[ The protests roiling Israel represent a struggle over its
future. The traditional elite is in an existential fight to maintain
power, while the ascendant religious-nationalist majority seeks to
redefine the state.]
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WHY THE MAIN PLAYERS BEHIND THE ISRAELI PROTEST MOVEMENT ARE BRINGING
THE CONFRONTATION TO A HEAD  
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Razi Nabulse
March 27, 2023
Mondoweiss
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_ The protests roiling Israel represent a struggle over its future.
The traditional elite is in an existential fight to maintain power,
while the ascendant religious-nationalist majority seeks to redefine
the state. _

A protester in military paraphernalia shouts slogans during a mass
anti-government protest following Benjamin Netanyahu’s dismissal of
Defense Minister Yoav Galant., Photo: Ilia Yefimovich/DPA / Zuma Press
// Mondoweiss

 

Any Palestinian following the developments in the Israeli protest
movement against “the judicial coup” will require nerves of steel
to withstand the hypocrisy on display. The protests are estimated to
be 100,000 people strong, politicians are jumping over tables in the
Knesset, and former army Chief of Staff Yair Golan is calling for a
state of “civil disobedience.” Only yesterday,
Netanyahu dismissed Defense Minister Yoav Gallant
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he voiced opposition to the judicial reforms, and angry protestors
took to the streets in Tel Aviv and other cities and shut down
highways. The army has been going through its own crisis ever since
military reservists, especially those in the Air Force, joined the
protests. If that wasn’t enough, large sums of money are being
transferred out of Israeli banks for fear of the effects that the
judicial reforms might have on the Israeli economy and on the value of
the Israeli Shekel. As for gall, that was hardly in short supply in
Yuval Noah Harari’s op-ed telling Netanyahu to “stop your coup or
we’ll stop the country
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It’s as if Harari has never heard of al-Issawiyya, which continues
to be strangled by the Hebrew University where he teaches, or of
oppression and occupation, which wasn’t reason enough to warrant
speaking of halting the state.

The Israeli government is trying to use these judicial reforms to
grant itself absolute power through the passing of two central laws.
The first law aims to establish control over the Israeli Judicial
Selection Committee, hence appointing judges whose loyalties would lie
with specific politicians rather than with the law; and the second law
is the “Override Clause,” which would allow the Knesset to
override any decision of the Israeli High Court of Justice that passes
by a majority of 61 Knesset members. In other words, the government
would seize complete control over the state
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and balances, effectively becoming the sole governing authority in the
country given that it also controls the Knesset by virtue of its
majority within the parliamentary body. 

All of this is taking place without a constitution. This means, for
instance, that the government can decide to hold elections once every
ten years instead of the standard four-year limit still in effect, and
no one can override it; or it could pass laws granting the government
total control over the media, or it could put LGBTQ people in jail.
But the true crisis will emerge when the Israeli High Court of Justice
repeals the judicial reforms and regards them as illegal — that is
when the state will enter a constitutional crisis without a
solution. 

Who will the Israeli security apparatus obey: the government or the
judiciary? This isn’t merely a crisis of the state; it is far more
profound, posing the question of what the state _is_ in the first
place. Former commander of the Israeli Air Force Eliezer Shkedi said
as much
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an interview with Channel 12: “I have never come across a situation
where the commander of the Air Force, the chief of staff, the head of
the Mossad, or the police commissioner has to decide whether he
listens to an executive authority or to a court decision,” going on
to say that if he were the head of the Air Force he would never
disobey a court decision.

The fact that Israeli society has always echoed this hypocrisy is
nothing new, and neither is it a novel discovery that “democracy”
was never an honest description of a state that defines itself as a
“state of the Jews.” But the protests this time are greater than
at any previous point, and 35% of Israelis
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“civil war,” a phrase that has made its way into daily use.

It’s precisely this level of hysteria, however, that makes it
especially infuriating — because of the power and influence of the
participants in the protests, because it’s the first time that the
struggle is over the identity of the state, and because the roots of
the crisis relate to profound political questions concerning the
Zionist project, which are normally considered off-limits. 

The possibilities arising from the protests are open to a number of
potential outcomes. Most of them turn on an as yet unanswered
question: is Netanyahu pushing for these changes to get out of facing
corruption charges at the hands of the judiciary, or does he genuinely
want to make such a major change to the state’s structure and
identity?

In addition to the some 100,000 protestors shutting down roads in Tel
Aviv, who are capable of obstructing the movement of the state in
several important focal points, three main groups lead the protests
and occupy central positions of influence. These groups are likely
more influential than any closure of roads.

THE RESERVISTS

Israeli society is different from many other societies in its degree
of militarization. An Israeli soldier remains a soldier even after the
end of their official service. This means that the relationship
between a “citizen” and a “soldier” is not a natural one. The
same applies to the state in its entirety. After the end of formal
service, the soldier is released into the reserve army, serving
sporadically and often volunteering at specific times throughout the
year. While generally unknown to the public, the current crisis has
revealed just how much the army relies on its reservists, especially
in specific fighting units like the Air Force, which the protests have
shown relies on a small number of active duty soldiers and a much
larger number of ostensibly “normal” citizens. Many of them
routinely lead airstrikes in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. 

It appears that there is now an organized effort led by reserve
soldiers in the air force
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in cyber-intelligence units such as Unit 8200
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which also relies heavily on reservists, to refuse training in protest
at the judicial overhaul and to refuse service in the event that it
passes. But what makes these protests so powerful is that the members
of the ruling coalition government, except Netanyahu, have not served
in the army for religious reasons.

Two things make these unprecedented protests from within the ranks of
the military particularly notable: first, the nature of the units
engaging in the protest — the Air Force and the military
cyber-intelligence units, which attract people from largely well-off
and Ashkenazi backgrounds from within the army’s class divide —
and second, that the reservists occupying these positions within the
military believe that the weakening of the judiciary will take Israel
to the International Criminal Court and weaken its ties to the United
States. This would place them under international scrutiny and open up
accountability for war crimes that they carried out as members of the
Air Force. The Israeli High Court of Justice has historically defended
them, even when they bombed Ramallah during the Second Intifada.

These protests are influential because of the central importance of
the army within Israel, where any weakness in the army is regarded as
an existential issue.

These protests are, therefore, influential because of the central
importance of the army within Israel, where any weakness in the army
is regarded as an existential issue. They are also important because
the difference between a soldier and a civilian is complex, meaning
that they can’t be disciplined and censored as members of the
military since they are also technically civilians. This is what led
military analyst Nir Dvori to exclaim on Channel 12 that “in Iran,
they know today that even if we decide to launch a strike, that is not
possible.”

THE HIGH-TECH COMPANIES

In recent decades, a new economic class has taken shape in Israel
working in the high-tech sector, or “hi-tech.” These include large
programming companies that have made billions in tandem with the
development of the Israeli military industry.

For instance, anyone coming out of Unit 8200 would be able to then
create a company, or perhaps sell intelligence and security services,
or make a business in private surveillance. Some of the most
successful examples
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this are the Waze navigation app, bought by Google for 966 million
dollars, and the Mobileye mobility app, bought by Intel for 15.3
billion dollars. Other examples include the rise of digital
currencies, surveillance technologies, and other enterprises where
shareholders control astronomic amounts of money. It has now become a
common refrain that hi-tech carries the Israeli economy and is what
increases the Israeli standard of living.

The main fear among this sector of Israeli society is the judicial
reforms’ impact on the economy and foreign investment.

This sector is participating in the protests on two levels: first, by
transferring funds outside of Israel and depositing them in foreign
banks, which have reportedly reached hundreds of millions of dollars,
and second, by funding and providing logistical support to the
protests on the street, while also recruiting workers
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the sector to join the protests. The main fear among this sector of
Israeli society is the judicial reforms’ impact on the economy and
foreign investment. And while these implications remain unknown, that
uncertainty, coupled with what the weakening of the judiciary might
mean for property rights, makes for a poor investment climate in
Israel.

THE INFLUENTIAL FIGURES

Another notable feature of these protests is the participation of
prominent Israeli figures and personalities.

Those who can be seen giving speeches at rallies include former
Military Chiefs of Staff, former Chiefs of intelligence, former Prime
Ministers, and even a joint letter by all former Air Force Chiefs
addressed to Netanyahu. The media is also completely mobilized in
favor of the movement and takes part in putting out the word
concerning protests, adopting terminology that casts the judicial
moves as a “coup” and constantly covering actions. In academia,
prominent figures like the former Governor of the Bank of Israel,
Jacob Frenkel, have called for halting the judicial overhaul. And none
of this is to mention the former High Court judges, the over 400
security figures, the presidents of Israel’s universities, or the
international repudiation of the reforms most recently shown by former
NY Mayor Mike Bloomberg, who warned that the Netanyahu government is
“courting disaster
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What is most notable about these personalities is that they are not
calling for preventing these reforms. Instead, they are calling for
the judicial reform process to be halted voluntarily by the government
— which has been pursuing it at lightning speed — with the
objective of taking a step back to fully understand the implications
of these reforms for the state. This has been pushed for by Israel’s
President, Isaac Herzog, who proposed an alternative “people’s
framework” for the reform process. In essence, this calls for a
deeper investigation into a reform that stands to change the nature of
the state.

WHAT’S DIFFERENT THIS TIME

This isn’t the first time that Israel has witnessed vigorous
protest. Many previous protests have been larger
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Aviv’s “tent city” protests in 2011 certainly had a larger
turnout for the reduction of property prices, focusing on the economy
and cost of living, and even the settler protests against the Gaza
disengagement in 2005 were larger and far more violent than today’s
movement. But these protests are different for two reasons: the first
and primary reason relates to the players moving the protests, and the
second relates to the participating social strata.

This is the first time there has been such a fundamental struggle over
the structure and identity of the state, specifically over the limits
of “Jewish democracy,” as well as over the relationship of the
state to Judaism.

This is the first time, for instance, that there has been such a
fundamental struggle over the structure and identity of the state,
specifically over the limits of “Jewish democracy,” as well as
over the relationship of the state to Judaism as a religion, issues of
personal freedom, and the kind of state that Jews want. This is very
different from the kinds of protests that Israel has witnessed
historically, from the “Black Panthers” representing the struggle
of Mizrahi Jews to the social protests of 2011, all of which revolved
around improving the social conditions of specific groups. The current
protests, in contrast, get to the very heart of the state and its
future.

The closest social protest in Israel has ever gotten to this was the
settler protests in 2005 after the Gaza disengagement. This is why
Netanyahu himself has likened today’s protests
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that era. At that time, the question that arose was the same as
today’s: what is the relationship with the state? Settlers in 2005
saw in the disengagement plan a betrayal by the state of the social
contract. The protestors today likewise believe that the government is
betraying the social contract by changing the rules of the game.

The difference, therefore, lies in the protestors’ identity and
relationship to the state.

The settlers were far weaker in the face of the deep state, which is
what pushed them to make the strategic decision of gaining control
over the state’s main loci of power to prevent a repeat of the Gaza
disengagement. Today, the elites leading the protests have all the
power in their hands and are trying to hold onto that power, from the
court judges to the ex-military chiefs to the media. Settlers have a
religious and ideological connection to the land at a time when
largely secular Ashkenazi Jews, who make up the majority of
protestors, believe that personal and constitutional freedoms and the
social contract are at the heart of the state. That is why religious
settlers refuse to vacate “the Land of Israel” or step down from
the state, while many secular Jews have started searching for foreign
passports since the judicial overhaul was announced. That is why many
of them have refused to serve in the military, especially since the
economic and military burden of the state largely falls to them, while
religious Jews do not serve in the army for religious reasons.

These groups have a genuine interest in preserving the current
structure of the state and preventing the judicial changes that would
transform Israel into a “non-liberal democracy
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implications for the lives of these liberal Israelis, including their
relationship with the West, especially America and Western Europe, and
all that it entails in terms of the exchange of weapons, aid, and
knowledge. It would mean forgoing personal protections in
international courts, retreating from the public sphere, and losing
freedom of the press. And it would mean the challenging of social
freedoms like LGBTQ rights and academic freedom. All this and more
would be under attack by the demagoguery of the religious majority,
who will no longer have any counterweights to their powers if the
judicial reforms are passed. It bears mentioning the response of
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to an interviewer’s question about
what there is to guarantee that the rights of minorities are not
violated. He answered
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short, is the essence of the judicial change, placing the rights of
Jews in the hands of politicians, not the courts.

THE FOUNDING GENERATION

Polling has shown that the number of older protestors is significantly
higher than young protestors, most of whom are at the
“center-left” end of the Israeli political spectrum. This aligns
with general trends in Israeli society, where young people are far
more likely to hold right-wing views than their elders. In other
words, the protestors, primarily made up of the center-left camp and
the elderly, are the generation that founded the Zionist state, the
same generation that enjoys economic, military, and cultural
dominance. This explains the level of influence and social and
economic capital backing the protests, and this is what makes the
struggle over the state so fierce. Those who hold the power are
fighting tooth and nail to hold onto it, while the younger Israel, the
new and more religious and more extremist Israel, is also seeking to
prevail. The conflict between the founding Israel and the new Israel
has now reached its peak, threatening the state’s very nature.

The conflict between the founding Israel and the new Israel has now
reached its peak, threatening the state’s very nature.

Shkedi, as the former commander of the Air Force, said that the
current reservists refusing service would nevertheless return in the
event of a war. That’s why relying on these protests to dismantle
Israel from within is an exaggeration, more wishful thinking than
realistic. The moment Israeli society faces an external (or
Palestinian) threat, it immediately comes together. But what is
important is the implication of these protests for Israel’s internal
crisis in the long term, first at the level of preparedness and second
at the level of cohesion in Israeli society and the military. These
have long-term implications for the type of compromise that may be
reached in the future.

What is for sure is that the true struggle moving forward, if we are
to grant that Israel is a “democracy for Jews,” is over the nature
of “Jewish democracy,” and over the kind of Israel that Jewish
Israelis want. Will it be an Israel that manages its oppression
rationally or a new Israel that is guided by bloodlust and the desire
for vengeance: the Israel of the Second Intifada and the High Court,
or the Israel of Huwwara
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_A version of this article originally appeared in Arabic on the
Institute for Palestine Studies website
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by Mondoweiss into English and republished with permission._

_[RAZI NABULSE is a writer and researcher from the town of ‘Iblin
in the Galilee. He was born in Haifa in 1989 and currently resides
between Haifa and Bulgaria with his family. He is a researcher at the
Institute for Palestine Studies (IPS). His research focuses on Israeli
studies and the Zionist Movement. He formerly was the head of the
Israeli Studies Unit at the Palestinian Center for Policy Research and
Strategic Studies (Masarat), in Ramallah. At Masarat Razi produced
strategic studies, policy and position papers. He annually authored a
chapter in Masarat's annual conference publication._

_Razi has contributed to multiple publication outlets and websites on
the topic of the Zionist project and the Palestinian Question,
including the Journal of Palestine Studies, and Israeli
Affairs (journal of the Palestinian Forum for Israeli
Studies, MADAR), As-Safir Al-Arabi, and frequently contributes
to 7iber website in Jordan, amongst others._

_Razi authored Zionism and Colonialism: Strategies for Land Control
and the Production of Ghettos, published by Masarat in 2017, Ramallah.
He also contributed a chapter to the 2018 publication of the
Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies (Madar) titled: Israel and
Apartheid: A Comparative Study.]_

* Israel
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* Israel protests
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* Israeli High Court
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* Judicial Overhaul
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* Israeli politics
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* Benjamin Netanyahu
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* Yoav Galant
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* Israeli reservists
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* zionism
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* religious nationalists
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* Palestinians
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* Occupied Territories
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* Judicial Coup
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