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[INSIDE JW]

Records Show EcoHealth/Wuhan Research to Create Coronavirus
‘Mutants’

[[link removed]]
Judicial Watch uncovered a smoking gun document on our
government’s entanglement in coronavirus “mutant”
gain-of-function research in Chinese labs.

Our team received 552 pages
[[link removed]]
of records that include the initial grant application and annual
reports to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) from EcoHealth
Alliance
[[link removed]]
describing the aim of
its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China to create
mutant viruses “to better predict the capacity of our CoVs
[coronaviruses] to infect people.”

These and other documents strongly suggest that U.S. funding in China
and elsewhere for mutant virus, gain-of-function research may have
been responsible for the emergence of the COVID pandemic in Wuhan.
This gain-of-function scandal should be the subject of criminal
investigations.

Judicial Watch obtained the records from the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request in December 2021 for:

> All reports submitted by EcoHealth Alliance to NIH or its
> sub-agencies related to NIH Grant No. 1R01A|110964 titled
> “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence” during the
> term of the grant.
Eco Health planned to sequence the spike protein from coronaviruses
obtained from bats for the purpose of “creating mutants to identify
how significantly each would need to evolve to use ACE2,” which is
explained as “the receptor to gain entry to human cells.”

Here are the details revealed in the documents.

In the initial “Application for Federal Assistance
[[link removed]
submitted on June 5, 2013, by EcoHealth Alliance, a section is titled
“Specific Aims
[[link removed]
which notes the intention to create mutant bat viruses and “predict
the capacity of our CoVs [coronaviruses] to infect people:”

> To understand the risk of zoonotic CoV [coronavirus] emergence, we
> propose to examine 1) the transmission dynamics of bat-CoVs across
> the human-wildlife interface; and 2) how this process is affected by
> CoV evolutionary potential, and how it might force CoV evolution. We
> will assess the nature and frequency of contact among animals and
> people in two critical human-animal interfaces: live animal markets
> in China and people who are highly exposed to bats in rural China.
“Specific Aim 3” discusses “Testing predictions of CoV
inter-species transmission:”

> We will test our models of host range (i.e. emergence potential)
> experimentally using reverse genetics, pseudovirus and receptor
> binding assays, and virus infection experiments in cell culture and
> humanized mice. With bat-CoVs that we’ve isolated or sequenced,
> and using live virus or pseudovirus infection in cells of different
> origin or expressing different receptor molecules, we will assess
> potential for each isolated virus and those with receptor binding
> site sequence to spill over. We will do this by sequencing the spike
> (or other receptor binding/fusion) protein genes from all our
> bat-CoVs, creating mutants to identify how significantly each would
> need to evolve to use ACE2, CD26/DPP4 (MERS-CoV receptor) or other
> potential CoV receptors.
In the continuing discussion of the aims of the research, the report
states:

> _In vitro_ [outside the body] cell lines & Humanized mouse model: We
> have developed primary cell lines and transformed cell lines from 9
> bat species using kidney, spleen, heart, brain and intestine. We
> have used these for virus isolation, infection assays and receptor
> molecule gene cloning. We also have a large number of cell lines
> from humans and animals that we will use for virus infectivity
> assays. We have obtained a letter of support from Dr Ralph Baric,
> who is keen to collaborate with us initially to infect his humanized
> mouse model with our bat SL-CoV [SARS-Like Coronavirus] that uses
> ACE2, and subsequently to use other CoVs that we identify …

***

> The results will provide information whether bat-CoVs could use
> known bat and human ACE2, DPP4 or other known CoV receptors to enter
> cells, and allow us to determine critical receptor binding sites,
> viral host range, and to better predict the capacity of our CoVs to
> infect people. [Emphasis in original]
EcoHealth Alliance’s $3.3 million grant to fund a project titled
“Understanding the Risk of Coronavirus Emergence
[[link removed]
was initially to run from October 1, 2013, to September 30, 2018. The
first “Project/Performance Site Location” is the Wuhan Institute
of Virology. Three other Chinese sites follow: East China Normal
University in Shanghai, Yunnan Institute of Endemic Disease Control
and Prevention in Dali, and the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention of Guangdong in Guangzhou.

On May 27, 2014, the NIH awarded EcoHealth Alliance $3,086,735
[[link removed]]
over five years for “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus
Emergence.”

An EcoHealth Alliance grant application, received by the NIH on June
5, 2013, includes a list of “Senior/Key Personnel
[[link removed]
including Shi Zhengli
[[link removed]]
and Zhang Yun-Zhi of the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV); Peter
Daszak, CEO of EcoHealth Alliance; and other Chinese scientists,
including Ke Changwen of the Chinese “CDC and Prevention of
Guangdong Province.”

A section of the EcoHealth Alliance application titled “EcoHealth
Alliance Budget Justification
[[link removed]
describes some of the work to be conducted by EcoHealth scientists in
China:

> A research scientist will be hired at 12 months time per year to
> provide direct assistance and oversight of field activities in
> China; maintain equipment and logistics; and coordinate animal and
> human sample shipment to the labs in China and in the US.

***

> Once we secure IRBs [Institutional Review Boards] for human sampling
> in Y1 [Year 1], we will hire three medical officers from China
> provincial CDCs [Centers for Disease Control] as consultants to work
> in Guangxi, Hunan, and Fujian during Y2-Y5. These medical officers
> will be responsible for IRB approved human sampling as well as
> maintaining cold chain for storage and shipping samples.

***

> Dr. Zhengli Shi, Senior Virologist. [Redacted] per year in Y1 -Y5.
> Dr. Shi will oversee the coronavirus screening for all samples
> collected in China. She will work with the PI [Principal
> Investigator], Co-Investigators, and Senior/Key Personnel to analyze
> data and write manuscripts. She will also coordinate data and
> material sharing with the co-investigators.
In a budget calculation for the year 2014-15
[[link removed]],
the Wuhan Institute of Virology as a sub-awardee of the grant was
allocated to receive $128,718 in direct costs and $10,297 in indirect
costs from NIH. The salaries of Shi Zhengli and a Wuhan Institute of
Virology colleague Ge Xingyl are redacted from the budget. Over the
five years of the grant, the Wuhan lab was to receive $749,976.

A section of the grant award titled “Wuhan Institute of Virology
Budget Justification, Subaward” discusses “Other Direct Costs
[[link removed]


> RNA Extractions
>
> We will be running RNA extractions for 1,000 bats per year (three
> sample per bat: oral, anal, and blood) in each year … Extracted
> RNA per animal will be pooled.

***

> DNA Sequencing
>
> In each year of the project, DNA sequencing will be performed on
> 3,200 samples at a cost of $2.91 per reaction….

> Laboratory Supplies
>
> We request support for in vitro infection experiments using
> pseudoviruses carrying the spike proteins (wild type or mutants) or
> live viruses in cell lines of different origins, binding affinity
> assays between the spike proteins (wild types or mutants) and
> different cellular receptor molecules, and humanized mouse
> experiments.
The Year 2 annual report
[[link removed]]
for the bat coronavirus project, budget period June 1, 2016, to May
31, 2017, under “Specific Aim 3
[[link removed]
states:

> Testing predictions of CoV inter-species transmission. The following
> experiments will be undertaken in Year 2:
>
> * Humanized mice with human ACE2 receptors will be infected with
> WIV1 and the two rescued chimeric SARS-like coronaviruses to
> determine the tissue tropism and pathogenicity of bat SL-CoV.
> * Isolation of novel bat coronaviruses. Live virus or pseudovirus
> will be used to infect cells of different origin or expressing
> different receptor molecules. Spillover potential for each isolated
> virus will be assessed.
> * An infectious clone of full-length MERS-CoV [Middle East
> Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus] will be constructed using reverse
> genetic method. Using the S [spike] sequence of different
> MERS-related viruses identified from Chinese bats, the chimeric
> viruses with S gene of bat MERS-related coronaviruses and backbone
> of the infectious clone of MERS-CoV will be constructed to study the
> receptor usage and infectivity of bat MERS-related coronaviruses.
Among the “Additional Year 2 items for Specific Aim 3
[[link removed]
are:

* The infectious clone of WIV1 was successfully constructed using
reverse genetic methods;
* Two chimeric bat SARS-like coronavirus strains were constructed by
replacing the S [spike] gene in the backbone of WIV1;
* Permission to import mice with human ACE2 to China was obtained,
so as to conduct the experimental infections proposed in our R01
specific aims.

The annual report
[[link removed]]
submitted for Year 3 of the grant project, budget period June 1, 2017,
to May 31, 2018, under the heading “Specific Aim 3: Testing
predictions of CoV inter-species transmission
[[link removed]
notes:

> In Year 3, we successfully isolated Rs4874 from the single [bat]
> fecal sample. Using the reverse genetic system we previously
> developed, we constructed two chimeric viruses with the WIV1
> backbone replaced with the S [spike] gene of Rs7327 and Rs4231,
> respectively. Vero E6 cells were respectively infected with Rs4874,
> WIV1-Rs4231S and WIV1-Rs7327S, and efficient virus replication was
> detected by immunofluorescence assay in all infections. To assess
> the usage of human ACE2 by the three novel SL-CoVs, we conducted
> virus infectivity studies using HeLa cells with or without the
> expression of human ACE2. All viruses replicated efficiently in the
> human ACE2-expressing cells.
In the Year 4 annual report
[[link removed]],
budge period June 1, 2018, to May 31, 2019, submitted to NIH by
EcoHealth on September 16, 2020, in answer to the question “How Have
the Results Been Disseminated to Communities of Interest,” the
report details that Peter Daszak and WIV lab director Shi Zhengli
briefed their findings
[[link removed]]
to, among others, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), the National Natural Science Foundation of China, the Chinese
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Chinese Academy of
Sciences.

Among the accomplishments listed in the Year 4 report is: “_In vivo_
[experimentation done in a whole organism] infection of SARSr-CoVs
with variants of S [spike] protein in human ACE2
[[link removed]]
(hACE2) expressing mice.”

The report also includes information about the construction of viruses
of “varying pathogenicity
[[link removed]
and testing them on humanized mice:

> Using the reverse genetic methods we previously developed,
> infectious clones with the WIV1 [bat SARS-like coronavirus] backbone
> and the spike protein of SHC014, W IV16 and Rs4231, respectively,
> were constructed and recombinant viruses were successfully rescued.
> In Year 4, we performed preliminary in vivo infection of SARSr-CoVs
> on transgenic mice that express hACE2. Mice were infected with 105
> pfu of full-length recombinant virus of W IV1 (rWIV1) and the three
> chimeric viruses with different spikes. Pathogenesis of the 4
> SARSr-CoVs was then determined in a 2-week course. Mice challenged
> with rWIV1-SHC014S have experienced about 20% body weight loss by
> the 6th day post infection, while rWIV1 and rWIV-4231 S produced
> less body weight loss. In the mice infected with rWIV1 -WIV16S, no
> body weight loss was observed (Fig. 35a). 2 and 4 days post
> infection, the viral load in lung tissues of mice challenged with
> rWIV1-SHC014S, rWIV1-WIV16S and rWIV1-Rs4231 S reached more than 106
> genome copies/g and were significantly higher than that in
> rWIV1-infected mice (Fig. 35b). These results demonstrate varying
> pathogenicity of SARSr-CoVs with different spike proteins in
> humanized mice.
In a revised award
[[link removed]]
dated July 13, 2020, the NIH granted additional funds
[[link removed]],
including $77,750 to the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill,
$76,301 to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and $75,600 to the
Institute of Pathogen Biology of China.

The 2020 renewal application
[[link removed]]
to extend funding for the Wuhan bat research projects states that
EcoHealth would not be working with “select agents
[[link removed]
(severe
threats), such as SARS-CoV, but rather with a SARSr-CoV molecular
clone designated WIV1 which, while a “BSL3” (biosafety level 3)
pathogen, was not considered a select agent.

The select agent research was to be conducted at Ralph Baric’s lab
at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.

A section titled “P3CO Research” notes:

> IMPORTANTLY, WE ARE NOT PROPOSING TO GENETICALLY MANIPULATE SARS-COV
> over the course of this proposal. [Emphasis in original] However, we
> are proposing to genetically manipulate the full length bat
> SARSr-CoV WIV1 strain molecular clone during the course of this
> proposal, which is not a select agent, has not been shown to cause
> human infections, and has not been shown to be transmissible between
> humans.
The same 2020 renewal application states
[[link removed]
“This project is a multi-institutional collaboration led by
EcoHealth Alliance, New York (Daszak, PI), which will subcontract
funds to three institutions: the Wuhan Institute of Virology (Dr.
Shi), the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Dr. Baric), and
the Institute of Pathogen Biology (Dr. Ren).”

These documents are all an incredible confirmation of the dangerous
and reckless experiments that were using your tax dollars both in
China and here in the U.S. And, even worse, they are powerful
circumstantial evidence that this mutant gain of function research led
to the deadly pandemic. More documents are coming, but Congress and
other appropriate authorities can’t act soon enough to follow up on
this scandal that is deadly beyond measure.

BIDEN JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REFUSES TO REVEAL NAMES OF SPECIAL
COUNSEL’S STAFF

The Department of Justice is brazenly refusing
[[link removed]]
to release the names of staffers working in Special Counsel Jack
Smith’s office in two investigations targeting former President
Donald Trump and other Americans.

On December 9, 2022, we filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request for:

> All staff rosters, phone lists, or similar records depicting all
> employees hired by or detailed to the office of Special Counsel Jack
> Smith.
The Justice Department responded on April 12, stating that records
responsive to our request had been located, but were being withheld
“pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(A)” of FOIA:

> Exemption 6 pertains to information the release of which would
> constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
> Exemption 7(A) pertains to records or information compiled for law
> enforcement purposes, the release of which could reasonably be
> expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.
We can only conclude, after seeing the uproar over the anti-Trump,
partisan Mueller operation, that the Garland Justice Department has
something to hide about Jack Smith and his prosecutors again targeting
Trump and other Republicans with unprecedented investigations.

Special Prosecutor Jack Smith isn’t above the law and the American
people have the right to basic transparency and accountability.

Attorney General Merrick Garland appointed Smith
[[link removed]]
in November to take over two investigations involving Trump, who is
running for president in 2024.

The first investigation involves Trump’s handling of classified
documents he retained at his Mar-a-Lago, Florida residence after
leaving the White House in January 2021.

The second investigation regards Trump’s challenge of the 2020
presidential election results, which allegedly included a plan to
submit separate slates of electors to block Congress from certifying
Democrat Joe Biden’s victory.

Previous Judicial Watch and other investigations of Special Counsel
Robert Muller’s investigative team highlighted anti-Trump bias and
partisan hiring. FBI official Peter Strzok was secretly removed from
Mueller’s team after anti-Trump and political text messages were
uncovered. Through FOIA, Judicial Watch has uncovered many records
regarding the Mueller team.

In May 2019, DOJ records
[[link removed]]
included text messages and calendar entries of Mueller special counsel
prosecutor Andrew Weissmann showing he led the hiring effort for the
investigation that targeted President Trump. (Weissmann was formerly
the Obama-era chief of the Justice Department’s Criminal Fraud
Section.)

Weissman’s calendar shows that he began interviewing people for
investigator jobs on the Mueller operation almost immediately after it
was announced that he had joined the team in early June.

On June 5, 2017, he interviewed
[[link removed]]
former Chief of the Public Corruption Unit of the U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the Southern District of New York Andrew Goldstein
[[link removed]].
Goldstein was a _Time_ magazine reporter. Goldstein contributed a
combined $3,300
[[link removed]]
to Obama’s campaigns in 2008 and 2012. His wife, Julie Rawe, was a
reporter and editor for _Time_ for 13 years, until 2013. He became a
lead prosecutor for Mueller.

The next day, on June 6, 2017, Weissmann had a meeting with “FARA
[Foreign Agents Registration Act] counsel.”

Weissmann interviewed
[[link removed]]
another prosecutor, Kyle Freeny
[[link removed]],
from the DOJ Money Laundering Section for the team on June 7, 2017.
She contributed
[[link removed]]
a
total of $500 to Obama’s presidential campaigns and $250 to Hillary
Clinton’s. She was later detailed to the Mueller investigation.

He interviewed
[[link removed]]
a trial attorney who worked with him in the Criminal Fraud Section,
Rush Atkinson
[[link removed]],
on June 9, 2017. Records show that Atkinson donated $200
[[link removed]]
to Clinton’s campaign in 2016. He is a registered Democrat and
contributed $200
[[link removed]]
to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 campaign. Atkinson also became part of the
Mueller team.

Weissmann interviewed
[[link removed]]
DOJ Deputy Assistant Attorney General Greg Andres
[[link removed]]
for the team on June 13, 2017. Andres donated
[[link removed]]
$2,700 to the campaign for Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) in 2018
and $1,000 to the campaign for David Hoffman (D) in 2009. Andres is a
registered Democrat. His wife, Ronnie Abrams
[[link removed]],
a U.S. district
judge in Manhattan, was nominated to the bench in 2011 by Obama. He
joined the Mueller team in August 2017.

HEARING FOR MOTHER WHO REQUESTED SCHOOL BOARD COVID RECORDS

We were in court this week on behalf of Megan Brock, a parent being
sued by Bucks County, PA, to prevent the release of documents she
requested under the commonwealth’s Right-to-Know Law related to
COVID restrictions and the re-opening of the county’s schools.

The hearing was before Judge Denise Bowman in Doylestown, PA, in the
case
[[link removed]]
(_County of Bucks v. Megan Brock_
[[link removed]]
(No. 2022-02979)).

Bucks County filed multiple suits against Brock to prevent the release
of the documents after the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records found
in Brock’s favor and ordered Bucks County to search for and release
the documents in two Right-to-Know Law requests.

Brock sent a February 7, 2022, request asking for all electronic
correspondence by Bucks Co. Director of Policy and Communications
[[link removed]]
Eric Nagy with Board
Vice Chair
[[link removed]]
Diane
Ellis-Marseglia, Board Chair
[[link removed]]
Bob Harvie, former Director of the Commissioners’ Office of Public
Information
[[link removed]]
Larry
King, Chief Clerk
[[link removed]]
Gail
Humphrey, and Health Department Director
[[link removed]]
David Damsker from
8/10/2021 to 8/28/2021, on the buckscounty.gov
[[link removed]]
domain. Also, all communications about Bucks
County Health Department School Guidance.

A March 8, 2022, request asks for a copy of an email sent to Acting
Chief Operating Officer
[[link removed]]
Margaret McKevitt
on 8/23/2021 on the buckscounty.gov
[[link removed]]
domain,
which contained the final copy of the Bucks County COVID-19 Amended
School Guidance, including all responses.

FBI STONEWALLS PUBLIC RECORD REQUEST INVOLVING CHINESE POLICE STATION
IN NY

The story of Chinese police stations operating in our country is
coming out now, but not because the FBI is willing to talk about it.
The agency knew about such a station in New York but told us it
didn’t. We’re not surprised. Our _Corruption Chronicles_ blog
explains.
[[link removed]]


> The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) misled and stonewalled
> Judicial Watch on a legitimate public record request involving an
> illegal Chinese police station opened in New York by agents of
> China’s communist government. The outpost is the first in the
> United States operated on behalf of the Fuzhou branch of the
> Ministry of Public Security (MPS) of the People’s Republic of
> China (PRC) and was surreptitiously established in an office
> building in Manhattan’s Chinatown to intimidate Chinese dissidents
> living in this country.
>
> Back in October 2022 Judicial Watch filed a Freedom of Information
> Act (FOIA) request
>
[[link removed]]
with the FBI
> for records concerning the foreign police station which was operated
> by two Chinese men who live in New York, federal authorities
> recently confirmed. The men, 61-year-old Harry Lu Jianwang of the
> Bronx and 59-year-old Chen Jinping of Manhattan, were arrested this
> week and charged
>
[[link removed]]
> with conspiring to act as agents of the PRC government as well as
> obstructing justice by destroying evidence of their communications
> with an MPS official. “The PRC, through its repressive security
> apparatus, established a secret physical presence in New York City
> to monitor and intimidate dissidents and those critical of its
> government,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of
> the Justice Department’s National Security Division. An assistant
> director of the FBI’s counterintelligence division also said this
> week that the case serves as a powerful reminder that China will
> stop at nothing to bend people to its will.
>
> It was not the FBI’s first public acknowledgement of the illicit
> Chinese police station in the Big Apple. In mid-November of last
> year FBI Director Christopher Wray told a congressional committee
> that his agency was investigating
>
[[link removed]]
> an unauthorized police station run by China in New York as part of a
> chain in major cities around the world. A Spanish-based human rights
> group had just disclosed that China has dozens of overseas police
> service stations globally and lawmakers asked Wray about it during a
> Senate Homeland Security Committee hearing. The FBI director
> affirmed he was aware of the existence of the stations and that it
> is outrageous to think the Chinese police would attempt to set up
> shop in New York. He also said the Chinese station “violates
> sovereignty and circumvents standard judicial and law enforcement
> cooperation processes.”
>
> The FBI has since recognized that it conducted a search of New
> York’s Chinese police station in October 2022 and that agents
> interviewed the defendants and seized their phones. “In reviewing
> the contents of these phones, FBI agents observed that
> communications between Lu and Chen, on the one hand, and the MPS
> Official, on the other, appeared to have been deleted,” according
> to a statement issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ). “In
> subsequent consensual interviews, Lu and Chen admitted to the FBI
> that they had deleted their communications with the MPS Official
> after learning about the ongoing FBI investigation, thus preventing
> the FBI from learning the full extent of the MPS’s directions for
> the overseas police station.” The feds knew that Lu had a
> longstanding relationship of trust with Chinese law enforcement and
> that he was tasked with carrying various activities including to
> assist the PRC government’s repressive activities in the U.S.
>
> Nevertheless, the FBI wrongfully rejected Judicial Watch’s
> detailed public record request, denying the existence of any
> information involving the Chinese police station in Manhattan. In a
> November 18, 2022 response
>
[[link removed]
Judicial
> Watch’s October filing the agency outright claims it has no
> records. “Based on the information you provided, we conducted a
> main and reference entity record search of the Central Records
> System (CRS) per our standard search policy,” the FBI writes in
> its response. “However, we were unable to identify records subject
> to the FOIPA that are responsive to your request. Therefore, your
> request is being closed.” The document is signed by Michael G.
> Seidel, who is identified as the section chief of the
> Record/Information Dissemination Section of the Information
> Management Division.
>
> Like most government agencies the FBI is rarely forthcoming with
> records, which forces Judicial Watch to sue in federal court for
> information that should be available to the public under the law.
> The FBI even took advantage of the pandemic, using it as an excuse
> to withhold information by shutting down its electronic public
> records operations
>
[[link removed]
> a time when mandatory social distancing forced Americans and federal
> government employees to telework.

Until next week...






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