[ Bernd Gehrke is critical of those in the peace movement and left
who dismissed the threat of invasion coming from Russia - a failure to
understand the genesis of today’s Russian capitalism and its
emergence from Soviet-era party bureaucracy.]
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ABOUT RUSSIAN NEO-IMPERIALISM  
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Bernd Gehrke
December 1, 2022
Against the Current
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_ Bernd Gehrke is critical of those in the peace movement and left
who dismissed the threat of invasion coming from Russia - a failure to
understand the genesis of today’s Russian capitalism and its
emergence from Soviet-era party bureaucracy. _

Clockwise from top left: Leonid Mikhelson, Mikhail Fridman, Alexei
Mordashov, Igor Shuvalov, Alisher Usmanov, Vladimir Potanin. Some of
Russia’s super rich are finding their assets in the west under
sanctions from the US., The Guardian

 

For BORIS ROMANCHENKO (1)

THERE HAS RARELY been such an embarrassment of leftist positions:
Russia’s war of aggression against independent Ukraine has made
absurd the assessment expressed shortly before by many (and some
prominent “campist” or pacifist) leftists that, despite the
military saber-rattling on Ukraine’s borders, no threat of war
emanated from Russia.

The most important players in the German peace movement have publicly
acknowledged their error, so a fair discussion with them is possible.
But there has been little discussion about what the reasons were for
this fundamental misjudgment. Probably one of the most important
causes for the misjudgment is the lack of preoccupation with the
aggressive character of Russian contemporary capitalism.

This preoccupation is necessary, not only because of the current war
against Ukraine and the danger of nuclear war that has once again
become apparent. The previous crushing of the political opposition in
Russia, and the increasing repression of the Putin regime during the
war, poses the danger that the regime will develop from authoritarian
presidential rule into an openly totalitarian-fascist regime, as the
Russian sociologist Greg Yudin recently noted. (2)

For example, it was almost completely lost in the flood of war news
that shortly after the war began, security forces for hours occupied
the premises of the Memorial human rights organization in Moscow,
which was banned at the end of 2021, and confiscated numerous
documents and computers.

In view of the war in Ukraine and the numerous crimes against Russian
civil society, this incident seems almost harmless. However, like the
banning of Memorial itself, the raid makes clear that this is an
attack on every precondition of social self-organization: on the
discussion of independent narratives of history and society, in favor
of a totalitarian ruling ideology.

Yet the virtually hopeless economic situation into which the invasion
of Ukraine has brought Russian capitalism poses a considerable danger
not only for the Russian opposition. Radicalization and increasing
violence on the part of the Putin regime, both internally and
externally, are to be feared. At the same time, Russia’s foreign
policy goals, which have already been proclaimed, are threatening
enough for its neighbors and for Europe as a whole.

The Putin regime today not only openly embodies the arch-reactionary
ideology of the global New Right in cultural and domestic politics,
but the brutal reality of authoritarian-repressive and neoliberal Wild
East capitalism with all its ugliness that’s likewise clearly before
everyone’s eyes.

Russia’s internal constitution should make deception about the
character of Russian foreign policy impossible — “should,” were
it not for the fact that many on the left look the other way. So the
German left hardly discusses the character of Russian wild-east
capitalism, whose brutality differs little from that of wild-west
capitalism in the emerging countries of the South.

The standard of living of wage earners is far lower and rural
infrastructures far less developed than in the West, showing that
Russia is still a Second World country. Moreover, it is a country with
an extreme contrast of poverty and wealth, with that small layer of
the one percent super-rich facing a huge mass of poor people.

The so-called middle class, on the other hand, comprises a maximum of
10% of the population. One of the first measures after Putin took
office as president was the introduction of a neoliberal flat tax of
only 13% on incomes and the implementation of various deregulation and
privatization measures.

The daily struggle for existence in the big cities with their masses
of precarious jobs, which like the country’s construction sites are
filled by migrant low-wage workers from Russia’s backyard in Central
Asia, constantly increases the pressure on militant trade unions by
the phalanx of state and capital.

The western left has shown little interest in this dramatic situation
of the working classes in Russia, which is similar to the situation in
other emerging countries. Likewise, it has shown little interest in
land grabbing and the overexploitation of nature on a huge scale,
accompanied by violent actions and death threats against eco-activists
and resisting small farmers. There is even a small trade union or NGO,
“Alternative,” whose goal is the liberation of people from private
slavery.

There exists a vast force field of corruption affecting virtually
every aspect of political power, the police, the judiciary and
capital. The resulting open exploitation of people and the
overexploitation of nature not only makes clear the kleptocratic
character of the connection between the authoritarian state apparatus
and real wild-east capitalism. It also explains the many murders of
investigative journalists.

State protection laws for people and nature, if they exist, are
usually only a polished accessory for the often overtly violent
enforcement of capital’s interests.

Western multinationals such as Coca Cola and Volkswagen (VW) behave no
differently in Russia than they do, for example, in Mexico.
 

THE EXAMPLE OF VOLKSWAGEN

In 2019 VW management presented a wage settlement below the rate of
inflation in negotiations with two company unions. When one of the two
unions, MPRA, part of the independent Confederation of Labor (KTR)
(3), which represented 38% of the workforce in the collective
bargaining committee, began collecting signatures from the workforce
to solicit their opinions, VW management banned it from the plant
floor.

Because the collection of signatures continued outside the plant gate,
VW accused the unionists of “terrorism” and called the police. The
regional labor ministry, in collusion with the governor, then banned
the signature gathering, clearly contravening existing legal rights of
the unions.(4) We have long known this practice of cronyism of the
German flagship corporation with authoritarian regimes, Brazil or
apartheid South Africa being prominent examples.

This incident became a prelude to a major attack by the Russian state
and capital on the rights of dependent employees and trade unions in
general in the following year. On May 23, 2020 the State Duma decided
to abolish the previous Labor Code, which had enshrined the autonomous
negotiation of labor relations by companies and trade unions.

It has now been replaced by a law “unique in the world,” as Oleg
Shein, vice chairman of the KTR, wrote. In this new version, labor
relations are now “regulated by state regulations,” and in the
event of a “conflict between the Labour Code and government
decisions,” the government’s decision now “takes
precedence.”(5) Militant trade unionists engaged in
internationalist solidarity activities are also increasingly
threatened by the “foreign agents” law, also used against Memorial
and other human rights groups.(6)
 

NOMENKLATURA CAPITALISM

To understand the Putin regime’s actions, it is important to recall
the genesis of today’s Russian capitalism and its emergence from the
despotic former ruling “communist” _nomenklatura_ (the
privileged Soviet-era party bureaucracy — ed.).

After the failed coup of the Soviet security apparatuses in August
1991, President Boris Yeltsin initiated a shock strategy of
liberalization and the ultra-fast privatization of Soviet state
property. The stated goal was the rapid creation of a private
“ownership class” in order to ensure the irreversibility of the
capitalist path in Russia.

The result of this policy was a dramatic deepening of the already
existing social and economic crisis, with disastrous consequences for
the lives of most of Russia’s citizens. The average life expectancy
of men fell to under 58 years, pensioners in Moscow rummaged through
garbage cans for food, people made homeless by privatization camped
out in Red Square, wages went unpaid for months, and miners went on
strike for a bar of soap.

Privatization of state property was largely carried out through
criminal channels. Through trickery, fraud, corruption and violence,
companies and banks very quickly “got into the pockets” of former
“red directors” and other members of the
“communist” _nomenklatura_.

In a very short time, billions of dollars in assets were created
during these “founding years” of oligarch power. Mafiosi helped
just as diligently as dismissed KGB, army and police members. Thus, a
corrupt and criminal network of former directors, security guards and
mafiosi emerged, who had no hesitation to use violent methods to
further redistribute former state property in the 1990s.

The 1990s in Russia resembled the mafia confrontations in 1930s
Chicago, as can be read from many examples, such as the books of
murdered journalist Anna Politkovskaya. An apt term for the system
that emerged was quickly found: “nomenklatura capitalism,” a
capitalism that had emerged from the division of previous state
property among the former “communist” nomenklatura.(7)
 

CZARS, STALIN, PUTIN

It is quite amazing when “campist” leftists see Vladimir Putin,
admired by the global far right, as a poor victim of the West — that
Putin who, according to Steve Bannon and his rightwing U.S.
co-thinkers, is not “woke” and “has the balls” to mess with
the decadent West. Apparently, Putin-defending leftists are prisoners
of their own symbolic politics, as the Putin regime uses Soviet
symbols of victory over Hitler’s Germany, or denazification,
especially now in the war against Ukraine.

This seems to fit into these leftists’ worldview. But it overlooks
the fact that the flags of the Soviet navy also flutter on the masts
of Russian billionaires’ yachts, and that the Putin regime uses not
only Soviet symbols but also those of tsarism, both proclaiming the
“greatness of Russia.”

In this construct, the Soviet Union is openly and circumstantially
regarded as what it had become under Stalin: a specific variant of the
Greater Russian Empire. This is precisely why Putin so resolutely
hates Lenin, who saw the Soviet Union not as a continuation of the
Russian Empire, but as a union of Soviet republics based on the right
of peoples to self-determination.

But how does the use of Soviet symbolism go together with the
reactionary-nationalist practice of the present?

Since 2012, and especially since the 100th anniversary of the October
Revolution in 2017, the regime has managed to create a historical
ideology centered on the narrative of the positive nature of a Great
Russian authoritarian state. In it, a development from the tsars to
Stalin to Putin is constructed. Lenin has been largely erased from
memory, unless he has to be held up as the culprit in the downfall of
the Soviet Russian state from 1989 to 1991.

The times of the so called “Great Russian Revolution” are seen as
periods of turmoil, in which Reds and Whites both wanted the best for
Russia, and which eventually produced the rise of the strong Stalinist
state in succession to the Tsarist Empire. Here Russia had reached its
greatest expansion and its standing as a world power.

In this nationalistic way, symbols and cults of the Soviet state
handed down among large groups of the people, as recollections of
victory in “the Great Patriotic War” (World War II) can be mixed
with the symbols of tsarism to create a reactionary melange of
Russia’s greatness. In this nationalistic sense, the term
“reconciliation” became the central domestic political slogan
regarding the history of the 20th century.

Therefore, the holiday of May 9 today stands not so much as a symbol
of remembrance of Russia’s sacrifices in defeating Hitler’s
Germany and for “Never again war!,” but emphasizes Russia’s
strength today and the possibility of repeating the “march to
Berlin” in the struggle against the West.

No wonder that the censorship authorities have now recognized even a
Youtube-Video with the famous poet Yevtushenko’s lyrics “Do you
think the Russians want war?” as a statement likely to endanger the
state, and they have thus banned the video clip.(8)

Contrary to some reactionary demands, out of consideration for the
“conservatism” of the masses, statues of Lenin are allowed to
remain standing for the time being. Yet official ideology, taking up
ideas of a “Russian Eurasia” and other arch-reactionary beliefs,
is profoundly “anti-Western” and “anti-liberal” and ethically
conservative. It means “Russia, but normal,” to borrow an election
slogan of the Alternative for Germany.(9)

This ideology is coupled with a belief in Russia’s
“anti-decadent” mission and a desire for revenge for the demise of
the former Russian world power called the Soviet Union. Putin’s
face, distorted with rage, when he spoke of the “drug addicts in the
Ukrainian government” was as genuine an expression of this ideology
as was the proclamation by the Patriarch of Moscow, Cyril, that
Russia’s struggle in Ukraine was justified because it was directed
against the rule of homosexuals that supposedly existed there.
 

THE TELLING BEGINNING OF PUTIN’S CAREER

Only those who disregard the criminal-capitalist turn of the
authoritarian “communist” nomenklatura, which already produced
dictatorial features at the beginning of the capitalist transformation
of ex-Soviet state property, can be puzzled by this reactionary
ideology.

At the end of 1993, when Russia’s path to capitalism seemed
politically secured by Yeltsin’s deployment of tanks against
Russia’s elected Congress of People’s Deputies, a delegation of
leading German managers went to Russia to sound out investment
conditions. During a meeting with Vladimir Putin, the deputy mayor of
St. Petersburg at the time, who was responsible for looking after
foreign investors, a remarkable conversation took place, which not
only says something about the rulers in Russia at the time, about
Putin’s way of thinking even at the beginning of his political
career, but also about the German managers.

When the camera present at the meeting was turned off, a German
general manager asked Mr. Putin whether a Chilean-style military
dictatorship was being considered in Russia, not only in military
circles. Mr. Putin answered very unequivocally, “If you ask like
that … I favor a Pinochet dictatorship in Russia.”

At the end of 1993, the newspaper Neues Deutschland, on the basis of a
documentary by the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR) radio network a few
days later, supplemented the deputy mayor’s remarks as follows:

“In this context, Mr. Putin distinguished between ‘necessary’
and ‘criminal’ violence. He said that political violence is
criminal if it is aimed at eliminating market-economy conditions, and
‘necessary’ if it promotes or protects private capital
investments.

_“He, Putin, expressly approved of possible preparations by Yeltsin
and the military to bring about a Pinochet-style dictatorship in view
of the difficult economic path to privatization. Putin’s remarks
were received with friendly applause by both the German company
representatives and the deputy German consul general who was
present.” (10)_

The answer seems to have pleased the German gentlemen, because they
all came and invested in Russia — Siemens, VW, Daimler, the chemical
industry, and many more.
 

PUTIN AND THE OLIGARCHY

As deputy mayor, Putin was quite successful in organizing
corruption-based deals between old “red” business cadres, Western
managers or mafiosi with politicians, and a “successful” lunch
with Mayor Sobchak could cost over $100,000. In any case, the economic
situation in St. Petersburg was much more favorable than in the rest
of the country, which is why Putin was brought to Moscow by
Yeltsin’s staff and, after an interlude as FSB chief, soon became
Russia’s prime minister.

The oligarchs, to whose election campaign Yeltsin owed his own
reelection and a second term in 1996, unabashedly determined Kremlin
policy. To secure their power and fortunes, they also organized the
transfer of presidential power when Yeltsin had to step down after two
terms in 2000. Thus Yeltsin handed over his office to Putin, who was
considered a “reformer” and a man of the oligarchs, even before
the end of the election period.

Immediately, the systematic staging of Putin as a bear-riding,
dragon-killing superhero began. Putin used a terrorist attack
(apartment bombings — ed.) in Moscow, presumably orchestrated by the
secret services, to launch the second Chechen war. Through this, he
demonstrated new strength and the restoration of Russia’s
“honour,” which won him great approval in the 2000 presidential
election.

He received equally strong popular support when Putin took on those
who had brought him to power: the oligarchs. He guaranteed them the
assets they had stolen, but only if they did not interfere in
politics.

This was exemplified by the ousting and punishment of the richest man
in Russia at the time, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. After he clashed with the
president in front of running television cameras over corruption in
the state apparatus and went into opposition to the president, he was
arrested in 2003 and sentenced to eight years in prison in 2005.

The charge was aggravated fraud and tax evasion with damages to the
Russian state of more than one billion U.S. dollars. His oil company
Yukos was divided among state-owned companies. But in the background
of this dispute there was also an economic-political conflict, because
Putin intended to bring the oil and gas industry back into state
ownership or control as an economically and politically strategically
important branch for Russia.

In addition to limiting the reach of the oligarchy rooted in the
criminal privatization of the 1990s, the authoritarian presidential
system created by Putin produced another phenomenon. Now the cadres of
the former KGB took control of the oligarchy, and furthermore now
produced their own oligarchs from their ranks. Often, it was the
president’s old associates and confidants who owed their new wealth
to him.

Thus, Putin effectively created a new “state oligarchy” alongside
and above Yeltsin’s “private oligarchy.” They occupy the most
important positions in the state apparatus and state corporations as
well as exercising economic control, forming a tight network of
politics and strategically important economic sectors. Through their
functions, their members also have the opportunity to line their own
pockets. For this reason, the members of this “state oligarchy”
remain all the more loyal to “the Putin system.”
 

MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY FAILS
 

The way in which authoritarian politics and the economy are closely
intertwined has consequences not only for democracy in Russia, but
also for long-term economic development. The problem is the political
entrenchment of two dominant economic blocs in a common political
power bloc dominated by secret service agents, with the president at
its center.

On one hand there is the oil and gas industry, which surpasses all
other civilian economic sectors in size and the high degree of
monopolization; on the other hand, the industry that develops and
exports coal. In addition, there is the military-industrial complex
(MIC).

The monopolistic capital strength of both economic power blocs almost
regularly leads to innovative companies emerging alongside them either
being bought up or forced out of the market. The subordination of
Russia’s great intellectual potential, for example in the IT sector,
to the needs of the military and intelligence services is another
eloquent example of the resulting longterm weakening of civilian
sectors, perpetuating the paradoxical situation of this giant country
remaining absent from the world market.

The modernization of the fossil industry and the MIK, at the expense
of the modernization of the rest of the civilian economic sphere, is
the power-structure-related fatal flaw permanently impeding economic
development in Russia. The Putin regime’s power structure, based on
economic rents resulting from kleptocratically consumed fossil fuel
rents, is therefore itself the best guarantee of Russia’s longterm
economic lag behind its imperialist competitors.

The contradiction between Russia as a nuclear superpower and its
economic status at the level of Brazil, which Vladimir Putin and his
entourage certainly recognized as a problem, had led to the
president’s declared goal of Russia becoming one of the world’s
five largest economic powers by 2024.

Tacitly, however, this goal had to be put on hold. More recent
forecasts before the attack on Ukraine said that Russia’s economy
would stagnate in the long term and remain at about the same place in
2035 as it is today. But by that time, the fossil fuel consumption of
the key countries in Europe, the main consumers of such forms of
energy, will have declined dramatically.(11)

VIOLENCE INSTEAD OF MODERNIZATION

 

Vladimir Putin has understood the importance of the time factor in the
competition between empires. In his speech and his contributions to
the discussion at the Russian Valdai Discussion Club in 2021, he
declared that the next few years will decide who will be the center
and who will be the periphery in the world.(12)

His policies in recent years make it clear that he and his entourage
must have realized that this battle cannot be won on the economic
field. With his brutal suppression of any opposition at home, massive
aid to the suppression of the revolts in Belarus and Kazakhstan, and
his statement in January 2022 that Russia would not tolerate any
revolution in the post-Soviet space, Putin had clearly expressed his
willingness to escalate violence both internally and externally.

Whether Russia’s longterm economic weakness, for which the character
of the regime itself is mainly responsible, formed the final, decisive
trigger for the war of aggression on Ukraine against the background of
the time factor cannot be answered definitively. However, it can be
assumed with some degree of certainty that it was at least one of the
main factors behind the decision to go to war.

If Russia cannot become a major economic power in the long run, then
violence is the only means left to be a major power. The longterm
economic weakness on the one hand, and Russia’s claim to great world
power status on the other, explain the increasing aggressiveness of
the Putin regime’s policies.

But not alone! The belief in a historical mission of a great Russian
empire vis-à-vis the “decadent West,” which is deeply rooted in
Russia’s ruling class and in Putin himself, always includes Ukraine.
This is not only for pseudo-historical reasons, but also because, as
is well known according to Zbigniew Brzezi?ski, Russia without Ukraine
is a great country but not an empire.

However, the imperial dream is far greater yet. Putin’s assertion
that the forcible annexation and colonization of the Baltic countries
by the Soviet Union in the wake of the Hitler-Stalin Pact took place
in accordance with valid international law does not bode well for all
the other peoples of the Russian-Soviet prison-house of nations who
became independent from Russia in 1991, such as Moldova (the
Romanian-speaking Bessarabia looted by the Tsarists and Stalin) or
Georgia.(13) Moreover, Putin’s junior assistant Dmitry Medvedev had
announced when he was president that Russia had the right to intervene
wherever ethnic Russians lived. And that applies to all former Soviet
republics, including those that are now members of the EU and NATO.

The draft treaties submitted by Russia to the United States and NATO
in December 2021, which called for the reversal of NATO in Eastern
Europe, indicate more than clearly that Russia also seeks renewed
control over former Warsaw Treaty countries in Eastern Europe.

The revanchist ambitions of Russian neo-imperialism thus clearly have
the potential for further wars. But they are also reasons for the
fear-driven flight of these countries under the supposedly protective
wings of the United States and the West. The limited possibilities for
the Putin regime to achieve its political goals in the “near
abroad” and in Eastern Europe through economic or even cultural
hegemony, and its fear of mass movements, are what makes this regime
so aggressive and dangerous.

It is high time for leftists in the West to finally take note of the
deeply reactionary and aggressive development of the Putin regime.
There can be no neutrality for the left against this regime, which
should of course not mean knocking on NATO’s door. Above all, a
socialist left must once again become an independent political force
with its own design for a new world order.

NOTES

1. Boris Romanchenko died at the end of March 2022 at the age of 96 in
a Russian artillery attack on Kharkiv in his apartment. He was a
Ukrainian forced laborer in Nazi Germany and survived four fascist
concentration camps. As vice chairman of the Buchenwald-Dora
International Committee, he actively campaigned for the memory of Nazi
crimes until his old age.

2. Cf. David Ernesto Garcia Doell: “A Fascist Regime Looms in
Russia” Interview with Greg
Yudin; [link removed]

3. The independent unions of the Confederation of Labor (KTR) formed
independently of the state after 1989, while the successor to the
Soviet “state unions” continues today to pursue a policy of
co-management with capital that is loyal to the regime. Although the
KTR unions have far fewer members than the state unions, most labor
disputes are led by the KTR unions or small independent trade unions.

4. Cf. Doro Zinke: “Russia — Free Trade Unions under Pressure,”
DGB, [link removed] [Accessed_12.01.
2022].

5. Cf. Oleg Shein: “Russian Capitalism and coronavirus,” KTR News,
27.05.20; [link removed] [Accessed_12.01.2022]
 

6. Cf. Bernd Gehrke, “In memoriam Memorial?” in express. Zeitung
für sozialistische Betriebs — und Gewerkschaftsarbeit;
Frankfurt/Main, No. 2-3/2022, 7-8.

7. See also the article by Slave Cubela in express 4/2022: “A
Neoliberal Monster in Moscow” on Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine, 8-9.

8.
[link removed]
poert-russlands-medien,T2KI1gM
[[link removed]] [accessed
25.03.2022].

9. The “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) is the largest party of the
New Right in Germany. Its campaign slogan in the last federal election
was “Germany, but normal!” It was directed against the
“left-green filthy hippie republic” in favor of an
authoritarian-conservative restructuring of society [accessed
25.03.2022].

10. Cf. Vice Mayor of St. Petersburg Vladimir Putin for military
dictatorship in Russia along Chilean lines, In: Neues Deutschland,
31.12.1993 [accessed 25.03.2022]. The conversation at that time was
recently shown again in a new ZDF documentary, which is available in
the ZDF-Mediathek. Cf. ZDF:Zeit, Putin’s Truth: The Five Mistakes of
the West, documentary by Florian Huber, broadcast March 24, 2022, min.
13:43
-16:11; [link removed] [accessed
25.03.2022].

11. Both the West’s tightened sanctions against strategic
technologies since February 24, 2022, and the mass emigration of
intellectual potential from Russia mean a real disaster for the
country’s modernization in the long term. Not only Western, even
Chinese companies are now withdrawing from the country, despite all of
Beijing’s political promises of alliance. [B. G., 7/1/2022]

12. Cf. Vladimir Putin took part in a plenary session of the 18th
annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, October
21,
2021; [link removed] [accessed
25.03.2022].

13. So far, the Russian Federation has never confirmed the Soviet
decree on the independence of the Baltic states. Just a few weeks ago,
an ultranationalist Duma deputy from Putin’s United Russia party
introduced a bill declaring the Soviet decree illegal. For now, the
bill has been put on hold, but no one knows for how long. Meanwhile,
Putin himself has openly placed himself in the tradition of Tsar Peter
I’s western conquest of the Baltics and talked about “bringing
Russian soil home.

_[BERND GEHRKE is a historian and publicist and lives in Berlin.]_

_November-December 2022, ATC 221
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* Russia
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* capitalism
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* neo-imperialism
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* imperialism
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* socialism
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* Ukraine
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* Ukraine war
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* Vladimir Putin
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* Europe
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* Soviet Union
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* USSR
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* Russian oligarchs
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* Oligarchs
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* Billionaires
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* mafia capitalism
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* peace movement
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* the Left
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* Germany
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*
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*
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*
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