This fifth monthly analytical report based on open source observations of
Jihadi activities throughout the Sahel will focus on the most significant
events that occurred in April 2023. The month of April partly overlapped with
the holy month of Ramadan (March 23 – April 20).





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CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring April 2023



Read CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring April 2023 by clicking here
<[link removed]>.



CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring April 2023

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen



This fifth monthly analytical report based on open source observations of
Jihadi activities throughout the Sahel will focus on the most significant
events that occurred in April 2023. The month of April partly overlapped with
the holy month of Ramadan (March 23 – April 20).



During Ramadan, there is generally a steep rise in operations by Jihadi groups
worldwide. This year, however, the Ramadan campaign reached results that were
far from impressive. In the heartlands of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in
Syria and Iraq only a limited number of attacks occurred during Ramadan, with
15 attacks in March and 36 in April. These are less than a third of the attacks
claimed in Ramadan 2022 and amount to just 14.8 percent of attacks that
occurred during Ramadan in 2020. This trend is visible, not only in the
heartlands of IS but indeed throughout the majority of its worldwide Wilayat
(provinces).



Attacks in the Sahel – General Trends



In the Sahel, however, the situation is different. Although IS and its
affiliates in the region did not officially announce a global Ramadan terror
campaign this year via its social media channels, there was still a slight
increase in the number of claimed attacks during this time. In March the number
of claims rose from 41 to 52, while claims in May rose to a total of 68—an
increase of almost a third. Therefore, rather than an unofficial Ramadan
campaign, the increased attacks are part of a continuing trend of a rising
insurgency throughout the Sahel, indicating that regional destabilization
persists unabated.



Terror attacks by al-Qaeda’s branch Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’
(JNIM) and IS’s two branches—the Islamic State in Western Africa Province
(ISWAP) and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP, a.k.a. the Islamic
State in the Greater Sahel or ISGS)—all continued to increase during the past
month. TheSahel
<[link removed]> is
becoming a quagmire that is slowly draining most regional governments’
resources and capabilities. Several areas are slowly replaced by either Jihadi
groups, bandits, orWagner Group
<[link removed]> forces as the main power
broker. In an exclusive interview with Wassim Nasr for France24, Abu Obeida
Youssef al-Aanabi, the current leader of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), described the Sahel as the “epicentre
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” of current “Jihad.”



(Source: [link removed]
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During the reporting period, the following attacks were carried out:





Table 1: Attacks Claimed During Ramadan (March 23 – April 20)



It is remarkable that during the Ramadan period, not a single claim was posted
in the name of ISGS / ISSP.



Forty-eight of the 70 claimed operations during Ramadan are from ISWAP, with
the overall majority being relatively small-scale attacks in Nigeria (41).
However, there is one exception of an attack in Dikwa in which approximately 35
individuals, labeled as “spies” and “militia-members” by ISWAP, were reportedly
killed.



Four attacks were claimed by ISWAP in Niger and three in Cameroon.



Twenty-two attacks (also relatively small scale) were claimed by JNIM. The
majority of these operations were carried out in Mali (19), and only three were
attributed by the group to actions in Burkina Faso.



This statistic demonstrates that the region did not experience a significant
increase in terror operations associated with Ramadan campaigns by
IS-affiliates and JNIM in previous years. For comparison, below are the number
of IS attacks during Ramadan since 2020, as documented by French researcher
Damien Ferré.



However, the continuing trend of monthly increases in terrorist operations in
the region that is visible between the end of March and the end of April is
part of larger, long-term strategic operations by these terror groups. Their
aim seems to be to grow their operational intensity and continue to further
destabilize the region.



Attacks Per Country



* Nigeria experienced the highest number of attacks during the reporting
period.Thirty-nine out of a total of 68 claimed attacks in the region affected
targets within Nigeria. The majority of the claims refer to attacks in Borno
province. Generally, the attacks were of relatively low impact. Exceptions are
claimed attacks in Adamawa, Kirinowa, and Jigawa. In Adamawa and Jigawa, the
attacks targeted the local Christian population and reportedly killed 11
individuals. All attacks were claimed by ISWAP.


* In Mali, 17 attacks were claimed by JNIM. Most of these attacks were
smaller scale. However, two of the claimed attacks targeted high profile
targets. On April 18, Malian Chief of Staff Oumar Traore was killed in anambush
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. On April 22, JNIM attacked the airport of Sévare and the International
Airport of Mopti Ambodédjo, where, according tomedia reports
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, several Wagner Group fighters were based.


* In Burkina Faso, JNIM claimed five attacks on the Burkinabe army. None of
those were of any significant scale. Despite continued terrorist violence, some
civilians are now reportedlymore afraid
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of Burkina Faso’s security forces. They have been accused by the local
population ofextrajudicial killings
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and forced disappearances of a significant number of individuals that the
security forces claimed were supporters of terrorist groups. Given the
diminishing trust of the population in its security forces and the increase in
terrorist operations, it seems likely that theWagner Group
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will fill this widening security gap.


* In Niger, ISWAP claimed responsibility for five Sixteen Nigerien soldiers
were allegedly killed and at least 10 wounded; two others were captured.


* In Cameroon, two attacks were claimed by ISWAP, which allegedly left 11
soldiers dead.


Table 2: Total Number of Attacks



Attacks Per Affiliate:



ISWAP



ISWAP claimed the overall majority of attacks in the region during the
reporting period. In total, 46 operations were claimed by ISWAP in Nigeria,
Niger, and Cameroon. Most of these attacks targeted army forces and militia in
the Borno area. A few sporadic attacks were aimed at the Christian population
in the Adamawa and Jigawa areas. The overall impact of these attacks is
relatively low with a maximum of eight reported kills in a single operation.



Table 3: Total Number of Attacks Claimed by ISWAP



ISGS/ISSP



No attacks were claimed by ISGS/ISSP.


JNIM



Al-Qaeda’s affiliate JNIM claimed 22 attacks, all of which occurred in Mali.
The most significant attacks were the killing of the Malian chief of staff on
April 18 and a large-scale operation targeting the airport of Sévare, where
JNIM claimed to have killed dozens of Malian soldiers and Wagner Group
mercenaries.



Table 4: Total Number of Attacks Claimed by JNIM



Conclusion



While it appears that there was no official Ramadan campaign this year, the
number of terrorist operations throughout the Sahel continued to increase. This
trend is clearly discernible even though the daily monitoring of these attacks
for this project began in December 2022. This ever-increasing regional
destabilization presents a growing challenge not only for local authorities but
also for the wider region. The ambitions of JNIM, ISWAP, and ISGS/ISSP are not
geographically limited. Therefore, if the region completely destabilizes, there
will be spill-over effects for the wider African continent and towards the
European Union.



Table 5: Claimed Attacks, December 2022 – April 2023



Table 6: Claimed Attacks, December 2022 – April 2023 (per group)





Table 7: Claimed Attacks, December 2022 – April 2023 (per country)



Although almost all of these terrorist operations were of relatively
small-scale, the trend is persistent. Nigeria remains to be the most targeted
country in the region, as ISWAP claims operations there on an almost daily
basis. The majority of claimed attacks in April were indeed claimed by ISWAP,
with 46 operations were claimed in Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon.



Twenty-two attacks were claimed by al-Qaeda’s affiliate JNIM. Mali remains the
core area of JNIM operations. Among these, the most significant operations were
the killing of the Malian chief of staff on April 18 and a large-scale
operation on the airport of Sévare, targeting the Malian army and Wagner Group
forces.



The situation in the Sahel seems to be deteriorating from month to month.
Western forces are retreating from the quagmire. As of May 3,German troops
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in Mali, operating under command of MINUSMA, began withdrawing. France’s
withdrawal and the reduction of their activities in the region means that the
resulting security vacuum will be filled either by terrorist entities, Wagner,
or in some areas, both. The Sahel remains a powder keg, and the fuse seems to
have been lit—and the full impact has yet to be realized.



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