within a matter of
months. Before the coup, it’s possible that his level of support
was comparable
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that of Alexey Navalny’s. If it were not for his brand of publicity,
Prigozhin would probably already have been murdered or put behind
bars. This suggests he has a certain amount of foresight.

It’s true that Putin has also infected the expert community with his
belief that individual figures are unable to act independently.
That’s why commentators have long wondered to what extent
Prigozhin’s accelerating departure was staged. Many (most likely,
correctly) believed that Putin needed Prigozhin to humiliate and
intimidate certain disgraced generals.

In January 2023, the Russian authorities outlawed Meduza, designating
our media outlet as an “undesirable organization.” In other words,
our newsroom’s work is now completely banned in the country our
founders call home. And Russian nationals who support Meduza can face
criminal prosecution. Today, Meduza’s need for support from people
across the globe — from readers like you — has never been more
important. Please, support our work [[link removed]].

The naked emperor’s political future

Despite it lasting less than a day, the “Wagner uprising,” which
grew out of this performance, is likely to deal a serious blow to
Putin’s power. The mutiny has demonstrated the vulnerability at the
core of Putin’s system of power. Prigozhin has just proven that it
is possible to seize a city of millions in Russia without firing a
single shot, and then move toward Moscow without meeting any
resistance. This may suggest that many of Russia’s security
officials and soldiers do not like their commanders, and will not risk
their lives for them. The confrontation ending in stalemate has not
changed anything in this respect.

For better or for worse, the rebellion didn’t last long enough to
discover to what extent Prigozhin’s radical populist ideas are
popular among Russia’s security services, which would have been
evident from the number of military personnel defecting to the side of
Wagner. In any case, Prigozhin has voiced his agenda, which will, in
one form or another, circulate further in society.

Prigozhin’s insurrection is another link in a long process
demonstrating the emperor has no clothes. Each such story almost
literally “exposes” Putin: it strips him of one of his many
“vestiges.”

The previous blow against Putin was in Russia’s Belgorod region,
when relatively small military units crossed the border, seized
populated areas, and then withdrew with impunity. This hurt Putin’s
ability to say his “special operation” posed no threat to
Russians.

The Russian army’s inability to solve large-scale combat tasks was
demonstrated to the whole world, as the myth of the “world’s
second army” and its leader collapsed with a bang. Putin’s
reputation was first damaged in the early days of the war, when it
became clear that he had been deceived about the state of affairs in
Ukraine and that he was unable to filter out unreliable information
— even as an experienced politician and a career intelligence
officer.

Prigozhin, however, dealt the most crushing blow to Putin. It’s now
clear that the president is unable to control “his” people, who at
some point may become a threat to everyone else.

It’s clear that the Kremlin will try to get rid of the remnants of
quasi-state structures like Wagner Group. However, the very existence
of Prigozhin’s “march” on Moscow proved the inadequacy of
Putin’s worldview, since he believed nothing of this sort was
possible. Destroying private military companies, of course, will not
fix that.

Interestingly, former politician Farkhad Akhmedov and Iosif Prigozhin
(no relation to Evgeny Prigozhin) predicted the current turmoil in a
leaked conversation
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They saw Putin as the reason they were losing money, power, and
opportunities to enrich themselves. It’s quite clear to them that
the entire system Putin created is in crisis, and that the seeds of
its decay are embedded within the system. However, they prefer to
publicly praise Putin and earn as much as they can. There’s an
understandable explanation for this, and it’s the only one that
still allows Putin’s system to stay afloat: once everyone recognizes
the emperor is naked, his court of hypocrites will be stripped bare
too.

_Maxim Trudolyubov is editor of Meduza’s Ideas
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_Translation by Ned Garvey_

_About Meduza_ [[link removed]]

* Yevgeny Prigozhin
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* Vladimir Putin
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* Russia
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